The US and Pakistan: Bye Bye President Zardari, But Hello to Whom?

Just over 48 hours after the culmination of the Long March, with the Government's restoration of Pakistani Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry, and the story has dropped out of American newspapers. But, of course, this weekend's events were only the beginning of a new, important stage in Pakistani and regional politics.

For many, it is the beginning of hope. Perhaps, after the expression of popular protest, the legal system can be resurrected and placed above personal and party manipulation. Perhaps there can be a scrutiny which would produce a meaningful democracy rather than today's well-connected politician who ascends to the highest office through connections rather than ability and integrity.

In no way do I want to demean that hope, but it moves alongside, and arguably trails behind, more immediate negotiations and manoeuvres after the drama of the last week.

First and foremost, Asif Ali Zardari is effectively Dead President Walking. If this was a showdown for those marching for Chaudhry's restoration, the future of political parties such as the Pakistani Muslim League (N), or a general wish for an ethical politics, it was also Zardari's showdown against his rivals. Trying to maintain a careful balance between the isolation of Nawaz Sharif and the appearance of a Government upholding judicial and political authority, he was putting his case not only in Pakistan but in the US through outlets like The Wall Street Journal.

The problem for the Obama Administration is that Zardari put his battle against Sharif, and indeed Chaudhry, above the battle against insurgency in northwestern Pakistan. An article in The Washington Post, fed by Administration sources, put the case cogently yesterday:

Administration officials are putting the finishing touches on a plan to greatly increase economic and development assistance to Pakistan, and to expand a military partnership considered crucial to striking a mortal blow against al-Qaeda's leadership and breaking the Pakistani-based extremist networks that sustain the war in Afghanistan....But the weakness of Pakistan's elected government -- backed into a corner by weekend demonstrations that left its political opposition strengthened -- has called into question one of the basic pillars of that plan.

The President had thus become secondary to the military commander, General Ashfaq Parvez Kiani, as he met American counterparts and political leaders in Islamabad, Washington, and Kabul.

At the same time, the US had to move carefully. After all, Washington had been instrumental in supporting Zardari's rise to the Presidency when Benazir Bhutto was assassinated and when General Pervez Musharraf became a liability for American plans. Even if the Pakistani military had become the key link for US officials, the appearance of democracy had to be maintained.

The Long March, with all its good intentions, provided a mini-solution for the Obama Administration. Only 24 hours into the march, the US jumped in through talks with Nawaz Sharif and a blunt call to Zardari --- Washington did not want the President to force a showdown with Sharif. By Saturday, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was telling both politicians, "If Pakistan is in such a state of internal political turmoil that U.S. aid can't be used effectively, that's going to limit what can be done and also how successful we are in Afghanistan."

Perhaps more importantly, the Americans appear to have been in close touch with the Pakistani military and security services during the crisis. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, spoke with General Kiani on Friday. The New York Times summarised, "One encouraging sign for Washington was the role played in the crisis by the army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, who let Mr. Zardari know that he could not rely on soldiers to confront the protesters who were threatening to descend on Islamabad."

We may never know exactly who, if anyone, gave orders to the security forces who let the convoy of Nawaz Sharif slip easily through the cordon of his house arrest, providing support to the growing demonstrations and forcing Zardari's hand. We may never know exactly what was said between the President, Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gillani, and General Kiani at the Sunday morning meeting that conceded the restoration of Chaudhry.

Even murkier, however, is the next step in the relationship between Zardari, his political rivals, his military, and the American sponsors. Even if there is no way back for the President, there is no easy solution to fit Washington's plans. The accession of Nawaz Sharif to power is still an uncomfortable prospect for the US, which has long considered him too close to "conservative" (read that in a political and religious sense) forces in Pakistan and the region. Indeed, Saudi Arabia's backing of Sharif poses the prospect of a battle between Washington and Riyadh for influence over the next steps in both Islamabad and Kabul.

As US envoy Richard Holbrooke bluntly said Monday, the immediate resolution of the Long March "bodes better than the alternative outcome" of disorder and collapse of the Government but "the underlying problem still exists". Having failed to get "stability" with Musharraf, having failed with Zardari, it is not hope that moves Washington but this question:

Who or what can come next?

Pakistan: Day Two of the Long March

update (8 p.m. GMT): The Zardari Government has met in emergency session. The President has been joined by Prime Minister Gillani, Senate Chairman Farooq Naek, Interior Minister Rehman Malik, Information Minister Sherry Rehman, and Water and Power Minister Raja Pervez Ashraf. Spokesmen are promising "important decisions" within 24 hours.

Update (5 p.m. GMT): High-level talks appear to have begun in Pakistan. The reasons for movement are unclear.

One possibility is that a call from US envoy Richard Holbrooke to President Zardari, following a meeting between the US Ambassador to Pakistan, Anne Patterson, and Nawaz Sharif, has pushed the Government to a more conciliatory position. The US and UK have both denied putting any pressure on Zardari to make concessions to the marchers, though Foreign Secretary David Miliband's office have confirmed that he has spoken to Zardari by telephone.

Update (2.30 p.m. GMT): Former Supreme Court Bar Association President Aitzaz Ahsan has said that the Long March will be called off if Iftikhar Chaudhry is reinstated.

Update (1.45 p.m. GMT): Dawn sources claim that President Zardari may have accepted some of the compromises suggested by PM Gilani.

Update (12 p.m. GMT / 5 p.m. Pakistan): There are rumours that PM Yousaf Raza Gilani is pushing for a compromise, and that President Zardari may be willing to yield to some of the marchers' demands. However police have sealed the Punjab-Sindh border and closed highways to prevent the marchers reaching Multan.

Update (9 a.m. GMT): The Pakistani Government has invoked Section 144, the order authorising detention of demonstrators in the Northwest Frontier Provinces, detaining dozens of people.

There were no reports of further arrests overnight. The most significant incident was the blocking of a convoy from Quetta with Ali Ahmed Kurd, the President of the Supreme Court Bar Association. Kurd and the convoy have responded with a sit-in blocking the main highway from Baluchistan to Sindh Province.

Mr Obama's War: Playing for Time in Afghanistan

Related Post: Transcript of President Obama’s Interview with New York Times

President Obama gave a 35-minute exclusive interview to The New York Times on Friday. On the economy, it's an essential read. On foreign policy, the Times made a complete hash of its exclusive.

Despite Obama's attention to the economic crisis, the Times headlined, "Obama Ponders Outreach to Elements of the Taliban", declaring:

President Obama declared in an interview that the United States was not winning the war in Afghanistan and opened the door to a reconciliation process in which the American military would reach out to moderate elements of the Taliban, much as it did with Sunni militias in Iraq.

That is quite a scoop. Although Secretary of Defense Robert Gates raised the possibilities of such talks, it has not arisen as part of the possible Obama strategy, especially amidst the attention to the sharp increase in US troops in Afghanistan.

Only problem? It's not close to what Obama said. Here's the exchange:

Q. Do you see a time when you might be willing to reach out to more moderate elements of the Taliban, to try to peel them away, towards reconciliation?

A. I don’t want to pre-judge the review that’s currently taking place. If you talk to General Petraeus, I think he would argue that part of the success in Iraq involved reaching out to people that we would consider to be Islamic fundamentalists, but who were willing to work with us because they had been completely alienated by the tactics of Al Qaeda in Iraq.

There may be some comparable opportunities in Afghanistan and the Pakistani region. But the situation in Afghanistan is, if anything, more complex. You have a less governed region, a history of fierce independence among tribes. Those tribes are multiple and sometimes operate at cross purposes, so figuring all that out is going to be a much more of a challenge.

So it was the Times, not Obama, that broached the possibility of engagement with the Taliban. And the President stonewalled: yes, there had been talks with former foes in Iraq but this approach could not be simply applied to Afghanistan.

Obama's clear signal, which the Times reporters missed, was that his investment was in the review being headed by US envoy Richard Holbrooke and Bruce Riedel of the Brookings Institution. As we've noted, that review followed Obama's refusal to accept fully the approach --- based on three earlier reviews --- proposed by the US military.

The President may have seized the political initiative in Washington, but in Kabul the immediate issue is President Hamid Karzai's bid to hold onto power. The Obama Administration has made a public commitment to a review which includes Afghan and Pakistani participation. And possibly most importantly, the first priority for Obama and his advisors right now is Pakistan. Obama told the Times reporters:

At the heart of a new Afghanistan policy is going to be a smarter Pakistan policy. As long as you’ve got safe havens in these border regions that the Pakistani government can’t control or reach, in effective ways, we’re going to continue to see vulnerability on the afghan side of the border. And so it’s very important for us to reach out to the Pakistani government, and work with them more effectively.

The explanation for the misleading headline in the Times is an easy one. Helene Cooper, one of the two reporters writing up the interview, has a "Week in Review" piece in today's paper, "Dreaming of Splitting the Taliban". The article is based on the opinions of think-tank experts and a "European diplomat", but it has no input from an Administration official. No problem: Cooper just stuck the theme of his Week in Review analysis on top of the Obama interview, twisting the President into the inside source for the piece.

Even if the concept of talking to the moderate Taliban is one that should be supported, that's lazy journalism. So toss aside the Times fluff, keep your eyes for the moment on Pakistan, and wait --- possibly until the NATO summit at the start of April --- for a real story on an Obama strategy in Afghanistan.

Mr Obama's War: The Spin is...It's Not Afghanistan. It's Pakistan.

Related Post: Pakistan Military, Prime Minister Act Against Zardari

We've found an intriguing article in Time, "The Afghanistan Problem: Can Obama Avoid a Quagmire?", valuable not as much for Joe Klein's analysis as for the inside information fed to him.

The immediate impression is of an Administration effort to build up the urgency of the Afghanistan crisis. So we get a glance at the first, "pretty alarming" meeting on the country, held three days after Obama's Inauguration. Of course, the President "was extremely cool and in control", rather than screaming wildly or crying in the corner, "but some people, especially political aides like Rahm Emanuel and David Axelrod who hadn't been briefed on the situation, walked out of that meeting stunned". To sum up, from another participant, "Holy s***."

No spin surprises there, but then we get good stuff. Such as that General David Petraeus, the mastermind heading US Central Command, is pissed off he didn't get his way on policy. Trashing Obama's decision not to accept the recommendations from Petraeus' review, one of the General's acolytes complains about the meetings, "You had people from the Department of Agriculture weighing in. There were too many cooks. The end result was lowest-common-denominator stuff. The usual Petraeus acuity wasn't there."

Obama's people threw the criticism right back at Petraeus, praising instead another study by General Douglas Lute, the Bush Administration's "war czar", which was "very skeptical about the Pakistani army's willingness to fight the Taliban and equally critical of the Karzai government in Afghanistan" They added, however, that the report "didn't provide much detail about what to do next".

So the President has commissioned another review, headed by US envoy Richard Holbrooke and Bruce Riedel, who was his campaign advisor on South Asia and is now outside the Administration in the Brookings Institution.

And here's the stinger. Even though that review isn't due until end of review, its conclusions (or what Obama's officials will spin as its conclusions) are already being leaked:

Afghanistan pales in comparison to the problems in Pakistan. Our primary goal has to be to shut down the al-Qaeda and Taliban safe havens on the Pakistan side of the border. If that can be accomplished, then the insurgency in Afghanistan becomes manageable.

Klein gets a bit fuzzy at this point, primarily because the Administration is still fuzzy on what a Pakistan-first effort means. It can throw in the $1.5 billion/year authorised by Congress, running over five years, in economic aid, but officials are unsure how to distribute the money to have any effect. (It is irrelevant, of course, that Pakistan has a President who was charged/convicted in various countries with corruption.)

So what to do? This paragraph offers the most enlightening, but most disturbing, scenario:

"We have to re-establish close personal relationships with the army," said a senior member of the National Security Council, who was involved in an intense series of meetings with the Pakistani military leadership during the first week of March. "We have to be sure they're on the same page as we are. Based on what I saw, they aren't yet."

So, does this mean that the Pakistani military is kicking up a fuss about the US missile strikes and proposed American strategy in the Northwest Frontier Provinces? Or does this farther, with Washington envisaging a Pakistani military running Islamabad's policy, either behind the scenes or quite openly after toppling President Zardari?

Watch this space.

In response

Ms Clinton's Wild Ride: Is Dennis Ross in the Saddle on Iran?

Related Post: Ms Clinton’s Wild Ride - A US “Grand Strategy” on Israel-Palestine-Iran?

In our analysis today of a possible US "grand strategy" linking its approach on Israel and Palestine to a change in policy on Iran, we speculated, "One explanation for this shift is the long-awaited entry of Dennis Ross, who has long advocated “Diplomacy Then Pressure”, into the State Department." Jim Lobe takes up the theme:

Ross Is Clearly a Major Player

Since Secretary of State Clinton set out for the Middle East over the weekend, it has seemed increasingly clear to me that Dennis Ross, contrary to my earlier speculation, pretty much got the job that he and WINEP [the Washington Institute for Near East Policy] were hoping for. Not only has he claimed an office on the coveted seventh floor, but Obama’s conspicuous placement of Ross’ name between those of Mitchell and Holbrooke in his speech on Iraq at Camp Lejeune last week strongly suggested that he considers Ross to be of the same rank and importance as the other two.

More to the point is what Clinton and those around her have been saying during the trip, including, most remarkably, the report by an unnamed “senior State Department official” that she told the foreign minister of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) that she was “very doubtful” that diplomacy would persuade Iran to abandon its alleged quest for nuclear weapons. This, of course, very much reflects Ross’ own view (as well that of neo-conservatives) and will no doubt bolster hard-liners in Tehran who believe that Obama’s talk of engagement is simply designed to marshal more international support for eventual military action, be it a bombing campaign or a blockade to cut gasoline imports. That Obama essentially confirmed today’s New York Times report about a proposed deal with Moscow whereby it would go along with increasing sanctions against Iran in exchange for Washington’s non-deployment of anti-missile defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic only adds to the impression that some version of the Bipartisan Policy Center’s September ‘08 report on Iran strategy (drafted by hard-line neo-cons Michael Rubin and Michael Makovsky and signed by Ross), which I wrote about here, is in the process of being implemented. (I was going to write about this later this week, but the Moon of Alabama beat me to the punch. See also Stephen Walt’s analysis of Clinton’s scepticism on his Foreign Policy blog).

Adding to my growing sense that Ross occupies a critical role in policy-making, at least in the State Department, are what Clinton has had to say so far on her trip about Gaza, Hamas, and the Palestinian Authority. As Marc Lynch reports in his truly excellent blog, also on the Foreign Policy website, “her remarks suggest that rather than seize on the possibility of Palestinian reconciliation, Clinton prefers to double-down on the shopworn ‘West Bank first, Fatah only’ policy” strongly advocated by Ross. In that respect, you should definitely read Tuesday’s extended colloquy between Lynch, Brookings’ Tamara Wittes (who is more optimistic), and Carnegie’s Nathan Brown, who shares Lynch’s “disappointment” about Clinton’s performance. As Lynch notes, it seems that Clinton is stuck “in a bit of time-warp” regarding Hamas’ power in Gaza, the Palestinian Authority’s abject failure to enhance its legitimacy, and the Arab League’s renewed efforts to both unify itself and to reconstruct a Palestinian government of national unity. This insensitivity to Palestinian and Arab public opinion bears all the hallmarks of Ross’ failed Mideast diplomacy during the 1990’s.

I also have the impression that Ross and the so-called “Israel Lobby” whose interests he represents believe that enhancing conditions on the West Bank, combined with diplomatic engagement with Syria, will somehow be sufficient for Washington to regain its credibility in the region and rally the Sunni Arab states — along with the European Union, Russia, China, etc. — behind a policy of confrontation with Iran.