Iran Document: Ahmadinejad's Aide on Economics, Politics, & Nuclear Discussions

The Latest from Iran (11 September): Prayers and Politics

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The Washington Post carries an interview with Iran's Mojtaba Samareh Hashemi, a top aide to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, in which he talks about Iran's proposal on its nuclear programme to the "5+1" powers and challenges the understanding of the liberal democracy in the West.

Hashemi talked about a three-fold Iranian response to the west: economic cooperation, political engagement, and revision of international arrangements. The economic approach focuses on cooperation in the energy sector while the political engagement seeks the improvement of the situation in Afghanistan and cooperation to stop smuggling, narcotics, and terrorism. On uranium enrichment , Iran is proposing a systemic revision to eliminate all current nuclear weapons and to prevent the proliferation of these weapons.

The first response to this initiative came from Russia, where the Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said on Thursday that Iran's proposals contained something that powers "could work with".

Transcript:

Q: What are the contents of the proposal given by Iran to the permanent members of the Security Council and Germany?

A: In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful, I thank you for this chance to speak. We are currently in the holy month of Ramadan and also commemorate the nights of Qadr.

One of the specialties of these nights for our nation is that they belong to the first imam, Ali. When his name is mentioned, the first thing that comes to mind is his commitment to justice. He has been quoted as saying that "if you offer me the whole world, but ask me to take a grain from the mouth of an ant with oppression, I will not accept."

A famous historian says about Imam Ali (peace be upon him): "He was killed while leading prayers, because of the greatness of his justice."

The Iranian nation follows such an imam. Not only Muslims, but all of humanity pride themselves that such a human existed. I say these things as a prologue to the answer to your question.

The package that the Islamic Republic of Iran has proposed, I will point out some of the generalities of the package.

This package speaks at least about three fields: one economic, one political and the third international issues.

In the economic subject, there are widespread opportunities for cooperation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and different countries, including European nations and the members of the 5-plus-1. Especially you know that Western nations are generally heavily affected by the international economic crisis, while the Islamic Republic has been affected much less. So much so that even according to international organizations and observers, the Iranian stock market is among the best in the world.

Q: Can you give me some more examples?

A: Especially in the field of energy, providing energy, there are many opportunities for cooperation. The other subject of the package is political cooperation.

It pays attention to peace, regional and international security, fighting narcotics smuggling, cooperation in fighting terrorism, in fighting organized crime. International cooperation can also be formed in this subject.

Q: What are the details of this subject of paying attention to peace and international security?

A: For instance, one of the crisis-ridden regions of the world is our neighbor Afghanistan. In spite of the increased presence of allied forces in that country, peace and security have not increased. At this point there are over 100,000 [foreign troops] in Afghanistan, while we see that the area of control of the central government has not increased. And the security of citizens is threatened even more. There have been demonstrations by people in Kabul and in other Afghan cities against the presence of foreign forces.

Apart from that, drug smuggling has strongly increased. Events inside Afghanistan have a wide range of regional and international effects. Some of the narcotics produced in Afghanistan are shipped to Europe, and Iran is paying a very high price in fighting smugglers. Apart from these, the infrastructure in that country has not been rebuilt or developed. Today a large number of Afghans are living unemployed and in poverty. This might be one of the main reasons behind the increased production of narcotics.

This is a subject that, with the participation of the legal Afghan government, can be focused on by everyone, and Iran can play its constructive role there. This can be a subject for discussions and cooperation.

We should all help the government of Afghanistan to be able to rule all over Afghanistan. We should all make sure that only useful and productive crops substitute for narcotics. We should all help to rebuild Afghanistan.

This is a good example on interaction, negotiations and speaking together, and all will benefit from it: the people, government and neighbors of Afghanistan, and also the region and the West.

This is just an example. There are many, many other examples where cooperation is possible.

Q: Is there any mention in the proposal of suspending uranium enrichment, a key demand in three rounds of United Nations sanctions?

A: The methods of preventing development of nuclear weapons and a widespread system for preventing the multiplying and the proliferation of nuclear weapons are a part of the package.

Since nuclear weapons are an international threat, with the cooperation of all countries we can design an international framework that, basically, prevents research, production, multiplying and keeping nuclear weapons and also moves toward destruction of present nuclear weapons.

Iran is ready in this path to offer any and every kind of cooperation and effort. No country must be exempt from this international framework against nuclear weapons.

Q: So you are confirming that Iran has no plans to give up uranium enrichment in the proposed package?

A: It's very obvious that all the nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran until now, and from now on, were within the framework of the laws of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and agreements and contracts made with the International Atomic Energy Agency and their rules and conventions.

And it is also very obvious that legal and lawful activities are the right of every nation.

Q: So in the proposal you suggest this international framework against nuclear weapons in order to also remove doubts that Iran is making such weapons?

A: Since today the threat of nuclear weapons comes from countries that have them, and to be secure and safe from future activities of countries that in the future will join the nuclear club, this framework must be widely be implemented from now on.

Q: So that we don't have any misunderstandings about your words, this doesn't mean that you are planning to make a nuclear weapon, but an international system in which no one will be allowed to make nuclear weapons?

A: Iran not only does not want to make nuclear weapons, but is actually intensely against nuclear weapons. In all truth, Iran is trying to establish a new regime to prevent nuclear weapons worldwide, which are an international anxiety.

Q: "The U.S. representative in the International Atomic Energy Agency said on Wednesday that Iran has enough low-enriched material to make one nuclear bomb. What is your reaction?

A: These are not the words of the Americans. This is the Israelis speaking. It's better that the Americans give their own opinion.

Q: Iran has been saying that it is waiting for change from the U.S. What is your stance on the Obama administration?

A: For Iran, the paradoxical statements by American politicians have been strange. This shows that apparently there is no central decision-making unit in the American government. Of course, the Obama government is under intense pressure from the Zionist lobby [to pressure Iran], but ultimately the Obama administration has been elected by the American people, and everybody expects their decisions to be based upon the interest of the American people.

Until now we have only seen words from the American government, but there have been no actions taken. Iran sent a message of congratulations after Obama's election victory. Iran said that within the framework of justice and international respect we are ready to interact with America. We even gave practical proposals to the American government in the past.

Q: Like what?

A: For instance, just as a step we asked for direct flights between Tehran and New York, but the Americans gave no response. This would have been the smallest step. With such an atmosphere, how can we count on their claims that they are ready for negotiations or a rebuilding of relations with Iran?

One point that is very important for Iran is the interference of some elements of the American government in Iran's election and especially some of the American media, in directing and intensifying street unrest in Tehran. They had an important role.

Q: Who are you talking about? Hillary Clinton? U.S. media? Iran makes many of these claims.

A: Both of them. I think they know it very well. For example, one of them is VOA [Voice of America - Persian Service]. Both radio and TV.

With all of these ups and downs, still the road is not closed. Ultimately, if there are going to be interactions or relations, there should be really some practical, positive signs.

Q: Can you give me some practical signs that you would like to see from United States?

A: Maybe one of them could be apologizing for their interfering in Iran's election and other instances of meddling, which are not few.

Q: The supreme leader in his speech during the [Persian] new year holidays in Mashhad referred to a letter supposedly sent by Obama. Recently we have heard of a second letter sent by Mr. Obama. What was in this letter and why did he send the letter to the supreme leader and not to the president?"

A: I postpone the answer of this question to the future. Let's respond later.

Q: So the letters have been sent by Mr. Obama?

A: Well, I think I answered you.

Q: Yes, okay, but so you say that two letters have been sent?

A: American sources have said that they have sent those letters.

Q: And how about Iranian sources?

A: I told you, I will answer in the future.

Q: Okay, there has been talk of establishing a U.S. consulate or special interests section [in Tehran]? Do you see at this point in time any chance for the opening of such a special interests section?

A: This kind of request is not yet received.

Q: And if the request comes? How will Iran answer?

A: The president has said that if such a request comes, we will study it positively.

Q: Imagine that the U.S. sources are right about the letters. Why would Mr. Obama send the letters to the [supreme leader] and not to the president?"

A: The answer to this question depends on the last question. If they were right about the letters, you have ask this question of them.

Q: I did. They said they want to try approaching the supreme leader because they have a feeling that there is a difference between the government and the supreme leader in their points of view. They think it's better for them to approach him directly.

A: The response to such a question has been given previously by president and the supreme leader in their speeches. The policies of the Islamic Republic are homogenous. When policies are made and chosen, everybody follows them. So there is no difference in the policies of the supreme leader or those of the government.

Of course, the government is the executive power, and it's the government that carries out the policies. Mr. President [Ahmadinejad] is the head of Supreme National Security Council, in fact. The representatives of the supreme leader are also on that council. Therefore, the decisions made in that council are coordinated decisions which are carried out throughout the system and government. Such a difference is just the belief of some American officials.

Q: What if the Western countries turn down the package? What will be Iran's reaction?

A: If they decline the package, it means they don't agree with the development of economic, political and international relations and economic cooperation. That means that they still wish to continue their nuclear policies on building, multiplying and preparation of nuclear weapons and shy away from disarmament. Of course, I don't think this will happen because it's a great opportunity for them.

Q: Ahmadinejad has said that the Western nations are in a gradual downfall and that this is an exceptional chance for the Islamic revolution to present its own theory on how to run the world appropriately. Does this mean that we face a much more active Iranian foreign policy in the coming four years?

A: Yes, you do.

Q: Could you elaborate more on this in practice?

A: The actions today by the West are based on a certain specific philosophy and ideology, which is so-called liberal democracy. Both the internal and external signs of this Western liberal democracy show that it's approaching defeat and collapse.

The opportunity for Westerners to speak their views and to participate in determining their fate is very limited and weak. You see, for example, in the United States there are only two major parties that are active in politics. If somebody is not affiliated with either of these parties, he won't be able to reach high positions within the government, for example to become president.

Can you find a president of America who won the election without being dependent on one of these parties? The political parties take away the possibility of the presence of original forces in the nation. Power just changes hands between members of two parties.

And if this were the only thing, there would be less criticism.

But unfortunately there are organized groups and parties behind the scenes that force their views even on those two parties.

Not only in the United States; they are only one example. Unfortunately, an important part of politicians in Europe -- not all of them -- who are in parliament or parties, or have the media, are forced to act under the pressure of the Zionist lobby.

They don't have the necessary independence. We received this conception from political negotiations between Iran and many of these politicians. I, myself, have talked with some high-ranking European officials and authorities. When we speak to them about international events and we ask them to take a fair position, they say they are under pressure.

There are many examples. It shows what liberal democracy is today. It's not only in politics. It can be expanded to economics, the media and to international relations. But the present time is not sufficient for such talks now. I'm ready to open this completely for you.

I want to say in summary: justice as the basic principle, of keeping the dignity of human beings, is not paid attention to by those politicians. . . . The interests of special power groups have higher priority than this. [Examples are] what happened in Iraq, like American interference, harsh prisons in Iraq and the U.S.A., injuring and killing people in Iraq and not caring about civilian citizens in Afghanistan and Pakistan. So much so that even the NATO secretary general says that in order to make Afghanistan secure, civilians will be killed

In fact, they divide the world into two groups: first-degree and second-degree humans.

This shows liberal democracy is just a claim and has no essence.

But what we say must happen as a basic principle are a number of things. The first is justice as a general human requirement; it should be one of the first fundamentals of everything. Safeguarding human dignity is another. Kindness and love should be the basis of peace and security. Mutual respect is another principle which must be considered in international relations, in governance, in economic relations, in financial relations and other dimensions.

If you discuss the international economic crisis, a big part of this crisis is rooted in the injustices that exist in the world, which are because of the relations and structures that the great powers have forced onto the world. If these injustices did not exist, this event would not happen.

There are many things that should be changed: the structure of the U.N., structure of the U.N. [Security Council], the work procedure in [the Security Council] and the veto privilege for the permanent members.

All of these show that the present structure ruling the world belongs to 60 years ago and is the result of the Second World War, in which some were victorious and one group lost. At that point, they planned things in such a way so the whole world would always be controlled by themselves. I think the time has come to evaluate these relations and new relations to be created.

Q: What steps will Iran take in order to spread its world view? Will this be some kind of diplomatic offensive?

A: I think that if the present structure and relations are properly explained to the people, and if the media help to clarify the realities and truth for the people with respect to the general request for creating justice in the world and the activities of the political elite, we can reform the present situation.

The request is there; the circumstances are ready. The great powers have no replacement for their present unsuccessful rule. If they had, they would have solved the 60-year problem of Palestine. They would have solved the problems of Afghanistan. They would have solved the problems of regional wars and other international issues. But nothing has been solved in the world. People don't feel secure. They don't even implement international disarmament, while everybody knows that nuclear weapons are a general threat.

I remember a U.S. politician talked about a bomber plane carrying atomic weapons which flew from one airport to another. He said that if something had happened to that plane, a great tragedy would have been created for America.

Even though they know that production and storage of nuclear weapons [are dangerous], they still continue. This shows that they are too irresponsible to run the world. Naturally, everything needs to be changed.

Q: Do we see all of this reflected in the package?

A: Of course, what Iran proposes is based upon international interest, justice, cooperation and mutual respect: principles which are accepted worldwide. All wise and logical people accept this.

Q: So in the U.N., [Ahmadinejad] will announce this diplomatic offensive?

A: It has been like this until now.

Middle East Inside Line: Israel Shifts on Settlements; Egypt & Hamas Ally on "Normalisation"

Israel Manoeuvres on Settlements Issue: Just one day after the approval of new 455 housing units in the West Bank, Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak (pictured) tacked back diplomatically and said that "freezing [settlement] construction is a correct national priority". He added, "Regarding the settlements, we need to act wisely and responsibly, not with harsh words and violence."

Barak's maneuver, coming just before US envoy George Mitchell's visit to Israel, both sends a signal to Washington and prepares the Israeli public for a policy shift.

Whether or not the US knew about Israel's construction of an additional 455 housing units, making Washington's protests in the last week posture rather than substance, it is now necessary for the Netanyahu Government to consider an alignment with the the US. And that in turns means convincing the public, and especially the core membership of the Likud Party,  that Israel needs to show "genorosity" on the settlements in return for Arab pledges to normalise relations.

Egypt and Hamas Ally to Slow "Normalisation" with Israel: Despite Saudi Arabia's explicit rejection of the normalization of ties with Israel, the Arab League's dismissal, and Israel's latest hesitations, Washington gave the good news: "Some Arab countries had agreed in normalizing their relations with Israel in exchange of the latter's temporary freeze in its settlements."

However, right after the US message, both Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal and Cairo sent contradictory signals. On Sunday, Meshaal warned Arabs not to accept a temporary freeze in exchange for the normalization of relations with Israel. Then on Tuesday, Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit said: "A settlement freeze in the West Bank is not of equal value to normalization, and will not bring this about alone."

Why this alliance of views, given recent hostility between Egypt and Hamas? Sources close to Hamas in the Gaza Strip stated that Meshaal's recent visit to Cairo "brought the Islamist movement and Fatah closer to ending their differences." The same sources added that Hamas agreed to sign a "reconciliation accord" with Fatah after the Egyptians promised to reopen the Rafah border crossing permanently .

In Cairo, both sides might have negotiated to slow the "normalization process between some Arab countries and Israel", or at least, on breaking up the "positive" atmosphere portrayed by Washington. This would not be a burden for Egypt both since the scope of these "normalization steps" is expected to be limited, and since Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan had already rejected taking a step towards Israel unless it halted settlement constructions completely and permanently.

Video, Transcript, and Analysis: Gates Interview with Al Jazeera (7 September)

On Tuesday, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates spoke to Al Jazeera on a range of issues including the situation in Iraq, the Iran nuclear progamme, the "necessary war" in Afghanistan, the role of Pakistan in the region, and the ties of United States with Latin America.



The most critical point Gates made was on the Iranian pursuit of uranium enrichment. It appears that the US is trying to neutralise Israeli opposition to a peace process with the "threat" of Palestine by offering an incentive of dealing with the greater "threat" from Iran. Washington will lead a political campaign rallying Arab states against Tehran's ambitions if Israel in turn meets some of the Arab concerns by engaging in genuine discussions with the Palestinian Authority:

I think there's a central question or a central point here to be made and it has to do both with our friends and allies in the region, our Arab allies, as well as the Iranian nuclear programme, and that is one of the pathways, to get the Iranians to change their approach on the nuclear issue, is to persuade them that moving down that path will actually jeopardise their security, not enhance it.

So the more that our Arab friends and allies can straighten their security capabilities, the more they can strengthen their co-operation, both with each other and with us, I think sends the signal to the Iranians that this path they're on is not going to advance Iranian security but in fact could weaken it.

FULL TRANSCRIPT

Q - There are rumblings of discontent with the war in Afghanistan among many Americans. Is that cause for concern to you personally as secretary of defence?

Americans know that our country has been at war for a number of years ever since we were attacked in 2001.

Obviously we've lost a lot of our young men and women in combat, not to mention the casualties in New York and Washington and Pennsylvania on September 11.

And so there is a sort of war awareness on the part of the American people.

By the same token, I believe that they and members of our congress vividly remember that it was from Afghanistan that the attack was launched.

And that the Taliban did not just provide a safe haven for al-Qaeda, but actively co-operated with them, colluded with them and provided them with a worldwide base of operations.

And so I think the American people know that we have to work with the Afghan government and people so that they can establish control over their own territory and prevent Afghanistan from being used as a base for al-Qaeda in the future.

The reality is also that al-Qaeda has killed many more Muslims than it has Americans, Europeans and others.

So this is a challenge we all face and I am confident the American people will sustain their committment to help the Afghan people.

Q - How much is the US in a pickle in Afghanistan?

I think the picture is mixed. It's clear that the Taliban have had success in reinfiltrating back into the country.

They have intimidated a lot of Afghans. And so we and our allies and a lot of the security forces, clearly have our work cut out for us.

The situation is serious, but General [Stanley] McChrystal and, I must say, the Afghan defence minister [Abdul Rahim] Wardak have told me that we can be successful.

Q - In light of the US attack in Kunduz, which resulted in the killing of many civilian Afghans, how much of a real problem are civilian deaths in Afghanistan?

I think it's a real problem, and General McChrystal thinks it's a real problem too.

Clearly, we regret any loss of civilian life in Afghanistan, and I've addressed this issue while in Afghanistan as well in the United States. And one of the central themes of General McChrystal's new approach in Afghanistan is significant change in our tactical approach to try and minimise the number of innocent civilians that are killed.

So he has changed the rules in terms of air power. He has issued a directive that convoys obey Afghan traffic laws, and, in fact, that our troops take some additional risk to themselves to avoid innocent Afghan casualties.

Part of the challenge here is that the Taliban actively target innocent civilians and they also create circumstances where they mingle among innocent civilians.

And they are willing to put innocent civilians at risk.

But we are trying to figure out new tactics that minimise this.

But it is a challenge. Central to the success of the 42 nations that are trying to help the Afghan people and government at this point is that the Afghan people continue to believe that we are their friends, their partners and here to help them.

So civilian casualties are a problem for us and we are doing everything conceivable to try and avoid that.

I think that based on the latest polling that we have, nationwide, in Afghanistan, fewer than 10 per cent of the people support the Taliban.

The Taliban's approach is one principally of intimadation of villagers and others, and Afghans don't want to live under those circumstances. They don't want to live under the Taliban rule again.

While they may not actively support the US, neither do they support the Taliban.

The Afghan people have been at war for over 30 years. What they want is peace and security. Over time, we and all of the international community with us, along with the Afghan security forces, are in a position to try to bring that to them.

Q - Do you think saying the US is in Afghanistan to help the people holds water despite the fact that Afghans have traditionally been hostile to foreign forces in their country? In the past they rejected occupation, first by the British and later on by the Soviets, for example.

I think that the historical rejection of foreign powers has been because the Afghan people have come to see those powers, whether it's Britain or the Soviet Union or anyone else, as being there for their own imperial interests, rather than being there in the interests in the Afghan people.

We have no interest in a permanent presence in Afghanistan; no interest in bases in Afghanistan.

What our interest is, is in giving the Afghan people the capacity to protect its own people and to prevent Afghanistan from being a centre for violent extremists again. And then we'll leave.

And I think that's an important message from us to the Afghan people. We want to give them the capacity to protect their own security as well as the security of other nations around the world from threats emanating from Afghanistan, and then we'll be gone.

Q - When Barack Obama said the war in Afghanistan was a war of necessity, did he say that because he knew it could be a winnable situation or because if he said otherwise and he talked about exiting Afghanistan, people would say President Obama does not have what it takes to look after the national security concerns of Americans?

I do not believe that President Obama would have made trhe committment he has made if he did not believe we could achieve our objectives in Afghanistan, which as I have described are giving them the capacity to secure their own territory and prevent al-Qaeda from returning to Afghanistan.

If he didn't think, he could achieve those objectives, I don't believe he would have committed the additional forces he has, or made the statement in support of the strategy as he did a few weeks ago.

Q - So you think the war in Afghanistan is winnable?

I don't like to speak in terms of winning or losing. I think we need to speak in terms of achieving our objectives.

This is not just about the United States, it's about the Afghan government and people, about dozens of nations and nongovernmental organisations that are in Afghanistan that all share the same objectives that I have just described.

Which is to bring peace and security to the Afghan people and to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a haven for violent extremists.

I think that those objectives are achievable and I think that's the way we ought to think about it.

Q - There is a debate about the level of US troops in Afghanistan. Some people say to secure the gains the US makes in Afghanistan, the troop level needs to be increased. Others say the more you increase the level of troops, the more you increase the targets for the Taliban.

We are not yet beginning to think about significant troops in Afghanistan.

The next step for us is to evaluate General McChrystal's assessment of the situation and the way he intends to implement the president's strategy going forward. And once we've done that, then we will look at the question of whether additional resources are needed to achieve those objectives.

I have been concerned about ... I have had a number of reservations about the number of US troops.

One of those is - as we were just talking - about whether our forces come to be seen by the Afghans at some point as occupiers rather than partners.

General McChrystal's point, which I think has great validity, is: it's really how those forces are used and how they interact with the Afghan people that determines how they are seen by the Afghans.

And I think that the approach that he has taken, in terms of partnering with the Afghans, and interacting with the Afghan people, and supporting them, mitigates the concerns that I had.

There are issues on both sides of [the argument] and, frankly, I haven't made up my own mind at this point, in terms of whether more forces are needed.

Q - So, as far as you are concerned, thinking about withdrawing the US militarily from Afghanistan, even thinking about it, is out of the question?

That's my view.

Q - This takes me back to the original point you made about 9/11. President Bush made the original decision to go to war in Afghanistan, which he did, and then subsequently made the decision to go to war in Iraq, opening himself to criticism that he diverted crucial attention from Afghanistan to Iraq. And yet, now we have President Obama saying that it is a war of necessity. A lot of people would argue it was a war of necessity then, but having moved away from it, then come back to it again, it's become a war of choice.

It is a matter of first of all, this gets very tied up into US politics and the controversies of the war in Iraq and so on. I think that success in achieiving our objectives in Afghanistan has been a consistent theme since 2002, for both the Bush administration and the Obama administration.

I think President Obama would say as you suggested that our attention was diverted by Iraq and now it is important to focus, again, on the situation in Afghanistan, and the truth is the situation in Afghanistan has changed, and it really began to change in 2005 and 2006.

Frankly, when agreements were reached on the Pakistani side of the border, it essentially relieved the pressure from the Pakistan side, on the Taliban who were then in Pakistan.

And so we have seen a steady increase in violence that really began late in 2005 and early 2006, and the Taliban have gotten better and better over that time.

You also now have alliances of convenience between the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Haqqani network, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar - his group - and al-Qaeda. So it is now perhaps a more complex situation than it was in 2002.

But in terms of the determination to deal with this problem and partner with the Afghans in achieving these objectives, the president is absolutely firm.

Q - When you say the situation now is much more complex, to what extent is that synonymous with saying we, US politicians, missed the bandwagon?

The way I would phrase it, and the way we have phrased, it is that we did not provide the resources in Afghanistan early enough to stem this change in the situation in 2005 and 2006.

And we have to speak frankly: because of the troop commitments in Iraq, we didn't have the resources to move in reinforcements if you will as the situation in Afghanistan began to deteriorate.

When I first arrived in this job, I extended one brigade in Afghanistan in January 2007 and added another brigade later in spring 2007 but that was really about all the resources that we had at that time.

As we have drawn down in Iraq, more capability has become available.

Q - I would like to ask you about the 'shenanigans' with the news agency Associated Press over the publication of the picture of the dead US marine. Doesn't that put you in a difficult position, leaving you open to the accusation of infringing or violating freedom of expression?

I have, in a letter that I sent to the head of the Associated Press, I said this is not a matter of law, this is not a matter of policy, this is not a constitutional issue, this is a question of judgement, of common decency, and out of respect for the family.

What I asked was, that they defer to the wishes of the family that these pictures of their maimed and stricken child not be provided the newspaper all over the United States. They chose to go ahead and do it anyway.

Q - And you are not concerned that this may have been interpreted as an infringement on the freedom of press?

No I don't think. There is no question, no issue of infringement of the freedom of the press whatsoever. I was asking them, I didn't pressure them, I didn't threaten them.

All I did was ask the. In fact, the words that I used with the head of the Associated Press was that "I beg you to defer to the wishes of the father of this marine".

That's all I asked. That's not an infringement of the freedom of the press. That's an appeal to common decency.

Q - [Washington Post columnist] George Will recently wrote about Pakistan, saying that it is the country that really matters. What do you make of that, given that the implications are that Afghanistan does not really matter, that the US should get out of Afghanistan?

Pakistan is very important. It is important intrinsically to the United States.

We have been a friend of Pakistan's for a long time and an ally of Pakistan's. We've had a very close relationship and we look forward to building that relationship, going forward completely independent of Afghanistan.

I think one of the new aspects of the president's strategy with respect to Afghanistan is the recognition that the problem we face there, we and the Afghans, is a regional problem.

And as we've seen in recent months, it is a problem that the Pakistani government faces and so I think Pakistan clearly is important.

It is important in its own right to the United States, as a friend and ally, but it is also important in terms of violent extremists that cross back and forth across that border and put both the government of Afghanistan and the government of Pakistan at risk.

Q - Given the difficulties that successive Pakistani civilian governments have had, how dependable, from a US point of view, do you think the current government in Pakistan is, in terms of being able to deal not only with the volatility of Pakistan but also the regional volatility, Afghanistan, India and so forth?

I think if you look back, 15 or 16 months, the Pakistani government has performed admirably.

No one I think would have predicted the political consensus that has emerged in Pakistan in terms of the effort to take on these violent extremists in the North West Frontier Province, in the Fata [Federally Administered Tribal Areas] and in that area.

I think people would not have predicted the success of the Pakistani army. I think people would not have predicted the success in the Pakistani government's effective dealing with internally displaced persons as a result of a military operation and how many of them have returned to Swat and how effective the Pakistani government has been in this respect.

So all of that is simply to say I believe that the Pakistani government, both the civilian side and the military side, have performed better than almost anyone's expectations in the region, or in this country, or elsewhere, and we are very impressed by that and we are prepared to be helpful, to help the Pakistanis in any way we can.

Q - Given the serious misgivings that the United States had in the past about the role of Pakistani intelligence, in terms of dealing with the Taliban, there were accusations to the Pakistani intelligence at that time that they were actually lending a hand of support to the Taliban. Are you 100 per cent satisfied now that that has stopped and that you, the US, the Pakistani military and the Pakistani civilian government are all in the same trench, working for the same goal?

First of all, I believe we are in the same trench, working for the same goal.

I think you have to go back a little bit in history. I was very much involved in the American effort 20, 25 years ago in co-operation with Pakistan to support the muhajidin in Afghanistan when they were fighting against the Soviet Union.

One of the vehicles that we used in that effort was the connection between the Pakistani intelligence and various muhajidin groups within Afghanistan.

So these relationships with groups in Afghanistan and with Pakistanis go back a long way and at that time we were very productive and very useful.

My own view is that the connections were maintained largely as a hedge because the Pakistanis are very concerned about the stability of their border area and about the stability of Afghanistan and they weren't sure whether we would continue our efforts in Afghanistan.

So I believe we're on the same page, I believe we're working for the same goals. I have a lot of confidence in the Pakistanis.

Q - Basically the implication of what you're saying is that the United States will not do again what it did after the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, which is to cut loose and leave the regional players to fend for themselves, undermining the credibility of the US in that part of Asia?

I think that's absolutely right. And I have to say I was in the American government at the time we did that and it was a serious strategic mistake.

As soon as the Soviets left Afghanistan, we turned our backs on Afghanistan and we did not cultivate our relationship with the Pakistanis properly. And so I think we gave rise to doubts in the region about whether we are prepared to stay there and be their partner on a continuous basis, and I believe we've learned our lesson and that both Afghanistan and Pakistan can count on us for the long term.

Q - In terms of Pakistan's nuclear weapons, you are absolutely categorically sure that there is no risk that they may fall into the wrong hands given the pressures that the Taliban in Afghanistan are exerting not just on the Pakistanis but also on the United States in Pakistan?

I'm quite comfortable that the security arrangements for the Pakistani nuclear capabilities are sufficient and adequate.

Q - What sort of guarantees do you have to cover that?

I would say it's based both on our own understanding of the security arrangements that the Pakistanis have for their weapons and their capabilities, their laboratories and so on. But also the insurances we have been given by the Pakistanis.

Q - Were you baffled by President Obama's envoy Richard Holbrooke, when he was asked how he would measure progress and he said 'we will know it when we see it'?

I probably would have answered the question differently.

Q - How would you have answered it?

I would have answered it: I believe that success or progress will be as when we see the Afghan national security forces, the army and the police, assuming a greater and greater role in security operations protecting Afghanistan and the Afghan people, so that we can recede, first into an advisory role and then leave altogether.

So in some way, it's somehow comparable to the situation in Iraq where our role has become less and less prominent, where the Iraqis have taken a more and more prominent role protecting their own security, and I think that will be one way we will be able to measure success in Afghanistan as we see the Afghan security forces taking a more and more prominent and leading role in protecting their own security.

Q - In the latest press conference that you gave, together with Admiral Mike Mullen, you talked about the analogies people often make between Afghanistan and Iraq. You said that the fundamental difference is that in Iraq there has been a strong central government but in Afghanistan, there has never been a strong central government. And in terms of fighting al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, that's obviously making your work a lot more difficult. How confident are you that the Iraqi central government, led by Nuri al-Maliki, at the present time, can hold the country together after you leave?

I think we have real confidence that they can do that and I think the best evidence that a sense of Iraqi nationalism has returned is that al-Qaeda has made very strong efforts in recent weeks and months to try and provoke a renewal of the sectarian violence between the Sunnis and the Shias in Iraq through suicide bombers, and what has been interesting and encouraging is that they have failed in that effort.

The Shia understand this is al-Qaeda trying to provoke that kind of a conflict and they're having none (...) so there has not been any renewal of sectarian violence.

Our generals have very high regard of the Iraqi army and, increasingly, Iraqi police, and I think we would not have felt comfortable agreeing to the arrangements we have to pull out of Iraqi cities, and to put a deadline on the withdrawal of American combat troops, if we didn't have confidence in the Iraqis. I think [commander of US forces in Iraq] General [Ray] Odierno would say they have developed better and faster than he would have anticipated.

So we are very encouraged by the developments in Iraq with respect to the security situation despite these suicide bombings that we think are mostly the efforts of al-Qaeda.

Q - A lot of the people in the region will look at Iraq post-2003, now that you say al-Qaeda has been trying to stoke up sectarian strife in Iraq. A lot of people will look at 2003, and at what the United States did post 2003, and say: Actually that was the engine of sectarian strife in Iraq in the first place.

Well, I wasn't in government at the time and I was no expert on Iraq before I came into government. I wouldn't pretend to be an expert now either but ...

Q - But would you say the US getting out of Iraq would necessarily put an end to sectarian strife or would it actually increase the prospects of sectarian strife?

I think that what we have already seen in Iraq, despite the provocations by al-Qaeda, the Iraqis are ready to move beyond the violence of the last several years and to grove their economy and to have peace.

I think that's why you have not seen renewed sectarian violence and that's why we are comfortable with the arrangements in which we have withdrawn from cities and in which we will withdraw all our combat troops by the end of August next year.

We are very comfortable with that, and that means we do not believe there will be a renewal of the sectarian violence with our departure.

Q - My understanding is that President Obama has pledged that the US will not build any permanent military bases in Iraq after leaving. Does that pledge still stand?

Absolutely.

Q - Now how do you define permanent? Because bases in Germany have been there for about 60 years now. In Korea for a similar period of time. How do you define permanent and how do you define temporary?

Temporary is based on the fact that another part of this agreement is that all US forces will be out of Iraq by the end of 2011. That is the agreement that we have with the Iraqi government: all US forces. No bases, no forces.

Q - Unless the Iraqis ask you to stay?

Unless there is some new agreement, or some new negotiation which would clearly be on Iraqi terms.

But we will not have any permanent bases in Iraq. We have no interest in permanent bases in Iraq and we are now planning on withdrawing all American military forces by the end of 2011.

Q - A lot of people, including some of your closest allies in the Gulf, think that at the end of the day, the real winner after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, is Iran, and, you listen to US politicians here in DC, you have a real problem with Iran.

I think Iran has been a challenge for the United States, and for the international community for that matter, for 30 years. I think that a strong and democratic Iraq, particularly one with a multi-sectarian government, becomes a barrier to Iranian influence and not a bridge for it.

So I think, in the short term, perhaps Iran's position was strengthened somewhat but I think if you look to the longer term, and the role that Iraq can play in the region going forward, I think that Iran's position may well be diminished.

Q - But many people feel that you took out one fundamental bastion against Iranian influence in the region and that is the regime of Saddam Hussein. You changed the political configuration in the country, bringing a Shia government to power. Everybody knows there are Iraqi politicians in the Iraqi government who are very close to Iran or have some sort of sensibility that makes them close to the government of Iran. How is that going to be a bastion against Iranian influence even in the long term?

Well, I think first of all we've seen over the past years a genuine assertion of Iraqi nationalism from Prime Minister Maliki and from other leaders inside Iraq.

I have no doubt that at the end of the day, the leaders in Iraq are first and foremost Iraqis. After all none of them have forgotten the eight years of war that they fought with Saddam Hussein and they haven't forgotten that Saddam Hussein started that war.

So I think that, by all accounts that we can see and the actions we have seen the government of Iraq take, including for example Prime Minister Maliki's offensive in the Basra area over a year ago, made clear they are most concerned with maintaining Iraqi sovereignty.

If the United States has learned anything in the last year as we have negotiated the framework agreement with the Iraqis it is that the Iraqis are very sensitive about their sovereignty and, as with almost any other country, are not going to tolerate other countries trying to interfere in their internal affairs.

Q - Let's assume for a minute that in the short term, or medium term even, that the Iranians have strengthened their hand in Iraq, and that's going to change in the long term. Hasn't Iran been able to increase its influence in neighbouring Iraq, and therefore strengthened its hand in dealing with the West over its nuclear programmme?

No, I don't agree with that. I think that the situation in Iraq has little bearing on Iran and its nuclear programme.

Q - Can you, for example in the case the Israelis resort to military action, as they seem to be itching to do, against Iranian nuclear facilities, can you guarantee that Iranians will not use Iraq to retaliate against the Unites States for example?

Well, I'm not going to address hypothetical situations. Our view is that there is still an opportunity for diplomacy and political and economic pressures to bring about a change of policy in Iran, so getting into hypotheticals about military reaction, I think doesn't take us very far.

And I'm confident that we still have some opportunities in that area.

Q - Hypotheticals aside, if you say you still have some time for manoeuvring in that area, to what extent are you reading from the same hymn sheet as the Israelis?

Every country looks at a given situation through the lens of its own security. Our view, and the view that we have shared I might say strongly with all our friends and allies in the region as well as elsewhere, is that the way to deal with the Iranian nuclear programme at this point is through diplomatic and economic efforts.

Q - The issue of Iran and Israel is obviously rattling a lot of countries in the region, the Israelis, the Gulf states, who are thinking about buying more and more weapons, and indeed there has been some sales authorised by the United States. Some estimates put the weapons packages to the Gulf states and Israel at about $100bn. How much substance is there to that?

That figure sounds very high to me. But I think there's a central question or a central point here to be made and it has to do both with our friends and allies in the region, our Arab allies, as well as the Iranian nuclear programme, and that is one of the pathways, to get the Iranians to change their approach on the nuclear issue, is to persuade them that moving down that path will actually jeopardise their security, not enhance it.

So the more that our Arab friends and allies can straighten their security capabilities, the more they can strengthen their co-operation, both with each other and with us, I think sends the signal to the Iranians that this path they're on is not going to advance Iranian security but in fact could weaken it.

So that's one of the reasons why I think our relationship with these countries and our security co-operation with them is so important.

Q - I mentioned $100bn and you said that doesn't sound right to you. What does sound right to you as a figure?

I honestly don't know.

Q - But there are a lot of weapons being asked for by the countries in the region?

We have a very broad foreign military sales programme and obviously with most of our friends and allies out there, but the arrangements that are being negotiated right now, I just honestly don't know the accumulated total.

Q - You're asking the Iranians to give up their intentions to build nuclear weapons. They are saying they're not building nuclear weapons. On the other hand, a lot of people in the region feel that you know that the Israelis do have nuclear weapons and they say why doesn't the West start with Israel, which is known to possess nuclear weapons rather than with the Iranians, who are suspected of having them. What do you say to that argument?

First of all, it's the Iranian leadership that has said it wants to wipe Israel off the face of the earth. Those threats have not been made in the other direction. It is the Iranian government that is in violation of multiple UN Security Council resolutions with respect to these programmes, so focus needs to be on the country that is feuding the will of the international community and the United Nations.

Q - But you decided that the rhetoric of the Iranians reflects the reality of what's going on in Iran in terms of nuclear weapons. Isn't that a leap of faith?

Well, we obviously have information in terms of what the Iranians are doing. We also have what the Iranians themselves have said, so we only are taking them at their word.

Q - So you know for sure that they are working on a nuclear bomb?

I would not go that far but clearly they have elements of their nuclear programme that are in violation of UN Security Council resolutions.

We want them to adhere to these resolutions and we are willing to acknowledge the right of the Iranian government and the Iranian people to have a peaceful nuclear programme if it is intended for the production of electric power so on. What is central, then, is trying to persuade the Iranians to agree to that and then to verification procedures under the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency].

That gives us confidence that it is indeed a peaceful nuclear programme and not a weaponisation programme.

The truth of the matter is that, if Iran proceeds with a nuclear weapons programme it may well spark and arms race, a real arms race, and potentially a nuclear arms race in the entire region.

So it is in the interest of all countries for Iran to agree to arrangements that allow a peaceful nuclear programme and give the international community confidence that's all they're doing.

Q - But the Obama administration seems to have a difficult circle to square because on one hand they're saying that they want improved relations with the Muslim world. On the other hand, any pressure on Iran, is seen by people in the Muslim world as an indication the US is not genuine in wanting to improve those relations because many Muslims say Israel has nuclear weapons, and the US is not doing anything about it.

The focus is on which country is in violation of the UN Security Council resolutions. The pressure on Iran is simply to be a good member of the international community.

The neighbours around Iran, our Arab friends and allies, are concerned about what is going on in Iran, and not just the governments.

So the question is how does Iran become a member in good standing of the international community. That's in the interest of everybody.

Q - A last issue, relations between the US and Latin America: There have been a lot of angry noises coming out of Latin America over the issue of military bases in Colombia. How much of a problem is the issue of bases in Colombia to the United States and its relations with Latin America?

I think that's an issue that has been exploited by certain governments down there such as the Venezuelan government.

I think for most of the continent it's not a problem. These are not American bases. This is a co-operative arrangement, negotiated with the government of Colombia, for counter-narcotic purposes.

That's all it is and nothing more, no permanent US base, no US base at all, but use of Colombian facilities in co-operation with the Colombians.

Q - But doesn't it concern you that even President Lula [da Silva] in Brazil, who is not really known for being over-vocal in his criticism of the United States, has actually been quite vocal recently in terms of criticising what is described by President [Hugo] Chavez of Venezuela, for example, as belligerent intentions on the part of the United States in Latin America?

Well, they are clearly not belligerent intentions on part of the United States and I believe that when the other governments that may be concerned in South America fully understand the nature of the co-operation agreement with the Colombians, they will understand that this is a very limited operation tightly focused on counter-narcotics.

Middle East Inside Line: Chavez Attack on Israel, Gaza Low-Intensity Conflict

Chavez's Diplomatic Dive Bombing of Israel: Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez targeted Israel and the U.S. during his visit to Syria. After a one-hour meeting with Syrian President Bashir al-Assad, Chavez blamed Israel for "dividing the Middle East" as "a country that annihilates people and is hostile to peace":

The entire world knows it. Why was the state of Israel created? ... To divide. To impede the unity of the Arab world. To assure the presence of the North American empire in all these lands.

I believe [this] is a fateful battle. It's either now or never in order to liberate the world from imperialism and change the world from a unipolar into a multi-polar world.

Likud Splitting over Settlements Issue? Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is feeling pressure from his Likud Party members in the wake of headlines that he already accepted a temporary freeze on settlement construction in the West Bank. More than half of the party leadership has accepted an invitation to speak at a hawkish rally in Tel Aviv on Wednesday. Vice Premier Silvan Shalom, Ministers Gilad Erdan, Moshe Kahlon, Yuli Edelstein and Michael Eitan, and Knesset Speaker Reuven Rivlin have accepted, while Vice Premier Moshe Ya'alon has not decided whether to attend.

Shalom has asserted:

A clear, wide majority in the Likud would not give a hand to any step that would strangle the settlements, which is one of the party's banners... We need to take steps to advance the diplomatic process, but with conditions, and one of them must be not freezing the settlements that we built. The Palestinians cannot ask us to make unilateral, irreversible, far-reaching concessions that impact the permanent [borders] just for agreeing to meet with us.

Shalom added that US President Barack Obama's diplomatic process would "blow up in our face and lead to a dead end."

Education Minister Gideon Sa'ar supported Netanyahu on Thursday:

In today's complex situation, our prime minister whom we chose, Binyamin Netanyahu, must maintain all our national interests - the settlements that are the apple of our eye, Jerusalem, and also our relations with the United States and avoiding international isolation, because we will not be able to do the things that are close to our hearts if we are isolated.

Israel-Gaza Low-Intensity Conflict: Seven mortar shells were fired from Gaza into Israel, all hitting open areas without casualties or damage. On Thursday night, Israeli jets bombed a tunnel in the southern Gaza Strip.

The Latest from Iran (2 September): The Votes on the Cabinet

NEW Iran: Busted! Would-be Minister of Science Rewrites His "Ph.D."
The Latest from Iran (1 September): The Ripples of Debate Continue

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2000 GMT: Here is That Split in the Judiciary. For those who don't think there is a battle going on within the establishment, take note that pro-Ahmadinejad and anti-Ahmadinejad officials are praying in separate parts of the judiciary building.

1740 GMT: Checking the Scorecard on the Nuclear Talks.

What We Predicted (1145 GMT): "The foreign policy story to watch today is not in Germany, where there will be a ritual consideration of the "5+1" powers of Iran's reported new proposal over its nuclear programme but no substantive developments (because, if Iran has really submitted a new proposal, time will be needed to examine it)."

What Happened (The Statement): "World powers pressed Iran on Wednesday to meet them for talks on its disputed nuclear program before a United Nations General Assembly meeting later this month.

Volker Stanzel, political director in the German foreign ministry, made the comments in a statement after chairing a meeting with his counterparts from Russia, China, the United States, France and Britain to discuss Iran's nuclear program."

What Happened (Translation): Nothing.

EA Scorecard: Bullseye!

1545 GMT: Another Story to Watch. We saw a report earlier today but held off pending verification. The Assembly of Members of Parliament, made up of former MPs, was due to see opposition leaders including Mohammad Khatami, Mir Hossein Mousavi, and Mehdi Karoubi at its general meeting.

The gathering was cancelled, however, after pressure from authorities, including -- according to one MP --- threatening phone calls from security forces.

Some of you may remember that last month some former MPs issued a call, invoking the Iranian Constitution, for reconsideration of the Supreme Leader's position.

1535 GMT: More on that supposed Supreme Leader letter urging MPs to confirm the Ahmadinejad Cabinet. It is being reported that one of the Ministerial nominees is circulating the letter.

1320 GMT: The reformist Parleman News has a useful summary of today's discussions of the Cabinet nominees. The headline claim is that the Supreme Leader has unofficially asked Parliament to give its approval, a step that would support our interpretation of a working Khamenei-Ahmadinejad alliance (0730 GMT) until the Cabinet is established.

1315 GMT: The Mystery of the Dismissed Ambassadors. The Iranian Foreign Ministry has downplayed the report that President Ahmadinejad has dismissed 40 ambassadors for "supporting rioters" after the elections. Spokesman Hassan Qashqavi said, "Changing the ambassadors, the heads of our overseas offices and consulates is a natural affair that happens every three years."

1310 GMT: Press TV has now posted an English-language summary of the breaking story that President Obama has sent a second letter to the Supreme Leader. It adds from Tabnak that Obama's first letter, sent four months ago, was answered: ""The Leader at the time replied to the letter by providing argumentation."

1240 GMT: The leader of the reformist bloc in Parliament, Mohammad Reza Tabesh, has responded to the claims by the commander of the Revolutionary Guard, General Mohammad Ali Jafari, that former President Khatami and other reformist leaders have tried to topple the Supreme Leader (0830 GMT). Tabesh said that the Revolutionary Guard "should be a non-partisan organization and those who gave the permision to IRGC to enter election politics, making arrests and obtain the 'confessions' should be prosecuted".

1230 GMT: Parliamentary Notes. Reuters reports that the nominee for Minister of Science, Research, and Technology, Kanesh Daneshjou, has faced criticism in the Majlis. The rumour that Daneshjou is claiming a false Ph.D. from a British university does not appear to be the problem; rather, it is his role running the Interior Ministry's election headquarters. Comments have included, "Considering the heat in the society after the presidential election, there are doubts whether the nomination of Mr. Daneshjou will help to cool down the society or whether it increases the heat," and "The question is whether the university environment will accept a renowned political and security figure like you as a scientific figure?"

1205 GMT: Another Delay. State media are now indicating, and the lack of news supports this, that votes of confidence in Parliament will be on Thursday.

1145 GMT: The Foreign Policy Story to Watch Today. It is not in Germany, where there will be a ritual consideration of the "5+1" powers of Iran's reported new proposal over its nuclear programme but no substantive developments (because, if Iran has really submitted a new proposal, time will be needed to examine it).

Instead, the story could well be in Tabnak, which is claiming that President Obama has sent a second letter to the Supreme Leader. The content is not known, but speculation is that this is another invitation to open up paths for dialogue.

Notice, however, that the path has cut out the "middle man" of President Ahadminejad and gone straight to the top.

1000 GMT: Mehdi Karoubi has written to Grand Ayatollah Montazeri expressed his deep appreciation for Montazeri's support during the post-election conflict, in particular, the Ayatollah's expressions of regret and condemnation of attacks on protestors and detainees.

0830 GMT: Piling on the Pressure. Yet more confirmation of the Ahmadinejad-Revolutionary Guard to break the opposition: the Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, General Mohammad Ali Jafari, has claimed that “the unpublished section of the confessions of the prisoners” indicate that former President Mohammad Khatami and other reformist leaders were trying to topple the Supreme Leader and the regime with post-election unrest.

(The stridently pro-Government Fars News features this as their lead story.)

0730 GMT: We've had another look at the story from yesterday of behind-the-scenes meetings between Ahmadinejad representatives, pro-Government senior clerics, and MPs to ensure approval of the President's ministers. Here is the translation from the National Iranian American Council:

There have been contacts from the office of the Supreme Leader and people close to Ahmadinejad to MPs. In one case, Commander of the Armed Forces Hassan Firouzabadi called some MPs into his office.

One MP told Rouydad [newspaper]: “They have contacted Representatives and they want Representatives to approve all of the Cabinet members. Their goal is to show, through a high vote of approval of all Ministers, that their power is great and that the influence of post-election protests has been negligible.”

When asked who did the contacting, this MP said, “The contacts came from the Supreme Leader’s office and some people close to Ahmadinejad, and Maj. Gen Hassan Firouzabadi even called some Representatives into his office.”

...The decision to put pressure on MPs to approve Cabinet officials was made last week in a meeting with the presence of Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami, Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, Mehdi Taeb, Morteza Moghtadaie, and some of Ahmadinejad’s deputies and some MPs including Gholamali Haddad-Adel, Mehdi Koochakzadeh, Hamid Rasaie, Movid Hosseini-Sadr, and Kazem Mousavi, as well the heads of two pro-government newspapers.

"Contacts from the office of the Supreme Leader". Is it safe to presume that, despite the weeks of bickering between Ayatollah Khamenei and President Ahmadinejad over political and legal issues, the two will be firmly allied to ensure the Cabinet is put in place?

0555 GMT: As we noted yesterday, the internal story in Iran is likely to be pushed aside by the international media in favour of the "5+1" talks on the Iranian nuclear programme in Germany today. This coverage was assured after Iran trumpeted that it was going to be put a new proposals to the powers (the US, UK, France, China, Russia, and Germany).

A separate feature isn't needed at this point. Here's the read: the date "15 September" has been floating around as the cut-off point for US engagement with Iran. While that date has been more a creation of White House spin and media speculation rather than a policy decision, Tehran needed to do something if it wanted to release the public pressure. That need is greater because the Ahmadinejad Government --- unlike the nuke-obsessed US media --- needs to concentrate on its internal position. So the day before a major international gathering, the Iranians say, "We'll talk," but give the appearance of doing it on their terms with a supposed new package.

0545 GMT: We held off from publishing this story yesterday, as it felt --- despite its apparent publication in Fars News --- like a rumour, but it has now been repreated by several Iranian sources.

President Ahmadinejad has apparently dismissed 40 ambassadors from their posts to bring "fundamental correction in the [Foreign] Ministry". The claim is that these ambassadors supported the Green movement and dissidents abroad and will be replaced with "specialists devoted to the bases of revolution".

If true, the action is far from unprecedented: soon after his initial election in 2005, Ahmadinejad recalled Iranian ambassadors from major posts, including London and Paris. In the current context, it should be seen as part of the President's efforts to assert his control over key ministries, including the judiciary and the Ministry of Intelligence as well as Foreign Affairs.

0530 GMT: After three days of debate, the Iranian Parliament is convening this morning for its votes of confidence in President Ahmadinejad's 21 Cabinet nominees. It's still anyone's guess how many will be rejected. Estimates of up to 7 had been put about.

News from the chamber yesterday continued to be mixed for the Government. MPs accepted without reservation Ahmadinejad's selection for Minister of Defence, Ahmad Vahidi, and the nominees for Justice and Agriculture apparently escaped criticism. However, the nominee for Welfare,  Fatehmeh Ajorloo, like another proposed female Minister, Marziyeh Vahid-Dastjerdi (Health), was attacked for her lack of knowledge.