The Latest from Iran (25 January): Who Makes A Move Today?

2145 GMT: The Karroubi Story. We've worked tonight through the stories, the rumours, and possibilities to post an interim analysis of Mehdi Karroubi's statement today on "Mr Khamenei" and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, "the head of the government of the regime".

2140 GMT: In Case You Missed It. Persian2English reports: "Abolfazl Eslami, former Counselor of the Iranian Embassy in Tokyo, writes that he has decided to join people’s movement in light of the Islamic Republics’ violence and oppression."

1955 GMT: And on the Clerical Front. Ayatollah Bayat-Zanjani has renewed his criticism of the regime, asking Iran's leaders to do "nahy az monker" (repent from the bad way).

1945 GMT: Remember the Economic Front? Most of the management of Bank Melli have been replaced.

1935 GMT: We are hoping to have a thorough, on-the-mark analysis, from an EA correspondent with excellent sources, of the Karroubi statement about 2130 GMT. (To be blunt, I got it wrong earlier today, but I think, thanks to a lot of help, we'll have the best possible reading by the end of tonight.)

NEW Iran Special Analysis: What Karroubi’s Statement on “Mr Khamenei”/”Head of Government” Means
NEW Iran Snap Analysis: The Karroubi and Khatami Manoeuvres
NEW Iran: Listening to Rumours, Whispers, and Shouts
Iran and Israel: The Start of a Beautiful Friendship?
Iran Analysis: Should the Greens Be Waiting for Economic Collapse?
UPDATED Iran: The Plot Against President Ahmadinejad
The Latest from Iran (24 January): Watching Carefully

Meanwhile, another piece of evidence to put into the mix, indicating that Karroubi is not recognising Ahmadinejad as President but merely as a "selected leader". He told Rah-e-Sabz that he stood by his comments, but the people have problems which must be solved by the government, which is responsible for the situation. He repeated a statement he had made to an English newspaper: "I am convinced that Ahmadinejad will not stay for four years."

1610 GMT: Going after Revolution. Amidst all the confusion over the Karroubi statement, a blunter political move by another cleric:

Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, who is close to the President, has made another attempt to pressure Hashemi Rafsanjani's authority. Speaking in Qom, he said that he was "shocked" at Rafsanjani's recent speech where the former President offered his view of the political situation "according to [Rafsanjani's] experience". Yazdi snapped, "Is this more important than the Supreme Leader's experience?"

Yazdi urged/warned Rafsanjani to "come back to the breast of the Revolution and the Supreme Leader", criticising Rafsanjani's ambiguity: "Your speech is not just two sides; it is many sides."

1515 GMT: We have posted a major update to our earlier analysis of the Karroubi and Khatami moves today, taking into account corrected and new information about the Karroubi statement.

1500 GMT: Hasan Ahmadian, a leading member of Mir Hossein Mousavi's campaign, was reportedly released on bail of $500,000 last night.

1300 GMT: We have posted an urgent snap analysis of the important --- if true --- developments of the Karroubi letter accepting Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as President (see 1135 GMT) and Mohammad Khatami's letter to the Supreme Leader: "Has a Deal Been Struck?"

1230 GMT: Watch-It Warning of the Day. Tehran Prosecutor General Abbas Jafari Doulatabadi strikes the pose --- insulting senior figures and the head of the three branches of the Iran Government (the President, Speaker of Parliament, head of Judiciary) is a crime. So don't do it.

Doulatabadi also commented on other matters, including the 5 Ashura detainees tried this weeks on charges of "mohareb"/war against God and threats to national security (verdicts will be issued soon) and the murder of Professor Ali-Mohammadi (enquiry continues).

1135 GMT: A Vote of Legitimacy. Well, you can now top our morning analysis of Rumours with this report:

Iranian opposition leader Mehdi Karroubi who had refused to accept the re-election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, now recognises the hardliner as the country's "president", Karroubi's son told AFP (Agence France Presse) on Monday.

Hossein Karroubi quoted his father as saying: "I am still of the same belief that the election was unhealthy and massively rigged. But since the (Supreme) leader (Ayatollah Ali Khamenei) endorsed (Ahmadinejad's victory), I believe that he is the head of the government, meaning he is the president."

....Fars (News Agency) asked the opposition leader whether he now acknowledges Ahmadinejad as the president.

The ex-speaker of parliament, who came fourth in the disputed June 12 presidential election, replied: "I still maintain that there were problems (in the election), but with regard to your question, I should say that I recognise the president."

1130 GMT: Far-from-Academic Losses. An EA reader follows up on the story of the apparent firing of Professor Abbas Kazemi by Tehran University for his attendance at the funeral of Grand Ayatollah Montazeri (0655 GMT):

If the news is true about Kazemi being fired from U of T, that is a sad thing. Kazemi wrote The Sociology of Religious Intellectuals in Iran, which I have sitting on my table right in front of me.

1120 GMT: The Meaning of Investment. An EA reader pulls me up on my morning jab at Press TV (0755 GMT) over its story that Iran is seeking foreign investment:

On the foreign investment caps being lifted, you are missing the big story. When (President) Khatami tried to do similar things in the late 1990s, the Guardian Council and fellow conservatives completely attacked the idea, saying it was selling out the country's resources. This is another example of how Ahmadinejad is actually more of an economic liberal than Khatami (who was never really sure about economic liberalism and it was not his forte) ever was.

1110 GMT: Your Latest Plot --- Greens, the CIA, and Currency. Kayhan newspaper is none too amused that Iran's Central Bank has backed away from declaring "invalid" any banknotes with Green slogans and/or markings.

For you see, the marking of the banknotes is clearly a CIA plot, based on the ideas of Robert Helvey, a retired Army officer and associate of Gene Sharp at Harvard University. Sharp is Iran's bete noire when it comes to thoughts of "velvet revolution", and Helvey also got a mention in the Tehran trials of August.

0755 GMT: More Morning Fun from Press TV. Apparently Shamsoddin Hosseini, Iran's Economy and Finance Minister, says there will no limit on foreign investment in Iranian industrial or mineral sectors under the 5th Development Plan (2010-2015) proposed by Presdent Ahmadinejad: ”The Iranian government will be trying to remove any obstacle in the financial domain by the end of the fifth development plan."

With respect, given reports that foreign investment fell up to 96 percent between March 2008 and March 2009 (in other words, before the current political crisis), I am a bit surprised Mr Hosseini did not declare that investors would be met at Imam Khomeini Airport with flowers and cases of Parsi Cola.

0735 GMT: Press TV's Morning Spin. The Iranian state outlet offers this dramatic story, "China attacks US for online warfare in Iran":

A Chinese Communist Party editorial says the election unrest in Iran was an example of US 'naked political scheming' behind a facade of free speech....The People's Daily editorial said the US had launched a "hacker brigade" and used social media such as Twitter to spread rumors and create trouble in Iran.

Interesting that Press TV doesn't seem to notice a possible motive for China's apparent defense of Iranian sovereignty and legitimacy --- perhaps theirreporters were looking at Twitter when US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made her high-profile speech last week calling for Internet freedom and focusing on China as the Number One Test Case.

0710 GMT: We've put our first updates in a separate analysis on political and economic developments.

0650 GMT: The Academic Fight over the Funerals. Norooz claims Professor Abbas Kazemi, a member of the School of Communications at Tehran University, has been fired for attending the funeral of Grand Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri last month.

More than 110 academics and scholars around the world, including Noam Chomsky and Ramin Jahanbegloo, have called for an independent enquiry into the murder of Tehran University professor Massoud Ali-Mohammadi.

0645 GMT: Strikes and Firings. The Flying Carpet Institute reports that five workers at Rasoul Auto Company have been dismissed after strikes over disputed back pays. The employees' wages for November and December have not been settled.

0615 GMT: Sunday's Best Story? Rah-e-Sabz claims that President Ahmadinejad handed over his budget proposal to Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, the CD was blank. (Cue all the metaphors about Ahmadinejad's economic plans.) Apparently Ahmadinejad was "quickly ordered" to transfer the proposal that does exist to Parliament.

0530 GMT: We've moved our overnight updates to a separate entry, "Listening to Rumours, Whispers, and Shouts".

UPDATED Iran Snap Analysis: The Karroubi and Khatami Manoeuvres

UPDATE 26 JANUARY: This reading is now overtaken by our special analysis on the significance of the Karroubi statement

UPDATE 1915 GMT: First, an apology. I got this wrong earlier --- I missed the important nuances in Karroubi's statement and made the wrong connection: it is not linked to the Larijani-Rezaei-Qalibaf initiative.

Second, a top EA correspondent is finishing checks with sources and will have the best analysis of this situation later tonight.

Iran Special Analysis: What Karroubi’s Statement on “Mr Khamenei”/”Head of Government” Means
The Latest from Iran (26 January): Now for the Follow-Up….
The Latest from Iran (25 January): Who Makes A Move Today?

UPDATE 1630 GMT: An EA reader points us to a curious piece that appeared in Mehdi Karroubi's Saham News this past weekend. The apparent confusion and even dispute between Karroubi and Khatami over a supposed approach to the Supreme Leader has been at the back of my mind while trying to read latest events. Any assistance from readers appreciated.

UPDATE 1500 GMT: EA sources, as well as readers, offer important amendments to our reaction:

First, it should be noted that Hossein Karroubi contacted a number of press outlets after Fars News claimed that Mehdi Karroubi had declared, without reservation that, he "recognised the President". Given Fars' past record, as well as the unlikely scenario that Karroubi would make such an important statement through that outlet, the scenario is that Hossein Karroubi was putting out a hasty "clarification" to prevent the Fars story from getting any traction.

Second, Hossein Karroubi's clarification had two important qualifiers. First, he made clear that his father saw Ahmeadinejad as "selected leader" rather than "elected President". Second, even though that selection was on the basis of the Supreme Leader's endorsement, there was a pointed reference to this as the action of "Mr Khamenei".

So the story seems to move away from a concerted response linking Karroubi and the "establishment" critics of the Government. Still, questions remain:

Why did Hossein Karroubi not give a simple repudiation of the Fars report? For the statement he offered has a curious tension: Mehdi Karroubi accepts the overriding verdict of the Supreme Leader (and thus velayat-e-faqih) even as he diminishes leader and system with the "Mr" tag.

And perhaps more importantly, is the Khatami letter to the Supreme Leader legitimate? For if so, Karroubi's response is not only to Ayatollah Khamenei; it is to the former President's attempt to bring together a group for reconciliation.

A quick reaction to emerging events, combined with the inside information Enduring America received last week:

Last week, as part of our articles on a possible "Plot Against President Ahmadinejad", we noted that the key participants (Ali Larijani-Mohsen Rezaei-Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf) had extended invitations to Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi to join the move.

This morning, we are processing news that 1) Mehdi Karroubi, through his son, is saying that he is recognising Ahmadinejad as President because of the Supreme Leader's endorsement; 2) Mohammad Khatami has written to the Supreme Leader upholding the process of reform but recognising the legitimacy of the Iranian system and has suggested the arbitration of Hashemi Rafsanjani in a resolution of political issues.

No one has yet been able to put forward a reason for the apparent shift, so here goes: the overture by the "establishment group" was not rebuffed. Instead, a deal may have been struck: the Supreme Leader and velayat-e-faqih are beyond dispute. The June election will not be overturned (primarily because Ayatollah Khamenei endorsed it), but the "reformist" leaders can put their grievances and recommendations for change to a working group.

And Ahmadinejad remains on the outside of the process.

A lot of holes at this stage in the hypothesis. After all, this assumes that the Karroubi and Khatami statements are as reported (I tend to think that is the case). Mir Hossein Mousavi has not made a declaration. And, of course, there will be nothing in public to connect this to a Larijani-Rezaei-Qalibaf initiative.

But, given how much rough water will be stirred rather than smoothed by these developments, best to cling on to something....

Iran: Listening to Rumours, Whispers, and Shouts

Of course, there has never been a phase in this post-election conflict which has been one of clarity, even over the basic demand --- expressed in the march of hundreds of thousands on 15 June --- to overturn the result of the Presidential election. This phase, however, has been particularly complex and often confusing, with manoeuvres and statements coming from all directions outside and inside the Iranian establishment.

Mehdi Karroubi's Etemade Melli party tried to put out a clear signal yesterday that the fight, both over the election and the direction of the Iranian system, goes on. Using the symbolic event of Karroubi's visit to the family of Ali Reza Beheshti, the detained chief advisor of Mir Hossein Mousavi, the party's Saham News website declared that the regime had been ignoring the rights of people for years and now did not understand the meaning of the arrests of the arrests of "sons and daughters of the Revolution". (Ali Reza Beheshti is the son of the late Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, a key figure in the 1979 Revolution who founded Iran's judiciary.) It again cited Karroubi's case on detainee abuses, which he has pressed since July, with the example of Kahrizak Prison. (English-language summary of the statement)



Responding to a hard-line newspaper's claim that Karroubi had been "asleep" and only just woken to realise he had been manipulated by foreign agents, Etemade Melli declared:

Do you want to know who else is asleep and when they should wake up? Hold a free election or give permission for a free and safe gathering for the supporters of Karroubi and Mousavi then watch and see how people will wake you up. So it is necessary that you know that Karroubi is standing firm and confident and has proofs for all his remarks.

Etemade Melli's statement has received surprisingly attention so far outside Iran, however, in part because of the chatter over the country's economic situation. The rumours that Iran's banking sector is on the point of collapse only strengthened on Sunday, fuelled by news of individual cases of bank shutdowns and conflict. Peyke Iran, for example,featured the story of a bank in the Sadeghiyeh district of Tehran, where security forces had to disperse crowds who were demanding (unsuccessfully) the funds from their accounts.

The rumours sit, sometimes eerily, alongside other reports that there is no crisis. An EA source from Tehran reports, for example:

One can still write checks for any amount. Also, most people with bank accounts in Iran now have debit cards, and more and more stores are getting little debit card chargers. I paid my phone bill at the government office last week with my debit card. That is not an economy on the brink.

On the political scene, the biggest distraction was the story that Javad Larijani, a key official in Iran's judiciary and brother of Speaker of Parliament Ali and head of Judiciary Sadegh, had used a racial slur when denouncing Barack Obama. The episode overshadowed the important passages in Larijani's speech where he both praised and criticised Hashemi Rafsanjani, apparently in an effort to get the former President to declare his political position over the Ahmadinejad Government (see yesterday's updates).

UPDATED Iran: The Plot Against President Ahmadinejad

URGENT UPDATE 1240 GMT: The Next Move in the Plot? Abdolhossein Ruholamini has given another interview about the crimes in Kahrizak Prison, including the abuse and death of his son Mohsen.

Ruholamini repeated the information, mentioned in our main article about his speech to a student organisation, that he has more than 3500 pages of evidence against the people in charge of Kahrizak. And he reiterated that there is independent evidence of the attempted murder of Kahrizak doctor Ramin Pourandarjan, who died last autumn. Ruholamini again singled out Ahmadinejad aide Saeed Mortazavi as the main suspect, saying the former Tehran prosecutor should accept the charges and resign instead of issuing political statements.

Iran Discussion: How Would Ahmadinejad Fall? (And What Would Come Next?)
Iran: A Response to “The Plot Against Ahmadinejad”
The Latest from Iran (22 January): Breaking News

Ruholamini added the new claim that forces "behind the scenes" have been trying to get the families of victims to agree to silence, but he declared that he and some other families would "stand till the end".

These claims, however, are only the set-up for Ruholamini's political hammer blow: in a meeting with the Supreme Leader, "Ayatollah Khamenei supported my cause".

And guess where the interview has been reprinted? Well, it is in two publications linked to the central plotters against President Ahmadinejad: Tabnak, linked to Mohsen Rezaei, and in Farda, which supports Mohammad Baqer-Qalibaf.

UPDATE 1000 GMT: There has been no high-profile media coverage, to our knowledge, of our news of the Larijani-Rezaei-Qalibaf meeting. The closest intersection has been a blog post by Babak Dad, who is now writing outside Iran, and his interview on Voice of America Persian yesterday. Dad's blog considered in detail the more general story of the manoevures by Ali Larijani, Mohsen Rezaei, and Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf against the Ahmadinejad Government, while his interview  but so far he has not connected this to the specific claim of a plot to curb or remove the President from power.

UPDATE 23 JANUARY, 0700 GMT: 24 hours later, how does the plot story hold up?

Well, there was no explicit confirmation --- given the sensitivity of any attempt to depose the President, that would be unlikely --- there were no development pointing away from the possibility. Indeed, the one piece of circumstantial evidence, Ali Larijani's statement before Friday Prayers in a city southwest of Tehran, gave implied support. The Speaker of Parliament made a veiled invitation to opposition leaders to join a move, and he continued the attack on the Government's management of the economy.

(Someone is also starting some pretty wicked rumours. Notable amongst these on Friday was the "Iran banks will fail on Wednesday" story.)

EA readers maintained a healthy scepticism about the day throughout the day. Some points can be answered quickly --- because of the way we received the information and checked it, I am certain it is not regime disinformation or a pretext to move against irritants like Larijani. Other questions are far trickier, such as the role of the Supreme Leader in these manoeuvres and the process by which the plotters could pull the trigger and oust Ahmadinejad.

An EA correspondent picked up on some of these issues in "A Response to the Plot Against Ahmadinejad", and this morning we have a sharp, valuable discussion between Chris Emery and another EA Iran specialist on not only the complications of deposing the President but the uncertainties of what would follow.

UPDATE 0810 GMT: In last night's debate on Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, Hojatoleslam Ruhollah Hosseinian, a member of Parliament and fervent Ahmadinejad supporter, alleged that "some people in charge want to overthrow" the Government with the help of the Parliament.

---

For months we have reported on the challenge to President Ahmadinejad, not just from the Green movement but from conservative and principlist members of the Iranian establishment. Since Ashura (27 December), we have noted a rising intensity in criticism, for example, from member of Parliament Ali Motahhari and his brother-in-law, Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, as well as the Parliamentary report on detainee abuses charging Ahmadinejad aide Saeed Mortazavi with responsibility.

The question still remained. Were these criticisms being made by high-profile individuals or were they part of an organised effort to limit Ahmadinejad's authority and possibly even remove him from office?

Here is what we can now report from reliable sources:

1. THE MEETING MAKES A PLAN

Sometime after the demonstrations of Ashura (27 December), three well-placed Iranian politicians met to discuss current events. The protests, with their scenes of violence and, in some cases, the retreat of Iranian security forces before the opposition, had been unsettling, raising fears not only that the challenge would persist but that the authority of the Government might collapse.

The three men were 1) Ali Larijani, the Speaker of the Parliament; 2) Mohsen Rezaei, former head of the Revolutionary Guard, former Presidential candidate, and Secretary of the Expediency Council; and 3) Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf, Mayor of Tehran.

The meeting reached agreement on a general two-step strategy. First, the crisis with the opposition would be "solved", either through a resolution with its leaders or by finally suppressing it out of existence. Then, there would be a political campaign to get rid of the unsettling influence of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Each of the three men brought not ideas but key groups to the table. Larijani, of course, commanded a good deal of backing in Parliament and was close to the Supreme Leader. Rezaei not only had the background in the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps but also, in the Expediency Council, worked with Hashemi Rafsanjani. Qalibaf, although mostly quiet during the post-election crisis, had the base of support from his solid reputation overseeing Tehran.

(It is likely, according to sources, that Rafsanjani knows of the plan, especially given the connection with Rezaei. It is unclear whether the Supreme Leader knows its details.)

The plan, however, soon ran into trouble with its first objective. The group was unable to get the support of Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi. Despite the sustained wave of post-Ashura arrests, striking at the top levels of the Green movement, the prospect of large demonstrations on 22 Bahman (11 February), the anniversary of the 1979 Revolution, remains. And it is that prospect that was reportedly worrying the Supreme Leader when he spoke last week to ask the "elites" to choose sides and stop being "ambiguous".

So the possibility arose that the second step --- the removal of Ahmadinejad --- would take priority over the first. Newspapers connected to the three men stepped up their articles criticising the Government over the post-election crisis, over the Kahrizak Prison scandal, and over the economy. Larijani went public in statements alleging mismanagement by the Ahmadinejad administration and referring to the dangers of "extremism" within, as well as outside, the Government.

Meanwhile, a key distinction was being made at every opportunity. While the Government could and should be criticised, Ayatollah Khameini should not be challenged. Larijani in particular set out the line: velayat-e-faqih, the system of ultimate clerical authority, is beyond dispute.

The immediate goals are the downfall of two men in Ahmadinejad's camp: former Tehran Prosecutor General Mortazavi, who is vulnerable because of the detainee scandal, and former First Vice-President and current Chief of Staff Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai, whose management skills as well as his character are being attacked across a range of issues.

It may be possible for Mortazavi to be removed and for Ahmadinejad to survive, assuming that none of the Kahrizak scandal sticks to him. Victory over Rahim-Mashai, however, would be a major blow to the President. After all, this was the fight of the summer, where Ahmadinejad had to give way over his relative and friend as First Vice-President --- notably because of pressure from the Supreme Leader --- but then brought him back as his closest aide.

To lose Esfandiar once is misfortune; to lose him twice political calamity. Ahmadinejad's authority would be open to further attack, and the post-election crisis could be brought upon him personally. Which brings us to....

2. THE FATHER EXPRESSES HIS ANGER.

"It may be possible for Mortazavi to be removed and for Ahmadinejad to survive, assuming that none of the Kahrizak scandal sticks to him."

Abdolhossein Ruholamini is a prominent Tehran University professor who was the chief advisor to Mohsen Rezaei. He is also the father of Mohsen Ruholamini, who died from abuse this summer in Kahrizak Prison. That death was instrumental in prompting both the closure of Kahrizak, by personal order of the Supreme Leader, and the Parliamentary enquiry into events there.

Abdolhossein Ruholamini, however, is still campaigning. Last week he met with the student movement, Islamic Community from European Countries to Iran. In a forceful speech, he declared his anger with Ahmadinejad and the Government. He made clear that he and others had decided to "claim and appeal" over the authorities at Kahrizak, Saeed Mortazavi, the police, and the judiciary: (I paraphrase) "We have much evidence against Mortazavi, against police, against some judges. (Ruholamini said that, in one case, a single judge had condemned 700 people to jail in one day.) We even have phone conversations over the killing of the doctor [Ramin Pourandarjan] in Kahrizak.”

Ruholamini made clear that his claim and appeal is also against President Ahmadinejad. And he has also said that he met the Supreme Leader over the matter and Khamenei said (paraphrasing), "Go ahead. The way is clear for you."

3. THE OUTCOME?

EA sources report the sentiment of those in and around the Larijani-Rezaei-Qalibaf meeting and the statements of Ruholamini: “We have decided to replace Ahmadinejad”. At the same time, the group is insisting that the removal has to done within the framework of law. It is notable, for example, how Mohsen Rezaei --- in an extended interview with Press TV last week --- insisted repeatedly that the difference between him and other Presidential candidates (Mousavi and Karroubi) in the post-election conflict was that Rezaei had always made his complaints within Iran's system, rather than on the streets.

The most likely path for that campaign is Parliamentary removal of Ahmadinejad --- similar to the US process of impeachment and conviction of a President --- for negligence in carrying out his duties and leading the country in a good direction. This was the process used to oust the first President of the Islamic Republic, Abdolhassan Bani-Sadr, in 1981.

That case, however, raises a question and possible complication. In 1981 Ayatollah Khomeini was behind the removal of Bani-Sadr. In this case, it is still not clear if the current Supreme Leader, and those close to him such as his son Mojtaba, are fully aware of or in line with the campaign against Ahmadinejad.

Which in turn brings us back to the earlier disputes of summer 2009, when the Supreme Leader --- after protracted battles with Ahmadinejad including not only Rahim-Mashai but also control of key ministries --- proceeded with the President's inauguration. This time, given the mounting fears over 22 Bahman, which way does he turn? Does he intervene or stand aside, letting others play out this political showdown?

Iran Discussion: How Would Ahmadinejad Fall? (And What Would Come Next?)

Chris Emery and another top EA correspondent respond to yesterday's "The Plot Against President Ahmadinejad" and readers' question by considering the process for the President's removal and the political questions that would follow:

EMERY: First of all, we should not overlook that there would have to be another election within 50 days in the case of impeachment. The massive question then would be whether (Mir Hossein) Mousavi would be barred from standing. If he was, then the exercise in restoring legitimacy is worthless. If he wasn't, then the regime would be taking a monumental step. Can't see it happening for those reasons alone.

Iran: A Response to “The Plot Against Ahmadinejad”
Iran: The Plot Against President Ahmadinejad
The Latest from Iran (22 January): Breaking News

But if it did....


My understanding is that constitutionally the Majlis Speaker would take a central role in any impeachment. They would also be responsible, along with the Deputy President and head of the Judiciary to arrange for the new President to be elected within 50 days. This may be complicated if (Speaker of Parliament) Ali Larijani is standing.

That would partly explain Rafsanjani's influence in 1981 as head of the Majlis. It might not give him quite as an important role now. On the other hand, in the above scenario, there would be two Larijanis and a weak Deputy (President) at the center of the process.

I also believe that in the case of dismissal of the President, the Deputy would take over until a new election. That would put (Mohammad Reza) Rahimi in temporary power.

However, in the case of "other matters which prevent him to perform his duties", the Leader "shall appoint another person in his place". Even if Rahimi doesn't have the "approval" of the Supreme Leader, Khamenei can appoint another for the interim. So the SL could have his pick for 50, probably quite important, days. But I assume they would not get rid of Rahimi and declare an election quickly.

(Tehran Mayor Mohammad-Baqer) Qalibaf or Larijani or possibly (Secretary of Expediency Council Mohsen) Rezaei most likely to be acceptable to (Revolutionary) Guards and Supreme Leader. The Greens would take Qalibaf, but I suspect the international community would be happy with Larijani.

I said on Enduring America a while back that getting rid of Ahmadinejad and a modest amount of judicial reform or scapegoating would be the best way of splitting the opposition and isolating the fringe who want to dismantle the Islamic Republic. This initiative makes perfect sense but for the problem of an election.

Let me know where I am going wrong.

CORRESPONDENT: Chris, your reading is substantially correct, however the lack of precedent under the present Constitution, i.e. the one in place since 1989, means that it is likely that none of the gritty details contained in it will be respected. My gut feeling is that we won't see new elections in 50 days time, if and when Ahmadinejad is dethroned, but rather a temporary Presidential council taking over, with the usual suspects --- Larijani, Qalibaf, Rezaei, perhaps some Mousavi-leaning people --- part of it.

However, the big, unattended question in my view is --- what happens to Ahmadinejad himself if he is ousted? He certainly won't take the [deposed President in 1981, Abdolhassan] Bani Sadr route and challenge the regime before fleeing abroad, and he won't be chucked into regime retirement homes like the Supreme Leader's office and/or the Expediency Council either. How quite anyone intends to handle an impeached Ahmadinejad is quite a mystery for me, given that the man arguably has more popularity now than what Bani Sadr enjoyed at the moment of his ousting.

EMERY: I agree there is a lack of precedent, but the provisions and mechanisms for impeachment were not altered in 1989.

Would they really make up an entirely extra-Constitutional body? Perhaps they could amend the Constitution, but that was a lengthy undertaking last time and took a public referendum.

Perhaps I'm thinking too orthodox, and they could do this on the fly, but I remain skeptical that this will really happen. Not least because of the problem of what to do with Ahmadinejad. Can't quite see him donning a chador, escaping to France, and joining forces with MEK (Mujahedin e-Khalq, opposed to the Iran regime since 1979)! Of course the sensible thing to do would be to have Ahmadinejadmeet an accident and blame MEK-US-Israel-Mousavi....

CORRESPONDENT: Chris, the impeachment scenario today is very different from 30 years ago. At the time, executive power was in the hands of the Prime Minister, and Bani Sadr was technically impeached because he was relieved of his technically ceremonial office.

This time round the whole executive branch of state enters a state of paralysis, collapse, and uncertainty which cannot be rapidly hushed up like 1981, when prime minister Mohammad Ali Rajai's government, at the time totally estranged from President Bani Sadr, kept on working --- ironically one of the very first decisions after the ouster of Bani Sadr was appointing one Mir-Hossein Mousavi to the vacant Foreign Minister position. Besides, at the time there was Khomeini who could rally everyone around himself. Khamenei will not be able to redeem himself via a simple ouster of Ahmadinejad.

As for extra-constitutional bodies, there is ample precedent. The Assembly of Experts was founded in 1983 or 1984 and included in the Constitution in 1989 --- ditto the Expediency Council, which Khomeini created in January-February 1988 and which was finally incorporated in the Constitution in June 1989. All it needs is essentially a decree by Khamenei.

EMERY: So impeachment would for political reasons have to be accompanied, not by the Consitutional provisions, but by the establishment of a temporary Presidential Council which may or may not receive consitutional legitimacy some years down the line. I still think this would be an extraordinary step. It would presumably have to be rubber-stamped by Parliament.

Also, how temporary would this council be? presumably till the next election cycle?

CORRESPONDENT: I think anything, including Ahmadinejad's resignation would be exceptional and extraordinary right now, and would not solve the political crisis in the long term for sure. I am not even sure his impeachment would ensure a working government, I have reasons to believe that it would unleash anarchy.

Besides, Khamenei has erred on the side of caution throughout the past 20 years. To stick a neck out and implicitly acknowledge that he screwed it up big time on [the Presidential election of] 12-13 June would be a step too far. So I think Khamenei would agree to such a plan only if it were backed up by cast-iron guarantees from everyone involved that he and his cronies (Revolutionary Guards especially) would be left unscathed.

As to how Mousavi and (Mehdi) Karroubi would react to all this, considering that they risk alienating their popular base en masse if they appear to buckle under the terms of a pro-Khamenei agreement --- as a Qalibaf-Larijani-Rezaei one would certainly be portrayed as by the reformist media.... That remains also very much to be seen.