Update: Israeli Government Confirms No Hamas Rockets 19 June-4 November 2008

On Thursday, we reported on the Israeli Government's distribution to foreign journalists of a document which said that 1) only 20 rockets were fired into southern Israel in the cease-fire period between 19 June and 4 November 2008 and 2) those rockets were fired by "splinter groups" rather than Hamas.

Now, thanks to our reader Mae, we have located the original report, which comes from the Intelligence and Terrorism Center. In December 2008, they summarised "The Six Months of the Lull Arrangement":

The lull was sporadically violated by rocket and mortar shell fire, carried out by rogue terrorist organizations, in some instance in defiance of Hamas (especially by Fatah and Al-Qaeda supporters). Hamas was careful to maintain the ceasefire....Between June 19 and November 4, 20 rockets (three of which fell inside the Gaza Strip) and 18 mortar shells (five of which fell inside the Gaza Strip) were fired at Israel.

So why did rocket fire from Hamas resume?

On November 4 the IDF carried out a military action close to the border security fence on the Gazan side to prevent an abduction planned by Hamas, which had dug a tunnel under the fence to that purpose. Seven Hamas terrorist operatives were killed during the action. In retaliation, Hamas and the other terrorist organizations attacked Israel with a massive barrage of rockets. Since then, 191 rockets and 138 mortar shells have been fired.

Olmert's War: How the Prime Minister Took Israel Further into Gaza

In today's Ha'aretz, Aluf Benn has a stunning analysis (reprinted in full below), supported by a wealth of inside information, of the battles within the Israeli Cabinet over the ground offensive in Gaza:

[Prime Minister Ehud] Olmert and [Defense Minister Ehud] Barak detest each other and both of them have only contempt for [Foreign Minister Tzipi] Livni, whom they view as inexperienced. Olmert supposedly respects Barak's security record but is actually using it against him. In the prime minister's narrative, Barak was hesitant, did not want to launch the operation, placed obstacles before each stage and was ready to stop it a while ago. Before every decision, Barak and the Israel Defense Forces' top brass presented lengthy timetables and warned of heavy losses among the soldiers, on the home front and among Palestinian civilians. In Olmert's view, all their assessments were wrong.

The only problem with Benn's analysis is that it is incomplete. He attributes the difference in positions to Olmert's focus on Gaza while Barak and Livni had an eye on February elections. Fair enough, but he might have also mentioned that Olmert is trying to wipe away the stain of his failure in the 2006 war against Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Even more important, it should be noted that it is Olmert, the politician, who is pressing the military campaign while it is Barak, heading the military, who is looking at political considerations and urging a more restrained Israeli position. While Olmert may revel in the short-term military success, it is the politics of occupation that may ultimately prove Barak right.



Unlike Livni and Barak, Olmert is focusing on Gaza, not elections

Prime Minister Ehud Olmert this week likened Israel's situation in the confrontation with Hamas to that of a mountain climber. "When the Guinness Book of Records enters the record set by someone who conquered a peak, he must have been on the peak for a certain amount of time before the record is registered," Olmert explained to his interlocutor. "Israel has a hand on the peak, the slope is slippery, but the goal is within reach. When we get there, we have to stay there for a while."

This is the narrative Olmert is formulating as the Gaza operation seems to near its end. He maintained his determination and tenacity even when the troika's two other members, Defense Minister Ehud Barak and Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, wanted to stop. The successful, highly popular war was his. They were bothered by next month's elections, and this influenced their approach, while he, who is not running for anything, concentrated on running the war.

Olmert and Barak detest each other and both of them have only contempt for Livni, whom they view as inexperienced. Olmert supposedly respects Barak's security record but is actually using it against him. In the prime minister's narrative, Barak was hesitant, did not want to launch the operation, placed obstacles before each stage and was ready to stop it a while ago. Before every decision, Barak and the Israel Defense Forces' top brass presented lengthy timetables and warned of heavy losses among the soldiers, on the home front and among Palestinian civilians. In Olmert's view, all their assessments were wrong.

Olmert has no doubt that the one who was right about it all was Yuval Diskin, the head of the Shin Bet security service, who, together with Mossad espionage agency chief Meir Dagan, presented a tough line in the troika meetings and pressed for the operation to continue. Both of them backed Olmert, who talked about "a success strategy and not an exit strategy." Some gained the impression that Diskin has a "magical influence" over the prime minister. He opposed the earlier cease-fire with Hamas, he evaluated the balance of forces correctly, he was not moved by the pressures.

During Monday night's troika meeting, Olmert, after listening to the proposals made by Barak and Livni, produced an intelligence document stating that Hamas was drawing encouragement from the comments of the defense and foreign ministers and discussing the possibility that if they manage to hold out a little longer, they might secure a victory over Israel. A "senior security figure" supported Olmert: "We are closest to and farthest away from the achievement: close on the ground, but far away because of what is going on in the political echelon, because we are busy pressuring ourselves and being afraid of ourselves."

An irresponsible adventurer?

As early as last week, Barak and Livni reached the conclusion that the Gaza operation had accomplished all it could and that continued military pressure would only harm Israel and heighten the chance of military and international complications. Despite their political rivalry, Barak and Livni presented a similar approach, which brings to mind the similarity of their election slogans on billboards. Barak was afraid of an operational glitch that would cause the deaths of numerous civilians in Gaza; Livni was upset by the humanitarian crisis in the Strip and by the diplomatic and legal price Israel would pay after the war.

From their perspective, Olmert looked like an irresponsible adventurer, who had, in the course of the war, become addicted to glory and lost touch with reality. It happened in Lebanon in 2006 and now again in Gaza. Once again he was leading Israel into a collision with a wall. They, too, do not understand what Olmert means by "the continuation of the operation." After all, he knows as well as they do that Barack Obama will take the oath of office as president of the United States next Tuesday, and that the last thing he wants to see after his inauguration ceremony is a map of Gaza on his desk in the Oval Office. And that if the war does not end by Tuesday, Obama will mercilessly bring down the curtain on it. Barak spoke this week with his counterpart and friend Robert Gates, the U.S. secretary of defense, who will stay on under Obama. It is a safe guess that he picked up the spirit of the new commander-in-chief from him.

Internally, too, Olmert found himself increasingly isolated. The army joined Barak's call for a cease-fire. The GOC Southern Command, Yoav Galant, who came across as an activist pushing for more, said the conquest of Gaza was within reach - if the military echelon could promise him "a year" to mop up the occupied area. Even Diskin, according to another account, asked for five months to conclude the preventive operations. It is the wont of officers and officials to show determination and tenacity, ostensibly, while leaving it to the political echelon in charge to curb them - to restrain stallions, as Moshe Dayan put it. Of them it will not be said, as Olmert said of the IDF senior officer corps in 2006, that they "did not present plans" to the political echelon.

The wily politician?

On Monday the troika held a lengthy meeting, which ended well after midnight. As usual, there are conflicting versions about what transpired. Olmert's impression was that Barak and Livni were speaking softly, with the tape recorder documenting their remarks, and then shouting aloud to the reporters outside. Their impression was that behind the prime minister's talk about determination and courage lay the wily politician Olmert, who maneuvered them into a decision to continue the operation under the guise of "waiting for answers from Egypt." They are two and he is one, but he has the power.

The next day, things took a different turn. Olmert became entangled in an unnecessary and stupid incident with the U.S. administration after boasting of getting President Bush to interrupt a talk he was giving so that Olmert could tell him to order Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to change her intended vote on a cease-fire resolution in the Security Council. Rice supposedly emerged "shamefaced." The administration responded brutally, presenting Olmert as a teller of tales. There has been no love lost between Olmert and Rice since the Second Lebanon War, and he often complained about her to the president. But until this week's incident, he did so discreetly. His verbal blundering during a visit to Ashkelon strengthened Barak and Livni's claims that Olmert was losing it.

Olmert did not convene the troika on Tuesday and apparently was in no hurry to return phone calls from the defense minister and the foreign minister. The result was a wave of wicked rumors that he had disappeared or had been hospitalized. His office managed to allay reporters who called to ask about the prime minister's whereabouts. Olmert gained another day, but Barak lost his patience; his call for a cease-fire was the main headline in Haaretz the next day.

In the meantime, Hamas' determination also faltered, from a perspiring Ismail Haniyeh on television on Monday, to the announcement that the organization had accepted the Egyptian initiative for a cease-fire on Wednesday evening. Yitzhak Rabin once said that there is generally no military decision in Israeli-Arab wars. So how does one know who won? Simple: The side that requests a cease-fire first is the loser.

During the troika's next meeting, on Wednesday, the atmosphere was far more conciliatory. The discussion focused on the preparation for Amos Gilad's visit to Cairo the following day, to conclude the cease-fire terms. In a parallel move, Livni worked out a draft agreement with the U.S. administration for cooperation in preventing arms smuggling into Gaza. The final decision on ending the operation awaited Gilad's return, yesterday evening.

Problematic successes

What can we learn from this story? First, that it is impossible to explain the Israeli leadership's decision-making on the basis of a theoretical model formulated by a committee of inquiry, or proposals made by strategic experts and consultants. No model can factor in the passions, the personal rivalries, problems of character and political constraints faced by decision makers, all of which can decisively affect the outcome.

Second, every investigation focuses on what happened and not on what might happen in the future. The Winograd Committee, which examined the conduct in the Second Lebanon War, emphasized the "process," the need for prior preparation and the examination of alternatives before entering battle. It looked at the failed battles in Lebanon but did not consider the question of how to pull out of an operation that appears to be successful. The events of the past week show that successes, too, sometimes cause problems.

The Israeli Invasion of Gaza: Rolling Updates (16 January)

Later Updates: The Israeli Invasion of Gaza (17 January)
Latest post: Israeli Newspaper Details Israel’s Use of Illegal Weapons in Gaza
Latest post: Gaza --- It’s Not Necessarily All About Tehran

Late evening update (2 a.m. Israel/Gaza time): Relatively quiet on all fronts the last few hours. A hectic diplomatic day but a comparatively quiet military day, as Israeli troops battled with "at least 20 armed gunmen" Friday and five civilians were wounded when 15 rockets were fired into southern Israel.

Everyone is drawing breath, but it will pick up in several hours. Saturday is the day that Israel makes its move and puts all other actors on the spot, as the Cabinet declares a unilateral ceasefire. It is a giant snub to "world opinion", saying that Tel Aviv doesn't need an international agreement to get its political and military objectives. Gaza will still be blockaded, Israel will remain freedom of action to send military forces in whenever it wants, and Hamas will go unrecognised.

The responses of other countries and groups to this move will be critical. Is Egypt's Hosni Mubarak really prepared to be tied at the hip to Israel, in pursuit of the overthrow of Hamas, even though it may damage Cairo's position in the Arab world and even threaten internal instability? Will Saudi Arabia continue to stall on meaningful cease-fire efforts or, in light of growing internal concern with the Government position, will it shift towards other Gulf States who are demanding support of Hamas and unequivocal condemnation of Israel? Can Syria and Iran press their diplomatic initiative in forging a new bloc, and can Khaled Meshaall benefit?

And what in the world is Barack Obama doing? Did his people know of the Israeli plans, given Tzipi Livni's presence in Washington today, and tacitly approve them? Or have they sat so far back that they are trailing behind these developments?

No answers, just a lot of questions. But my speculation is that tomorrow will send a re-alignment of loyalties and objectives that ensures the political battle over Gaza enters a new phase.



10:15 p.m. Al Jazeera English declares Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal as "big diplomatic victor" with appearance at Qatar summit, especially with refusal of Palestianian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas to attend.

9:45 p.m. A piece of significant news lost in the diplomatic shuffle: Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan called for Israel to be blocked from the United Nations today.

Erdogan's declaration is not only a clear sign of the deterioration in the historically close Turkish-Israeli relationship. It is also a marker of Ankara's move towards Syria and Iran as the battlelines shape up amongst Arab states over the Gaza conflict and its aftermath.

8:30 p.m. Israel finally plays its hand: tomorrow, the Cabinet will hold a rare meeting on the Sabbath so it can vote on a unilateral ceasefire. This means Tel Aviv could declare "victory" without having to recognise Hamas. Instead of reaching a confirmed agreement on control of Gaza's borders, Israel will rely on arrangements with the United States --- including today's memorandum of understanding to block arms shipments to Hamas --- and Egypt to achieve its objectives.

This means that there may be no further military action, but there is no meaningful political settlement. The economic blockade will remain. Israel and Egypt, hoping for support from Washington, will continue to work for the re-installation of the Palestinian Authority in Gaza. Indeed, it has been already been announced that Egypt is "considering whether to organize a summit in the near future between Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas".

Since the issue is no longer whether Hamas agrees to a ceasefire, attention will turn to whether the Obama Administration supports this new Israeli manoeuvre to isolate and undermine Hamas. Equally important, the split in the Arab world may be exposed. Which way will Arab countries move? Will they support an Egypt-Israel alliance or will they take a firm line against Tel Aviv and in support of the Gazan leadership?

6:30 p.m. CNN correspondent Ben Wedeman finally gets into southern Gaza: how much local support do you think there will be for arrangements stage-managed by Cairo and Washington?

We toured an area near the border with Egypt where tunnels had been dug to get supplies into Gaza. There we saw dozens and dozens of houses completely destroyed, huge craters everywhere.

Earlier, when we caught the last bus from Egypt into Gaza, we spoke to Palestinian passengers, most of whom said they had been arrested in Egypt and abused by police before being deported. Their bitterness toward Egypt, particularly its president, Hosni Mubarak, and other Arab leaders over their perceived failure to provide support was echoed among others we spoke to.

This was matched by anger toward the United States, because most people know it supplies Israel with the warplanes bombarding them.

5:42 p.m. US and Israel sign deal to curb arms smuggling to Hamas, with Condoleezza Rice repeating the mantra that it will contribute to a "durable ceasefire". Details still not available, but Ha'aretz reports that it will include "patrols of the Persian Gulf, Sudan, and neighboring states". Diplomats said earlier that the arrangement included greater intelligence cooperation, and US technical and logistical assistance for border monitors. No US personnel will be involved on land with the border monitoring in either Gaza or Egypt.

Forgive me, but this doesn't sound like a vital component of a cease-fire agreement. Instead, it looks like US and Israel are trying to write a blank cheque to pick off "suspect" Iranian ships in international waters and to run covert and military operations in areas like Sudan.

5:40 p.m. Important clarification: Saudi Arabia did not attend today's meeting in Qatar.

5:20 p.m. Recapping on developments from the meeting in Qatar. Syrian President Bashir al-Assad has made the first big move, asking all Arab countries to cut "all direct and indirect" ties with Israel. Immediate effect is to suspend the "indirect peace negotiations" between Syria and Israel, but this is also Damascus's gambit to lead an Arab bloc against Tel Aviv and Cairo.

Al-Assad's move reinforced Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal's call for an isolation of Israel, and Qatar has now suspended relations with Tel Aviv.

5 p.m. More on the Israeli position on a cease-fire. Reuters, like Al Jazeera English, reports that Israel is pushing for a permanent ceasefire but adds our interpretation that Israel is insisting "Hamas must accept the return of Western-backed President Mahmoud Abbas's Palestinian Authority to Gaza's border crossings".

Meanwhile, one Palestinian reported killed and several wounded by Israeli forces during protest in Hebron in the West Bank. Demonstrations took place in towns despite Israeli attempts to close off the West Bank for 48 hours.

4:35 p.m. Well, well. The Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz has broken ranks to ask, "Is Israel using illegal weapons in its offensive on Gaza?" The story by Amira Haas uses reports and witnesses to answer Yes with the level of detail beyond that in American and British reports. Further information is in a separate post.



4:25 p.m. Interesting twist on the diplomatic front: Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov says Moscow is "sending...signals to representatives of Hamas, and those states which have influence on Hamas", i.e. Iran and Syria, to support the Egyptian proposals.

Another sign that the Syrian and Iranian Governments and in particular Syrian leader Bashir al-Assad are big winners in this crisis....

4:15 p.m. A quick P.S. from "Rafah Kid": "The bulldozers are back on top of us again."

4 p.m. While trying to hold the line diplomatically, Israel is pursuing the other part of its plan to take Hamas out of power: "decapitation".

The Israelis are continuing their attempts to assassinate Hamas leaders. Having killed Saed Siam on Thursday but failed to "liquidate", as the US used to call it, military leader Mahmud az-Zahar, Tel Aviv has a partial short-term success. The question remains, however: how many Hamas leaders would have to be slain before the movement collapsed? I think the number is far more than Israel can achieve in the window before a cease-fire has to be agreed.

2 p.m. No significant updates on the Israeli position from talks in Cairo and later in Washington. For the moment, attention is on a sideshow --- important not for immediate Gaza situation but for Arab and Middle Eastern politics --- in Qatar. In addition to the Gulf States and Iran, Hamas and the Palestinian groups Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) are present.

There is a clear possibility here, if the Gaza crisis continues, of a split in the Arab states and regional powers between those trying to isolate Hamas (notably Egypt and Saudi Arabia) and those backing the organisation and groups beyond Fatah (not only Syria but also Iran and Turkey).

12:20 p.m. "Rafah Kid", taking advantage of a few hours of electricity, has posted a short blog and photos from Rafah in southern Gaza.

12:15 p.m. Joshua Landis, in addition to some incisive comments on future US policy towards Syria, gets to the point on the next President and Israel/Palestine:

Obama’s support for Israel’s destruction of Hamas is not promising. If the US supports Israel’s continued efforts to hunt down Hamas’ leaders and kill them, the situation will be bleak. If Hamas is effectively decapitated, diplomacy will have little future for the Palestinians.

12:10 p.m. Bit of a twist that we had missed on the meeting of some Arab countries in Qatar: Egypt won't be there but Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad will be making an appearance. The dynamics, especially between Iran and Saudi Arabia, are worth watching.

11:45 a.m. More notable is Ban's effusive praise of the PA for its achievements over the last three years. He makes clears that "they are the democratically elected leadership" of Palestine --- a bit curious in light of the 2006 elections in Gaza --- as he presses his call for "the unity of the Palestinians....Only you, the Palestinians, can do this."

Ban either has no comprehension of the complexities in Gazan politics and society, or he is happily marching along with the Israel-US blueprint for PA at the head of Gaza as well as the West Bank. I'm starting to believe the former.

11:40 a.m. United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon now speaking at press conference with Palestinian Authority leader (depeand present/former (depending on your point of view) West Bank Prime Minister Salam Fayyad. He calls for a "sustainable" ceasefire --- "there is no time to lose" --- but thinks that an agreement is "very close".

Nothing too stunning there, especially in substance.

11:05 a.m. Al Jazeera's Mouin Rabbani believes two issues in cease-fire talks: Israel demand for permanent cessation, which Hamas rejects without permanent end to Israeli occupation of Gaza and West Bank, and Israel desire for international monitors on Egyptian side of border, which Cairo views as infringement on its sovereignty.

11 a.m. Israeli shelling continues as Friday prayers begin. Large funeral procession expected for Hamas leader Saed Siam.

10:16 a.m. Israel continues to stall on the diplomatic front while keeping military options open: Gaza offensive could be entering its "final act" but the extent of operations and length of time of that act kept open.

10:15 a.m. Oh, yes, the Gulf Cooperation Council states meet in Qatar today to discuss Gaza. There will be little of direct effect upon the conflict, especially since Egypt is pointedly staying away from the meeting. More intriguing will be inter-Arab politics, reading for example the position that Saudi Arabia takes.

9:50 a.m. Al Jazeera's Ayman Moyheldin: Gaza death toll 1133 with 5200 injured.

9:30 a.m. Our colleagues at "Alive in Gaza" have posted another audio interview with photojournalist Sameh Habeeb from Gaza City: "Drones in the Air".

9:15 a.m. Palestinian Statistics Bureau: Current conflict has cost the Gazan conflict $1.4 billion.

Morning update (8:45 a.m. Israel/Gaza time): The overnight development is on the diplomatic front. It appears that Israel's manoeuvre in the cease-fire negotiations will be an attempt to get an American presence in the international force monitoring Gaza's borders and tunnels. Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni travels to Washington today and is reported to be seeking US guarantees. On Thursday, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's office put out the line that US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had told Olmert that "the United States would be prepared to assist in solving the issue of smuggling". Meanwhile, Ministry of Defence official Amos Gilad returns to Cairo.

Israel says it struck more than 40 Gazan targets overnight, including two Hamas outposts. Its killing of key Hamas official Saed Siam yesterday continues to resonate: according to Al Jazeera, Fatah officials are privately expressing satisfaction over Siam's death.

Gazan death toll is now more than 1110. Israeli death toll remains at 13.

There continues to be a battle in the media between Israel's projection of its military success and the controversy over its shelling of civilian targets, including its use of white phosphorous. Speaking about the Israeli attack on the United Nations compound, UN official John Ging applied the "duck test" (if it walks likes a duck, quacks like a duck, etc.): ""It looks like phosphorus, it smells like phosphorus and it's burning like phosphorus. That's why I'm calling it phosphorus."

Israeli Newspaper Details Israel's Use of Illegal Weapons in Gaza

Latest Updates: The Israeli Invasion of Gaza (16 January)

Update: Make of this what you will --- Rafah Kid has posted on Twitter, "Seriously they always use banned stuff...the dum dum bullets are back too...small entry and MASSIVE exit hole..noone cares"

In today's Ha'aretz, Amira Haas not only dares to ask, "Is Israel using illegal weapons in Gaza?", but uses reports and the expertise of military analyst Mark Garlasco to give a definitive and detailed Yes.

Garlasco confirms the use of white phosphorous and suggests it arises from "conclusions drawn from the Second Lebanon War, in which the IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] lost many tanks". He also notes the first use in warfare of the GPS-guided mortar, with an unexpected range of error that led to the bombing of the Jabaliya school/shelter, and he confirms the use of the US-supplied "bunker-busting bomb" GBU-39.



Garlasco speculates that Israel is using DIME (dense inert metal explosives) for the first time, and he adds a new piece of information: Tel Aviv's unveiling of the Spike, "a special missile that is made to make very high-speed turns, so if you have a target that is moving and running away from you, you can chase him with the weapon."

Almost as an obligatory disclaimer, Haas gives the final paragraph over to an IDF spokesman:

The IDF is fighting the terror elements while meticulously observing the rules of engagement under international law. For understandable operational reasons, the IDF will not relate to a detailing of the materiel that is in its possession and the parameters in which it used. It should be emphasized, however, that the IDF uses only methods and materiel that are permitted under international law.

Gaza: It's Not Necessarily All About Tehran

Latest Updates: The Israeli Invasion of Gaza (16 January)

Last week, we noted --- via the wisdom of William Kristol --- the litany of comment setting out the fight in Gaza as a de facto fight against Iran. Israel had to triumph over Hamas, the argument runs, or Hamas' sponsors in Iran would win a big victory in their drive for regional supremacy.

Trita Parsi, in our opinion one of the best analysts of Iranian politics and US-Iranian relations, has offered the following dissection of the Hamas = Iran narrative:

Israel, Gaza and Iran: Trapping Obama in Imagined Fault Lines

In talking about the assault on Gaza, neo-conservative pundits and Israeli hardliners have relied on a familiar frame. The fighting in Gaza, they say, is a struggle between Israel and so-called "moderate" Arab states (namely, Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia) on the one hand, and Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas on the other. In reality, Israel is fighting Iran in Gaza, the argument reads.
These imagined Manichean fault lines defy logic and reality. This conflict is the last thing Tehran would have wished for in the last few weeks of the Bush administration. It increases the risk of a US-Iran confrontation now, and reduces the prospects for US-Iran diplomacy once President elect Obama takes over - neither of which is in Iran's national interest. Rather than benefiting from the instability following the slaughter in Gaza, Iran stands to lose much from the rise in tensions. And so does Obama.



To Iran, Hamas is no Hezbollah

While there certainly is an underlying rivalry between Israel and Iran that has come to fuel many other otherwise unrelated conflicts in the region, not every war Israel fights is related to Iran. In this specific case, the parallels to the 2006 Lebanon war are inaccurate. Iran's ties to Hamas are incomparable to the much deeper relationship Iran enjoys with Hezbollah. Iran's close relationship with Hezbollah is rooted in the Iranian view that Shiite minorities in Arab countries are Iran's most likely allies and agents of pro-Iranian sentiment; consequently, backing Hezbollah is viewed to be in Iran's core national interest. In contrast, Iran's relationship with Hamas is a marriage of convenience at best.

In spite of its ardent pro-Palestinian rhetoric, Iran's relationship with Palestinian groups -- including Hamas -- has often been strained. Tensions with Yasser Arafat's Palestinian Liberation Organization were mostly rooted in Arafat's insistence on defining the Israel-Palestinian conflict as a secular Arab nationalist cause -- leaving non-Arab Iran with no opening to play a leadership role in the Muslim world's cause célèbre. Differences with Hamas, however, derived from a mix of politics and ideology. Hamas' intellectual roots go back to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, a Sunni fundamentalist movement. Furthermore, during the Iraq-Iran war, both the PLO and Hamas expressed support for Saddam Hussein.

Throughout the 1980s, Iran was better at offering rhetoric than practical support to the Palestinian cause, due to Iran's immediate security concerns. This changed in the mid-1990s, when Iran feared that the Oslo peace process was partially aimed at securing Iran's prolonged isolation and political exclusion. But even after the outbreak of the second Intifada, the Iranians took the lead in making grandiose speeches about Iranian backing of the Palestinian cause, but seldom tried to live up to the standards set in its statements. As I describe in Treacherous Alliance: The Secret dealings of Israel, Iran and the United States (Yale University Press), European diplomats in contact with representatives of Islamic Jihad and Hamas visiting Iran after fighting between Israelis and Palestinians had broken out reported back that both groups were utterly disappointed with their Iranian hosts whom they accused of making empty promises -- Tehran neither provided them with money nor weapons. A joke in the streets of Tehran reflected Iran's pretense: "Why aren't there any stones left to stone the adulteress? Per the order of the Supreme Leader, all the stones have been shipped to Palestine as Iran's contribution to the Intifada."

Again, history seems to be repeating itself. After daily demonstrations in Tehran in favor of the Palestinians, including a six-day sit-in at Tehran airport by hard-line students demanding government support for sending volunteers to fight in Gaza, Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei contained the protesters by thanking them - while pointing out that Iran was not in a position to go beyond rhetorical support since "our hands are tied in this arena." Other Iranian officials have reinforced that message. General Mohammad Ali Jafari, commander-in-chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, declared that Hamas does not need military support to defend itself. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's brother indicated to the demonstrators at Tehran airport that Iran's support for the Palestinians would be limited to "spiritual support for the victimized people of Gaza."

Why Israel's offensive in Gaza should worry Obama

Tehran's complex, if not conflicted, response to the assault on Gaza can best be understood in the context of its broader strategic aims. By rejecting any material Iranian support or involvement in the Gaza battles, Iran's strategic imperatives trumped its ideological concerns and pretenses once more. Khamenei's statement regarding Iran's hands being tied resembles Ayatollah Khomeini's refusal to support the Lebanese Shiites by directly entering into war with Israel in 1984 through his edict that the road to Jerusalem goes through Karbala. That is, until Iran has defeated Saddam Hussein, it will not be sucked into a conflict with Israel, regardless of Tehran's ideological opposition to the Jewish state.

Contrary to the neo-conservative narrative that the fighting benefits Iran, Tehran seems to view the Israeli assault on Gaza as highly problematic for several reasons. First, there are suspicions in Tehran that Israel's offensive is a trap with the aim of drawing both Hezbollah and Iran into the fighting. With only weeks left till President Elect Obama takes office, any direct conflagration between Iran and Israel would significantly reduce Obama's ability to deliver on his campaign promise of opening talks with Tehran without preconditions.

Second, increased tensions and polarization in the Middle East undermines Obama's ability to pursue a new policy towards this region, including a shift in America's 30-year old policy of isolating Iran. In fact, polarization along the imagined Gaza fault lines - and a misleading equation of Hamas with Tehran - traps the incoming Obama administration in an involuntary continuation of the Bush policies that contributed to the increased instability in the Middle East in the first place. From the vantage point of Israeli hardliners, this may be a welcomed outcome since it will make compromise with Tehran more difficult and pressure on Israel less likely. Hence, Tehran seems poised not to help reduce Obama's maneuverability.

Third, the conflict is creating unwelcome tensions between Iran and key Arab states. Arab dictatorships fearing that the rise of Iran would weaken America's position in the Middle East and that the survival of Hamas would embolden Islamic nationalist opposition groups throughout the region - both of which would undermine these Arab governments' undemocratic rule - initially sided with Israel by remaining silent or explicitly putting the blame on Hamas. But as the casualties rose and the images of slaughter spread on Arab satellite TVs, the anger of the Arab streets reached the Arab palaces and courts. A similar pattern was seen in 2006 when many Arab governments initially welcomed Israel's air assault on Hezbollah in Lebanon. There, the change of heart had less to do with the images of Lebanese casualties and more to do with Hezbollah's surprising resilience and fighting power.

Though it is true that increased tensions enables Iran to score propaganda victories on the Arab streets, since many Arab states have either remained silent or secretly collaborated with Israel to defeat Hamas, this does carry a great risk for Tehran. If the fighting in Gaza goes on for too long, the spillover effects will be felt in increased Arab-Iranian tensions at a time when Tehran is more interested in soothing ties with the Arabs in order to minimize Arab disruption to any potential US-Iran opening.

The neo-conservative narrative and its imagined fault lines may temporarily add fuel to the US-Israeli alliance, but it will neither bring stability nor order to the region. Rather, it will push the Middle East further into endless conflict and restrict America's next president to a mindset and a policy framework that risks making the promise of change a dream unfulfilled.