Iran Analysis: What's Most Important Today? (Hint: Not Sanctions)

We begin today with a special analysis from Mr Verde of last Friday's events, which become more rather than less significant with the passage of time: "4 June: The Day the Regime Will Regret".

Keep that, and the internal developments in Iran, in mind today as the international politicians and press run amok with the story of Iran's nuclear programme and the world's sanctions. After months of spin and manoeuvre, the UN Security Council will convene this morning in New York to adopt a US-led resolution for stricter financial measures. The Americans are now confident they will get passage, with Russia and China giving assent --- Washington is putting out the line that it will be a 12-3 vote with no vetoes.

Iran Analysis: 4 June “The Day the Regime Will Regret” (Verde)

The economic reality is that, to get Moscow and Beijing on board, the sanctions package has been diluted so much that the measures are marginal. (As EA has noted regularly, the behind-the-scenes effort to get foreign companies to disinvest from Iran is far more significant.) Politically, however, this will be the platform for tough-guy --- and tough-woman --- posturing with claims, "We have been vindicated."



The US and its allies will intone that this shows the world now realises the seriousness of Iran's threat. Russia and China will say very little, and what they say will be very guarded: we have supported the sanctions but the primary path to resolution should be diplomatic discussions. Turkey, which will probably vote No, will use that move to bolster its emerging claim as a defender of negotiation rather than punishment and, thus, as a country able to work both with the big boys like Washington and the smaller nations seeking recognition and respect.

And Iran's leaders will use the UN measure to their own advantage. Three days before the anniversary of the 2009 election, they will tell their people that this proves the hostility of foreign powers --- the same foreign powers who tried to undermine Iranian democracy by supporting the opposition movement and "regime change". They will insist that the vote in New York reminds those in Tehran, Shiraz, Tabriz, and Ahwaz that they cannot let up in their defense of "Iran" (i.e., the Supreme Leader, the President, and the Government).

In other words, they will use the nuclear-sanctions fuss as their saving distraction. It will be upheld over the arrests, sentences, and executions that continue and, in recent days, escalate. It will be given priority over the political disputes --- on the economy, on President Ahmadinejad's battle with Parliament over legislation, on the treatment of Ayatollah Khomeini's grandson --- within the ruling establishment. It will be the shiny object held high so Iran's people can look away.

So, as the ink is spilt and trees die today for the rhetoric over the UN sanctions decision, the important spin-off will not be on any claimed effect on Iran's centrifuges and uranium. It will be this: will the political theatre 6121 miles away take over the stage in Tehran? Or will it be set aside --- not by Iran's leaders but by others --- for other, more significant shows?

Iran Analysis: 4 June "The Day the Regime Will Regret" (Verde)

Mr Verde writes for EA:

When the history of this post-election conflict is written, the events of Friday, 4 June 2010, may be as significant as last year’s Qods Day and Ashura. They may be even more important.

The regime is trying to pretend that there is no crisis of confidence/legitimacy and that the post-election protests are over. But last Friday, at what was supposed to be the commemoration of Ayatollah Khomeini's death, President Ahmadinejad was still talking about last year’s elections and the Supreme Leader was still threatening former (and possibly even current) regime officials –-- this time with execution. Seyed Hassan Khomeini, the grandson of the Ayatollah, was shouted down during his speech.

Events like the 4 June commemorations are planned well in advance, tightly controlled, and well-choreographed. We can therefore dismiss with great confidence any suggestion that the hecklers were ordinary people acting in the moment. They were thugs organized by regime officials.

Whatever the true intentions of the organizers,these events have and will continue to damage Ayatollah Khamenei. The reason?

There are two possibilities: either the thugs were organized on the order of Khamenei, or the heckling was carried out without his permission.

If Khamenei was kept out of the loop, then he is losing his grip on the Islamic Republic. When a group of regime thugs can barrack Hassan Khomeini with impunity right in front of the Supreme Leader and the world media, when Khamenei cannot even control his audience for a few minutes during an important ceremony. how can one expect him to have control over the actions of other regime officials? (Which, looking backward, raises the question: how can the Supreme Leader claim so confidently that there was no fraud during the June 2009 elections?)

If the thugs were carrying out Khamenei’s orders, then the Islamic Republic is gripped by such a dangerous crisis that its highest official is forced to sacrifice the reputation of his regime in an attempt to embarrass and humiliate another regime insider. If this is the case, then Khamenei’s warm embrace of Hassan Khomeini after the latter’s abandoned speech also points to the nasty, duplicitous personality of the Supreme Leader.

In either case, the events of 4 June have provided a rallying point for Khamenei’s detractors within the regime –-- whose numbers, by the way, seem to be growing by the week. It not only Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, but alsoother reformists and even principlists like Ali Motahari have used these events as an excuse to criticise Khamenei personally.

If the intention of the regime's show on 4 June was to weaken the opponents of Khamenei and Ahmadinejad, the scheme appears to have backfired.

One may argue that the Supreme Leader is trying to wipe out any reference to Ayatollah Khomeini and replace Khomeini’s legacy with his own. The problem is that, since last June, Khamenei’s reputation as a religious and political leader has been damaged. He has not been able to make repairs and all high-profile regime manoeuvres, including last Friday, have brought more damage.

Let’s not forget that the June ceremonies were cut back from 3 days to 1 day this year; despite all the preparations the numbers attending were far less than what he regime had claimed and hoped for; 15 Khordaad (5 June), the day which marks the beginning of the uprising in the 1960s that eventually led to the 1979 Revolution, was completely forgotten this year.

Ayatollah Khomeini is the main pillar of the Islamic Republic. The regime owes its existence to him, and all of its officials claim his approval for their ideas and actions. doing. His burial site, where the 4 June ceremonies were taking place, is similar to the shrines of Shia Imams. The failure of regime officials to capitalise on this --– and by their actions disrespecting his memory –-- points to serious problems within the Islamic Republic.

In February, I mentioned that, because of the crisis in the Islamic Republic, the regime will be forced into display that will come back and haunt them. Add the events of 4 June to that growing list.

The Latest from Iran (8 June): Tremors and Falsehoods

2000 GMT: The Rooftop Allahu Akbars Are Back. Claimed video of tonight in west Tehran, with residents shouting "God is Great":

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4NriBVuN3og&feature=youtu.be[/youtube]

NEW Iran Election Anniversary Special: The Power of the “Gradual”
NEW Iran Special Report:The Attack on Civil Society (Arseh Sevom)
Iran Analysis: The Unexpected Fight Over “Khomeini”
Iran Analysis: One Year After the Election (Shafaee)
Iran Feature: Music and Resistance (Fathi)
The Latest from Iran (7 June): Mousavi-Karroubi Meeting

1955 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Masoud Nourmohammadi, detained since 20 January, has been sentenced to three years in prison for "assembly and collusion against national security". His brother, reformist activist Saeed Nourmohammadi, is serving a one-year prison sentence, with five years suspended, and a 30-year ban on political activity.


1935 GMT: 22 Khordaad. Still waiting for video to surface of today's press conference by Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi. Those present included Advar News, Jaras, Norooz, Saham News, Green Voice of Freedom, Tahavole Sabz, Kalameh, Emrooz, and Mizan.

Meanwhile, Rah-e-Sabz clarifies the latest developments on the requests to march on 12 June. The number of reformist groups seeking permits has risen from 8 to 10.  Two parties have already been rejected, while the rest --- meeting a request from the Ministry of Interior for more information --- have said the protest will "be a silent one, with no one carrying any arms. There will be no statement read out and no speech made." Demonstrators will "carry signs asking for free elections and using green as their symbol".

1920 GMT: Parliament v. President (cont.). The most intriguing move, however, comes from "principlist" MP Ali Motahari. Having been warned for saying that the disturbance at last Friday's ceremony for Ayatollah Khomeini was due in part to the President's election, Motahari said that he would welcome his removal from the party. He declared that this would prepare the ground for the establishment of an independent faction composed of moderate reformists and principlists.

1915 GMT: Parliament v. President. A number of intriguing developments in the conflict between the Majlis and the President....

BBC Persian reports that the Supreme Leader has stepped in, calling for more oversight of the work of Parliament but also seeking more collaboration between the Majlis and Ahmadinejad.

A number of MPs have criticised Ahmadinejad's latest power play. Farhad Tajari, deputy chief of the Majlis legal commission, condemned the President’s letter to the Guardian Council questioning the legitimacy of a number of Parliament's bills, and Seyed Reza Akrami maintained that only the Guardian Council can declare Parliamentary measures illegal. Abbas Rejai, the head of Parliament’s agricultural commission, said that as the Guardian Council has approved all legislation in his area, no one can question its validity.

The Parliament also blamed the office of the President for releasing Ahmadinejad's letter, which bore a confidential stamp, with “all its blatant legal equivocations”.

1910 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Kouhyar Goudarzi, member of the Committee of Human Rights Reporters, has been sentenced to one year in prison.

1740 GMT: Ahmadinejad "All OK. Nothing to See. Move Along." Amidst his rhetoric about the nuclear issue and Israel, President Ahmadinejad did take time today in Turkey to make a passing comment on his own country.

So let it be noted --- because all media hell is going to break loose tomorrow when the UN Security Council adopts a sanctions resolution and the Iranian Government responds, three days ahead of the election anniversary, with defiance and its honourable defence of the country's sovereignty against foreigners --- that Ahmadinejad said:

The Islamic Republic is one of the most stable countries of the world because its foundations are set in the hearts of every single Iranian....People hold the elections, supervise it and participate in it.

1625 GMT: The Complexities Within. Dissected News offers an interesting overview of the tensions not only within the Green Movement but also within the Iranian establishment.

1610 GMT: Jailing the Journalists. Reporters Without Borders posts a lengthy summary of the represssion of journalists in Iran. Some basic statistics:

* At least 170 journalists and bloggers, including 32 women, have been arrested in the past year.

*22 of them have sentenced to jail terms totalling 135 years.

*85 journalists are awaiting trial or sentencing.

* More than 100 journalists have been forced to flee the country.

*23 newspapers have been shut down and thousands of web pages have been blocked.

*With 37 journalists and bloggers currently held, Iran is one of the world’s four biggest prisons for the media, alongside Cuba, Eritrea and North Korea.

1605 GMT: In the Category of Totally Unexpected News. Kalemeh, the website of Mir Hossein Mousavi, is complaining that the Ministry of Interior is stalling over requests for permits to demonstrate on 12 June, the anniversary of the election.

The Ministry has turned down two applications from reformist parties but has asked six other groups for more information.

1345 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Student activist Behzad Bagheri was arrested on Saturday in Isfahan.

1315 GMT: From the Facebook page supporting Mir Hossein Mousavi:

Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi held a joint press conference today on the eve of one year anniversary of rigged presidential election (June 12) and answered to the questions of reporters from all over the world. Details of this press conference as well as the video of it will be published soon.

1300 GMT: I have posted an analysis, for the anniversary of Iran's election, assessing the significance of events that have happened and events to come: "The Power of the Gradual".

The decision to post the piece, which is a draft introduction to a new book, was spurred in part because of my frustration and sorrow at a set of high-profile analyses in Foreign Policy magazine which I think misrepresent the dynamic of post-election developments, especially with respect to information in and out of Iran.

In that context, I have just noted two other, very different reflections. Human rights activist Ahmad Batebi gives a lengthy interview in which he assesses, "People's Movement Will Stay Alive with Knowledge & Information". And Kathy Riordan interviews an activist, "Michi", on the influence of social media in this post-election crisis: "People in many countries outside Iran have established bonds with the Iranian people. Stereotypes and misunderstandings have been stripped away."

1215 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Reports have come in that journalist Zhila Bani Yaghoub has been sentenced to one year in prison and has banned for 30 years from reporting. Her husband, journalist Bahman Amoui, is already serving a five-year sentence in Evin Prison.

1010 GMT: American Detainees. Foreign Ministry spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast has said Tehran has no plans to swap three Americans jailed last summer in Iran on spying charges for Iranians held in the Unites States.

The website Free the Hikers offers the latest on the detainees, arrested after walking --- inadvertently, they claim --- across the Iraq-Iran border.

0940 GMT: Evading the Attacks. Writing in The New York Times, Jo Becker illustrates how the state-owned Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines evades sanctions through the re-flagging and renaming of ships:

Of the 123 Irisl ships listed [by the US Government], only 46 are still clearly owned by Irisl or its United States-listed subsidiaries, according to an analysis of data from IHS Fairplay, formerly Lloyd’s Register-Fairplay, based in Britain, which issues large merchant vessels their unique identifying numbers and tracks them over their lifetime. Four more were scuttled.

The rest — 73 — are now on record as owned and operated by companies that do not appear on the blacklist. The companies are located far from Iran, in places like Malta, Hong Kong, Cyprus, Germany and the Isle of Man. In all but 10 instances, however, records and interviews established definitive links between the ships’ new registered owners and Irisl.

0725 GMT: 22 Khordaad. The website 12june.org is now listing 68 cities planning events on 12 June for the anniversary of the Presidential election.

0654 GMT: Video of Day. Short and to the point --- "22 Khordaad" (12 June) is inscribed on a railing:

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YIugT-rfCIA[/youtube]

0650 GMT: Where's Mahmoud? President Ahmadinejad is in Turkey, putting the emphasis on foreign affairs. He has told a crowd in Istanbul that last week's raid on the Freedom Flotilla was the "death knell" for the "Zionist regime". He also said the recent Iran-Brazil-Turkey declaration on Tehran's uranium enrichment is the last chance for an agreement on the issue.

0645 GMT: Women's Rights Corner. Ayatollah Abdolnabi Namazi, the leader of Friday Prayers in Kashan has explained that televising women pariticipating in sports is forbidden.

0635 GMT: The Khomeini Fall-Out. Ayatollah Dastgheib, condemning the attack on Hassan Khomeini, asserts that the "only way out" out of the current predicament is the return of Mir Hossein Mousavi to the political scene with the assurance that he will not be threatened.

0555 GMT: We begin the morning with a special report from a new NGO, Arseh Sevom (Third Sphere), "Attacks on Civil Society in Iran, 2005-2010".

Meanwhile, in the current civil society, there are more signs of nervousness as the regime is still trying to deal with the aftermath of the ceremony for Ayatollah Khomeini, that went wrong last Friday and the uncertainty of the election's anniversary (22 Khordaad/12 June) approaches:

A New Anti-Government Coalition?

A sharp poke at Ahmadinejad, in the guise of analysis from Khabar Online, the website connected with Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani: it claims that even a significant number of "hardliners" have joined the reformists in opposition

The analysis projects that "moderate reformists" have a small chance to gain influence within two or three years and advises that hardliners should put themselves in four groups to discuss change, including "idealists", "pragmatists", and those taking the Government line.

Parliament v. President

The head of Iran's judiciary, Sadegh Larijani, has declared that the Parliament should help the judiciary to correct and update laws.

Hmm.... Could Sadegh be taking sides in the evolving dispute between his brother Ali and President Ahmadinejad? After all, it is Ali Larijani and other MPs who are complaining that the Government is implementing "incorrect" measures.

There's the prospect of more pressure on the President, with the claim that the results of an investigation into undocumented spending during Ahmadinejad's Government will be published soon.

"Dorough Online" (Lie Online)

That is new name given to Iran's media by Green Voice of Freedom, which is claiming a "new record" of at least three big lies per day handed down to the Iranian people. Unsurprisingly, Green Voice is offering examples from the ongoing presentation of last Friday's shout-down of Ayatollah Khomeini's grandson, Seyed Hassan Khomeini.

More Dorough....

The "hard-line" Kayhan, according to the Green site Rah-e-Sabz, is betraying its nervousness with a series of allegations, inventing foreign supporters, mysterious editors, and a headquarters in London for the opposition publication.

Political Prisoner Watch

Fereshteh Ghazi's posts an interview with the father of Amir Javadifar, who died in detention after he was arrested on 9 July. As Iran holds another court session, ostensibly to punish those who carried out abuses at Kahrizak Prison, Javadifar's father says, "We demand those who gave the orders at Kahrizak to be sentenced."

Iran Election Anniversary Special: The Power of the "Gradual"

This morning, I drafted this contribution to a new project for the anniversary of Iran's election. (More details soon, I hope.) I decided to post this after reading a series of high-profile analysis in Foreign Policy magazine which try to define Iran One Year Later for us. Ironically, given that the title of the collection is "Misreading Tehran", I found some of the pieces misleading, misguided, and even at times --- although I know this was not the intention of the authors --- belittling in their representation of Iranians.



So, in part, this is my response to those unhelpful definitions. But, in larger part, it is a Thank You to those who have been my instructors during this past year.

On 12 June 2009, I was enjoying a night out in London. My wife, who patiently puts up with the daily demands of my website on international affairs, had asked if I could risk trading an evening with Iran's Presidential election for dinner and the theatre. I assured her that it was clear that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his leading challenger Mir Hossein Mousavi would move to a second round of voting.


At 7:30 the next morning, the BBC rang to ask for an urgent comment: Ahmadinejad had won in the initial ballot with 63% of the vote. After I gave them a remark based more on surprise than insight, I realised two things: 1) I would be covering this story every day until there was a resolution; 2) to do so, I would have to become a student, seeking a variety of teachers to give me a crash course on the dynamics of Iranian politics, economics, religion, and society.

It is a year later. There is no resolution, and I am still learning.

I had had the good fortune, in the years before the 2009 election, to be introduced to Iran. I had worked with Iranian colleagues and students, and eventually --- despite my US passport --- had been able to visit the country to teach, participate in seminars, and give interviews to the Iranian media. I had even become an Adjunct Professor at a leading Iranian university.

Those opportunities had given me a glimpse of an Iran which was one of the most political environments I had ever encountered. There was constant discussion --- even as there were limits on that discussion --- of what the country was and what it might become. There was consideration, beyond the simplicities of the US v. Iran, of Tehran's role in the region and in the world, there were concerns about an economy facing both internal challenges and external restrictions, and there were glimpses of debates on social and cultural issues. Inevitably, given that I was working with students, there was much attention to the “Third Generation” that had grown up after the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s. I was told often --- by both critics and defenders of the Government --- that 30 years after the 1979 introduction of an Islamic Republic, this was a “Gradual Revolution”.

In the weeks before and after the 2009 election, however, change did not seem “gradual”. Even watching from a distance, I was swept up in the excitement that surrounded a campaign which, with its televised debates as well as its well-attended speeches, appeared to offer a louder political voice to Iran's people. That fervour continued after the election when President Ahmadinejad's victory speech, with its description of opponents as “dust and tumbleweeds”, was met by millions on the streets of Tehran. It crackled when the Supreme Leader's Friday Prayer vindicating the vote encountered more demonstrations of anger, tragedy, and hope. It would be resurgent when there were more public encounters: in mid-July after former President Hashemi Rafsanjani's Friday Prayer, on Qods Day in September, from 13 Aban (4 November) to 16 Azar (7 December) to the funeral of Grand Ayatollah Montazeri to the commemoration of Ashura on 27 December.

These were dramatic, still vivid events, yet I wonder if they misled us into forgetting about the “gradual”. Narratives were written as if a knockout blow would be landed either by the Green Movement or by the defenders of President Ahmadinejad. Predictions were uttered about the imminent fall or unshakeable permanence of the Islamic Republic. Each public occasion, while important, was given the aura of the defining incident that would finally conclude the inconclusive outcome of 12 June 2009.

Prize fights are settled within 15 rounds of 3 minutes each; the quest for civil rights is not. The election, after all, was just the public apex of a larger, ongoing climb for political, economic, and social recognition, respect, and justice. The Green Movement, as significant as it would become, did not displace the movements for women's rights, student rights, labour rights, legal rights, economic rights, religious rights, and the rights of Iran's many ethnic groups. (Indeed, one of the ongoing, “deeper” issues of this past year has been how the Green Movement --- if it is more than a symbolic entity --- interacts with the activism of these other movements.)

This post-election contest, which rested upon years of discussion and challenge within the Islamic Republic, was always destined to be a marathon and not a sprint.

But marathons are hard to cover. And, in the immediate aftermath of 12 June, that coverage --- at least by “mainstream” media --- would be complicated as Iranian authorities cracked down on domestic and foreign correspondents. The “mainstream” non-Iranian press was effectively blinded within weeks as reporters were expelled or fled because of intimidation and threats of detention, camera crews were restricted to offices and hotel rooms, and bureaus were shut. Iranian journalists persisted, but many of them --- eventually more than 100 --- would wind up in jail. By September, even the most prominent reformist newspapers and websites were being shut down, their offices raided and ransacked, their editors behind bars.

Unsurprisingly, some non-Iranian outlets --- deprived of their “normal” capacity for effective reporting --- would thus look for the big event rather than the gradual shifts. There would be weeks of silence or muted coverage of internal events, often as headlines were devoted to Iran's nuclear programme, and then a sudden burst of attention to a gathering such as the Ashura demonstration or the rallies on 11 February, the anniversary of the Islamic Revolution. Then, when that high-profile event did not produce a clean, final “victory”, the mainstream media might retreat into somnolence, sometimes after a benediction that the Green Movement had been vanquished.

Well, here's the paradox: amidst and even beyond these big events, the “gradual” has triumphed in media as well as politics.

Ultimately, it is not the speed of technology that --- despite the repression of the Iranian Government and despite the retreat of the “mainstream” media --- has ensured that Iran's post-election story is still ongoing in June 2010. Rather, it is the “gradual” efforts of those who, each day, often at risk to themselves, have persisted in telling their tales or passing on the information from others.

They are not the international correspondents with news programmes named after them, they are not the anchormen and anchorwomen with weekly talk shows to define the news, they do not even have by-lines. Sometimes their names are not even their own but are the pseudonyms and usernames that have to be adopted to ensure that they can report again.

However, it is they who remove our blindness by giving us a glimpse of the day-to-day. It is they who break up the deafening noise of State propaganda and pronouncements with sounds of what has occurred in their neighbourhoods. It is they who give form to the meaning --- not in the abstract, but in the real --- of “rights” and “justice”.

Ironically and somewhat sadly, I write this --- four days before the anniversary of the election --- as yet another set of articles by analysts tries to define all that we have experienced. One headline blares, “The Green Movement was a historic success. Too bad no one was watching.” (No. We are still watching, still writing, still learning.) A commentator proclaims, "Getting the real story out of Iran today is virtually impossible." (Difficult, yes. Impossible, no --- thanks to those whom the commentator, focused on mainstream media, never notices.) A journalist declares, “There was no Twitter Revolution inside Iran.” (No, but that was never the issue. Twitter is a tool, a powerful tool that allows us to ensure that the “gradual” does not disappear --- we are still reporting, still writing, still learning --- as those in power try to shut down information into and out of Iran.)

[An important caveat: the collection also includes a redemptive piece by Nazila Fathi which avoids the dismissive generalisations and assesses, "Despite those all the obstacles put in its way, the media has done a remarkable job in properly identifying the enormity of the past year's events. The Green Movement has, indeed, shaken the very core of the Islamic Republic. The country is polarized and the regime's legitimacy has been compromised. All of this, the Western media -- at least, those of us who had any real experience covering Iran -- got largely right."

My one suggestion is that Fathi's "media" be considered as not only "Western media" but many Iranian journalists and Iranians who report even if they do not carry official press credentials.]

But, as I write this, irony rebounds and sadness turns back to hope. For I read these edicts from those analysts and journalists who try to define, once and for all, what has happened. Then I read the contributions in this book, contributions which come not from anointed experts or the by-lined professionals, and I realise that the story of “what has happened” is in these essays.

And it is not just “what has happened” but “what may happen”. There are no proclamations of the final outcome in these pages, no ringing of the bell to say that all is complete. Instead, the victory is in the process, the pursuit of the “gradual”. As long as the search for rights is persistent in these words of sorrow or hope, then rights cannot be denied. As long as the vision of fairness is offered in these reflections, then others have not succeeding in making us --- inside or outside Iran --- blind.

The power of the vote may have been taken away on 12 June 2009. Some may try to pronounce that Iranians --- repressed by their Government, bedazzled by false hopes of Twitter --- are reduced to the powerless. But As long as the power to express is put in the simple but effective phrases by these authors, then the power of expression remains.

A marathon, not a sprint.

Iran Special Report: The Attack on Civil Society and 19 Ways to Challenge It (Arseh Sevom)

Arseh Sevom (Third Sphere), a new NGO based in Holland "aiming to promote peace, democracy, and human rights", has published its first report, "Attacks on Civil Society in Iran, 2005-2010". The Executive Summary and Recommendations:

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Human rights abuses in the Islamic Republic of Iran are happening to individuals, but they are targeted at civil society. This is as true of the mistreatment and torture of those detained for protesting after the 2009 presidential elections as it is of the arbitrary arrests of human rights defenders. The abuses are designed to control an increasingly liberal population and to silence opposition and dissent.

Human rights discourse is marginalized and problematic in the IRI. In the past, many intellectuals have agreed in part with the regime that “human rights” has been used as a tool by the West to punish countries like Iran. Mohammad-Javad Larijani, head of Iran’s human rights council, has stated repeatedly that the Islamic Republic of Iran is in full compliance with human rights law. In 2008 he stated, “Tehran’s strategy is to conform international commitments on human rights to the Islamic concepts and then enforce them nationwide.”


This report looks at the ways in which civil society has been systematically undermined in Iran. The report does not deal with each individual or organizational case, but looks at the underlying patterns of abuses that are designed to target whole sectors of society through the harrassment of individuals and organizations. There are dozens of reports highlighting abuses and individual cases. We attempt to examine the internal situation that has led to the attacks on civil society activists and unravel the larger narrative underlying individual cases.

Our report begins with 2005, the year Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected as president of Iran. At the time, civil society in Iran had experienced its first taste of relative freedom, which primarily arose from the tentative opening of society during two four-year terms of reformist president Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005).

In 2005, the new administration took a hostile approach to civil society organizations, which resulted in limitations on their actions because of closures, travel restrictions, and other restrictions. The antagonist position towards civil society was the defining feature of Ahmadinejad’s first term, just as the struggle between societal reform and hardline elements had defined the administration of Khatami.

In this report we cover the following major topics:

- The tentative rise of civil society
- Struggle between reform and suppression
- The 2005 elections
- The emergence of a new political class
- Velvet revolution
- Struggle for the soul of Iran
- From green wave to civil rights: post-presidential elections (2009)
- Stifling women’s voices
- Reform is criminalized
- State control of workers
- The attack on human rights defenders
- Basij student movements are the only legitimate ones
- “Iran is the freest country in the world”
- Civil society, civil no more
- Recommendations

Recommendations

1) Civil society as a Social force: In today’s world civil society is one of the fundamental aspects of democracy as well as key player in the new geopolitics. Therefore, we ecommend that the Islamic Republic of Iran regard civil society as an effective factor in development and democracy, and not as a technocratic concept. The government must refrain from anti-civil society politics. We believe all of the aspects of the civil society must participate in proposal, decision making, execution and evaluation of all the policies, programs, in all fields and layers of the society.

2) Freedom of Association: Freedom of association is one of the main characteristics of stable democracy. Associations are important centers for practicing democracy.

Therefore we demand guarantees for the right of founding, acting, assembling, and protesting, according to Article 26 of the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, The Charter of the Human Rights, principles of civil-political rights, economic, social, and cultural rights, conventions and ratifications 87 and 98 of the International Labor Standards.

3) Autonomy: Autonomy is a fundamental necessity for longevity of civil society. We demand that according to Article 26 of the constitution, and the treaties of civil rights-political, economic, social and cultural-, conventions and ratifications 87 and 98 of the International Labor Organization, to refrain from interference in their internal affairs that jeopardize the independence of associations.

4) Human Rights: Respecting human rights is the foundation of peace, democracy, and sustained development, and Iran is a signatory to the universal declaration of human rights. Therefore, we demand respect and complete implementation of all articles and clauses in the human rights declarations, and protection and support for all human right activists in Iran.

5) Education of human and civil rights: Continuous and public education about civil and human rights is a necessary condition for having responsible and committed citizens in any society. We demand that the Islamic Republic government provide necessary conditions for teaching human and citizen rights in all layers of the society.

6) Guarantee the Freedom of Press: Newspapers are known as the fourth foundation of democracy. They play an important role in sustaining democracy. Therefore, we demand guarantee and improvement of the freedom of press in Iran.

7) Media Diversity: Multiplicity and diversity of media is representative of freedom of speech and thought. Therefore, we demand policies for diversification and the implementation of a private and non-governmental media sector across society.

8) Freedom of Speech and Thought: We demand guarantees for freedom of speech and thought and the lifting of restrictions from all social and artistic domains.

9) Revision and Reforms in all Rules and Regulations Pertinent to Civil Society: In the current situation, the absence of general laws, concentration of current laws, and legal vacuum in some domains and restrictive laws has led to underdevelopment and retardation of this immense social asset. Therefore, we demand corrections and revisions of all laws and rules overseeing the current civil society organizations.

10) Women: We demand revision and reforms of all discriminatory laws and rules, joining the convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women, and implementation of these rules by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

11) The Fundamental Labor Conventions: We demand ratification of conventions for freedom of association and assembly, the right to union formation and negotiation, minimum labor age, and prohibitions on child labor.

12) Revision of Educational Texts: Reform and revision of educational texts according to principles of human rights, civil rights, promotion of collaborative networks, volunteering and civil cultures, is another fundamental recommendation.

13) Supervision of Civil Society Organizations: Groups and organizations of the civil society oversee and reflect the needs and demands of people in different levels, especially those of the marginalized and disenfranchised groups. Therefore, we demand their official right to oversee their own affairs.

14) Social Exchange: Iranian civil society cannot flourish in a greenhouse, and without interactions with the outside world. Therefore, we demand that the government lift obstacles in the way of exchange, dialogue, and transfer of knowledge and experience among those inside and outside Iran.

15) Social Networks: Success and liveliness of social networks along with relations based on trust are key social assets of a society. There is a tight link between social assets and the development and sustainable democracy. Therefore, we demand that the government put aside the politics of destruction that deteriorate the real and virtual social networks.

16) Right to Access and Circulation of Information: To guarantee the right to access and circulate information is an important duty of the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, one of the signatories of the resolution and action plans of the World Summit on Information Society in Geneva (in 2003) and in Tunisia (2005). Therefore, we demand the right to access information and the lifting of the obstacles and broad filters on the transfer of information. Also, we demand the rights and civil freedom of citizens and associations in the virtual domain.

17) Professions and Professionalism: Professional organizations and professionalism are important foundations of a civil society. we demand that the government respect the independence of professional associations and to avoid interfering in their affairs, especially in the formulation and establishment of a code of ethics and conduct.

18) Culture, Language, Ethnicity: Cultural, linguistic and ethnic diversity is a common human heritage. We demand, according to the articles 15 and 19 of the constitution, that cultural, linguistic, and ethnic identities be respected.

19) Accountability to Interest Groups: With attention to considerable growth of unions and social demands, we demand accountability to interest groups, particularly university students, teachers, workers, farmers, nurses, industrialists, employers, lawyers, physicians, journalists and others.

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