The Israeli Invasion of Gaza: Rolling Updates (16 January)

Later Updates: The Israeli Invasion of Gaza (17 January)
Latest post: Israeli Newspaper Details Israel’s Use of Illegal Weapons in Gaza
Latest post: Gaza --- It’s Not Necessarily All About Tehran

Late evening update (2 a.m. Israel/Gaza time): Relatively quiet on all fronts the last few hours. A hectic diplomatic day but a comparatively quiet military day, as Israeli troops battled with "at least 20 armed gunmen" Friday and five civilians were wounded when 15 rockets were fired into southern Israel.

Everyone is drawing breath, but it will pick up in several hours. Saturday is the day that Israel makes its move and puts all other actors on the spot, as the Cabinet declares a unilateral ceasefire. It is a giant snub to "world opinion", saying that Tel Aviv doesn't need an international agreement to get its political and military objectives. Gaza will still be blockaded, Israel will remain freedom of action to send military forces in whenever it wants, and Hamas will go unrecognised.

The responses of other countries and groups to this move will be critical. Is Egypt's Hosni Mubarak really prepared to be tied at the hip to Israel, in pursuit of the overthrow of Hamas, even though it may damage Cairo's position in the Arab world and even threaten internal instability? Will Saudi Arabia continue to stall on meaningful cease-fire efforts or, in light of growing internal concern with the Government position, will it shift towards other Gulf States who are demanding support of Hamas and unequivocal condemnation of Israel? Can Syria and Iran press their diplomatic initiative in forging a new bloc, and can Khaled Meshaall benefit?

And what in the world is Barack Obama doing? Did his people know of the Israeli plans, given Tzipi Livni's presence in Washington today, and tacitly approve them? Or have they sat so far back that they are trailing behind these developments?

No answers, just a lot of questions. But my speculation is that tomorrow will send a re-alignment of loyalties and objectives that ensures the political battle over Gaza enters a new phase.



10:15 p.m. Al Jazeera English declares Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal as "big diplomatic victor" with appearance at Qatar summit, especially with refusal of Palestianian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas to attend.

9:45 p.m. A piece of significant news lost in the diplomatic shuffle: Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan called for Israel to be blocked from the United Nations today.

Erdogan's declaration is not only a clear sign of the deterioration in the historically close Turkish-Israeli relationship. It is also a marker of Ankara's move towards Syria and Iran as the battlelines shape up amongst Arab states over the Gaza conflict and its aftermath.

8:30 p.m. Israel finally plays its hand: tomorrow, the Cabinet will hold a rare meeting on the Sabbath so it can vote on a unilateral ceasefire. This means Tel Aviv could declare "victory" without having to recognise Hamas. Instead of reaching a confirmed agreement on control of Gaza's borders, Israel will rely on arrangements with the United States --- including today's memorandum of understanding to block arms shipments to Hamas --- and Egypt to achieve its objectives.

This means that there may be no further military action, but there is no meaningful political settlement. The economic blockade will remain. Israel and Egypt, hoping for support from Washington, will continue to work for the re-installation of the Palestinian Authority in Gaza. Indeed, it has been already been announced that Egypt is "considering whether to organize a summit in the near future between Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas".

Since the issue is no longer whether Hamas agrees to a ceasefire, attention will turn to whether the Obama Administration supports this new Israeli manoeuvre to isolate and undermine Hamas. Equally important, the split in the Arab world may be exposed. Which way will Arab countries move? Will they support an Egypt-Israel alliance or will they take a firm line against Tel Aviv and in support of the Gazan leadership?

6:30 p.m. CNN correspondent Ben Wedeman finally gets into southern Gaza: how much local support do you think there will be for arrangements stage-managed by Cairo and Washington?

We toured an area near the border with Egypt where tunnels had been dug to get supplies into Gaza. There we saw dozens and dozens of houses completely destroyed, huge craters everywhere.

Earlier, when we caught the last bus from Egypt into Gaza, we spoke to Palestinian passengers, most of whom said they had been arrested in Egypt and abused by police before being deported. Their bitterness toward Egypt, particularly its president, Hosni Mubarak, and other Arab leaders over their perceived failure to provide support was echoed among others we spoke to.

This was matched by anger toward the United States, because most people know it supplies Israel with the warplanes bombarding them.

5:42 p.m. US and Israel sign deal to curb arms smuggling to Hamas, with Condoleezza Rice repeating the mantra that it will contribute to a "durable ceasefire". Details still not available, but Ha'aretz reports that it will include "patrols of the Persian Gulf, Sudan, and neighboring states". Diplomats said earlier that the arrangement included greater intelligence cooperation, and US technical and logistical assistance for border monitors. No US personnel will be involved on land with the border monitoring in either Gaza or Egypt.

Forgive me, but this doesn't sound like a vital component of a cease-fire agreement. Instead, it looks like US and Israel are trying to write a blank cheque to pick off "suspect" Iranian ships in international waters and to run covert and military operations in areas like Sudan.

5:40 p.m. Important clarification: Saudi Arabia did not attend today's meeting in Qatar.

5:20 p.m. Recapping on developments from the meeting in Qatar. Syrian President Bashir al-Assad has made the first big move, asking all Arab countries to cut "all direct and indirect" ties with Israel. Immediate effect is to suspend the "indirect peace negotiations" between Syria and Israel, but this is also Damascus's gambit to lead an Arab bloc against Tel Aviv and Cairo.

Al-Assad's move reinforced Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal's call for an isolation of Israel, and Qatar has now suspended relations with Tel Aviv.

5 p.m. More on the Israeli position on a cease-fire. Reuters, like Al Jazeera English, reports that Israel is pushing for a permanent ceasefire but adds our interpretation that Israel is insisting "Hamas must accept the return of Western-backed President Mahmoud Abbas's Palestinian Authority to Gaza's border crossings".

Meanwhile, one Palestinian reported killed and several wounded by Israeli forces during protest in Hebron in the West Bank. Demonstrations took place in towns despite Israeli attempts to close off the West Bank for 48 hours.

4:35 p.m. Well, well. The Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz has broken ranks to ask, "Is Israel using illegal weapons in its offensive on Gaza?" The story by Amira Haas uses reports and witnesses to answer Yes with the level of detail beyond that in American and British reports. Further information is in a separate post.



4:25 p.m. Interesting twist on the diplomatic front: Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov says Moscow is "sending...signals to representatives of Hamas, and those states which have influence on Hamas", i.e. Iran and Syria, to support the Egyptian proposals.

Another sign that the Syrian and Iranian Governments and in particular Syrian leader Bashir al-Assad are big winners in this crisis....

4:15 p.m. A quick P.S. from "Rafah Kid": "The bulldozers are back on top of us again."

4 p.m. While trying to hold the line diplomatically, Israel is pursuing the other part of its plan to take Hamas out of power: "decapitation".

The Israelis are continuing their attempts to assassinate Hamas leaders. Having killed Saed Siam on Thursday but failed to "liquidate", as the US used to call it, military leader Mahmud az-Zahar, Tel Aviv has a partial short-term success. The question remains, however: how many Hamas leaders would have to be slain before the movement collapsed? I think the number is far more than Israel can achieve in the window before a cease-fire has to be agreed.

2 p.m. No significant updates on the Israeli position from talks in Cairo and later in Washington. For the moment, attention is on a sideshow --- important not for immediate Gaza situation but for Arab and Middle Eastern politics --- in Qatar. In addition to the Gulf States and Iran, Hamas and the Palestinian groups Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) are present.

There is a clear possibility here, if the Gaza crisis continues, of a split in the Arab states and regional powers between those trying to isolate Hamas (notably Egypt and Saudi Arabia) and those backing the organisation and groups beyond Fatah (not only Syria but also Iran and Turkey).

12:20 p.m. "Rafah Kid", taking advantage of a few hours of electricity, has posted a short blog and photos from Rafah in southern Gaza.

12:15 p.m. Joshua Landis, in addition to some incisive comments on future US policy towards Syria, gets to the point on the next President and Israel/Palestine:

Obama’s support for Israel’s destruction of Hamas is not promising. If the US supports Israel’s continued efforts to hunt down Hamas’ leaders and kill them, the situation will be bleak. If Hamas is effectively decapitated, diplomacy will have little future for the Palestinians.

12:10 p.m. Bit of a twist that we had missed on the meeting of some Arab countries in Qatar: Egypt won't be there but Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad will be making an appearance. The dynamics, especially between Iran and Saudi Arabia, are worth watching.

11:45 a.m. More notable is Ban's effusive praise of the PA for its achievements over the last three years. He makes clears that "they are the democratically elected leadership" of Palestine --- a bit curious in light of the 2006 elections in Gaza --- as he presses his call for "the unity of the Palestinians....Only you, the Palestinians, can do this."

Ban either has no comprehension of the complexities in Gazan politics and society, or he is happily marching along with the Israel-US blueprint for PA at the head of Gaza as well as the West Bank. I'm starting to believe the former.

11:40 a.m. United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon now speaking at press conference with Palestinian Authority leader (depeand present/former (depending on your point of view) West Bank Prime Minister Salam Fayyad. He calls for a "sustainable" ceasefire --- "there is no time to lose" --- but thinks that an agreement is "very close".

Nothing too stunning there, especially in substance.

11:05 a.m. Al Jazeera's Mouin Rabbani believes two issues in cease-fire talks: Israel demand for permanent cessation, which Hamas rejects without permanent end to Israeli occupation of Gaza and West Bank, and Israel desire for international monitors on Egyptian side of border, which Cairo views as infringement on its sovereignty.

11 a.m. Israeli shelling continues as Friday prayers begin. Large funeral procession expected for Hamas leader Saed Siam.

10:16 a.m. Israel continues to stall on the diplomatic front while keeping military options open: Gaza offensive could be entering its "final act" but the extent of operations and length of time of that act kept open.

10:15 a.m. Oh, yes, the Gulf Cooperation Council states meet in Qatar today to discuss Gaza. There will be little of direct effect upon the conflict, especially since Egypt is pointedly staying away from the meeting. More intriguing will be inter-Arab politics, reading for example the position that Saudi Arabia takes.

9:50 a.m. Al Jazeera's Ayman Moyheldin: Gaza death toll 1133 with 5200 injured.

9:30 a.m. Our colleagues at "Alive in Gaza" have posted another audio interview with photojournalist Sameh Habeeb from Gaza City: "Drones in the Air".

9:15 a.m. Palestinian Statistics Bureau: Current conflict has cost the Gazan conflict $1.4 billion.

Morning update (8:45 a.m. Israel/Gaza time): The overnight development is on the diplomatic front. It appears that Israel's manoeuvre in the cease-fire negotiations will be an attempt to get an American presence in the international force monitoring Gaza's borders and tunnels. Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni travels to Washington today and is reported to be seeking US guarantees. On Thursday, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's office put out the line that US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had told Olmert that "the United States would be prepared to assist in solving the issue of smuggling". Meanwhile, Ministry of Defence official Amos Gilad returns to Cairo.

Israel says it struck more than 40 Gazan targets overnight, including two Hamas outposts. Its killing of key Hamas official Saed Siam yesterday continues to resonate: according to Al Jazeera, Fatah officials are privately expressing satisfaction over Siam's death.

Gazan death toll is now more than 1110. Israeli death toll remains at 13.

There continues to be a battle in the media between Israel's projection of its military success and the controversy over its shelling of civilian targets, including its use of white phosphorous. Speaking about the Israeli attack on the United Nations compound, UN official John Ging applied the "duck test" (if it walks likes a duck, quacks like a duck, etc.): ""It looks like phosphorus, it smells like phosphorus and it's burning like phosphorus. That's why I'm calling it phosphorus."

Gaza: It's Not Necessarily All About Tehran

Latest Updates: The Israeli Invasion of Gaza (16 January)

Last week, we noted --- via the wisdom of William Kristol --- the litany of comment setting out the fight in Gaza as a de facto fight against Iran. Israel had to triumph over Hamas, the argument runs, or Hamas' sponsors in Iran would win a big victory in their drive for regional supremacy.

Trita Parsi, in our opinion one of the best analysts of Iranian politics and US-Iranian relations, has offered the following dissection of the Hamas = Iran narrative:

Israel, Gaza and Iran: Trapping Obama in Imagined Fault Lines

In talking about the assault on Gaza, neo-conservative pundits and Israeli hardliners have relied on a familiar frame. The fighting in Gaza, they say, is a struggle between Israel and so-called "moderate" Arab states (namely, Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia) on the one hand, and Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas on the other. In reality, Israel is fighting Iran in Gaza, the argument reads.
These imagined Manichean fault lines defy logic and reality. This conflict is the last thing Tehran would have wished for in the last few weeks of the Bush administration. It increases the risk of a US-Iran confrontation now, and reduces the prospects for US-Iran diplomacy once President elect Obama takes over - neither of which is in Iran's national interest. Rather than benefiting from the instability following the slaughter in Gaza, Iran stands to lose much from the rise in tensions. And so does Obama.



To Iran, Hamas is no Hezbollah

While there certainly is an underlying rivalry between Israel and Iran that has come to fuel many other otherwise unrelated conflicts in the region, not every war Israel fights is related to Iran. In this specific case, the parallels to the 2006 Lebanon war are inaccurate. Iran's ties to Hamas are incomparable to the much deeper relationship Iran enjoys with Hezbollah. Iran's close relationship with Hezbollah is rooted in the Iranian view that Shiite minorities in Arab countries are Iran's most likely allies and agents of pro-Iranian sentiment; consequently, backing Hezbollah is viewed to be in Iran's core national interest. In contrast, Iran's relationship with Hamas is a marriage of convenience at best.

In spite of its ardent pro-Palestinian rhetoric, Iran's relationship with Palestinian groups -- including Hamas -- has often been strained. Tensions with Yasser Arafat's Palestinian Liberation Organization were mostly rooted in Arafat's insistence on defining the Israel-Palestinian conflict as a secular Arab nationalist cause -- leaving non-Arab Iran with no opening to play a leadership role in the Muslim world's cause célèbre. Differences with Hamas, however, derived from a mix of politics and ideology. Hamas' intellectual roots go back to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, a Sunni fundamentalist movement. Furthermore, during the Iraq-Iran war, both the PLO and Hamas expressed support for Saddam Hussein.

Throughout the 1980s, Iran was better at offering rhetoric than practical support to the Palestinian cause, due to Iran's immediate security concerns. This changed in the mid-1990s, when Iran feared that the Oslo peace process was partially aimed at securing Iran's prolonged isolation and political exclusion. But even after the outbreak of the second Intifada, the Iranians took the lead in making grandiose speeches about Iranian backing of the Palestinian cause, but seldom tried to live up to the standards set in its statements. As I describe in Treacherous Alliance: The Secret dealings of Israel, Iran and the United States (Yale University Press), European diplomats in contact with representatives of Islamic Jihad and Hamas visiting Iran after fighting between Israelis and Palestinians had broken out reported back that both groups were utterly disappointed with their Iranian hosts whom they accused of making empty promises -- Tehran neither provided them with money nor weapons. A joke in the streets of Tehran reflected Iran's pretense: "Why aren't there any stones left to stone the adulteress? Per the order of the Supreme Leader, all the stones have been shipped to Palestine as Iran's contribution to the Intifada."

Again, history seems to be repeating itself. After daily demonstrations in Tehran in favor of the Palestinians, including a six-day sit-in at Tehran airport by hard-line students demanding government support for sending volunteers to fight in Gaza, Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei contained the protesters by thanking them - while pointing out that Iran was not in a position to go beyond rhetorical support since "our hands are tied in this arena." Other Iranian officials have reinforced that message. General Mohammad Ali Jafari, commander-in-chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, declared that Hamas does not need military support to defend itself. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's brother indicated to the demonstrators at Tehran airport that Iran's support for the Palestinians would be limited to "spiritual support for the victimized people of Gaza."

Why Israel's offensive in Gaza should worry Obama

Tehran's complex, if not conflicted, response to the assault on Gaza can best be understood in the context of its broader strategic aims. By rejecting any material Iranian support or involvement in the Gaza battles, Iran's strategic imperatives trumped its ideological concerns and pretenses once more. Khamenei's statement regarding Iran's hands being tied resembles Ayatollah Khomeini's refusal to support the Lebanese Shiites by directly entering into war with Israel in 1984 through his edict that the road to Jerusalem goes through Karbala. That is, until Iran has defeated Saddam Hussein, it will not be sucked into a conflict with Israel, regardless of Tehran's ideological opposition to the Jewish state.

Contrary to the neo-conservative narrative that the fighting benefits Iran, Tehran seems to view the Israeli assault on Gaza as highly problematic for several reasons. First, there are suspicions in Tehran that Israel's offensive is a trap with the aim of drawing both Hezbollah and Iran into the fighting. With only weeks left till President Elect Obama takes office, any direct conflagration between Iran and Israel would significantly reduce Obama's ability to deliver on his campaign promise of opening talks with Tehran without preconditions.

Second, increased tensions and polarization in the Middle East undermines Obama's ability to pursue a new policy towards this region, including a shift in America's 30-year old policy of isolating Iran. In fact, polarization along the imagined Gaza fault lines - and a misleading equation of Hamas with Tehran - traps the incoming Obama administration in an involuntary continuation of the Bush policies that contributed to the increased instability in the Middle East in the first place. From the vantage point of Israeli hardliners, this may be a welcomed outcome since it will make compromise with Tehran more difficult and pressure on Israel less likely. Hence, Tehran seems poised not to help reduce Obama's maneuverability.

Third, the conflict is creating unwelcome tensions between Iran and key Arab states. Arab dictatorships fearing that the rise of Iran would weaken America's position in the Middle East and that the survival of Hamas would embolden Islamic nationalist opposition groups throughout the region - both of which would undermine these Arab governments' undemocratic rule - initially sided with Israel by remaining silent or explicitly putting the blame on Hamas. But as the casualties rose and the images of slaughter spread on Arab satellite TVs, the anger of the Arab streets reached the Arab palaces and courts. A similar pattern was seen in 2006 when many Arab governments initially welcomed Israel's air assault on Hezbollah in Lebanon. There, the change of heart had less to do with the images of Lebanese casualties and more to do with Hezbollah's surprising resilience and fighting power.

Though it is true that increased tensions enables Iran to score propaganda victories on the Arab streets, since many Arab states have either remained silent or secretly collaborated with Israel to defeat Hamas, this does carry a great risk for Tehran. If the fighting in Gaza goes on for too long, the spillover effects will be felt in increased Arab-Iranian tensions at a time when Tehran is more interested in soothing ties with the Arabs in order to minimize Arab disruption to any potential US-Iran opening.

The neo-conservative narrative and its imagined fault lines may temporarily add fuel to the US-Israeli alliance, but it will neither bring stability nor order to the region. Rather, it will push the Middle East further into endless conflict and restrict America's next president to a mindset and a policy framework that risks making the promise of change a dream unfulfilled.

Tony Blair Slams Hamas; His Former Ambassador Slams Blair and Israel

 This morning the Today programme on BBC Radio 4 had an interesting contrast in perspectives on the current crisis. First came former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, appearing in his capacity as a Middle Eastern envoy, to criticize Hamas. Then came Blair’s former ambassador to the United Nations and Iraq, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, who began by criticizing Blair and then went after Israel over the current crisis. In the course of his interview he said that: 

1. that Israel had broken the ceasefire by not opening the border crossings;


2. that Hamas is not a proxy of Iran;


3. that Hamas is not trying to set up a Taliban-style government in Gaza;


4. that Hamas’ unwillingness to accept the existence of Israel was about rhetoric and not about reality;


5. that Israel continues to inflame the situation in the region by constructing illegal settlements;


6. that Israeli domestic politics were also driving the crisis;


7. that Fatah and Islamic Jihad have also been firing rockets;

Greenstock, who has had contacts with Hamas through a charity called Forward Thinking, referred to the precedent of Northern Ireland, noting that Blair had already followed the path of talking with interests that engaged in terrorism.

The Israeli Invasion of Gaza: Rolling Updates (8 January)

Later Updates: The Israeli Invasion of Gaza (8 January --- Evening)

Latest article: Follow-Up on Gaza: Was the Israeli Attack Planned in June?

3:48 p.m. The perils of Twitter. CNN's story on an Israeli strike on a school in northern Gaza, circulated 30 minutes ago, was actually about the strike on Jabaliya two days ago.

3:30 p.m. Missed this earlier: an eighth Israeli soldier has been killed, hit by an anti-tank missile.

3 p.m. Israeli military says 20 rockets fired from Gaza on Wednesday and 16 so far on Thursday, numbers which are still down from levels at start of conflict. Further evidence that Hamas military units are limiting deployments in the field and staying in cities?



2:15 p.m. Al Jazeera now has a full report on the Israeli firing on the UN aid convoy. One Palestinian was killed.

Israeli operations in Rafah, after warnings to residents to evacuate their homes, concentrated on the bombing of tunnels rather than entry into the city.

2:03 p.m. If We Can't See It, It Doesn't Exist: CNN International has nothing --- nothing --- on the Red Cross report of dead and wounded and firing upon medical personnel by Israeli forces.

It does, however, report on Israeli forces bulldozing a Gazan house, despite white flags on the roof, because correspondent Ben Wedeman can see it from across the border.

2 p.m. Gazan resident Fares Akram writes about yesterday's "respite":

Most people headed for the bakeries, others rushed around with empty containers looking for drinking water. I joined a queue in front of a bakery but unfortunately returned without a single loaf since the bread ran out before it was my turn. Going to the green market was disappointing; there weren't enough vegetables. There were onions and cucumbers but tomatoes, the one thing everyone wants, were scarce. Nor was there any eggplant. There was something on sale that we don't use so much here: sweet pepper, considered a luxury because it's expensive.

1:35 p.m. More interesting stonewalling from IDF spokeswoman Liebovich: she denies any knowledge of Israeli forces firing on ambulances taking away Gazan wounded. Responding to Red Cross complaint, she says, "I don't think it's serious to investigate an event through a press release."

1:30 p.m. UN says aid convoy is fired upon by Israelis. Speaking to al Jazeera, Israeli Defense Forces spokeswoman Avital Liebovich claims to have no knowledge of incident.

Liebovich talks down the firing of rockets into northern Israel as an "isolated incident", indicating both Israel and Hezbollah wish to avoid a second front in the conflict.

1:05 p.m. One of the little-noticed curiosities of the Israeli campaign so far is the relatively light number of "militant" deaths. With more than 300 of the 700 dead are women and children, even if every male killed was a Hamas activist, less than 400 of the bad guys have been slain.

The probable reason? Unsurprisingly, Hamas fighters have not stayed out in the open to be picked off by Israeli forces but have gone back into urban areas. This explains in part why the Israeli Cabinet is in protracted deliberations over whether to order its military into the cities.

The Washington Post has further details.



12:50 p.m. Confirmation of more than 60 Israeli airstrikes overnight, a significant escalation

12:30 p.m. The Israeli Consulate in New York will not be amused: The New York Times has three opinion pieces today --- by Rashid Khalidi, Nicholas Kristof, and Gideon Lichfield --- critical of Israeli strategy and operations in Gaza.

12:10 p.m. Israeli Cabinet has postponed decision on expansion of ground offensive. Information is that minority in Cabinet wish to expand immediately, expelling Hamas and occupying Gaza until a new "responsible" government can be established. Minister of Defense Ehud Barak opposes, however, preferring to exhaust all diplomatic options before moving to a "Phase 3" of the invasion.

Further information that Barak and Olmert support the diplomatic route while Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni is in favour of expanded military operations.

12 noon: Israeli bombardment continues near Jabaliya and Beit Lahoun in northern Gaza.

11:38 a.m. Al Jazeera correspondent says "remarkable" that no casualties in senior citizens' home hit by rocket in Nasariya in northern Israel.

11:35 a.m. Another diplomatic front: Iranian Speaker of the Parliament Ali Larijani met Syrian official and Hamas leaders, including Khaled Mashaal, on Wednesday. Larijani also met representatives of the Palestinian group Islamic Jihad.

11:30 a.m. Gazan death toll now over 700; one-third are children. Israeli death toll is 10, of which seven are soldiers.

11:25 a.m. International Committee of the Red Cross is demanding immediate access to Gaza. The demand follows the incidents in Zeitoun where, in addition to the discovery of dozens of bodies, Red Cross and Red Crescent workers found "weak children laying with their dead mothers".

11:15 a.m. Analysis in Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz:

The five [Israeli] brigades operating in the Strip are preparing as if they will be ordered to take over the entire Strip, but the General Staff believe that the politicians want a deal. In the field the sense is that Hamas has been pushed to the heart of the urban centers, and is avoiding direct contact with the IDF as much as possible.

11 a.m. Al Jazeera reports more rockets from Lebanon fired into northern Israel. Images of damage in Nahariya being shown. Israeli defense sources say that Hezbollah is not responsible; Palestinians in Lebanon more likely.

In Gaza, reports of an Israeli strike on a hospital.

Morning Update: Four rockets from Lebanon have struck northern Israel, wounding two people. The Lebanese Army says that "an unknown group" is responsible. Hamas has denied any involvement, and analysts are suggesting that Palestinians living in Lebanon may have fired the rockets.

The negotiations in Cairo today apparently will be "shuttle" negotiations with brokers talking to Israel and the Palestinian Authority and then to Hamas. Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit confirmed that, if Hamas representatives attend, "they will not be in the same room as other negotiators".

The United Nations General Assembly will convene to discuss the crisis. This is a logical next step: the Libyan-drafted resolution for an immediate ceasefire will go before the Security Council on Thursday but, even if it had majority support, will be vetoed by the United States.

Follow-Up on Gaza: Was the Israeli Attack Planned in June?

Latest Updates: The Israeli Invasion of Gaza: Rolling Updates (8 Jan — Evening)
Latest Updates on the Situation in Gaza (8 January)

On Sunday, we suggested that the Israeli Cabinet had planned for attacks on Gaza as soon as the December cease-fire expired. A well-sourced analysis by Steve Niva in Foreign Policy in Focus offers detail on this "strategic escalation":

War of Choice: How Israel Manufactured the Gaza Escalation



Israel has repeatedly claimed that it had "no choice" but to wage war on Gaza on December 27 because Hamas had broken a ceasefire, was firing rockets at Israeli civilians, and had "tried everything in order to avoid this military operation," as Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni put it.

This claim, however, is widely at odds with the fact that Israel's military and political leadership took many aggressive steps during the ceasefire that escalated a crisis with Hamas, and possibly even provoked Hamas to create a pretext for the assault. This wasn't a war of "no choice," but rather a very avoidable war in which Israeli actions played the major role in instigating.

Israel has a long history of deliberately using violence and other provocative measures to trigger reactions in order to create a pretext for military action, and to portray its opponents as the aggressors and Israel as the victim. According to the respected Israeli military historian Zeev Maoz in his recent book, Defending the Holy Land, Israel most notably used this policy of "strategic escalation" in 1955-1956, when it launched deadly raids on Egyptian army positions to provoke Egypt's President Nasser into violent reprisals preceding its ill-fated invasion of Egypt; in 1981-1982, when it launched violent raids on Lebanon in order to provoke Palestinian escalation preceding the Israeli invasion of Lebanon; and between 2001-2004, when Prime Minister Ariel Sharon repeatedly ordered assassinations of high-level Palestinian militants during declared ceasefires, provoking violent attacks that enabled Israel's virtual reoccupation of the West Bank.

Israel's current assault on Gaza bears many trademark elements of Israel's long history of employing "strategic escalation" to manufacture a major crisis, if not a war.
Making War 'Inevitable'

The countdown to a war began, according to a detailed report by Barak Raviv in the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, when Israel's Defense Minister Ehud Barak started planning the current attack on Gaza with his chiefs of staff at least six months ago — even as Israel was negotiating the Egyptian brokered ceasefire with Hamas that went into effect on June 19. During the subsequent ceasefire, the report contends, the Israeli security establishment carefully gathered intelligence to map out Hamas' security infrastructure, engaged in operational deception, and spread disinformation to mislead the public about its intentions.

This revelation doesn't confirm that Israel intended to start a war with Hamas in December, but it does shed some light on why Israel continuously took steps that undermined the terms of the fragile ceasefire with Hamas, even though Hamas respected their side of the agreement.

Indeed, there was a genuine lull in rocket and mortar fire between June 19 and November 4, due to Hamas compliance and only sporadically violated by a small number of launchings carried out by rival Fatah and Islamic Jihad militants, largely in defiance of Hamas. According to the conservative Israeli-based Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center's analysis of rocket and missile attacks in 2008, there were only three rockets fired at Israel in July, September, and October combined. Israeli civilians living near Gaza experienced an almost unprecedented degree of security during this period, with no Israeli casualties.

Yet despite the major lull, Israel continually raided the West Bank, arresting and frequently killing "wanted" Palestinians from June to October, which had the inevitable effect of ratcheting up pressure on Hamas to respond. Moreover, while the central expectation of Hamas going into the ceasefire was that Israel would lift the siege on Gaza, Israel only took the barest steps to ease the siege, which kept the people at a bare survival level. This policy was a clear affront to Hamas, and had the inescapable effect of undermining both Hamas and popular Palestinian support for the ceasefire.

But Israel's most provocative action, acknowledged by many now as the critical turning point that undermined the ceasefire, took place on November 4, when Israeli forces auspiciously violated the truce by crossing into the Gaza Strip to destroy what the army said was a tunnel dug by Hamas, killing six Hamas militants. Sara Roy, writing in the London Review of Books, contends this attack was "no doubt designed finally to undermine the truce between Israel and Hamas established last June."

The Israeli breach into Gaza was immediately followed by a further provocation by Israel on November 5, when the Israeli government hermetically sealed off all ways into and out of Gaza. As a result, the UN reports that the amount of imports entering Gaza has been "severely reduced to an average of 16 truckloads per day — down from 123 truckloads per day in October and 475 trucks per day in May 2007 — before the Hamas takeover." These limited shipments provide only a fraction of the supplies needed to sustain 1.5 million starving Palestinians.

In response, Hamas predictably claimed that Israel had violated the truce and allowed Islamic Jihad to launch a round of rocket attacks on Israel. Only after lethal Israeli reprisals killed over 10 Hamas gunmen in the following days did Hamas militants finally respond with volleys of mortars and rockets of their own. In two short weeks, Israel killed over 15 Palestinian militants, while about 120 rockets and mortars were fired at Israel, and although there were no Israeli casualties the calm had been shattered.

It was at this time that Israeli officials launched what appears to have been a coordinated media blitz to cultivate public reception for an impending conflict, stressing the theme of the "inevitability" of a coming war with Hamas in Gaza. On November 12, senior IDF officials announced that war with Hamas was likely in the two months after the six-month ceasefire, baldly stating it would occur even if Hamas wasn't interested in confrontation. A few days later, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert publicly ordered his military commanders to draw up plans for a war in Gaza, which were already well developed at the time. On November 19, according to Raviv's report in Haaretz, the Gaza war plan was brought before Barak for final approval.

While the rhetoric of an "inevitable" war with Hamas may have only been Israeli bluster to compel Hamas into line, its actions on the ground in the critical month leading up to the official expiration of the ceasefire on December 19 only heightened the cycle of violence, leaving a distinct impression Israel had cast the die for war.

Finally, Hamas then walked right into the "inevitable war" that Israel had been preparing since the ceasefire had gone into effect in June. With many Palestinians believing the ceasefire to be meaningless, Hamas announced it wouldn't renew the ceasefire after it expired on December 19. Hamas then stood back for two days while Islamic Jihad and Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades militants fired volleys of mortars and rockets into Israel, in the context of mutually escalating attacks. Yet even then, with Israeli threats of war mounting, Hamas imposed a 24-hour ceasefire on all missile attacks on December 21, announcing it would consider renewing the lapsed truce with Israel in the Gaza Strip if Israel would halt its raids in both Gaza and the West Bank, and keep Gaza border crossings open for supplies of aid and fuel. Israel immediately rejected its offer.

But when the Israel Defence Forces killed three Hamas militants laying explosives near the security fence between Israel and Gaza on the evening of December 23, the Hamas military wing lashed out by launching a barrage of over 80 missiles into Israel the following day, claiming it was Israel, and not Hamas, that was responsible for the escalation.

Little did they know that, according to Raviv, Prime Minister Olmert, and Defense Minister Barak had already met on December 18 to approve the impending war plan, but put the mission off waiting for a better pretext. By launching more than 170 rockets and mortars at Israeli civilians in the days following December 23, killing one Israeli civilian, Hamas had provided reason enough for Israel to unleash its long-planned attack on Gaza on December 27.
The Rationale for War

If Israel's goal were simply to end rocket attacks on its civilians, it would have solidified and extended the ceasefire, which was working well, until November. Even after November, it could have addressed Hamas' longstanding ceasefire proposals for a complete end to rocket-fire on Israel, in exchange for Israel lifting its crippling 18-month siege on Gaza.

Instead, the actual targets of its assault on Gaza after December 27, which included police stations, mosques, universities, and Hamas government institutions, clearly reveal that Israel's primary goals go far beyond providing immediate security for its citizens. Israeli spokespersons repeatedly claim that Israel's assault isn't about seeking to effect regime change with Hamas, but rather about creating a "new security reality" in Gaza. But that "new reality" requires Israel to use massive violence to degrade the political and military capacity of Hamas, to a point where it agrees to a ceasefire with conditions more congenial to Israel. Short of a complete reoccupation of Gaza, no amount of violence will erase Hamas from the scene.

Confirming the steps needed to create the "new reality," the broader reasons why Israel chose a major confrontation with Hamas at this time appear to be the cause of several other factors unrelated to providing immediate security for its citizens.

First, many senior Israeli political and military leaders strongly opposed the June 19 ceasefire with Hamas, and looked for opportunities to reestablish Israel's fabled "deterrent capability" of instilling fear into its enemies. These leaders felt Israel's deterrent capability was badly damaged as a result of their withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, and especially after the widely criticized failures in the 2006 Israeli war with Hezbollah. For this powerful group a ceasefire was at best a tactical pause before the inevitable renewal of conflict, when conditions were more favorable. Immediately following Israel's aerial assault, a New York Times article noted that Israel had been eager "to remind its foes that it has teeth" and to erase the ghost of Lebanon that has haunted it over the past two years.

A second factor was pressure surrounding the impending elections set to take place in early February. The ruling coalition, led by Barak and Livni, have been repeatedly criticized by the Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu, the former prime minister, who is leading in the polls, for not being tough enough on Hamas and rocket-fire from Gaza. This gave the ruling coalition a strong incentive to demonstrate to the Israeli people their security credentials in order to bolster their chances against the more hawkish Likud.

Third, Hamas repeatedly said it wouldn't recognize Mahmud Abbas as president of the Palestinian Authority after his term runs out on January 9. The looming political standoff on the Palestinian side threatens to boost Hamas and undermine Abbas, who had underseen closer security coordination with Israel and was congenial to Israeli demands for concessions on future peace proposals. One possible outcome of this assault is that Abbas will remain in power for a while longer, since Hamas will be unable to mobilise its supporters in order to force him to resign.

And finally, Israel was pressed to take action now due to its sense of the American political timeline. The Bush administration rarely exerted constraint on Israel and would certainly stand by in its waning days, while Barack Obama would not likely want to begin his presidency with a major confrontation with Israel. The Washington Post quoted a Bush administration official saying that Israel struck in Gaza "because they want it to be over before the next administration comes in. They can't predict how the next administration will handle it. And this is not the way they want to start with the new administration."
An Uncertain Ending

As the conflict rages to an uncertain end, it's important to consider Israeli military historian Zeev Maoz's contention that Israel's history of manufacturing wars through "strategic escalation" and using overwhelming force to achieve "deterrence" has never been successful. In fact, it's the primary cause of Israel's insecurity because it deepens hatred and a desire for revenge rather than fear.

At the same time, there's no question Hamas continues to callously sacrifice its fellow Palestinian citizens, as well as Israeli civilians, on the altar of maintaining its pyrrhic resistance credentials and its myopic preoccupation with revenge, and fell into many self-made traps of its own. There had been growing international pressure on Israel to ease its siege and a major increase in creative and nonviolent strategies drawing attention to the plight of Palestinians such as the arrival of humanitarian relief convoys off of Gaza's coast in the past months, but now Gaza lies in ruins.

But as the vastly more powerful actor holding nearly all the cards in this conflict, the war in Gaza was ultimately Israel's choice. And for all this bloodshed and violence, Israel must be held accountable.

With the American political establishment firmly behind Israel's attack, and Obama's foreign policy team heavily weighted with pro-Israel insiders like Dennis Ross and Hillary Clinton, any efforts to hold Israel accountable in the United States will depend upon American citizens mobilizing a major grassroots effort behind a new foreign policy that will not tolerate any violations of international law, including those by Israel, and will immediately work towards ending Israel's siege of Gaza and ending Israel's occupation.

Beyond that, the most promising prospect for holding Israel accountable is through the increasing use of universal jurisdiction for prosecuting war crimes, along with the growing transnational movement calling for sanctions on Israel until it ends its violations of international law. In what would be truly be a new style of foreign policy, a transnational network that focuses on Israeli violations of international law, rather than the state itself, could become a counterweight that forces policymakers in the United States, Europe, and Israel to reconsider their political and moral complicity in the current war, in favor of taking real steps towards peace and security in the region for all peoples.