UPDATED Iran Document: The Hardliners' Project --- Full Text (Bahavar)

Pedestrian posts the thoughts of Emad Bahavar, a political activist in the Freedom Movement of Iran, writer, and the head of “Supporters of Khatami and Mousavi” in the 2009 Presidential campaign. He was arrested shortly after the election, and released after two months. He was detained last week but released on Tuesday.

Bahavar's recent article in Rooz Online, “The destination was to begin the journey”, was the reason for his latest arrest. This is Part 1 of 3, with the following parts coming out in the next few days:

The Latest from Iran (11 March): Marathon

The destination was to begin the journey
Rooz Online, 6 March 2010

It is now quite obvious that what happened before and after the presidential election was a result of a very clumsy solution devised by security and military forces, to solve the “crisis of leadership” in the future system of the Islamic Republic. A solution that did not solve the crisis, and in fact, inflicted irreversible injury and damage to the very structure and legitimacy of the political system.


The ruling elite try to deny the existence of any political crisis, and to show that indeed it is the reformists who have reached a dead end. But analyzing their behavior and their responses to the aftermath of the election and the “green movement”, proves the opposite. A “political crisis”, in its most urgent form presents itself as a “crisis of legitimacy”, and a “crisis of legitimacy”, at its worse, becomes a “crisis of leadership”. Thus, not only is the system in a political crisis right now, this crisis is no ordinary quandary and is the worst of its kind.

“Who will be the next leader?” “What sort of mechanism will be used to choose the next leader?” “Is the current system of Leadership of the Jurist, in the current context of the constitution, sustainable?” These are questions which reformists, principalists and conservatives have been grappling with. The events of the recent election are in a way the product of different groups thinking of these questions. The events are in fact, a direct result of “serious measures” taken by the most hardline base of the establishment, in response to those questions. The result of the explosive, destructive actions following the election brought to light the very fact that a solution to these questions is not possible by “simple minded solutions” and the “crisis” and “dead end” argued here is much more serious to be solved by an adventurous wing of the establishment on its own.

What was this all about?

These events first seriously began when the most hardline wings of the system, composed of military groups, quasi-miliatry groups and extremist clerics, devised a strategy for “the transfer of leadership”. When Ayatollah Khamenei began his leadership of the country, most groups in the ruling establishment formed a consensus on his appointment and by acting above and beyond any faction or group, he was able to give the system relative stability and solidity. The election of a reformist president during his time, also gave many groups the belief that there is a chance to be active in the system and to reform it, without jeopardizing the stability of the entire system. But there was no guarantee that this stability would continue on forever.

There was no guarantee that when it came time to transfer the leadership to a “new leadership”, the same political stability would remain. By all accounts and all analysis, the system would experience great tension during this period and this tension might undermine its very existence. That is why all political factions within the system, from reformist to conservative to hardline, attempted to put forth a solution to this quandary in the frameworks of their own beliefs. For reasons of which I can not write about, it was the hardliners who were given the opportunity to carry out their solution. They were appointed to establish a “military rule”, a homogeneous ruling system empty and silent of dissent, to create an appropriate circumstance for the period of the transfer of leadership. This is how in 2005, “Mahmoud Ahmadinejad” was chosen to serve as president and to prepare suitable conditions for this period.

What was the hardliners’ solution?

The worst kind of political stability is when the future of an entire system is put to depend on the future of one person, because the smallest change in the top of the hierarchy will influence the entire system. In a monarchy, this quandary has been relatively solved by hereditary rule and the selection of the children or kin of the monarch as the next rulers. In this system, the death of the king and the succession of his son is seen as a legitimate, natural process, and does not undermine the entirety of the system.

But in the current ruling system of the Islamic Republic, the mechanisms are neither monarchical or democratic. From one angle, it seems that the Assembly of Experts is chosen by the nation to elect a leader, from another angle, the approbation supervision of the Guardian Council over the members of the assembly means that a substantial number of the nation’s real representatives never make their way through and thus have no say in the selection of the leader. Thus, the very principle of legitimacy and admissibility of the leader by the people [in the tradition of democratic systems] is undermined with the role of “approbation supervision” of the the Guardian Council.

So what was the solution the hardliners put forth? As we know, the hardliners follow extremist clerics like Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, who never believed in the selection of the leader by the Assembly of Experts, and has always disapproved of this article of the constitution. The emphasis of Ayatollah Yazdi on the appointment of the leader is based on a theory of “seeking and appointing” --- not electing.

Thus, the solution of the hardliners for the transition process is something like a hereditary monarchy, with the different that the new leader does not necessarily have to be next of kin. In the view of Ayatollah Yazdi, the current leader has ways to seek the opinion of the twelfth Imam [who will return from occultation one day], and when notified of the Imam’s choice, inform the Assembly of Experts. The Assembly of Experts will in turn swear allegiance to the new leader on behalf of the nation and through this mechanism, the people’s approval will be satisfied. Thus, the new leader will be appointed by the old one (he will be “sought and appointed”), will have holy legitimacy, and through the approval of the Assembly of Experts (an indirect swearing of allegiance by the people) also have the people’s approval.

The belief of the hardliners is nothing but a recreation of theory of the caliphate. The Assembly of Experts and Parliament are nothing but a seal of approval for the caliphate. Hardline Shi’as in this way are very similar to hardline Sunnis. They believe that by implementing these theories, the tensions during the transition period will reach a minimum, and these tensions will be limited to insignificant political dissent and disapproval. In this way, the old leader will appoint the new one, and the Assembly of Experts will approve.

But the real quandary for the hardliners was implementing these plans, not writing them, as they had been written long ago, from the time of Sheykh Fazlollah. How can it ever be brought to fruition in the time of reformist publications, numerous newspapers, well known intellectuals, and clerics deeply opposed to such views? Is the implementation of such a project possible in such a pluralistic, politicized environment?

How did the hardliners’ project begin?

The hardliners were appointed to create a military government, homogeneous and clear of dissent, to pave the way for the new leadership. For this purpose, Ahmadinejad was chosen as president in 2005 and most of the positions on his cabinets were taken by former military officials. The hardliners’ plan was written out in “two parts”, for two presidential terms. In his first term, Ahmadinejad was appointed to either control or destroy the potentials created in civil society during the reformist era. The aim of this period was to “return to square one”. In this period, student associations, NGOs, political parties and the press were put under excruciating pressure, to attempt to return to the pre-1997 era [before Khatami].

The most important part of the project however, was to do with Ahmadnejad’s second term. The second term was a “period of elimination”. Two groups of political players had to be eliminated. One group which was a “barrier”, and one group which was the “goal”. The reformists were a barrier to the hardline project. It could be predicted that they would be vocal in their opposition to election fraud. So a scenario was written to widely arrest and eliminate the reformists, by accusing them of a “velvet revolution” and “soft overthrow”.

A second group which was to be eliminated consisted of moderate conservative politicians who had traditional been an ally to Rafsanjani. The goal was to eliminate Rafsanjani and his allies, because, in the view of hardliners, this group would have a big role in determining the next leader. Before the election, and in Ahmadinejad’s first term, there was great effort to take many of Rafsanjani’s close allies to court, people like [Hassan] Rowhani, [Housein] Mousavian, and Mehdi Hashemi. And that attempt was not very successful. The process of eliminating Rafsanjani was to begin with Ahmadinejad’s televised debate, and by firing up the nation, it was to be carried out swiftly.

Thus, by imprisoning more than 500 political and civil activists, and eliminating conservatives from the top of the ruling establishment’s hierarchy, a suitable environment for the period of transition was to be prepared. In such an environment, there would even be an appropriate chance for changing to constitution to be more inline with the principle of “seeking and appointing”. But as we saw, all did not go according to the hardliners plan. The green movement was born.

What really Happened?

The discussion about how the Green Movement was born requires a lot more space, and will  not be the focus of this article. But what is quite obvious is that this movement was a blow to the hardliner project which they had been planning for years. Not only did they not achieve an appropriate environment for transferring leadership, but rather, the political landscape of the country was badly shaken. The hardliners expected to see hopelessness and silence from political activists and the public, after a brief period of protest following the election. But just the opposite happened. The protests saw no end and they became louder and louder every day. Even those people who had previously been apolitical and disinterested, got involved. Thus, not only were the political not silenced,the apolitical became active as well.

The hardliners project was defeated. The reformists stood their ground and did not back down. Imprisoning the reformists was not a victorious strategy, and did not have the desired result. The resilience of some reformists actually gave more life to their cause. Rafsanjani with his insightful brilliance, deterred any attempts by the hardliners to be eliminated. Not only did he not lose his position, he wisely kept his distance with the leadership.

The hardliners solution for this period of transfer was a simple minded “the use of brute force”. They assumed that technology and money would be enough. But the result was just the opposite of what they had planned for. The legitimacy of the system was greatly tarnished, and over night, its national and international appeal was damaged. Many of the system’s previous supporters became doubtful. The stability of the system was greatly undermined and the fracture between the people and the political elite became wider.

Thus, the effort of the hardliners was to return things to the way they were before the election. They tried to substitute their betrayal of the nation with violence. But whatever they did, it created a worse situation.

The blow that the hardliners forced on the system was worse than what any opposition could do. The damage and destruction brought on the system after the  election was the sole responsibility of military and quasi military forces which were the masterminds of the project. Only relying on their might and financial backing, they jeopardized the very existence of the system.

What was the role of pragmatic conservatives?

Last year, a group of conservatives had sent a message to reformists, asking them not to announce a candidate for the presidential election, and instead to back the conservative candidates (someone like [Mohammad-Baqer] Qalibaf, [Ali] Larijani, etc). The argument was that if the reformists have no candidate, there will less of a consensus on Ahmadinejad, and the moderate conservative would win. In the view of these pragmatic conservatives, that was the only way to unseat Ahmadinejad. The reformists of course turned down this offer. In their view there was no way to be sure that a consensus around Ahmadinejad could be broken. The conservatives took orders after all, and the harliners were bent on keeping Ahmadinejad in power. The only power that could unseat Ahmadinejad would be a nation wide momentum, like that of the 2nd Khordaad [when Mohammad Khatami was elected in 1997], not backroom deals between political factions. Thus, the reformists put their efforts in nominating Khatami again, and recreating 2nd of Khordaad.

Now, after nearly a year, individuals like Ali Motahari send letters to Mousavi and ask him to back down, and leave the job to moderate conservatives. The likes of Motahari argue that so long as the reformists are active, the hardliner and conservative consensus around  Ahmadinejad will not be broken. But if the reformists back down, the conservatives themselves will take care of Ahmadinejad.

This time too, the reformists and Mousavi’s response was negative. If Karoubi and Mousavi back down, not only will this not weaken Ahmadinejad, it will allow for a swift move on the part of hardliners to eliminate conservatives as well. The only reason that Rafsanjani’s allies and moderate conservatives have gone unscathed is that the hardliners have been busy with the repression and silencing of the green movement. The pragmatic conservatives underestimate the hardliners. If the hardliners remove the “barrier” that is the green movement, they will go straight for the conservatives. We must not forget that the actual aim was Rafsanjani and his allies, and the project remains unfinished. If the hardliners are not deterred, the pragmatic conservatives will not fare any better than the reformists.

During the months following the birth of the green movement, pragmatic conservatives tried to steer clear of the fights so that the two reformist and hardline factions would wear each other down. So that once both these factions were completely weakened, they could emerge as “the third force” or “saviors” and take control of government. But what happened was that the conflict between reformists and hardliners grew worse by the day and the political landscape was becoming ever more polarized and radicalized to a point where the entire system was at risk and there was no place for the conservatives.  That is why these conservatives decided to play a role in the events, after seven months of silence. A mediating role. The letter Mohsen Rezaie wrote to the leader, their attempts to reform election laws and to take Saeed Mortazavi [former Tehran Prosecutor General] to court, an attempt at changing the head of the police forces and the IRGC, parliament’s reports on government’s violations of law, their efforts to free imprisoned reformists and their numerous interviews in criticizing the government were all efforts on the part of pragmatic conservatives to end the conflict. Their efforts became more apparent after 22 Bahman [31st anniversary of the revolution].

What is waiting ahead?

The events of 2009 were a result of the deadlock in the reformist movement between 2002-2006. Who can clearly guess the repercussions of eliminating the reformists all together? The silencing of the symbols of the green movement has not destroyed that movement, but taken it to the inner layers of society. The green movement was beyond just “street protests” to be killed off when protests were no longer possible. The demands of this movement are very serious and the lack of a response to them leads the way for possible future political crises and more tension. Right in that moment when the hardliners think everything has come to an end and everything is calm, everything will start anew.

Two groups have always offered a wrong analysis of the Green Movement: an opposition which wants to overthrow the system, who interpreted the street protests as a “last action before the fall of the system” [a reference to Mohsen Sazegara] and the other group is conservatives who thought the Green Movement is the only obstacle towards a final stability of the system. (a writer in the conservative magazine Panjereh [Window] had declared the “end of history” right before a “final sin”; a sin that was the greatest sin of all and was the product of the devil).

The Green Movement however is a reformist, peaceful civil rights movement with clear demands, which is stubbornly trying to create better living conditions for all citizens. Thus, this movement will continue to live beyond the frameworks of those two groups, and will continue to speak out of its demands to the rulers, in whichever way possible, – and not just street protests. With the eruption of every national or international crisis, there is the chance that more street protests will take place. Even though Ahmadinejad has spent a great budget giving charity to the impoverished populations, with growing inflation and unemployment, this group too has much to protest. Amir Mohebian was right when he said: “Mousavi couldn’t tie the struggle of the lower classes to that of the middle class” but certainly, Ahmadinejad is up to the task.

2- Reformists and their leaders will not stop protesting. But the protests of the pragmatic conservatives will be much more effective and useful when they stand with the green movement, and not when they are alone. One of the reasons the reform movement was defeated was that Saeed Hajjarian’s strategy of “pressure from below, bargaining from above” never materialized. There was no pressure from below, and those around President Khatami had no ability to bargain.

The Green Movement is the restructuring and the reforming of the reform movement. When[Saeed] Hajjarian was in prison and was preparing for his televised interview, his strategies were being implemented outside prison. In an unwritten agreement, the people and the leaders of the Green Movement were pressuring [the ruling establishment] from below, and the bargaining was being done by the conservatives from above. This was an effective, realistic dividing of the responsibilities.

3- Up to this point, the hardliners have been defeated in their project. They have not been able to unseat Rafsanjani, and they have not been able to imprison Khatami, Mousavi and Karoubi. Even if Tehran does not see any other street protests, the political environment is so tense and inflamed that it will not allow them to carry out any other projects.

But we must remember that the hardliners are so determined to take the next leadership of the country that they are willing to put the country under any pressure. In order to create extreme circumstances, they are even willing to go to take the country to war with neighboring countries. We know that a war is a good excuse to carry out certain political decisions inside the country. (Faridedin Adel, the son of [Gholam-Ali] Hadad Adel [hardline ex-speaker of parliament] has predicated in an article that Iran will be going to war with Turkey in the next few months.)

4 – It has become quite obvious to the ruling establishment that the hardliners’ solution for the transfer of leadership is very very costly, and full of risk. And that even if this project was to succeed, sustaining it (in terms of its national and international legitimacy, economic difficulties, etc) would be near impossible. That is why we can be hopeful that in the future, the reformists and the pragmatic conservatives will also have the chance to put forth their  solution. These solutions include democratizing the parliament and the Assembly of Experts, eliminating the approbation supervision of the Guardian Council and creating a “Council of Leaders”.

The destination, was to begin the journey.

We can clearly witness two defeats for the contemporary  hardline Shi’a movement: the executions of Sheykh Fazlollah and Navab Safavi. Ayatollah Khomeini too left them dissappointed when establishing the Islamic Republic, by incorporating modern democratic institutions within the frameworks of the system. After the ayatollah’s death, the hardliners spent years trying to reclaim their century long pursuits. But in the last instant, with the rise of the “Imam’s prime minister” [Mousavi], a great movement took shape. The birth of the green movement was an end to the hardliner project, and marked another disappointment for them in history. The family of Ayatollah Khomeini raised their voice in protest and many of the marjas [grand ayatollahs], even some of the most conservative, spoke out in criticism.

If there is any group that is guilty of attempting to overthrow the system, it is the hardliners who wanted to overthrow the “Islamic Republic” and replace it with a “Shia Caliphate”. Mousavi had no choice but to disagree with such a move, even though it had a heavy price for him and the people. Mousavi consciously paid this  price to steer the reformists out of deadlock, because the reform movement is the only way of saving the democratic aspects of the system, and saving the Islamic Republic.

The hardliner project for eliminating the democratic aspects of the system was defeated with the birth of the green movement. The green movement reached its aim right at the start; whatever it might gain hereafter, are all added achievements. The destination was to begin the journey.

The Latest from Iran (11 March): Marathon

1910 GMT: Reuters has picked up Zahra Rahnavard's latest interview, highlighting the line, "I have said many times that this government is illegitimate...but because the government claims to be legitimate, it has to carry out its duties."

1900 GMT: From Washington With... ? We've posted the video of yesterday's "Iran at A Crossroads" conference.

NEW Video: “Iran at a Crossroads” Conference (10 March)
NEW Iran: Gender Issues and the Green Movement
Iran Document: The Hardliners’ Project (Bahavar)
Iran Interview: Habibollah Peyman “Change Through Social Awareness
The Latest from Iran (10 March): The View from Washington

1855 GMT: Rafsanjani Watch. Readers have rightly noted an apparent lapse in our coverage of former President Hashemi Rafsanjani. The reformist daily Bahar claimed on Wednesday that, in a clear sign of reconciliation with the regime, Rafsanjani would soon lead Friday Prayers in Tehran. (He has not done so since his 17 July address, which was a catalysts for demonstrations against the Government.)



I saw the story, which was picked up by the Babylon and Beyond blog of the Los Angeles Times, but decided to pass on it. It felt much more like rumour than a confirmed development.

That said, even the rumour deserves noting. Elements within the Government seem keen on establishing that Rafsanjani no longer has any issues with the leadership, so all is now politically well. So far, however, Rafsanjani has been his usual coy self, not confirming any return to the Friday Prayer slot.

1840 GMT: Rahnavard, Women's Rights, and the Green Movement. Zahra Rahnavard, the wife of Mir Hossein Mousavi, has given an interview to Kalemeh talking about the relationship between campaigns for women's rights and the initiatives of the Green Movement. (See our separate entry on this subject, which was posted before we read the Rahnavard interview.)

1805 GMT: From Czechoslovakia to Iran. Vaclav Havel, the playwright and activist who was instrumental in the movement that challenged the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia and then became the country's first post-Communist President, has sent a message to Iran's protesters. The occasion was the award of the Homo Homini Award by a Czech NGO to Iranian student activists Majid Tavakoli and Abdollah Momeni:

Of course all of us are interested in Iran's nuclear program and the nature of the current regime, just as we are interested in the abuses committed under the flag of Islam and whether or not the 2009 election was rigged. However, what I am most interested in are the brutal violations of human rights. I found myself in high political position thanks to peaceful public demonstrations and thanks to the students, who led them and made them happen. As a result, I have an elevated sensitivity for certain things and am deeply outraged and shocked that for participating in similar demonstrations in Iran, people are not only being sentenced to several years in prison, but are even being executed. It seems to me like an endless barbarity and I firmly believe this savagery is about to come to an end.

1745 GMT: Escape. It is being reported that student activist Ali Kantouri, recently sentenced to 15yrs in prison, has fled to Turkey.

1525 GMT: Rafsanjani Watch. I think former President Hashemi Rafsanjani has taken another swipe at President Ahmadinejad but any impact may be ruled out by Rafsanjani's vagueness in expression. From Radio Zamaneh:

Akabar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Chairman of Iran’s Expediency Council stressed the role of people in governance and maintained that with the growth and spread of media, governments that do not have popular bases can not last long....

Speaking in a meeting of members of municipal councils of Tehran Province, Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani said that Islam holds a special place for the role of people in the government.

He added that in democracies, parties that are triumphant in the elections act as buffers and when the elected candidates take a wrong turn, the responsibility falls on the shoulders of the parties and this way the system does not suffer.

He also criticized the policy of limiting the legal powers of city councils saying such policies only weaken the councils and reduce their ability to respond to people’s demands.

1445 GMT: Ain't Nothing Gonna Change. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reviews the Supreme Leader's pronouncement on possible electoral reform, which we noted yesterday), and sees this is a clear rejection rather than an ambiguous response.

1345 GMT: Fist-Shaking. Yet another Iranian military advance which has nothing to do whatsoever with Tehran's power politics vs. the US: Iran has started production of a surface-to-air missile.

President Ahmadinejad added rhetorical colour with the promise that people in the region "would cut (American) hands off of Persian Gulf oil".

However, in a sign that the US still wants to avoid conflict, and possibly establish co-operation, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said Iranian support for the Taliban in Afghanistan is "pretty limited".

1230 GMT: Catching Up.

I've posted a follow-up to the Washington hearing, considering the failure to answer adequately a question on gender issues and the Green Movement.

There is also an important correction: we reported yesterday, from Iranian human rights websites, that Saeed Nourmohammadi of the Islamic Iran Participation Front had been released on bail. His family say, however, that Nourmohammadi has not been freed.

Reports indicate more freeing of political prisoners. Mostafa Tajzadeh, a senior member of the Islamic Iran Participation Front, has been released without bail for Iranian New Year.

Israel-Palestine: "Proximity Talks" and US Vice President Biden

Here's the background: last Friday, US Mideast Special Envoy George Mitchell's deputy, David Hale, said Israeli-Palestinian understandings since the Annapolis talks would not be binding.

Following the approval of two conditions (the outlines of a border deal with Israel and a complete Israeli settlement construction freeze) by the Palestinian Liberation Organization executive committee, Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on Monday that he hoped for direct negotiations in the near future, but reiterated that any permanent settlement would require recognition of Israel as a Jewish state and a long-term guarantee of Israel's security.

Thus, the clear difference between two disputants' mentalities: on one hand, Ramallah is considering indirect talks as a basis to be consolidated in order to move to the next round of direct talks; on the other hand, West Jerusalem sees indirect talks as a way to block preconditions.

In the midst of Defense Minister Ehud Barak's permission for the construction of 112 housing units in the settlement of Beitar Ilit, despite the construction freeze in the West Bank settlements, U.S. Vice President Joe Biden arrived Israel on Tuesday while Mitchell moved to Ramallah for further talks.

Biden, on early Tuesday, met President Shimon Peres. He said that the agreed resumption of Israeli-Palestinian talks provided a "moment of real opportunity" for peace and added:

The interests of both the Palestinians and the Israeli people, if everyone would just step back and take a deep breath, are actually very much more in line than they are in opposition.

Then, Biden talked to PM Netanyahu. He said that "historic peace will require both sides to make historically bold commitments" and gave the golden statement:

There is no space between the United States and Israel when it comes to Israel's security.

When it came to the Iranian issue, Biden said: "We're determined to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and we're working with many countries around the world to convince Tehran to meet its international obligations and cease and desist." President Peres harshly targeted Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. He stated that Ahmadinejad must face "total" international isolation and added:

A person like Ahmadinejad, who calls openly to destroy the state of Israel, cannot be a full member of the United Nations.

A man who calls for acts of terror, and who hangs people in the street ... he should be placed in his proper definition. He cannot go around almost like a cultural hero.

Ahmadinejad has to be isolated and not be welcomed in the capitals of the world.

The Latest from Iran (9 March): Political Acts

1500 GMT: But Mahmoud, What If No One's Home? Here's a better story than the Khatami rumour....

On Monday President Ahmadinejad was totally disrespected when Afghan President Hamid Karzai who told Mahmoud to stay home (US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates was suddenly in town, and Americans and Iranians at the same time in Kabul just wouldn't do). So Iranian state media carried the story that Ahmadinejad's office had not said "Monday" but "this week". The meeting with Karzai would now be on Wednesday.

Which would be fine except Karzai's people are reportedly saying that the Afghan President will be in Pakistan on Wednesday.

So what's up? Is it a three-way get-together in Islamabad or will Ahmadinejad's office have to clarify "not this week, next week".

Iran Analysis: Corruption Within the Government?
Latest Iran Video: Hillary Clinton’s Message to Iranian Women (8 March)
Iran: A Journalist Writes Her Detained Husband and “Mr Interrogator”
Video: General Petraeus on Iran and Iraq (7 March
The Latest from Iran (8 March): Foreign Affairs

1445 GMT: Khatami Watch. Yes, we have read the rumours that former President Mohammad Khatami has been barred from leaving Iran. The source is Fars News, so status remains at rumour or disinformation --- Khatami's camp have denied the report.



1430 GMT: Human Rights Front. Student activists Abdollah Momeni and Majid Tavakoli, are this year's recipients of the Homo Homini Award, awarded annually by the Czech-based People in Need "in recognition of a dedication to the promotion of human rights, democracy, and nonviolent solutions to political conflicts".

Momeni was released this week on $800,000 bail after more than six months in jail, including reportedly about 100 days in solitary confinement. Iranian He has received a six-year jail sentence, which is being appealed.

Tavakoli was arrested at the 7 December National Student Day demonstrations. The regime attempted to humiliate him by disseminating photographs of him dressed in hijab.

1230 GMT: Dangerous Papers (cont.). An Iranian activist reports the press board's warning was handed out to the reformist publication Bahar for carrying an article about the mysterious changing colours of the Iranian flag.

1210 GMT: Newsflash! Even Football Can Be Dangerous. Mehr News Agency reports that Iran's press supervisory board has warned 17 publications over alleged breaches of media regulations.

Mohammad Ali Ramin, the Deputy Minister of Culture who has been widely criticised for his hard line against the media, said the publications were "not committed to journalistic duties, breached media regulations, printed superficial materials, and propagated materialism".

The leading reformist daily, Bahar (Spring), is accused of having published "rumours and lies".

The other 16 journals warned were: Nasl Emrouz, Banu Shargi, Ayne Zendegi, Payamavar, Sepidar, Pishkhan, Zendegi Irani, Medad Rangi, Zendegi Edeal, Ruiesh, Kohenoor, Tohid, Rahe Zendegi, Sinamaye Emrouz, Chelcheragh, and Football.

1150 GMT: The Nuclear Deal. For the second day in a row, Iran's Foreign Ministry has signalled that the "third-party enrichment" option --- which resurfaced during Ali Larijani's recent trip to Japan --- is still alive. Spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast said Tuesday that Iran's "priority is to obtain fuel" for a Tehran medical research reactor.

Mehmanparast assured, "If the [International Atomic Energy] Agency suggests a country in possession of the 20-percent enriched fuel, we are ready to buy [the fuel]. Besides, if there are countries ready for a swap which will fulfill our conditions, we are ready; otherwise, we will produce the fuel [ourselves]."

1135 GMT: Women's Day (cont.). The association of Iranian female journalists, RUZA, has issued a declaration stating that release of imprisoned women is its first goal.

Zahra Rahnavard, the wife of Mir Hossein Mousavi, met women's organisations yesterday, commemorating Neda and other victims of post-election conflict.

1130 GMT: One to Watch? There has been an increase in tensions between Azerbaijan and Iran, with protests in front of the Azeri Embassy in Tabriz and the burning of the Azeri flag. Good relations between Azerbaijan and Israel have been mentioned as a possible cause.

1120 GMT: Keeping the Universities in Line. Is the regime getting nervous about renewed public resistance at the universities? First, Minister of Higher Education Kamran Daneshjoo issued a warning to "deviant professors". Now Revolutionary Guard commander Rahim Savafi has declared that the universities are "empty" of elites faithful to the Supreme Leader and Constitution.

0930 GMT: Still Protesting. While university demonstrations have been muted since December, that does not mean that dissent has been quelled. A group of Tehran University students has put out the message: "If 'their' power relies on their guns, ours is that we are countless."

0920 GMT: Today's Media Head-for-the-Hills Moment. The New York Times is back to its red alert over Iran's nuclear programme, this time with a lengthy piece on the country's uranium enrichment process.

To be fair to reporter William Broad, his article is mainly an overview of both the possibilities and the limitations of Iran's nuclear programme. However, whoever wrote the headline missed the subtleties and/or preferred Panic Mode, "For Iran, Enriching Uranium Only Gets Easier".

0915 GMT: Here's some political theatre for you. The head of Iran's judiciary, Sadegh Larijani, has made a dramatic intervention with his claim of high-level embezzlement and corruption within the Government. Mr Verde has an analysis.

0820 GMT: Catching Up With the Political Poses and Other News.

Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani has hurled the label of "thugocracy", used by US General David Petraeus in a Sunday interview, back at the "goons" of the American Government: "It is understandable that they hate people with the knowledge of the region joining us today, so they use offensive words."

Juan Cole has an interesting analysis of President Ahmadinejad's declaration that the US Government created the "lie" of 9-11 to support its international plans, going farther into Ahmadinejad's religious beliefs:

Not only is Ahmadinejad the Iranian equivalent of a truther, he is also the mirror image of the Christian Zionists. That brand of evangelicals in the US believes that the establishment of Israel throughout geographical Palestine, i.e. the complete annexation of the West Bank and perhaps the expulsion of its Palestinian residents, will hasten the return of Christ.

Ahmadinejad holds the opposite. It is in his view the collapse of what he calls the Zionist regime and the emergence of a state for all Palestinians, whether Jewish, Christian or Muslim, that will provoke the Promised One to come. In Shiite Islam, the promised one is the return of the 12th Imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi, the lineal descendant of the Prophet Muhammad.

The Latest from Iran (8 March): Foreign Affairs

2000 GMT: More on Women's Day. An interesting interview with Parvin Ardalan, winner of the Olof Palme Prize in 2005 it was “for making the equal rights of men and women central to the struggle for democracy in Iran”:

Many of the women’s groups decided after the election not to communicate with the government because it has lost its legitimacy. For example, they collected all these signatures for the One Million Signatures campaign to give to the parliament, but now people no longer want to sign anything because they believe that no demands should be sent to a government that has no legitimacy. The situation has changed – people want gender equality but they don’t think the approach is to go to this government to get it. So currently even the groups that did have contact with the government, no longer do

1900 GMT: Rafsanjani Watch. Former President Hashemi Rafsanjani has met with reformist students of Tehran University for the second time in recent months.

1850 GMT: We've posted the video message of US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to Iranian women on International Women's Day.

1845 GMT: Political Prisoner News. An Iranian activist reports that Committee of Human Rights Reporters member Mehrad Rahimi was released on bail this evening. Five other CHRR members are still imprisoned.

NEW Latest Iran Video: Hillary Clinton’s Message to Iranian Women (8 March)
NEW Iran: A Journalist Writes Her Detained Husband and “Mr Interrogator”
Video: General Petraeus on Iran and Iraq (7 March)
Iran: Senior Reformist Amani “We Have Not Decided to Remain Silent”
The Latest from Iran (7 March): The Elections Next Door

1800 GMT: How Does Iran Celebrate International Women's Day? Building on the news that poet Simin Behbahani was barred from leaving Iran for ceremonies in Paris (see 0835 GMT), Golnaz Esfandiari notes other cases of restrictions of women's rights in the country.


1755 GMT: War on Terror News. Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani has announced that Iran has asked Germany to extradite the leader of the Party of Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK) to stand trial.

1745 GMT: Denial of Day:Tehran Province Governor Morteza Tamaddon claimed today that security and police forces did not enter the campus of Tehran University on the night of 14/15 June.

Responding to an 18-minute video, widely circulated last month, that showed men attacking university dormiitories, Tamaddon warned, “If anyone claims [security and police were present], we are ready to follow up on the matter.” He insisted a small group of students had started a protest in the University residences and were dealt with by the “appropriate authorities.”

1735 GMT: All is Well Press Release of Day. I have to preface this, while trying to keep a straight face, with the note that throughout Sunday, Iranian state media were announcing loudly that President Ahmadinejad would be in Kabul today (see 1055 GMT):

An Iranian diplomat in Kabul said Monday President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad would head a high-ranking delegation to Afghanistan on Wednesday, rejecting reports of delays in his visit.

Afghan sources in the presidential office had earlier claimed that Ahmadinejad had postponed his visit, which, they said, had been originally scheduled for Monday.

The Iranian source, however, told Press TV that Tehran had announced that the visit would take place during the week, without specifying that a day had been picked by the president.

The diplomat also rejected reports that the visit's itinerary had been influenced by US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates' visit to Kabul.

1730 GMT: Communicating with Iran. The US Treasury Department has approved an exemption to American sanctions on Iran, Sudan, and Cuba to allow the export of Internet communications software. Deputy U.S. Treasury Secretary Neal Wolin said that the change is intended to help people "exercise their most basic rights."

1715 GMT: Economy Watch. Looks like the Ahmadinejad Government may have scored a big victory, with the approval of a $347 billion budget for the Iranian year to March 2011.

This is less than the Government's $368.4 billion request. It also appears that the $40 billion sought from subsidy cuts has been reduced to $20 billion. Still, given the criticism of the Government over the proposal, the passage is a significant advance.

The vote for the budget was 151-62 with 12 abstentions.

1420 GMT: An Unwelcome Coincidence. Within 30 seconds of posting the update below, I read the news from the Kalemeh website:

An Iranian appeals court handed a five-year jail term to a reformist journalist...while...authorities freed five other critics on hefty sureties.

The journalist, Bahman Ahmadi Amoui, a prominent critic of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's economic policies, was previously sentenced to seven years in jail and 74 lashes, after a government crackdown on opposition supporters.

But the appeals court reduced that sentence to five years in jail and waived the lashes.

1415 GMT: A Special Letter. A bit limited with updates today because of academic duties; please keep sending in your latest news.

Meanwhile, we've posted a letter from journalist Zhila Baniyaghoub to her husband, Bahman Ahmadi Amoui. Both were detained after the June election, but Baniyaghoub was released while Amoui remains in Evin Prison. The letter, posted on Sunday, is one of the most moving expressions of feeling and thought I have read in this crisis.

1100 GMT: Adding Insult to Injury. Here's US Secretary of State Robert Gates, on his way to meet Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai after Karzai told President Ahmadinejad to stay in Iran: "[Tehran] also understand that our reaction, should they get too aggressive in this, is not one they would want to think about."

1055 GMT: Rejected. OK, now the news from Kabul makes sense....

I noticed a few hours ago that US Secretary of State Defense Robert Gates is also in Afghanistan today, paying a visit to President Hamid Karzai. This conjured up wild visions of US and Iranian delegations huddling somewhere in Kabul while Karzai manoeuvred between meetings with Gates and President Ahmadinejad.

But, of course, the simpler outcome is that the Afghan leadership --- whether because of pressure from the Amerians or of their own accord --- would choose their Washington visitors and tell Ahmadinejad to stay home. From Press TV:

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has postponed a trip to Afghanistan devoted to providing "solutions for settling the problems" in Iran's eastern neighbor.

The one-day visit, originally scheduled for Monday, would be the President's first visit to Afghanistan since both he and his Afghan counterpart Hamid Karzai were re-elected last year.

"President Ahmadinejad won't be coming to Kabul," an informed source at the Karzai's office told Press TV on condition of anonymity.

US Defense Secretary Robert Gates, the source added, has, however, arrived in Afghanistan on Monday morning on an unannounced visit.

The source did not pinpoint a next date for the meeting between the two presidents.

1030 GMT: Breaking News. It is being reported that President Ahmadinejad has cancelled his trip to Afghanistan, giving no reason.

0905 GMT: In Their Honour. For International Women's Day, Setareh Sabety has posted an essay, "Working Class and Female in Iran": "For whatever it is worth, I thought that I should expose the lives of three very ordinary Iranian women from different backgrounds and different sensibilities. This is for them."

0835 GMT: Stifling the Artists. Iranian authorities have barred one of Iran's most famous poets, Simin Behbahani, from leaving the country. Behbahani had been invited to read her work at International Women's Day ceremonies in Paris.

0730 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. The authorities continue to release the relatives of prominent blogger Agh Bahman: his sisters Banafsheh and Jamileh Darolshafaei. His cousin Yashar Darolshafaei has had bail set at $70,000. However, Abolhasan Darolshafaei, Bahman's father, is still detained.

0715 GMT: The Israel Front. Meanwhile, the US continues to send the Very, Very Concerned message to western Jerusalem, not to encourage an Israeli attack on Iran but to dissuade the Israelis.

The latest high-profile signal comes from Vice President Joe Biden's visit today. Before meeting Israeli officials, he declared:

Though I cannot answer the hypothetical questions you raised about Iran, I can promise the Israeli people that we will confront, as allies, any security challenge it will face. A nuclear-armed Iran would constitute a threat not only to Israel -- it would also constitute a threat to the United States.

0705 GMT: China and Iran. The International Crisis Group offers an incisive analysis on China's position on the Iranian nuclear issue:

Beijing is unconvinced that Iran has the ability to develop nuclear weapons in the short term and does not share the West’s sense of urgency about the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran, despite the risks that this would present to China’s long-term interests. Moreover, it does not believe the sanctions proposed by the West will bring about a solution to the issue, particularly given the failure of this approach so far. And while Beijing has stated that it supports a “nuclear-free” Middle East, it does not want to sacrifice its own energy interests in Iran. However, if China finds itself facing unanimous support for sanctions from other Security Council members, it will delay but not block a resolution, while seeking to weaken its punitive terms.

0635 GMT: Look for Iranian state media to spend Monday playing up Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's trip to Kabul to chat with Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai. After several months of being ostracised by the international community, Ahmadinejad has become one of the big boys again. This visit, following the Iranian President's diiscussions in Damascus, points to the Iranian Government's play for recognition and influence in both the Middle East and Central Asia.

But is Ahmadinejad a central figure or just a figurehead? We're still watching the Japan front on the uranium enrichment story, with yet another sign from Tehran yesterday that a deal may soon be on the table for Tokyo to carry out third-party enrichment.

And, while posting the video, we're trying to read General David Petraeus's appearance on the stage yesterday. His reference to Iran's regime as a "thugocracy" seems a crude attempt, both in rhetoric and conception, to match Hillary Clinton's recent pronouncement of an Iranian "military dictatorship".

However, the most significant part of Petraeus' statement may be his assurance that Tehran is too preoccupied with internal matters to mess around abroad, including in Iraq. That reads as a declaration of the containment of Iran, which indicates that Petraeus will not be pushing for more confrontational measures against Tehran, including military action.