Palestine Video & Analysis: Saeb Erekat's Speech at Birmingham (Yenidunya/Baghdady)

Ali Yenidunya and Christina Baghdady write:

On 23 March, the chief negotiator for the Palestinian Authority, Dr. Saeb Erakat spoke about the current political stalemate at the University of Birmingham. This prompted a lively and open debate, with Erakat encouraging those who attended to challenge him. The topics covered were broad, including: the Palestinian Israeli conflict, including the most recent exchange of maps between the former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and the Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas; the relationship and influence of external powers on the region; and the problem with Hamas.

Middle East Inside Line: Is Washington Scaring the Israeli Government?
US-Israel: The Big Fight Within Obama Administration — Ross v. Mitchell, NSC v. State Department

Video sections are interspersed amongst the analysis:

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y-g3qzellKw[/youtube]

Peace talks with Israel

Stating that the recent proximity talks should be based on a generally agreed framework consisting of core issues, in particular borders, Erakat suggested a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders with agreed swaps of territory.



[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PddtMfvZXWY[/youtube]

Erakat outlined the counter proposal, in response to the December 2008 offer of the Olmert Government in Israel, on the border swaps (part  3 of the video). Although the satellite images show that 1.2% of the West Bank is occupied by Israeli settlements, the Olmert government provided a map in December 2008 annexing 6.5% of settlement land (in return of giving 5.8%). The Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas provided a counter-map approving an annexation of 1.9% of the total land. Erekat noted that no agreement was achieved, and the problem is yet to be solved.

The questions remains:  what is the purpose of Israeli settlements and their expansion in the Palestinian territories since 1967? The term "security" is constantly reproduced by Israeli advocates. The Palestinian Authority also invokes "security", but it does so to consolidate legitimacy not just within the eyes of Palestinians but also in the international arena, since interaction with a stateless, non-territorial Palestinian group is more problematic compared to that with Israel. In the absence of a level playing field between Israel and the Palestinian territories and of Israel accepting conditions for the end of settlement construction, there is little hope for both parties to understand each other’s needs.

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UHrMO8PJzWo[/youtube]

Erakat pointed out the cost of war must be greater than that of peace to achieve a peace settlement. Was this a subtle hint that Israel is hoping to benefit further from a lack of peace? Following US Vice President Joe Biden’s visit to Israel, 1600 new housing units were approved by the Jerusalem municipality. Then, on 24 March, hours before the Obama-Netanyahu meeting in the White House, the Jerusalem municipality announced final approval for construction of 20 apartments in a controversial hotel in east Jerusalem.

That is where we come to the point of crisis. Despite Washington’s pressure on Israel to announce a moratorium in East Jerusalem if not a permanent freeze, the Israeli authorities are still ignoring calls to stop settlement expansion. Last week Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told  his ministers in the weekly Cabinet meeting: “As far as we are concerned, building in Jerusalem is like building in Tel Aviv.”

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eLjW27mh2WI[/youtube]

This crisis came out in Erekat’s words: “If Israel does not want a two-state solution, if they want to call my home town Jericho in its Hebrew name Yeriho, if they want to call Nablus in its Hebrew Shechem, if they want to call al Quds, Yerushalayim... [it] is destroying the two-state solution.” (part 2 of video)

External influence

To achieve peace in a region of conflict, a mediator may be useful, but if the mediator is not effective or the peace process reaches a stalemate, then external influences and distant events can adversely affect the situation. Erekat commented, "When bombs are falling in Iraq and Afghanistan, bombs are falling in my home in Jerusalem....When bombs fall in Kandahar, it also falls in my home in Jerusalem."

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F4Lhmxf6qnU[/youtube]

For the mediator to conduct their role effectively, they must be on good terms with the parties in conflict. The US has been that mediator with the 1993 Oslo process, but their position --- after a second intifada, the attack on Afghanistan, the invasion of Iraq, and now a potential third intifada  --- is now strained.

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cABGRWvjhEg[/youtube]

Erekat noted the issue of "security" for the US,  "This is a wake up call....The US take bodies wrapped in the national flag back to the US daily... They do not need anyone to seek security for them." This "wake-up call" has arguably brought a renewed push for peace, with  talks much more regular under the Obama Presidency than under the previous Bush administration.

However, Erakat pointed out that the Palestinian government had chosen the EU for nation- building, security talks, and mediation, and it wasn’t because they "love them". According to Erekat, the EU have  credibility and can provide sufficient financial support to the Palestinian territories. In addition, the EU has relatively stable relations with the US as it faces its "wake-up call".

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UTxKOFK5Bec[/youtube]

When one looks at the options available to the Palestinians, they have little choice Egypt and Jordan have arguably been effective as mediators; however, their financial contribution to nation-building as well as their credibility is on a par with the EU.

The United Nations, another option given their role in the Quartet (US-EU-UN-Russia) are not that close to Israel and the Palestinian territories. Moreover, it has failed on previous occasions to enforce the notion of the collective upon the action of a state, as in the ability to prevent the US-UK invasion of Iraq.

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p-iDUBxpTUA[/youtube]

Russia would be an interesting but highly unlikely choice as mediator. Russia has military links with Iran and thus with Syria and Hezbollah. That is a suspect list of alliances for the US, which would prefer the Palestinian government to choose the EU over Russian involvement.

For Erekat, democracy is the second pillar, after “just” solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, of the fight against “extremism”. He stated, "Anyone who says Arab world is not ready for democracy is a racist.”

That assertion faces the reality of governmental structures such as monarchies in Saudi Arabia and Oman, constitutional monarchies in Bahrain and Jordan; constitutional emirates in Kuwait and Qatar, a federation of emirates in United Arab Emirates, an authoritarian regime in Syria, and a “half-democracy” in Iraq.

Erekat says that “democracy is democracy”, regardless of how it arrives,  but that cannot guarantee social change and a political agenda for his outcome. Indeed, beyond the Arab world, does the US want this? Which country has been the closest ally of Washington? Israel or Saudi Arabia?

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r2exUU_IB3U[/youtube]

The Problem of Hamas

Dr. Erekat harshly criticized Hamas’s policy following its victory in the last Gazan elections. He described Hamas’s existence in the Gaza Strip as a coup d’etat and emphasized that “democracy in Palestine did not fail but Hamas failed”. Referring to the Quartet’s demands (recognition of the State of Israel, renouncing “terrorism”, and acceptance of previous agreements and obligations including the "Road Map"), Erekat blamed Hamas for not acting as a responsible government.

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8NnouyQA3ys[/youtube]

Yet, what is to be done? Erekat says that nations must go and tell Hamas to sign the reconciliation document. But how? In an aggressive manner? Erekat himself said that the peace talks had collapsed due to Israel’s Operation Cast Lead against Gaza in December 2008.

So, can Erekat mean that the only solution to peace is through dialogue in the region? Perhaps, given Erekat's reference to Tehran. Unlike his President, Mahmoud Abbas, who had blamed Iran for blocking reconciliation between his Fatah organization and Hamas, Erekat said that Iran should not be seen as a threat.

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8aF86-iuAKQ[/youtube]

How is this possible? Israel’s Deputy Ambassador to the UK, Talya Lador-Fresher, in her own speech at Birmingham in March, said Israel’s official policy is not to help the Gazans develop themselves economically. West Jersualem's position is explicit: unless there is a reconciliation agreement between Hamas and Fatah, Israel will never intervene and talk to Hamas.

At a time when both Israel and Egypt show their teeth to Hamas, who is supposed to put pressure on the Israelis to show flexibility? The EU or the US? Given Israel’s “(in)security needs”, and its claim that it has suffered since the unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, urging West Jerusalem to sit at a table with Hamas is more difficult than having Israel and the Palestinian Authority at the same table.

There is just one solution: instead of indirect pressure from Washington, the Obama Administration should start the same strategy they have pursued with Damascus to get a reconciliation agreement between Fatah and Hamas as soon as possible. This would not only help institutions produce an antidote to “insecurity requirements” but also bring an increase in the pressure on the State of Israel to reconsider the extent of its “concessions” on core issues.

Iran: Preventing Tehran from "Going Nuclear" (Ramazani)

R.K. Ramazani, one of the leading scholars on Iranian foreign policy, writes for the Charlottesville Daily Progress:

President Obama’s greetings to Iran on March 20 on the occasion of the Iranian New Year (Nowruz) rekindled the hope that the United States is still interested in settling its nuclear dispute with Iran through negotiations.

The hope for a new chapter in U.S.-Iran relations began on 1 October, when for the first time since the Iranian Revolution in 1979 the two countries engaged in direct negotiations over the nuclear issue at Geneva.

Iran’s Nukes: False Alarm Journalism (Sick)
UPDATED Iran’s Nukes: The Dangerous News of The New York Times

Alas, three major factors subsequently dampened that hope and increased the tensions between the two countries. First, Iran and the United States disagreed on the amount of Iranian enriched uranium to be shipped to Russia and France for further processing in return for 20 percent enriched uranium needed by Iran for medical purposes. Second, Iran proceeded to enrich uranium to that level on its own.


Third, as seen from Washington, the crisis that followed Iran’s presidential election of 12 June caused Tehran to send mixed messages to Washington because of the rift in the ranks of the Iranian religious and political elites.

Obama’s New Year message, however, is more than a restatement of his commitment to engaging Iran. It posed a serious question to Iran for the first time. He asked Iranian leaders: “We know what you are against, now tell us what you’re for."

The President claimed that Iranian leaders were “unable to answer that question” because Iran had refused to accept fully the International Atomic Energy Agency-brokered proposal of October 2009 on the nuclear issue. Despite media misrepresentation, Iran had not rejected the proposal. It had made a counterproposal, which the United States refused to accept.

To address the President’s question, Iran’s nuclear program must be placed in the context of Iran’s principle foreign policy goals because Iran’s nuclear program is meant to serve these goals.

The first goal is to protect Iran’s political independence and to defend its national security against any foreign attack. The second goal is to project Iran’s influence in the Middle East. Global powers such as the United States seek to create an international environment favorable to their national interest, while medium powers like Iran try to make their regional environment safe.

The Iranian people, as well as their government, claim that they do not seek to achieve these goals by means of nuclear weapons. According to the American World Public Opinion Organization’s report of 7 April 2008, 58 percent of Iranians believe nuclear weapons violate the tenets of Islam and at the same time 81 percent consider “it is very important to have full fuel-cycle program” for peaceful purposes. That organization’s survey of 3 February showed that even the opponents of the government of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad are “strongly committed to Iran’s nuclear program“.

A majority of the Iranian people and their government also claim that they seek to project influence, not hegemonic power, in the Middle East. According to the AWPOO’s report of 7 April 2007, Iranian people want their government to cooperate with, not to dominate, other countries of the Middle East.

If neither the Iranian government nor the Iranian people want nuclear weapons at the present time, does that necessarily mean they will not go nuclear in the future? According to the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate of 2007, Iran is keeping its options open.

The key question therefore is under what circumstances Iran would likely opt to weaponize nuclear energy? If Iran feels its national security is under present and imminent threat of military attack, it is reasonable to assume it would seek to acquire the level of nuclear capability that is necessary for quick diversion to nuclear weapons.

Such an attack could presumably be launched by the United States so long as it insists that all options are on the table. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, however, is skeptical about the effectiveness of striking Iran’s nuclear facilities. He thinks a military attack might only delay its nuclear progress for a couple of years.

Moreover, at the moment the United States is seeking to impose new sanctions on Iran that are tougher than the previous ones. Sanctions by the United Nations Security Council, however, would require the consent of Russia and China. They, especially China, would prefer to continue negotiating with Iran, and the effectiveness of even more biting sanctions is highly debated.

The time is now for Washington to reopen negotiations with Iran. The current U.S. dual-track approach --- tougher sanctions and threats of military attack combined with negotiations --- is apt to degenerate into a one-track strategy of confrontation with Iran if the present tensions escalate even further. That would likely end the prospects of negotiating with Iran in the future. That would be the surest way to a self-fulfilling prophecy - driving Iran to seek national security in nuclear weapons.

Such a development would damage the United States’ interest in non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and prevention of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, and it would scuttle the United States’ efforts to stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan toward the goal of withdrawing the bulk of the U.S. forces from these countries.

Confrontation with Iran could also lead to a third war front in the volatile Middle East with catastrophic consequences, including the disruption of the flow of Persian Gulf oil supplies to world markets resulting in an unprecedented rise in oil prices worldwide.

Most tragically, it would destroy the prospects of the pro-democracy movement of the Iranian people. If the Iranians feel their country is facing military attack they will rally around the flag, however much they may oppose their government.

Iran: The Green Movement's Next Steps (Shahryar)

Josh Shahryar writes for EA:

Yesterday was the funeral in Qom of Banoo Rabbani, the wife of Grand Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri. Despite claims by some activists that Greens were going to join the funeral and protest, the atmosphere for most participants was one of silent contemplation. Security forces essentially took over the funeral procession,arresting 30 people, and Rabbani was not even buried in the location selected by her family.

The funeral follows Chahrshanbeh Suri, the Fire Festival, on 16 March. Although there was much celebration, despite the disapproval of authorities including a Supreme Leader fatwa, no protest was planned or executed by the Green Movement.

So is the decision not to use public holidays or funerals for staging protests a bad one by the Movement?


The answer is no. The movement has endured for more than nine months. It has sufficient backing and is confident enough that it will survive, despite every repressive measure of the regime, that it does not have to periodically show the world, the Iranian government, and ordinary Iranians that it can put people on the streets. At the same time, the Greens have made clear that they will not be backing down from their demands, let alone giving up.

Mir Hossein Mousavi's Nowruz address clearly hinted at this, as he . declared, "Withdrawing our demands of unconditional execution of the Constitution is an act of treason for Iran and for Islam. This is a demand that we will not abandon."

So next question: What is the Green Movement going to do if not hold protests on holidays?

Again, Mousavi's address offers a good answer:

Faced with such a situation [overwhelming violence by the government], the Green Movement must expand its reach to all segments of society. The Green Movement must revive the timeless social and Islamic principle of inclusion. We must lend a hand to neighbors and neighborhoods both near and far, through job creation and other forms of interaction.

This Iranian Year 1389, according to Mousavi, is the year of "persistence". Several activists with whom I have spoken are hopeful that within the next few months, the Green Movement will not only survive but also thrive as it wins more supporters to its side.

Indeed, their resolve is that they need not just a majority of Iran's people to back them, but an overwhelming majority. One activist noted that next time they hold a protest in Tehran, they don't want "only" one or two million participants but hope to have as much as half the city on the streets.

Only time will demonstrate how successful this will be. The Green Movement, though, is not just a spontaneous mass of discontented citizens, but an organized and well-informed movement whose members are slowly building up networks within the country and unifying their goals, all the while preparing for future confrontations with the Government.

The Latest from Iran (29 March): Questionable Authority

1755 GMT: "Expert" Speculation of the Day. Meir Javedanfar gets himself into The Huffington Post with this assertion:

Until recently, both Tehran and Jerusalem saw the health care debate as an item that could significantly weaken Obama's standing at home, which in turn would reduce his leverage abroad. They were hoping that a defeat would force Obama to focus on his troubles at home.

I'll check with Ali Yenidunya on the Israeli angle, but I have seen nothing to indicate that the Iranian Government was counting on the health care issue to limit and even damage the US President.

1525 GMT: Jailing Persian Cats. On the same day that we noted the drama-posing-as-documentary No Time for Persian Cats, its storyline of Iranians trying to evade the authorities to play music comes true: underground rap artist Sasi Mankan has been arrested.

Just trying to learn more about Mankan, but here's a sample of his music:

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=suqzMyBEZ8k[/youtube]

NEW Iran: A View from the Labour Front (Rahnema)
NEW Iran’s Nukes: False Alarm Journalism (Sick)
Iran’s Nukes: The Dangerous News of The New York Times
The Latest from Iran (28 March): Dealing with Exaggerations

1300 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. RAHANA claims that children's rights activist Maryam Zia Movahed, detained since 31 December, has been moved to a clinic in Evin Prison after starting a hunger strike on 17 March.


Peyke Iran writes that Azeri journalist and human rights activist Shahnaz Gholami has been given a prison sentence of eight years in absentia by a Tabriz court. Gholami is currently in Turkey and seeking asylum. The site also claims that Abdolreza Qanbari, a teacher from Pakdasht, has been sentenced to death for "mohareb" (war against God).

Rah-e-Sabz has published the names of 41 detained human rights activists.

1230 GMT: Parliament v. President. There's a sharp analysis by Hamid Takapu in Rah-e-Sabz of the debate over subsidy cuts since 2008. Takapu argues that the sword of a referendum, demanded by the President on his current proposals, could cut two ways: a successful challenge could reduce Parliament to a symbolic body (Takapu uses the analogy of the Russian Duma) but it could also strike Ahmadinejad if people ask for referendums on bigger issues.

0950 GMT: Labour Watch. We've posted a lengthy extract from an interview with Saeed Rahnema, a labour activist in the 1979 Islamic Revolution, analysing the state of the labour movement and, more broadly, of activism in the post-election conflict.

0655 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Professor Seyed Ahmad Miri of the Islamic Iran Participation Front has been arrested in Babol, while journalist Sasan Aghaei and women's rights activist Somaiyeh Farid have been released on bail.

0615 GMT: We begin this morning with a series of dubious attempts to claim authority in and about Iran. The New York Times' claimed reporting on the Iranian nuclear programme, which we criticised yesterday, is taken apart further by Gary Sick.

Inside Iran, President Ahmadinejad continued his campaign to overturn the Parliament's decision on his subsidy reforms and spending plan, using a marker and whiteboard to provide the truth to journalists. He thus proved beyond doubt that this will be another year of prosperity and "huge victories" for Iran.

The problem for the President is that not everyone believes him. While his supporter Mohammad Karim Shahrzad has challenged one of Ahmadinejad's leading Parliamentary critics, Ahmad Tavakoli, to a televised debate, legislator Seyed Reza Akrami says the President has taken an oath to implement the law and thus the decision of the Parliament.

US-Israel: The Big Fight Within Obama Administration --- Ross v. Mitchell, NSC v. State Department

DENNIS ROSS

Laura Rozen of Politico returns to top inside reporter form with this piece on the division over Israel policy within the Obama Administration, in particular between Dennis Ross of the National Security Council and Obama's special envoy for the Middle East, George Mitchell.

Yet read this carefully and you'll pick up an even bigger story. This doesn't look like just Ross v. Mitchell but a battle between the National Security Council and the State Department.  Note the strength of the anti-Ross feeling amongst the unnamed officials and ask yourself, "Where are their desks in Washington?"

Then note the quick defense of Ross and dismissal of any tension by his NSC bosses, as well as the "other contacts", also likely to be in the NSC, who defend Ross's Israel line as part of a sensible approach to the "big picture" of the Middle East and Iran.

This is the "inside" part of the headline tension between the US and Israeli Governments. Just as something will have to give --- and someone will have to lose --- in that context, so someone will have to suffer defeat, possibly to the point of resignation, within the Obama Administration. Whether that is Ross or Mitchell will say a lot for which agency gets the upper hand in the Administration's foreign policy, particularly on Israel-Palestine and on Iran.

Middle East Inside Line: Arab League/Turkey Criticism of Israel, Peres v. Netanyahu, Armenia Complication for Turkey-Israel?

Since Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s tense visit to the White House last week, an intense debate inside the Obama administration about how to proceed with Netanyahu to advance the Middle East peace process has grown more heated, even as Israeli officials are expected to announce they have reached some sort of agreement with Washington as soon as tonight.


Sources say within the inter-agency process, White House Middle East strategist Dennis Ross is staking out a position that Washington needs to be sensitive to Netanyahu’s domestic political constraints including over the issue of building in East Jerusalem in order to not raise new Arab demands, while other officials including some aligned with Middle East peace envoy George Mitchell are arguing Washington needs to hold firm in pressing Netanyahu for written commitments to avoid provocations that imperil Israeli-Palestinian peace talks and to preserve the Obama administration's credibility.

POLITICO spoke with several officials who confirmed the debate and its intensity. Ross did not respond to a query, nor did a spokesman for George Mitchell. 

“He [Ross] seems to be far more sensitive to Netanyahu's coalition politics than to U.S. interests,” one U.S. official told POLITICO Saturday. “And he doesn't seem to understand that this has become bigger than Jerusalem but is rather about the credibility of this Administration.”

What some saw as the suggestion of dual loyalties shows how heated the debate has become.

[ROZEN UPDATE: NSC Chief of Staff Denis McDonough fiercely rejected any such suggestion. "The assertion is as false as it is offensive," McDonough said Sunday by email. "Whoever said it has no idea what they are talking about. Dennis Ross's many decades of service speak volumes about his commitment to this country and to our vital interests, and he is a critical part of the President's team."]

Last week, during U.S.-Israeli negotiations during Netanyahu’s visit and subsequent internal U.S. government meetings, the first official said, Ross “was always saying about how far Bibi could go and not go. So by his logic, our objectives and interests were less important than pre-emptive capitulation to what he described as Bibi's coalition's red lines.”

When the U.S. and Israel are seen to publicly diverge on an issue such as East Jerusalem construction, the official characterized Ross's argument as: "the Arabs increase their demands ... therefore we must rush to close gaps ... no matter what the cost to our broader credibility.”

A second official confirmed the broad outlines of the current debate within the administration. Obviously at every stage of the process, the Obama Middle East team faces tactical decisions about what to push for, who to push, how hard to push, he described. 

As to which argument best reflects the wishes of the President, the first official said, “As for POTUS, what happens in practice is that POTUS, rightly, gives broad direction. He doesn't, and shouldn't, get bogged down in minutiae. But Dennis uses the minutiae to blur the big picture … And no one asks the question: why, since his approach in the Oslo years was such an abysmal failure, is he back, peddling the same snake oil?”

Other contacts [Editor's Note: almost certainly NSC officials] who have discussed recent U.S.-Israel tensions with Ross say he argues that all parties need to keep focus on the big picture, Iran, and the peace process as being part of a wider U.S. effort to bolster an international and regional alliance including Arab nations and Israel to pressure and isolate Iran.

This is an argument that presumably has resonance with the Netanyahu government. But at the same time, Arab allies tell Washington that Israeli construction in East Jerusalem inflames their publics and breeds despair and makes it hard for them to work even indirectly and quietly with Israel on Iran. They push Washington to show it can manage Israel and to get an Israeli-Palestinian peace process going that would facilitate regional cooperation on Iran.