Twitter and the Obama Foreign Policy of Engagement: Style or Substance?

We had a bit of fun with the State Department's Twitterers in the dying days of the Bush Administration, so it's only fair to give credit and indeed to highlight what could be an effective use of social media and, far from incidentally, a signal to the changed US approach under Barack Obama.

DipNote has posted the following for readers' response:

On February 4, 2009, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs William Burns met with P-5+1 counterparts to discuss the approach that the international community will take toward Iran. When asked about Iran, Secretary Clinton said, “Iran has an opportunity to step up and become a productive member of the international community. As President Obama said, we are reaching out a hand, but the fist has to unclench.”

How ought the international community engage national regimes to transform from pariahs to partners?

Not sure the labelling of Iran as "pariah" assists the discussions with Tehran but it's encouraging to see the possibility of a dialogue with an audience concerned about the course of US foreign policy and the US-Iranian relationship.

Today's Obamameter: The Latest on US Foreign Policy (6 February)

Latest Post: Decoding the Political Challenges of the Iraqi Elections
Latest Post: Obama and Blair - The Symbolism of Loyalty
Latest Post: US Economy Saved - Dunking Dick Cheney
Latest Post: Red Alert - Fox "News" Launches Comrade Update

Current Obamameter Reading: Murky

9:25 p.m. We'll need time to decode Iranian Speaker of the Parliament Ali Larijani's speech at Munich today but, on first reading, it appears to be the line of "we will talk to the US if it unclenches its fist". Calling on Washington to change its tactics "to a chess game from a boxing match", Larijani invoked the history of US challenges to Iran, including Washington's support of Iraq in the 1980s during Baghdad's war with Tehran, but said a new relationship was possible if the US "accepts its mistakes and changes its policies". In a world where Israel was allowed to have more than 200 nuclear weapons, "the dispute over Iran’s nuclear issue is by no means legal”.

Simple translation? Iran talks formally but only if the US not only refrains from preconditions but eases existing economic restrictions.

9:20 p.m. You have to admire Poland, either for being completely out of it or having no shame in sucking up to Washington or both. Apparently missing the news that the Obama Administration is walking away from missile defence, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk "will definitely tell Vice President Biden tomorrow in Munich we are ready to participate in this project, a U.S. project".

Evening Update (8:30 p.m. GMT): We've just posted a separate entry "Decoding the Political Challenges of the Iraqi Elections" with Juan Cole's detailed breakdown and incisive consideration of the results.

The Russian Paradox. As Moscow tries to assert political and military influence in Central Asia and on its western borders, attempting to negotiate with the US from a position of strength, it faces financial and economic crisis at home. We'll have an analysis this weekend, but The Daily Telegraph has just posted Russian President Dmitri Medvedev's warning of unrest:

We are falling under the influence of the global crisis – a worsening problem of unemployment and other social issues. At such a time one encounters those who wish to speculate, to use the situation. One cannot allow an already complicated situation to deteriorate.

In the latest diplomatic move, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov told the Munich Security Conference that the Obama Administration offered a "window of opportunity" for positive resolution of the issue of missile defence in Europe.



2:15 p.m. Pakistan authorities claim 52 militants have been killed by army helicopters in fighting south of the Khyber Pass.

1:15 p.m. Today's Russia Reading: Gusting in Your Face. Abhkazia, the region in Georgia which Russia recognised as independent last summer, has announced that it will host a Russian naval base and an airbase. The Abhkaz Deputy Foreign Minister said a 25-year military treaty could be signed.

10:40 a.m. Watching the World Turn. McClatchy News Services has an illuminating article on how Iran is promoting its aims through "soft power" in Latin America, providing millions of dollars in aid to Bolivia.

10:10 a.m. The Guardian of London, amidst the mix of developments on US-Iran relations, offers what I think is sensible advice:

Instead of concentrating narrowly on preventing Iranian nuclear weapons, the better way would be to proceed incrementally, by way of small concessions and bargains, recognising that the gulf between the Iranian and American understanding of history is a very wide one. More fundamental progress is unlikely unless there is movement toward a settlement between Israelis and Palestinians, and an acceptance that the Israeli nuclear monopoly cannot be left out of the equation when urging nuclear restraint on other states. There are no magic wands in the Middle East.

9 a.m. After a bomb killed at least 27 people at a Shi'a mosque in Central Pakistan, hundreds of Shi'a have set fire to a police station.

8 a.m. US-led raid in Zabul province in southern Afghanistan kills 6 people; council member says they are civilians.

Morning Update (6:30 a.m. GMT; 1:30 a.m. Washington): Important clues to President Obama's position in his battle with the US military over strategy in Afghanistan. Speaking to Democratic Congressmen last night, he emphasized the US cannot win the war in Afghanistan by military means alone. The military "needs a clear mission", as there is a danger of "mission creep without clear parameters".

Translation? Obama is not happy with the military's suggestion that the US hand off non-military activities and "nation-building" to European allies and NATO and believes that the proposed buildup of US forces lacks an "exit strategy" with a political as well as military resolution.

You know Kyrgyzstan must be important, even if I still can't pronounce it, because CNN leads with Hillary Clinton's denunciation of the Kyrgyz Government's decision to close the US airbase as "regrettable". Notable, however, that she did not criticise Russia, who helped Kyrgryzstan on its way with promises of financial and economic support.

The Kyrgyz Government is insisting that its decision is final: "The U.S. embassy and the [Kyrgyz] Foreign Ministry are exchanging opinions on this, but there are no discussions on keeping the base." The Kyrgyz Parliament votes on the decision next week.

A suicide bomber killed himself and wounded seven at a checkpoint on Pakistan's Khyber Pass. Security forces suspect he was trying to get to a bigger bridge, which army engineers are repairing after it was damaged by a bomb earlier this week.

Judge Susan Crawford, overseeing the military commissions process at the Guantanamo Bay detention centre, has halted the last ongoing trial. She overruled a judge who ordered the continuation of hearings over a suspect in the 2000 bombing of the USS Cole.

Decoding the Political Challenges of the Iraqi Elections

Four days after the provincial elections in Iraq, the political complexities are beginning to emerge. While many are still caught up in the two-dimensional narrative of "victory for the secularists, defeat for Iran", this  is at best a diversion which does not appreciate the complexities of politics and society after Saddam.

Consider and contrast, for example, the fatuous cheerleading of the Kagan spin machine (Kimberly and Frederick in the Wall Street Journal) with Juan Cole's simple, effective correction: "Iran did not Lose the Provincial Elections". And, for the less onerous but still simplistic readings of "Big Win for Prime Minister al-Maliki", Cole has a more detailed breakdown today (which we reprint below) and an incisive conclusion:

Although Nuri al-Maliki's Da'wa Party got over a third of the votes in Baghdad and Basra, they clearly did not achieve a commanding position, and its share in the more rural Shiite provinces was signifcantly less..

The big story here is that the Shiite religious parties (and yes, the Da'wa or Islamic Mission Party is among them) again swept the Shiite south. However, those Shiite parties that won out this time want a strong central government, not a Shiite mini-state.



The irony, which is deliberately missed by those who want to twist the election into a simple "victory for America, defeat for Al Qa'eda, defeat for America's enemies" narrative, is that less than a year ago, the US was working against a strong Baghdad and in favour of stronger local Sunni movements. Then, however, al-Maliki asserted himself in the battles for Sadr City and Basra and Washington swung behind him as the most effective Iraqi leader.

But, of course, those local Sunni movements that had been courted by the US in the "surge" are still around --- indeed, up to 48 hours ago they were threatening a mini-war with Baghdad --- and so are the other parties in al-Maliki's coalition. As we said last summer and will say again, Iraqi politics is now beyond Washington, and the US military is marginal, not central, to the complex processes that will play out beyond any simple invocation of "democracy".

Religious Parties Sweep Shiite South; Sunni Arabs fragmented, mainly Secular
JUAN COLE

The Iraqi provincial election results are out. They confirm what I said last Monday, that the parties who want a strong, united Iraq have come to the fore in these elections. Although Nuri al-Maliki's Da'wa Party got over a third of the votes in Baghdad and Basra, they clearly did not achieve a commanding position, and its share in the more rural Shiite provinces was signifcantly less..

The big story here is that the Shiite religious parties (and yes, the Da'wa or Islamic Mission Party is among them) again swept the Shiite south. However, those Shiite parties that won out this time want a strong central government, not a Shiite mini-state.

There is nothing here to give comfort to those Americans who fear Iranian influence in Iraq. The Islamic Mission Party or Da'wa is just as committed to warm relations with Tehran as is the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq. The Da'wa leaders were in exile in Tehran for years just like ISCI. Da'wa is more "lay" and less clerical than ISCI, but being "lay" means non-clerical, not secular. Da'wa wants an Islamic State.

These election results raise severe questions about the viability of the Biden plan, which foresaw three decentralized super-provinces overseen by a weak central government. Most of the victors in this election are strong believers in a centralized civil bureaucracy.

On the whole, I think these results are encouraging for Obama. The Sunni Arab ex-Baathist secular elites have reentered polities in the Sunni Arab areas. These election results put paid to the fantasies of Dick Cheney and John McCain that Sunni Arab Iraqis are pro-"al-Qaeda." Most of them would not even vote for a religious party, much less for a radical fundamentalist terrorist group. Cheney said that if the US left, al-Qaeda would take over Sunni Arab Iraq. That is highly unlikely given these election results.

Iraq voted as several distinct demographic zones.

In the two provinces with very large Shiite cities, the Islamic Mission Party (Da'wa) of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki took over a third of the vote. Another 15-20% of the vote went to Shiite fundamentalist parties such as the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq or the Sadrists. Contrary to what a lot of observers are saying, the Da'wa Party is not secular and it is not anti-Iran. It is Iraq's oldest Shiite fundamentalist party, founded in the late 1950s, and it explicitly works for an Islamic republic. Its leaders consult with and tend to defer to Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani. Since these parties will have to make post-election coalitions to rule, given that none gained a majority, the resulting provincial governments will resemble those formed by the United Iraqi Alliance, which grouped as allies these same Shiite religious parties. The major difference in this election in the big urban areas is that in Baghdad, the Shiite middle class gave the Iraqi List of Iyad Allawi nearly 10% of the vote, and the Sunni fundamentalists got a similar percentage. Of course, some Sunnis may have voted for Allawi's Iraqi List. But the election returns suggest that Sunnis are no no more than ten to fifteen percent of the Baghdad population, and that Iraq's capital is now a largely Shiite city. In Basra province, the Sunni proportion seems even smaller, tiny, even. This is odd because Zubayr near Baghdad is a largely Sunni city of 300,000. The Basra middle classes, once fairly secular, returned the big religious parties overwhelmingly.

The second zone is the medium and smaller Shiite cities of the south. There, Da'wa did not do nearly as well, receiving between ten and twenty-three percent of the vote. The other 90 to 77 percent of the seats went to other fundamentalist Shiite parties in the main. The Sadrists showed substantial strength in some provinces, garnering 14% and 15% of the vote. Although the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq suffered a massive reversal, insofar as it had dominated the provinces of the south from 2005, it still often ranged from 8% to 15% of the seats in these provincial councils. Other small Shiite parties, including former PM Ibrahim Jaafari's National Reform Trend and the Islamic Virtue Party, both small Shiite fundamentalist parties, often got between three and eight percent of the vote.

The final zone is the four Sunni Arab provinces, which did not vote similarly to one another.

The ethnically mixed Diyala Province in the east split its vote, with about a quarter going to secular parties with a Baathist background; about a fifth going to the Sunni fundamentalist bloc; a fourth going to the Kurdistan alliance, and about 15 percent going to Shiite fundamentalist parties.

In al-Anbar, the secular and tribal parties won big, with the religious parties marginalized (15% of the vote).

In Ninevah, a big, secular, centralizing party, al-Hadba', got nearly 50% of the seats, sweeping away the Kurdish representatives that were once prominent on this provincial council.

Salahuddin returned so many small parties that seeing a trend thare is beyond me. The over all picture of the Sunni ARabis is that contrary to the last administration in Washington, the Sunni Arabs of Iraq are mostly secular nationalists and are uninterested for the most part in fundamentalists or "al-Qaeda."

Al-Hayat reports in Arabic that the Iraqi High Electoral Commission announced 90 percent of the results in the provincial elections held Jan. 31. More results are given in Arabic in this al-Hayat article. The New York Times has a fairly complete list of results in English.

Below, I list the major results, though I'm leaving out the very small parties. I will use the names of the leading parties rather than the names of their coalitions, since they aren't really much of a coalition and typically there is a strong party core. So the Islamic Mission Party or Da'wa of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki ran with others as the Coalition for a Government of Laws. The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) of Abdul Aziz al-Hakim (which is especially close to Iran) ran with some other closely allied small parties as the Martyr of the Prayer Niche Alliance. And the Sadrists, followers of Sayyid Muqtada al-Sadr, ran as "The Free Independent Movement." But I'll just call them Sadrists. Likewise, among Sunnis the National Dialogue Front of Salih Mutalk (secular, Sunni, ex-Baathist) ran in a coalition called "the Iraqi National Plan." Iyad Allawi's Iraqi National List kept its name. Former Prime Minister Ibrahim Ja'fari ran a party called the National Reform Trend.

LARGE SHIITE PROVINCES:

Baghdad: Da'wa won 38%; the Sadrists won 9%; the (Sunni) Iraqi Accord Front won 9%; The Iraqi List won 8.6%; the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) won 5.4%; The National Reform Trend won 4.3%

Basra: Da'wa won 37%; ISCI won 11.6% the Gathering of Justice and Unity won 5.5%; the Sadrists won 5%; the Iraqi Accord Front won 3.8%; the Islamic Virtue Party won 3.2%; the Iraqi List won 3.2%; the (Shiite fundamentalist) National Reform Trend won 2.5%

SMALLER SHIITE PROVINCES

Dhi Qar: Da'wa won 23.1%; Sadrists won 14.1%; ISCI won 11.1%; National Reform Trend won 7.6%; Islamic Virtue Party won 6.1%

Qadisiya: Da'wa won 23.1 %; ISCI won 11.7%; the National Reform Trend won 8.2%; the Iraqi List won 8%; the Sadrists won 6.7%; Islamic Loyalty won 4.3%; the Islamic Virtue Party won 4.1%

Maysan: Da'wa won 17.7%; Sadrists won 15.2%; ISCI won 14.6%; National Reform Trend won 8.7%; Islamic Virtue Party won 3.2%

Najaf: Da'wa won 16.2%; ISCI won 14.8%; Sadrists won 12.2%; Loyalty to Najaf won 8.3%; the National Reform Trend won 7%

Wasit: Da'wa won 15.3%; ISCI won 10%; Sadrists won 6%; Iraqi List won 4.6%; Constitutional won 3.9%; National Reform Trend won 3.2%

Babil: Da'wa won 12.5%; ISCI won 8.2%; Sadrists won 6.2%; the National Reform Trend won 4.4%

Muthanna: Da'wa won 10.9%; ISCI won 9.3%; Republicans won 7.1%; National Reform Trend won 6.3%; Sadrists won 5.1%; the National List won 5%; the Gathering of Muthanna won 4.9%;
Academics won 4.4%; the Middle Euphrates won 3.9%; the Islamic Virtue Party won 3.7%; the Iraqi List won 3.5%

Karbala: Yusuf Majid al-Hububi won 13.3%; the Hope of Mesopotamia won 8.9%; Da'wa won 8.5%; the Sadrists won 6.8%; ISCI won 6.4%; Justice and Reform won 3.6%; the
National Reform Trend won 2.5%; the Islamic Virtue Party won 2.5%

SUNNI PROVINCES

Salahuddin: Iraqi Accord Front won 14.5%; the Iraqi List won 13.9%; the Iraqi National Plan won 8%; the Kurdistan Alliance won 4% (plus many, many small parties)

Diyala: Iraqi Accord Front won 21.1%; the Kurdistan Alliance won 17.2%; and the Iraqi National Plan won 15%; The Iraqi List won 9.5%; Da'wa won 6%; the Coalition of Diyala won 5.3%; the National Reform Trend won 4.3%; the Sadrists won 3.1%; the National Movement won 2.6%; the Islamic Virtue Party won 2.3%

Ninevah: al-Hadba' won 48.4%; the Kurdistan Alliance won 25.5%; the Iraqi Accord Front won 6%; the Iraqi Islamic Party won 6.7%; the Turkmen Front won 2.8%; the National Iraqi Plan won 2.6%; ISCI won 1.9%

al-Anbar: the Iraqi National Plan won 17.5% ; the Awakening of Iraq won 17.1%; Iraqi Accord Front won 15.9%; the National Movement for Reform and Development won 7.8%; the Iraqi List won 6.6% (plus small parties)

The Latest from Israel-Gaza-Palestine (5 February)

Latest Post: Welcome to the Israel-Palestine Future, Courtesy of the Likud Party

9:30 p.m. Israeli newspapers reporting that Israeli troops killed a Gazan with a grenade on the border.

8:45 p.m. According to Reuters, the discussions on an Israel-Gaza settlement are foundering on the specifics of control and reopening of crossings. Hamas says Israel is offering re-opening of 75 percent of crossings and full re-opening after the freeing of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, kidnapped in 2006. The offer is vague, however: Israel has not defined the "capacity" of crossings, making the 75 percent hard to measure, it has not specified which goods will be allowed into Gaza, and it has insisted on the right to re-close the crossings for security reasons.

Hamas, for its part, is insisting on the right to vet Palestinian Authority security members put on the crossings and requiring that they come from Gaza.

7:35 p.m. Egypt is definitely striking back at Hamas after the failure, in its view, to put suitable proposals to Israel. Hours after the suspensions of talks on Thursday, members of the Hamas delegation were stopped at the Rafah crossing with between $7 million and $9 million and 2 millions euros ($2.5 million) in cash in their suitcases. The money was confiscated as the delegates continued into Gaza.

Hamas is paying its employees in cash while Israel tries to restrict any movement of currency into Gaza.



7:20 p.m. Keeping Abbas on a String. Israel has agreed to allow $43 million of Palestinian Authority funds, or "tax money collectedl..on behalf of the Palestinian Authority" into Gaza to pay PA employees. The amount, however, is less than that requested by PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, and Israel has offered no response to Fayyad's declaration yesterday of a $600 million reconstruction programme for Gaza.

4:05 p.m. Dumbest Headline of the Day. Reuters reports on this morning's Israeli seizure of a Lebanese ship carrying aid to Gaza (see 11 a.m.): "Israel Seizes Gaza Freighter; No Arms Aboard".

Which, given that this was clearly a ship loaded with medicine, food, and blankets, is kinda missing the point. How about "Israel Seizes Gaza Freighter to Maintain Blockade; Roughs Up Crew"?

3:50 p.m. Ali Yenidunya offers the following analysis of yesterday's Abu Dhabi meeting of foreign ministers from nine Arab countries:

There are two important results from this meeting: Support for Fatah and warning to non-Arab countries in order not to intervene to Arab and Palestinian affairs. After Iran President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s hospitability on Tuesday to the exiled leader of Hamas, Khaled Meshaal, this declaration is aimed at cutting the Shi'a penetration in Palestine by giving support to Fatah.

Although the target of this statement is commonly understood as Ahmadinajed by every media organization, this has gone unnoticed by the Turkish public. Some Turkish media have started asked if this declaration is aimed at Turkey’s increasing influence in the Middle East after Prime Minister Erdogan’s walkout in Davos. In response, ‘Arab betrayal’ discourses are being triggered in Turkey, referring to Arab proclamation of independence during the time of the Ottoman Empire.

11:50 a.m. Take That! Egypt, extracting some retribution for the failure to get a suitable proposal from Hamas for transmission to Israel (or for a suitable Hamas reaction to an Israeli proposal), has shut the border with Gaza to anyone and everyone: "The border is closed as of this morning. No humanitarian, media or medical delegations will be allowed through, nor will medical aid deliveries be permitted."

11 a.m. Details are emerging of the Israeli interception of the Lebanese ship with aid for Gaza, and it's not as straightforward as we reported at 5:50 a.m. An Al Jazeera correspondent on the ship reports five Israeli troops boarded the vessel:

They are pointing guns against us - they are kicking us and beating us. They are threatening our lives.

The owner of the ship says the Israelis destroyed all communications equipment and confiscated phones.

8:45 a.m. Egypt, in its version of the negotiations for an Israel-Gaza settlement, says it will be Saturday before Hamas makes its response to Israeli proposals. Hamas said yesterday that Israel had given an insufficient response to its proposals.

It's close to irrelevant who offered the proposals --- nothing will happen before the Israeli elections next Tuesday and while Palestinian Authority head Mahmoud Abbas is making his own maneouvres to represent the Palestinian position. The game right now is simply to claim the diplomatic high ground when and if meaningful negotiations do begin.

Morning Update (5:50 a.m. GMT; 7:50 a.m. Israel/Palestine): Israeli forces have stopped a ship, The Lebanese Fraternity, with 50 tons of aid. The ship was intercepted 20 miles off the coast of Gaza.

Indeed, the one area where international co-operation is succeeding on Gaza is control of arms shipments by sea. The US, Canada,and seven European nations met in Denmark on Wednesday to discuss the issue.

The Latest on (Possible) US-Iran Secret Talks

A blog at The Los Angeles Times updates on the possibility of American and Iranian officials meeting this weekend at the Munich Security Conference.

The Times seems to have gotten the story muddled, if not wrong, however. Its spin is that "Iranians have been falling all over themselves to predict there won’t be any thaw in the diplomatic ice", yet if you read the entry carefully, the evidence is that Tehran may be manoeuvring cautiously for quiet, little-noticed discussions.



Iranian Speaker of the Parliament Ali Larijani, one of the key Tehran politicans to watch when it comes to foreign affairs, will be at the Conference. Publicly he is setting out a guarded, wait-and-see line:

Mr. Obama in one of his speeches talked of following a new way regarding the Islamic world, but in some media, some sentences are attributed to him which are not promising, such as talking of big carrots and big stick. This sort of talk is beneath the dignity of the Iranian nation.

Larijani added that, for talks to proceed, there needed to be a step by Washington such as the unfreezing of Iranian assets or the release of Iranians detained in Iraq since 2005. The US would also have to avoid the precondition of a temporary suspension of Iran’s production of nuclear fuel.

OK, so Larijani is setting out red lines before any formal talks begin. But, and this is the key, he is not ruling out off-the-record contacts which could raise the issues of economic sanctions, detentions, and co-operation in areas such as Afghanistan. The Times has the significant line even as it ignores the significance:

[Larijani] told reporters today there was “no plan” to talk with American counterparts, but he didn’t rule out the possibility of informal contacts.

Juan Cole offers an excellent overview of the dynamics within the US Administration and of the reasons why Iran might welcome informal discussions.