Iran MediaWatch: Has "Green Reform" Disappeared in Washington?

UPDATE: Within minutes of posting this, I read an article in The Washington Post which points to an answer to my question:

Two weeks before President Obama visited China.... Dennis Ross and Jeffrey Bader, both senior officials in the National Security Council...traveled to Beijing on a "special mission" to try to persuade China to pressure Iran to give up its alleged nuclear weapons program. If Beijing did not help the United States on this issue, the consequences could be severe.

The Chinese were told that Israel regards Iran's nuclear program as an "existential issue and that countries that have an existential issue don't listen to other countries," according to a senior administration official. The implication was clear: Israel could bomb Iran, leading to a crisis in the Persian Gulf region and almost inevitably problems over the very oil China needs to fuel its economic juggernaut, said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity.

Earlier this week, the White House got its answer. China informed the United States that it would support a toughly worded, U.S.-backed statement criticizing the Islamic republic for flouting U.N. resolutions by constructing a secret uranium-enrichment plant. The statement, obtained by The Washington Post, is part of a draft resolution to be taken up as soon as Thursday by the 35 nations that make up the governing board of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.N. nuclear watchdog.

1. Key personnel in the National Security Council, notably Ross, are hell-bent on getting sanctions as soon as talks with Iran are declared to have broken down.
2. To pursue those sanctions, these officials are prepared to exaggerate to the point of hysteria: "Israe could bomb Iran".
3. To pursue those sanctions, these officials will leak private conversations with foreign powers and sensitive documents to accommodating reporters.
4. To pursue those sanctions, these officials will ignore obvious difficulties: "While diplomats and arms-control experts welcomed China's support of the IAEA resolution, some acknowledged that it is not clear whether Russia or China would go further and agree to new sanctions against Iran."
5. The issue of what is happening inside Iran --- be that "reform", "justice", "human rights" --- is irrelevant to these officials.

Iran: 3 Problems (for the Greens, for the US, for Ahmadinejad)
The Latest from Iran (26 November): Corridors of Conflict

Have "the Greens" disappeared in Washington?

Yesterday's New York Times editorial is an exercise in frustration, bluster, and irrelevance. Its legimitate concern at the oppressions of the Iranian regime falls away into obsession with and distortions of the nuclear issue --- "time is running out"; "Iran’s repressive leaders cannot be allowed to threaten the rest of the world with a nuclear weapon" --- and the knee-jerk call for tougher sanctions through the United Nations Security Council. ( To recap: 1. The Security Council won't adopt such sanctions; 2. They would have little effect on Tehran's position on the nuclear programme; 3. They do nothing to solve the dilemmas of engagement on issues such as Afghanistan; 4. They do nothing with respect to the human rights issue which supposedly concerned the NYT at the start of the editorial.)

Far more interesting is this morning's opinion piece in The Washington Post by Maziar Bahari, the journalist detained for 118 days after the June election, especially if his sentiments are shared by Obama's officials.

After making a striking assertion, "The [Revolutionary] Guards are becoming stronger than the President and the Supreme Leader," Bahari offers an equally striking recommendation,

Can the West, especially the United States, have a dialogue with these people? Yes. Because there is no other choice. The West has to negotiate with Iran on the nuclear program and the stability of Iraq and Afghanistan. Not talking to Tehran doesn't work.

So engagement has to be pursued, even if we don't like the Iranians in charge (including Bahari's jailers).What is most striking, however, is Bahari's treatment of Iranians beyond the Guards, the Supreme Leader, and the Ahmadinejad Government. In contrast to his clear position on engagement, this seems to be a muddled attempt at escapism from his earlier political calculations:

The rumor du jour in Iran is that Obama and the Guards are reaching a deal to normalize relations, in exchange for which America will ignore human rights abuses in Iran. Hence, the opposition movement's slogan "Obama, either with them or with us." The United States has acted against the interests of the Iranian people in the past. Repeating that mistake for tactical gains would be the biggest mistake of the Obama administration.

As for the Iranian people, the more immediate victims of the brutal regime, we have to think long-term. Our anger should be sublimated into something more positive. We have been brutalized to think of the world in black and white. Seeing the shades of gray can be our strongest weapon against those who would jail, beat and torture us.

Given the New York Times flight into nuclear worry and sanctions and the reality of Bahari's engagement --- it is not with the reformists, either as individual figures like Mousavi, Karroubi, and Khatami or with the grassroots mass of the protest movement, what exactly is the "long-term more positive"?

Iran: 3 Problems (for the Greens, for the US, for Ahmadinejad)

0645 GMT: A busy Wednesday, not only in political updates but in conversations with those who have a window into what is happening in Washington and Tehran. The politics and possibilities are so complex that days will be needed to work through the analysis but:

1. The chief problem for the Green movement vis-a-vis the US is not if there is an envoy --- Mohajerani, Makhmalbaf, Sazegara --- but its lack of a clear policy (how would it take power? what would it do if it held power? is there even a single Movement rather than movements?). Then again, does that matter? In other words, if the Green movement focuses on changing the situation inside Iran, giving the US Government (and everyone else) a different political scene to consider, can "Obama: You're with them or you're with us" be treated as a slogan rather than a pressing concern?

2. The chief problem for the Obama Administration is that its nuclear-first policy of engagement is facing the twin difficulty of 1) an Iranian Government that is too fractured and too weak to accept soon a "third-party enrichment" deal taking uranium outside the country and 2) its self-imposed artificial deadline of December to close off the talks and move to tougher sanctions. No doubt, since the talks are still "live" --- International Atomic Energy Agency head Mohmammad El Baradei, Russia, and Turkey are all pushing Tehran to accept a compromise on the Vienna third-party plan --- the US Government will try to push back the cut-off date into the New Year.

It is unlikely, however, that either Congress or the loud sections of the US media and "think tanks" will be willing to accept even a few months of grace. So Obama and advisors  face either the prospect of getting a sudden break-through in Iran's position (how to get to the Supreme Leader so he will endorse this?) or having to accept a "compromise" sanctions regime (probably financial and banking measures outside the United Nations framework).

And that in turn has consequences, because any rupture in the engagement with Iran will affect US strategy in near-by countries. All together now....Afghanistan.

3. And the problem for the Ahmadinejad Government? Take your pick.

The Green movement, whatever the indecisions and vagaries of prominent figures like Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mohammad Khatami and the recent caution of Mehdi Karroubi, won't go away. And the calendar is moving towards 16 Azar (7 December).

Unless the Supreme Leader has an immediate conversion, there will not be a nuclear agreement which both bolsters President Ahmadinejad's legitimacy and gives the impression of Iranian strength.

The "threats within" have resurrected: the Larijanis, Rafsanjani, other Parliamentarians, Ministries who don't like the quest for control of Ahmadinejad (or those allied with him). And they have plenty to work with --- the nuclear dispute, the Government's economic plans, the running sore of the post-election abuses.

The current manoeuvres to ease difficulties are no more than short-term bandages. Allow the most prominent reformists (e.g. Abtahi) to escape their recent sentences and face both the impression of weakness and the risk that those figures will not remain silent. Put them back in prison with "compromise" sentences (2-3 years) and make them martyrs.

And the solutions which sweep away all these little problems? They risk taking down even the symbolic appearance of the Islamic Republic. A Revolutionary Guard public move to assume power, a negotiation to keep rule in the hands of the Supreme Leader (and his family), a new set of the "right" Grand Ayatollahs: any of these bring the pillars of 1979 crashing down.

Problems, problems, problems.....

Latest Iran Video: A Shah's Greeting for Ahmadinejad

Venezuela greets President Ahmadinejad with "Soroude Shahanshahi", the anthem of the late Shah:

Ahmadinejad arrived in Carracas with Soroude Shahanshahi!
Uploaded by khandaniha. - News videos hot off the press.

The Latest from Iran (25 November): Larijani Talks Tough

2030 GMT: El Baradei's Clues. Want to know the state of the nuclear talks with Iran? The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohammad El Baradei, offers all the necessary hints in an interview with Reuters.

1. Iran's "swap" proposal, exchanging 20% enriched uranium for Iranian 3.5% stock inside the country, is not acceptable. "They are ready to put material under IAEA control on an (Iranian) island in the Persian Gulf. But the whole idea as I explained to them, to defuse this crisis, is to take the material out of Iran. I do not think (Iran's counter-proposal) will work as far as the West is concerned."

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The Latest from Iran (24 November): A Larijani-Rafsanjani Alliance?

To back his line, El Baradei is playing up uncertainty over the state of Iran's nuclear plans, pivoting on the controversy over the second enrichment plant at Fordoo: "You cannot really use it for civilian purposes. It's too small to produce fuel for a civilian reactor." So while the IAEA has "no indication that there are other undeclared facilities in Iran" or "any information that such facilities exist", Fordoo's existence raises questions about a wider Iranian programme --- questions that El Baradei can use (or create) to push back the "swap" initiative.

Iranian state media has already reacted: "IAEA fails to address Iran nuclear swap concerns". But this pretty much puts an end to Tehran's offer: if El Baradei won't back it, then it's almost certain none of the "5+1" powers will be offering any support.

2. But the talks are still very much alive, resting on a "third-party enrichment" arrangement. The plan would be one in which the IAEA would "take custody and control of the material. We've offered also to have the material in Turkey, a country which has the trust of all the parties.... I am open (to Iranian amendments) if they have any additional guarantees that do not involve keeping the material in Iran."

3. So, for now, El Baradei does not see a move to aggressive sanctions: UN resolutions are mainly "expressions of frustration".

Summary? Ball's in your court, President Ahmadinejad (and Supreme Leader Khamenei). Don't knock it back --- take a modified "third-party enrichment" offer and everyone will be happy.

1955 GMT: The Khatami and Mousavi Statements. Former President Mohammad Khatami has also issued a statement for Basiji week. He used the occasion to criticise both the specific oppression of dissenters --- "These days, honest and truthful people are being oppressed and worse than that all these are being done in the name of Islam and the revolution" --- and the general mismanagement of the Government --- "An unbiased view is that all areas of industry, agriculture, foreign affairs and different managements are in bad shape and all indexes have decline and the country has fallen behind." He continued to emphasise the hope for "a change in the country’s atmosphere" through an adherence to the Constitution".

And to summarise the Mousavi statement (see 1610 GMT): "What shaped Basij in the beginning of the revolution was pure ideas not weapons and military power that raised it to high statures....The goal of Imam Khomeini in creating Basij was to include all or at least a significant majority of the public by not belonging to a particular idea."

Now, however, the Basij "take orders with closed eyes and break tthe arms and legs of their religious brothers and sisters". They need to recognise that those who use lies as "their main political tactic...Following these people is not the righteous path."

At the end of the statement, Mousavi seizes the nationalist mantle and turns the charge of "foreign intervention" against the regime: If terrorising people succeeds, "the country will fall into the hands of foreign invaders".

1905 GMT: Here is Why There Won't Be Tough Sanctions. "The Chinese refiner Sinopec has signed a memorandum of understanding with the National Iranian Oil Refining and Distribution Company to invest $6.5 billion for building oil refineries in Iran. It is predicted that the two sides will close the deal in the next two months."

1850 GMT: Iranians' Civil Rights Violated (outside Iran). Forgive me for finding this story ironic as wel as serious: "An Iranian NGO (non-government organisation RahPouyan-e-DadGostar) is in the process of logging a legal complaint against the US over its violation of the rights of Iranian detainees."

Without dwelling on the case of Kian Tajbakhsh, the Iranian-American recently jailed for 15 years after a televised "confession" over his supposed role in velvet revolution, I'll note the possible significance that several of the 11 Iranians listed in the report have been connected to possible Israeli and/or US plots to abduct individuals connected with Iran's nuclear programme.

1840 GMT: A month after Iran's Ministry of Education announced a plan to permanently assign a member of the clergy to each school to “fulfill the cultural needs” of students, a religious official has stated that management of Iranian public schools is being transferred to seminaries. Ali Zolelm, the head of the Council of Cooperation between Ministry of Education and the seminaries, saying that seminars have already taken over school management in several provinces and the city of Qom.

1740 GMT: Larijani Keeps Up the Pressure. Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, speaking in Tehran, has launched another assault on Iran's nuclear talks with the US, claiming that Washington wanted to deceive the Iranian Government:

Analyzing the U.S. (role) in the nuclear issue shows that there was a trickery in this (deal) proposal (brokered by the International Atomic Energy Agency). They (Americans) thought that, using a kind of rhetoric, they can cheat politically," Larijani said addressing a gathering in Tehran, without specifying how the United States has tried to cheat Iran.

1610 GMT: Why Mousavi's Statement (see 1345 GMT) is Significant. An EA correspondent drops by:

Mousavi's latest communique isn't worth noting for its content --- it is a rather stale critique of current basij actions and dubious nostalgic take on the "good old days" of his premiership, when political repression was far higher than now.

What is remarkable is the coordination between Mousavi and Ayatollah Khomeini's bay foundation, run by his nephew Hassan. Mousavi's thoughts regarding the old vs new basij are almost identical to a similar article which appeared yesterday on the Jamaran website, run by the foundation. [Note: Mousavi's latest Internet interview was with Jamaran. -- SL]

This is yet another indicator that Khomeini's family have more than ever thrown their weight behind the reformists, no doubt a significant support in a clannish political system where familial ties are still a key yardstick of political interaction.

1345 GMT: Mousavi and the Basiji Celebrations. Mir Hossein Mousavi has used the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the Basiji movement to address the militia in his Statement No. 15. We're looking for an English translation.

1135 GMT: An Outstretched Hand (But You're Still Losers). The Supreme Leader said Wednesday in a televised speech, "Those who are deceived by a smile or applause by the enemy and try to confront the establishment and constitution should know that their efforts are futile."

Ayatollah Khamenei, backing President Ahmadinejad, said the opposition should not be branded as "hypocrites...just because they do not say what we say".

1130 GMT: Inspired by Marjane Satrapi's graphic memoir Persepolis, activists have published a Web update on the June election and the protests up to 21 June. All the drawings are from the original memoir except for one --- on the role of Twitter in the demonstrations.

1040 GMT: Trashing Neda. The commander of the Basiji militia, Mohammad Reza Naqdi, has marked this week's celebrations of his organisation by headlining the "real" story on the killing of Neda Agha Soltan. A "person from America" shot Neda as part of a plot in which the Iranian regime would be blamed for her death.

0930 GMT: The reformist website Rooz Online has published an English-language version of the speech of MP Ali Reza Zakani to which we have paid great attention. The summary is still garbled in places but it seems clear from this version that Zakani's primary targets, are not President Ahmadinejad and his inner circle but Speaker of the Parliament Ali Larijani, former President Hashemi Rafsanjani, and those ministries like Interior and Intelligence whom Ahmadinejad has seen as post-election obstacles.

Specifically, I now think Zakani's references to the eve-of-election polls that indicated a close race between Ahmadinejad and Mir Hossein Mousavi are not, as I first misread (and as Rooz now misreads in its headline), an attack on the President's legitimacy. Instead, they put blame at the feet of Iranian ministries (and implicitly Larijani) who spread the polls and thus fed the notion of electoral "fraud" after Ahmadinejad's victory.

0825 GMT: The New York Times reveals that President Obama, on the eve of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's visit to Latin America, wrote a three-page letter to Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva. Obama signalled his hope that Da Silva would back the US-led Vienna proposal for "third-party enrichment" of Iran's uranium.

More significant than the letter or indeed Da Silva's public response, balancing support for international efforts with a declaration of faith in Iran's "peaceful" programme is the leaking of the news by two Administration officials. This indicates that Washington still considered the discussion with Tehran "live", including Iran's tabling of its still-private response to the International Atomic Energy Agency.

0730 GMT: We've begun this morning by posting a video from Iranian students to international colleagues and a response to a reader's question, "Why do we keep analysing this dysfunctional Government?"

Of course, President Ahmadinejad is not admitting to dysfunction. Instead he is offering the globe-trotting sign that All is Well. After his visits to Gambia and Brazil yesterday, he had a stop-over in Bolivia, where he got a warm reception from a small group of Bolivian Muslims and a show of support for Iran's nuclear position and praise of Iranian-Bolivian links from President Evo Morales. Then it was off to Venezuela and another meeting with Hugo Chavez, a firm back of the Tehran Government.

And, in a signal of hyper-engagement, Iran has revived its application for membership of the World Trade Organization, sending a summary of its commerce policies to the WTO.

Iran : Why Keep On Analysing a "Dysfunctional" Government?

An EA reader intervened yesterday, "I am not sure why we are consumed and analyze every word (official or unofficial) by every member of this dysfunctional government."

It's a fair point that made me think. The obvious response is "well, that's what I do", whether the government in the analytic crosshairs is in Tehran or Washington or London. But, after 5 1/2 months of watching and trying to assess the state of play inside Iran's corridors of power, the inevitable question is whether that attention makes any difference.

The Latest from Iran (25 November): Reading the Signals
Iran: While the President’s Away…..The Contest Inside Tehran’s Establishment
Iran: Economics, Missing Money, and Ahmadinejad v. Parliament

So here's my answer, beyond that of academia or journalism: if this Government had established legitimacy amongst most Iranians, we could probably pack up and go home, at least on the issue of whether there would be significant change within the Islamic Republic.

In my opinion, however, it hasn't. That's not only the case with respect to the Green movement and its well of silent supporters, it's also the case within the Iranian establishment. It's precisely because a lot of those "every words" point to dysfunction, in the sense of establishing and maintaining power, that they deserve attention.

Ironically, where this government continues to function, haphazardly but still with consequences, is in the attempt to crush the challenge from outside. The arrests of students, the continued display of the "foreign intrigue" banner, and the disruption of communications both point to a regime which is far from impotent and one which is far from settled.

Perhaps more importantly, even the swinging of the fist brings further tensions. So Iran's ministries fight over whether to maintain indefinite punishment or offer a sign of "legal" process, compromising on the prison sentences plus heavy bail for reformist leaders.

Meanwhile, with legitimacy far from established, the President faces challenges that walk hand-in-hand with "dysfunction". This morning, we are already picking up on a running battle between Ali Reza Zamani, the member of Parliament who decided to offer "revelations" about possible manipulations of the election and to trash the National Unity Plan, and the former Tehran Prosecutor General Saeed Mortazavi. Seems that Zamani is arguing that the Kahrizak Prison scandal is due to Mortazavi's policy of shipping troublemakers to a facility which would become notorious for detainee abuse. And Mortazavi, perceiving --- with some justification --- that someone beyond Zamani may be lining him up as the "scapegoat" for post-election injustices --- is responding that he is not responsible. The bigger question is whether he tries to name those who he thinks are to blame.

Because Mortazavi is still nominally a Deputy Prosecutor General in Iran's judiciary. That's a judiciary which is in a running battle with the Revolutionary Guard over who administers justice in Iran. It's a judiciary headed by Sadegh Larijani, who is also the brother of Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani. The same Ali Larijani who now appears to be making another run at curbing, if not toppling, President Ahmadinejad. The Ali Larijani who may or may not represent the Supreme Leader in his statements but who definitely is now offering political cover to former President Hashemi Rafsanjani. The same Hashemi Rafsanjani who may now be calculating his own re-emergence on the political scene, whether or not that is linked to a National Unity Plan.

Another reader writes, "Those mixed messages....It's gotta wear ya down after a while." I appreciate the concern but the danger is not that I'm worn down --- I'll keep on keeping on.

The issue instead is whether the Iranian Government is being worn down by months of not only mixed messages but of scheming, bickering, and of course facing the unending challenge on the streets and in the universities. That's not to say that, if dysfunction turns to crumbling, it will be a Green victory. Take your choice: the Revolutionary Guard moving into the political turmoil to lead from the front, rather than stand alongside the President. A show of "unity" which brings a Larijani or a Rafsanjani to centre stage. A Supreme Leader making new alliances to maintain his own hold on velayat-e-faqih.

So it's a range of possibilities rather than a certainty, either that President Ahmadinejad's legitimacy has been secured or that his demise has been confirmed. Those possibilities lie not only in the dramatic shows of resistance but inside the mixed signals that rise up from the supposed seats of power in Iran.

And so I keep on analysing....