Iran Election Guide

Donate to EAWV





Or, click to learn more

Search

Wednesday
Jun092010

The Latest from Iran (9 June): Paying Attention

2030 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Human Rights Activists News Agency reports that the head of Mir Hossein Mousavi's campaign in Babolsar has been arrested.

2000 GMT: A Friendly Notice. To all journalists riding the two-dimensional bandwagon on Twitter & Iran, treating cliches like "Twitter Revolution" as if they were the core of meaningful analysis, I'm not going to respond for the moment --- this is a made-up dramatic revelation, which recurs every few months and does not get to the heart of what social media has meant in the post-election crisis. Best to let it serve as tomorrow's chip paper.

But if you keep it up, I may change my mind....

1900 GMT: Mahmoud Snaps Back. President Ahmadinejad, who has had post-election encounters with dust (read his "victory speech") and insects (see video), worked both into his response to the UN sanctions resolution: "These (U.N.) resolutions have no value...They are like a used handkerchief that should be thrown in the dust bin. Sanctions are falling on us from the left and the right. For us they are the same as pesky flies....We have patience and we will endure throughout all of this."

NEW Latest Iran Video: Obama Statement on Sanctions...and Rights (9 June)
NEW Iran Analysis: What’s Most Important Today? (Hint: Not Sanctions)
NEW Iran Analysis: 4 June “The Day the Regime Will Regret” (Verde)
Iran Election Anniversary Special: The Power of the “Gradual”
Iran Special Report:The Attack on Civil Society (Arseh Sevom)
The Latest from Iran (8 June): Tremors and Falsehoods


1855 GMT: Back to 22 Khordaad. BBC Persian reports on the increased security presence on the streets of Tehran on the eve of 12 June,the anniversary of the election.


1725 GMT: President Obama has just made a statement about Iran in the aftermath of the UN vote on sanctions. We've posted the video.

Here's the quick read: Obama proclaimed that the sanctions were the "most comprehensive" Iran has faced, said that the UN resolution sent an "unmistakeable message", and spent most of the rest of the time justifying the position on sanctions in connection with his policy of "engagement": "We recognize Iran's rights, but with those rights come responsibilities. Time and again the Iranian Government has failed to meet those responsibilities."

Then, in one of the eight minutes of the statement, having declared,"These sanctions are not directed at the Iranian people," Obama switched from nukes to rights. He noted this Saturday's anniversary of the election, "an event that should have been remembered for how the Iranian people participated with remarkable enthusiasm but will instead be remembered for how the Iranian Government brutally suppressed dissent and murdered the innocent, including a young woman [Neda Agha Soltan] left to die in the street".

It was a bit awkward for the President to link back to uranium and sanctions, and he did not help by throwing in the spectre of Tehran's War of Terror --- "Actions do have consequences. And today the Iranian Government will face some of those consequences. Because whether it is threatening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation regime or the rights of its own citizens or the stability of its own neighbors by supporting terrorism, the Iranian Government continues to demonstrate that its unjust actions are a threat to justice everywhere".

However, at least for one moment, "Iran" was seen in more than the one-dimensional image of a nuclear weapon.

1720 GMT: Rafsanjani Watch. Former President Hashemi Rafsanjani's office has released a letter which, in the eyes of Deutsche Welle, criticises the Supreme Leader's silence over President Ahmadinejad and implicitly acknowledges fraud in the 2009 election.

1620 GMT: Sanctions. The UN Security Council has voted 12-2, with 1 abstention, for new sanctions against Iran over its nuclear programme.

The relatively limited measures include restrictions on transactions with Iranian banks, asset freezes on Iranian individuals and companies, and an expanded arms embargo on items such as attack helicopters and missiles.

Turkey and Brazil, who recently signed an agreement with Iran on procedure for talks over uranium enrichment, were the two countries who voted against the resolution. Lebanon abstained.

1605 GMT: Karroubi Watch. Al Arabiya has just published an interview from May with Mehdi Karroubi. Topics covered include the rise of the Green Movement, party politics, accusations of prison abuse and torture, Government mismanagement, and Ahmadinejad's foreign policy. Karroubi also offered this in anticipation of 22 Khordaad (12 June), the anniversary of the election:
We promise and give assurances that no incident will occur. I am certain that if a march is held, paramilitary forces will attempt to turn it violent, but our people are wise, and politically mature enough that even if certain individuals come chanting radical slogans, the people have the ability to control the scenario and confront them. However, if authorisation is not granted for demonstrations, we will then decide what to do; but it is currently not possible to say much.

1545 GMT: On the International Front (Mahmoud Stays Home). On Monday, Iranian state media were trumpeting that their internationally-esteemed President would be showing his strength, in the face of Western pressure, by going to the Shanghai Expo in China.

Today, Agence France Presse says that Ahmadinejad plans to stay away from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting to snub Russia and China for supporting the US-backed sanctions resolution in the United Nations.

1120 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Amnesty International has launched a new campaign, "One Year On: Stop Unfair Trials". Cases include journalists Abolfazl Abedini Nasr, Hengameh Shahidi, Emaduddin Baghi, Shiva Nazar Ahari and Ahmad Zeidabadi, student activists Majid Tavakoli and Mohammad Amin Valian, and Zia Nabavi of the Council to Defend the Right to Education.

1015 GMT: The Nuclear Discussions. A piece of news that slipped under the media radar....

The International Atomic Energy Agency has announced that it has received replies from France, Russia, and the US to the Iran-Brazil-Turkey declaration on procedure for uranium enrichment talks.

No details were given beyond the note, "Attached to each of the letters was an identical paper entitled ‘Concerns about the Joint Declaration Conveyed by Iran to the IAEA’."

That, however, indicates co-ordination between the three governments. And the timing of the IAEA's statement, together with the lack of substance, indicates that it is happy to let the news be overtaken by today's sanctions vote in the UN.

0955 GMT: Reflecting on The Year. Journalist Masih Alinejad has offered her recollections and analysis in an extended video interview with Voice of America Persian.

0935 GMT: A Signal for the Week? Hamshahri features the colourful cover identifying the bad guys in "Sedition '88".

0930 GMT: Intimidation of Kurdistan Businesses? Human Rights Activists News Agency reports that, following a general strike on 9 May to protest executions, members of bazaars across Kurdistan have been summoned and threatened by government authorities and the businesses of others have been sealed.

0800 GMT: What is the Green Movement? An interesting interview with Fatemeh Sadeghi, a former professor at Tehran University, who argues that the Green Movement is not the opposition of the "secular" against the "religious".

0750 GMT: The Post-Election Abuses. Abdul Ruholamini has resurfaced to declare that those responsible for the abuse and killing of detainees in Kahrizak Prison must "pay for their deeds".

Ruholamini, the campaign manager for Presidential candidate Mohsen Rezaei, is the father of Mohsen Ruholamini, who died in Kahrizak last summer. The case was instrumental in bringing the abuses to light and pressing the Supreme Leader to close Kahrizak. Ruholamini had gone farther in public statements at the start of 2010, declaring that high-ranking officials must take responsibility for the crimes, but had been silent in recent months.

Ruholamini may have been prompted to his statement by the news that the trial of 12 people over the Kahrizak case has finished behind closed doors.

0745 GMT: The Events of 4 June. Another perspective, complementing that of EA's Mr Verde, on last Friday's developments at the ceremony for Ayatollah Khomeini comes from Hamid Farokhnia in Tehran Bureau.

Tehran Bureau also features a review by Muhammad Sahimi, "The Green Movement at One Year".

0740 GMT: Parliament v. President (and Supreme Leader). It seems that Ayatollah Khamenei's intervention --- calling for Parliament-Ahmadinejad co-operation and threatening the Majlis with new "oversight" --- may not have been an overwhelming success.

Key MP Ahmad Tavakoli, an ally of Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, has commented in Khabar Online that the Constitution is written for people to cooperate, not to fight. So far, so good for the Supreme Leader.

But then Tavakoli re-asserts, "The Government has no right not to implement the laws from the Majlis."

0715 GMT: On a day when "Iran news", for most non-Iranian media, may be dominated by the passage of the US-led sanctions resolution in the UN Security Council, we set out priorities with two analyses: Scott Lucas declares, "What's Important Today? (Hint: Not Sanctions), and Mr Verde looks at "4 June: A Day the Regime Will Regret".

One US outlet shares our attention to the internal: Newsweek notes last Friday's events, with the shout-down of Seyed Hassan Khomeini, under the (over-blown) headline, "Iran's Hushed-Up Civil War":
For his part, Supreme Leader Khamenei did little damage control, even though he has worked hard to present a united front for Iran’s leadership, knowing that discord suggests vulnerability. He took the stage after Khomeini and asked the crowd to act in a more appropriate manner. But that was it. No defense of Khomeini and no rebuke to the crowd. With the anniversary of the contested election just days away now, Khamenei has been trying to manage a delicate balancing act between quieting and frightening the opposition—and sending mixed messages in the process.

In another warm-up for 12 June, the anniversary of the election, Zahra Rahnavard gives an interview to the Italian paper La Republicca. Beyond general criticism of the Government and the declaration, "I hope to shed the last drop of my blood in the cause of freedom and democracy," she focuses on key issues:
The demands of the women in Iran are twofold: 1) National demands such as freedom, democracy, the rule of the law, freedom of political prisoners, right to individual freedoms; 2) Elimination of discrimination and strengthening of cultural rights, women's rights and equal rights under the law.

....Democracy is not possible without women and without paying attention to the demands of women.
Wednesday
Jun092010

Afghanistan Feature: Unprecedented "Civilian Surge" Begins for 468th Time

Forgive the headline, but I have read varieties of this story so often in the past 8+ years that I had to smile when it was framed as a seemingly dramatic change of approach --- "Afghanistan Strategy Shifts to Focus on Civilian Effort" --- by The New York Times for Rod Nordland's story.



I leave it to readers to convert the public-relations spin into political, economic, and military significance, especially given the revised narrative of the Marja "victory" and the apparent delay in the "Kandahar offensive", which had been promised by the US military since early this year:

KANDAHAR, Afghanistan — The prospect of a robust military push in Kandahar Province, which had been widely expected to begin this month, has evolved into a strategy that puts civilian reconstruction efforts first and relegates military action to a supportive role.

Afghanistan Analysis: Assessing the National Consultative Peace Jirga (Mull)


The strategy, Afghan, American and NATO civilian and military officials said in interviews, was adopted because of opposition to military action from an unsympathetic local population and Afghan officials here and in Kabul.

There are also concerns that a frontal military approach has not worked as well as hoped in a much smaller area in Marja, in neighboring Helmand Province.

The goal that American planners originally outlined — often in briefings in which reporters agreed not to quote officials by name — emphasized the importance of a military offensive devised to bring all of the populous andTaliban-dominated south under effective control by the end of this summer. That would leave another year to consolidate gains before President Obama’s July 2011 deadline to begin withdrawing combat troops.

In fact, there has been little new fighting in Kandahar so far, and the very word “offensive” has been banished.

“We cannot say the term offensive for Kandahar,” said the Afghan National Army officer in charge here, Gen. Sher Mohammad Zazai. “It is actually a partnership operation.”

The commander of NATO forces in southern Afghanistan, Maj. Gen. Nick Carter, insisted that there never was a planned offensive. “The media have chosen to use the term offensive,” he said.  Instead, he said, “we have certainly talked about a military uplift, but there has been no military use of the term offensive.”

Whatever it is called, it is not happening this month. Views vary widely as to just when the military part will start. General Zazai says it will begin in July but take a break for Ramadan in mid-August and resume in mid-September. A person close to Tooryalai Wesa, the governor of Kandahar, says it will not commence until winter, or at least not until harvests end in October. He spoke on the condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to talk to the press.

American officials, on the other hand, say it has already begun, not with a bang, but with a steady increase of experts from the United States Embassy and NATO and aid workers — a “civilian surge” — accompanied by a quiet increase in American troops to provide security for them. The Americans strongly deny that they planned an offensive they are now backing away from.

Whereas in Marja the plan was to carry out a military assault to oust the Taliban, followed by rapid delivery of government services, in Kandahar the approach is now the opposite. Civilian aid workers, protected by an increased military force, will try to provide those services first, before any major military action.

“This is not going to be a door-to-door military campaign,” said one American civilian official, who requested anonymity in line with his agency’s policy. “You’ll see more Afghan National Police checkpoints, but it’s not going to be an aggressive military campaign. They’ve looked at it and realized it wouldn’t work.”

The troops have been arriving on schedule; for the first time, Afghanistan now has more American soldiers than Iraq does. Some 94,000 are here, compared with 92,000 in Iraq, with roughly half of them in Helmand and Kandahar, though the full troop levels will not be reached until August.

The United States Marine Corps assault on Marja that began on Feb. 13 was called Operation Moshtarak Phase II (after the Dari word for “together”), and planners initially called the Kandahar offensive Operation Moshtarak Phase III. Now Phase III has a new name, Operation Hamkari (Dari for “cooperation”).

“I’m not sure exactly what happened at the political level above us, but the very name of the thing changed,” said one NATO official in Kandahar, whose government’s policy requires that his name be withheld.

It is not so much what happened as what did not. Marja did not go nearly as well as hoped, and the area is still not sufficiently controlled for the local government’s activities to resume or take root.

Marja, with 60,000 residents, is far smaller than Kandahar, with more than a million in the city and the surrounding districts. If Marja was hard, planners worried, what might Kandahar be?

Read rest of story....
Wednesday
Jun092010

The US and The World: Pentagon Creates Office for International Legitimacy (Ackerman)

Spencer Ackerman writes in The Washington Independent:

For the first time, the Department of Defense has established an office to guide policy on emerging non-traditional military activities like compliance with the rule of law, humanitarian emergencies and human rights. It’s a bureaucratic change that effectively frames international legitimacy as a security issue, a reflection of the legacy of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars among some policymakers. And the office’s first test may be its perspective on the thorny questions surrounding how the department handles al-Qaeda and Taliban detainees.

Announced within the Pentagon in late May, the Office for Rule of Law and International Humanitarian Policy is being led by Rosa Brooks, a senior adviser to Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy and a former director of Georgetown Law School’s Human Rights Center. It endeavors to ensure that the broad strategic aims of the Obama administration regarding adherence to a rules-based international order don’t get lost in the pressures of military contingencies. It will also advise senior Pentagon officials on their contributions to interagency planning and White House requests for advice on rule-of-law compliance, and will work with Congress and non-governmental organizations focusing on its host of issues.

The office — created by Flournoy with support from Defense Secretary Robert Gates and run by a staff that will eventually number 20 people — reflects a recent recognition that the legitimacy of the U.S. military in combat plays its own battlefield role, especially in conflicts like Afghanistan, where perceptions by civilians about whether to support America’s allies or its adversaries are considered decisive. “The counterinsurgency and counterterrorism doctrine has really moved in the direction of saying that these issues are not luxuries,” Brooks explained in a Monday interview at the Pentagon. “These issues are absolutely central to achieving our military objectives in a counterinsurgency or a counterterrorism environment, where the name of the game is ‘Do you have credibility? Do you have legitimacy? Are you building the structures that support long-term stability?’”

Many of the office’s emerging responsibilities will center on entrenching respect for the rule of law and human rights as a core focus within the Defense Department. Previously, Pentagon officials who worked on those issues were spread throughout the policy directorate, in bureaus as disparate as Counternarcotics and Detainee Affairs, a reflection of the secondary — Brooks called it “ad hoc” — treatment the department has traditionally provided to humanitarian concerns. Karen Greenberg, the director of New York University’s Center on Law and Security, said the office needs to “restore the notion that the rule of law is there on the table no matter what.” Matthew Waxman, a deputy assistant secretary of defense for detainee affairs at the end of the Bush administration, added that “sometimes important strategic issues can fall into bureaucratic seams, and redrawing parts of the organizational map can help address that.”

Read rest of article....
Wednesday
Jun092010

Iran Analysis: What's Most Important Today? (Hint: Not Sanctions)

We begin today with a special analysis from Mr Verde of last Friday's events, which become more rather than less significant with the passage of time: "4 June: The Day the Regime Will Regret".

Keep that, and the internal developments in Iran, in mind today as the international politicians and press run amok with the story of Iran's nuclear programme and the world's sanctions. After months of spin and manoeuvre, the UN Security Council will convene this morning in New York to adopt a US-led resolution for stricter financial measures. The Americans are now confident they will get passage, with Russia and China giving assent --- Washington is putting out the line that it will be a 12-3 vote with no vetoes.

Iran Analysis: 4 June “The Day the Regime Will Regret” (Verde)


The economic reality is that, to get Moscow and Beijing on board, the sanctions package has been diluted so much that the measures are marginal. (As EA has noted regularly, the behind-the-scenes effort to get foreign companies to disinvest from Iran is far more significant.) Politically, however, this will be the platform for tough-guy --- and tough-woman --- posturing with claims, "We have been vindicated."



The US and its allies will intone that this shows the world now realises the seriousness of Iran's threat. Russia and China will say very little, and what they say will be very guarded: we have supported the sanctions but the primary path to resolution should be diplomatic discussions. Turkey, which will probably vote No, will use that move to bolster its emerging claim as a defender of negotiation rather than punishment and, thus, as a country able to work both with the big boys like Washington and the smaller nations seeking recognition and respect.

And Iran's leaders will use the UN measure to their own advantage. Three days before the anniversary of the 2009 election, they will tell their people that this proves the hostility of foreign powers --- the same foreign powers who tried to undermine Iranian democracy by supporting the opposition movement and "regime change". They will insist that the vote in New York reminds those in Tehran, Shiraz, Tabriz, and Ahwaz that they cannot let up in their defense of "Iran" (i.e., the Supreme Leader, the President, and the Government).

In other words, they will use the nuclear-sanctions fuss as their saving distraction. It will be upheld over the arrests, sentences, and executions that continue and, in recent days, escalate. It will be given priority over the political disputes --- on the economy, on President Ahmadinejad's battle with Parliament over legislation, on the treatment of Ayatollah Khomeini's grandson --- within the ruling establishment. It will be the shiny object held high so Iran's people can look away.

So, as the ink is spilt and trees die today for the rhetoric over the UN sanctions decision, the important spin-off will not be on any claimed effect on Iran's centrifuges and uranium. It will be this: will the political theatre 6121 miles away take over the stage in Tehran? Or will it be set aside --- not by Iran's leaders but by others --- for other, more significant shows?
Wednesday
Jun092010

Iran Analysis: 4 June "The Day the Regime Will Regret" (Verde)

Mr Verde writes for EA:

When the history of this post-election conflict is written, the events of Friday, 4 June 2010, may be as significant as last year’s Qods Day and Ashura. They may be even more important.

The regime is trying to pretend that there is no crisis of confidence/legitimacy and that the post-election protests are over. But last Friday, at what was supposed to be the commemoration of Ayatollah Khomeini's death, President Ahmadinejad was still talking about last year’s elections and the Supreme Leader was still threatening former (and possibly even current) regime officials –-- this time with execution. Seyed Hassan Khomeini, the grandson of the Ayatollah, was shouted down during his speech.

Events like the 4 June commemorations are planned well in advance, tightly controlled, and well-choreographed. We can therefore dismiss with great confidence any suggestion that the hecklers were ordinary people acting in the moment. They were thugs organized by regime officials.

Whatever the true intentions of the organizers,these events have and will continue to damage Ayatollah Khamenei. The reason?

There are two possibilities: either the thugs were organized on the order of Khamenei, or the heckling was carried out without his permission.

If Khamenei was kept out of the loop, then he is losing his grip on the Islamic Republic. When a group of regime thugs can barrack Hassan Khomeini with impunity right in front of the Supreme Leader and the world media, when Khamenei cannot even control his audience for a few minutes during an important ceremony. how can one expect him to have control over the actions of other regime officials? (Which, looking backward, raises the question: how can the Supreme Leader claim so confidently that there was no fraud during the June 2009 elections?)

If the thugs were carrying out Khamenei’s orders, then the Islamic Republic is gripped by such a dangerous crisis that its highest official is forced to sacrifice the reputation of his regime in an attempt to embarrass and humiliate another regime insider. If this is the case, then Khamenei’s warm embrace of Hassan Khomeini after the latter’s abandoned speech also points to the nasty, duplicitous personality of the Supreme Leader.

In either case, the events of 4 June have provided a rallying point for Khamenei’s detractors within the regime –-- whose numbers, by the way, seem to be growing by the week. It not only Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, but alsoother reformists and even principlists like Ali Motahari have used these events as an excuse to criticise Khamenei personally.

If the intention of the regime's show on 4 June was to weaken the opponents of Khamenei and Ahmadinejad, the scheme appears to have backfired.

One may argue that the Supreme Leader is trying to wipe out any reference to Ayatollah Khomeini and replace Khomeini’s legacy with his own. The problem is that, since last June, Khamenei’s reputation as a religious and political leader has been damaged. He has not been able to make repairs and all high-profile regime manoeuvres, including last Friday, have brought more damage.

Let’s not forget that the June ceremonies were cut back from 3 days to 1 day this year; despite all the preparations the numbers attending were far less than what he regime had claimed and hoped for; 15 Khordaad (5 June), the day which marks the beginning of the uprising in the 1960s that eventually led to the 1979 Revolution, was completely forgotten this year.

Ayatollah Khomeini is the main pillar of the Islamic Republic. The regime owes its existence to him, and all of its officials claim his approval for their ideas and actions. doing. His burial site, where the 4 June ceremonies were taking place, is similar to the shrines of Shia Imams. The failure of regime officials to capitalise on this --– and by their actions disrespecting his memory –-- points to serious problems within the Islamic Republic.

In February, I mentioned that, because of the crisis in the Islamic Republic, the regime will be forced into display that will come back and haunt them. Add the events of 4 June to that growing list.