Iran: The Battle over the Judiciary and the Republic's Future

Iran Special: Mohammad Sadegh Larijani and a “Militarised” Judiciary
The Latest from Iran (16 August): New Challenge to Khamenei?

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The announcement on Facebook, which came just after 1000 GMT yesterday, was short but to the point: "Ayatollah Sadeg Amoli Larijani has been nominated [by] Iran revolution supreme leader to post of administration in department of justice". A few minutes later, a photo of the Supreme Leader and the new head of Iran's judiciary, Mohammad Sadegh Larijani, was posted.

Below the surface of that sentence, and a longer mention on Khamenei's website, is a struggle for power which illuminates how complex and diffuse the contest has become.

As we noted yesterday in a teaser, Khamenei's announcement had to negotiate his relationship with Iran's senior clerics. Larijani does not have the religious standing of "Ayatollah" but is just a "Hojatoleslam"; his title of Ayatollah is a political one, from his appointments to the Guardian Council and Assembly of Experts. After his initial reference to "Ayatollah" Larijani, the Supreme Leader reverted to "Hojatoleslam" Larijani. Questions will still remain amongst some, however, over the new head of judiciary's relative lack of religious qualifications to deliver justice as well as his relatively young age for a senior post.

That, however, is only the beginning of the political manoeuvres. The Supreme Leader's declaration yesterday was no less than an attempt to seize victory in the battle between conservatives in the Iranian establishment. It was clear last week that Larijani's proposed appointment was backed by figures such as his brother Ali, the Speaker of Parliament, and Mayor of Tehran Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf, as well as a lrage number of MPs, but bitterly opposed by supporters of President Ahmadinejad.

Ahmadinejad's camp won a preliminary victory when the formal ceremony for Larijani's accession was postponed but then Khamenei played his card. He would name Larijani anyway, albeit through a brief decree. This lacked high profile but was still a powerful marker of authority: go on, Mahmoud, challenge this at your peril.

This is the easy part for the Supreme Leader, though. For behind (and, for some, alongside and even ahead of) Ahmadinejad are the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. And they may have more reason than the President to oppose Larijani's appointment.

Bring in the issues that are now symbolically defining the fight for the Islamic Republic: detentions, abuses, confessions, trials. Throughout last week, the story emerged that Larijani wanted to bring an end to the prosecution/persecution of political detainees. As this story appeared in pro-Ahmadinejad outlets, it may have been psychological warfare to taint Larijani as too soft for head of judiciary, but it may also have been based, at least in part, on Larijani's sentiments.

Whatever the case, it immediately brings to the fore the question: does the new head of the judiciary step in to limit the crackdown on the opposition? And today, less than 24 hours after he had his nice picture with Khamenei, Larijani gets his first test. Trials for another 25 detainees open in Tehran, bringing the total appearing in court so far to more than 125.

It appears, however, that a number of these trials have not been arisen from the judiciary. They have not stemmed from arrests by the police or cases built by prosecutors. Instead, these defendants are the property of the IRGC: picked up early in the post-election crisis, sometimes held under IRGC control, and now brought into public as agents of the "velvet revolution".

And the IRGC has not been shy about hiding its intent. To the content, as the debate over Larijani circulated last week, Guard commanders were continuing their drumbeat --- supported in some quarters, such as the Friday prayer of Ahmad Khatami --- for the arrest of opposition leaders such as Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi.

So, if he is serious about limiting the cases against the detainees, Larijani knows who his main opposition is. It is not in Parliament or in the streets but in the corridors of the Revolutionary Guards.

Now take a step further out. For, of course, Larijani is not the only official (if the reports are true) who has split from the President over the actions against the opposition. The Green movement, conservative and priniciplist politicians inside and outside Parliament, senior clerics, and Hashemi Rafsanjani are each --- often from different viewpoints and motives, but converging with the same demands --- insisting that something must be done about the abuses of power and legal process since 12 June. Even the Supreme Leader, with declarations such as the closure of Kahrizak prison, has joined in.

These forces do not and cannot constitute a "bloc" against the IRGC. "Conservatives" and "reformists", even in agreement on specific measures, each cannot afford to be seen as having allied with the other. There is no prospect that the Supreme Leader will suddenly give a warm embrace to Mehdi Karroubi.

At the same time, the temperature over the detentions is steadily rising. And, far from reducing that temperature, someone in the Iranian system --- and I am increasingly thinking that someone means "IRGC" --- is paradoxically raising it by insisting on the trials and the public display of confessions.

So, to return to Ayatollah/Hojatoleslam Larijani, does he have enough support from other concerned factions within the Iranian system to stand up to the Revolutionary Guard? Or does he become another bystander, or casualty, in this crisis?

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2025 GMT: Green movement youth branch members Saeed Noormohammadi and Zoya Hasani have been released from detention.

2015 GMT: A Nice Message to Close the Day. The commander of the Basiji militia, Hossein Taeb, has declared that if Mehdi Karroubi's allegations of sexual abuse of detainees are proven to be a lie, Karroubi is "debauched" and "sinful" and should receive 80 lashes.

1810 GMT: Maryam, from the excellent blog Keeping the Change notifies us that she has translated into English a graphic, moving account by the Iranian journalist Babak Dad, "The Rapes Inside Iran's Prisons: The Story of One Anonymous Victim and a Call to the People of Iran". She introduces it, "It is, in short, a beautifully written and lyrical piece, providing the personal, yet socially critical, perspective on the rape allegations that we did not know we were missing until Mr. Dad brought it to our attention."

Dad has also been interviewed by the Voice of America about the account.

1720 GMT: In the morning, we're going to offer a detailed analysis --- after today's appointment of Mohammad Sadeq Larijani as the head of Iran's judiciary --- on the battle over the judiciary, and its wider implication for the political manoeuvres between the Supreme Leader, the President, Hashemi Rafsanjani, the Green opposition, and even (perhaps especially) the Revolutionary Guards.

For now, here's a teaser from the announcement on Ayatollah Khamenei's website that points to the tightrope walked by the Supreme Leader:

His Eminence Ayatollah Khamenei, Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution, has appointed Ayatollah Agha Hajj Shaykh Sadegh Larijani to the head of the judicial system. The text of the decree of the Supreme Leader of the Revolution follows:

In the name of God,

The Gracious Hojatoleslam Agha Shaykh Sadegh Amoli Larijani, esteemed scholar ... given that the extended period of leadership of Ayatollah Hashemi Shahroudi within the judiciary has come to an end....

Note the titles we've put in boldface. "Ayatollah" is a higher clerical rank than "Hojatoleslam". Larijani can be referred to as "Ayatollah" initially by the Supreme Leader, not by virtue of his religious standing but because of his membership on the Assembly of Experts and the Guardian Council. After that, Khamenei retreats to the title "Hojatoleslam".

An EA correspondent interprets, "Khamenei was trying to keep the Najaf and Qom seminaries from openly criticising him on the choice with the careful use of the titles. Meanwhile, he has nominated a non-specialist to lead the judiciary and kept other conservatives at bay, such as Ali Larijani and [Mayor of Tehran] Qalibaf by giving them a consolation prize."

More --- much more --- tomorrow morning.

1600 GMT: Mir Hossein Mousavi's website, Ghalam News, is still down. It has been out of service for at least 24 hours.

1500 GMT: Barazou Daragahi of the Los Angeles Times reports, from the Iranian Labor News Agency that Mir Hossein Mousavi has announced a "Green Path of Hope" to organise the political movement that arose before and after the Presidential election. Speaking to a group of doctors, Mousavi said, “Numerous volunteer and independent social networks throughout the society form the body of this movement. The Green Path of Hope is in fact aimed at regaining people’s denied rights.”

Building on the theme of recent weeks, Mousavi used the issues of detentions, confessions, and trials as a touchstone for political concerns, “We would not have witnessed so many crises today had [the authorities] adopted fair positions and respected people’s rights, instead of humiliating people on state television. Instead of accusing million-strong demonstrators of connection to foreigners, you have to find those who are waging a poisonous propaganda war on our people."

What is uncertain is how much Mousavi's announcement amounts to a "political front", even though that is label used by Daragahi, with no indication yet by other opposition leaders of their approach to the Green Path of Hope.

1425 GMT: Report from Etemade Melli (political party) website that security forces around Etemade Melli (newspaper) are increasing but situation under control.

1340 GMT: Reuters is reporting, from the Supreme Leader's official site, that Ayatollah Khamenei has appointed Mohammad Sadegh Larijani as head of Iran's judiciary, saying "in a letter to Larijani that he hoped the judiciary would flourish under him".

What Reuters does not ask is why the appointment was made today in a letter rather than in the ceremony scheduled for today. Indeed, the news agency garbles the story, "Some reformist websites had recently reported that Larijani was hesitant to accept the position because of the mass arrests of moderate detainees."

In fact, and in line with the analysis we posted in a separate entry today, Khamenei is pushing through the appointment --- albeit with little fanfare --- against the opposition of supporters of President Ahmadinejad. What is unclear is whether Larijani's reported demand, the cessation of cases against political detainees, will be met.

Instead, as the Iranian Students News Agency reports, trials for another 25 detainees will begin on Sunday. They will join the more than 100 prisoners who have already been in the dock.

1325 GMT: Safety Valve. The Iranian regime, according to Mehr TV, is trying to ease pressure by firing and pressing criminal charges against 12 police officers and a judge associated with the Kahrizak detention facility.

1145 GMT: The Conclusion of a Pre-Election Story. Rather quietly, Iranian-American graduate student Esha Momeni returned to the United States on Tuesday after detention and then a ban on leaving Iran. In April, we profiled the arrest of Momeni, who was working on a thesis on the women's right movement in Iran. She was detained in October 2008 when her research included the filming of a documentary on the activists and charged with “endangering national security” as an “agent of Western powers”.

Momeni has given an extended interview to journalists at her university, California State, Northridge. We've posted the video as a separate entry.

0930 GMT: When the Threat to a Supreme Leader Becomes "Real". This morning's interview with Al Jazeera English went well. AJE is an excellent operation, so we were able to set out the challenge to Ayatollah Khamenei both from former MPs, who are no doubt acting as a vanguard for other groups within the secular establishment, and from some senior clerics.

What struck me after the discussion was how a story becomes "mainstream". Enduring America had this information Thursday night and ran an extended analysis yesterday morning. However, the "threat" only becomes real when the big boys of the media decide to give it that label. So this morning, Al Jazeera English decided to feature the story when the Associated Press put it on their newswires. The Wall Street Journal and the Los Angeles Times also have detailed articles.

So I guess it's time to take the analysis to the next level. In the interview with Al Jazeera English, I suggested that the move against Khamenei should be seen in the context of a rebuttal to the campaign that has been waged against former President Hashemi Rafsanjani. That is especially true in the Assembly of Experts, where some pro-Ahmadinejad members had tried to limit Rafsanjani's influence. So one logical way "forward" is a settlement between Khamenei and Rafsanjani. But, in that case (and remembering the complexity of such a settlement, which would have to consider the Supreme Leader's power and authority), who would be the big loser?

Step up, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

0920 GMT: We have now posted Mehdi Khalaji's provocative analysis of Mohammad Sadegh Larijani and Iran's judiciary, adding our own interpretation.

0755 GMT: More on one of our last stories from yesterday. In response to the leaflets, spread by the Ansar-e Hezbollah groups at Friday prayers, calling for a "gathering" in front of the Etemade Melli newspaper, Karroubi has stated, "We always welcome the opinions and presence of critics and we will hear all of their suggestions and criticisms and we shall reflect these opinions in Etemade Melli." Karroubi also requested that the friends and supporters of Etemade Melli "refrain from gathering in front of the newspaper on Saturday so that our rerporters can interview these critics under calm conditions". Karroubi concluded with a message to his supporters " I will join you in the gathering taking place in front of the offices of Etemade Melli on Monday at 16:00 local time to thank those in charge of the newspaper and to get feedback from you".

The editor-in-chief of Etemade Melli has asked Tehran's prosecutor and head of police to provide security for the newspaper.

0745 GMT: Another Stick for "Conservatives" to Beat Themselves. The proclamation of Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi, a staunch supporter of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, that "obedience to the President is like obedience to God" has angered many "conservatives". The newspaper Jomhoori Eslami has pointed out the inherent hypocrisy in Mesbah's proclamation: "If Mr. Mesbah-Yazdi's statement is accepted, he must confess that he himself is a great sinner because, during the eight years that Mr Khatami was President, he encouraged everyone to disobey and confront the President....Even during the last four years, Mr Mesbah has also occasionally sinned against God by expressing his disagreements with Ahmadinejad."

0727 GMT: A slow-ish start to the day, but an unexpectedly busy Friday which exposed the challenges that persist for the regime. The Friday prayer address of Ahmed Khatami, despite his hard-line rhetoric against the "devil's tools and facilities" of the opposition and its leaders, was overshadowed by both secular and clerical challenges to the Government.

Three stories, all of which we noted yesterday and feature today, continue to lead that challenge. The first is the "Karroubi letter" on abuse of detainees, now taken up by Hashemi Rafsanjani in a demand for action. In a separate entry, we highlight an interview with Rafsanjani's brother, Mohammmad Hashemi, which sheds some light on the former President's concerns and motives.

The second story is the unexpected delay in the confirmation of Mohammad Sadegh Larijani as head of Iran's judiciary, which points to fighting between President Ahmadinejad and "conservative" and "principlist" critics of his politics and actions. Although Fars News says that Larijani's ceremony will take place on Monday, the tension is still present. We have a profile of Larijani and an analysis of Iran's judiciary in a separate entry.

The third story is the emerging challenge to the Supreme Leader's position, with both individual Ayatollahs and former MPs calling for a review of his authority. I am interviewing live with Al Jazeera English in 60 seconds on this, so will be back later with details.

Iran Special: Mohammad Sadegh Larijani and a "Militarised" Judiciary

Iran: The Battle over the Judiciary and the Republic’s Future
The Latest from Iran (15 August): Battles Within the Establishment

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In the midst of the ongoing uncertainty over the appointment of Mohammad Sadegh Larijani as head of Iran's judiciary Enduring America correspondents have been paying close attention to this extended analysis by Mehdi Khalaji, of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Khalaji offers both background and critique of Larijani within the context of what he calls the "militarization" of Iran's legal and judicial bodies.

We have read this in the light both of WINEP's political position of long-time hostility to the Iranian regime and of Khalaji's own history as a former cleric. An EA correspondent writes, "Khalaji usually goes down very strong on his former Qom classmates usually. His analysis may turn out to be true, but Sadegh is actually more scholarly than what Khalaji makes him out to be. For example, I have a very erudite rebuttal of Mohammad Khatami's civil society that was written by him 11 years ago in a right-wing weekly called Sobh. However, what Khalaji says about Khamenei's progressive replacement of the elite with a younger generation of his own liking is very similar to other analyses, including those from "reformists". Interesting to see how opinions are converging on this front."

Militarization of the Iranian Judiciary

Widespread reports suggest that Sadeq Larijani, a young and inexperienced cleric with close ties to Iran's military and intelligence agencies, will officially replace Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi as head of the Iranian
judiciary on August 16. [Editor's Note: The installation was originally scheduled for 15 August but has been delayed, reported to the 17th.] This appointment is particularly significant, since the judiciary in Iran wields considerable power --- albeit through the approval of Iran's top leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei --- and has a great deal of latitude to make decisions without reference to law or Islamic concepts, especially when "safeguarding the interests of the regime" is deemed necessary.

Who is Sadeq Larijani?

Born in 1960 in Najaf, Iraq, Sadeq Larijani is the son of Grand Ayatollah Hashem Amoli and the son-in-law of Grand Ayatollah Hossein Vahid Khorasani, currently one of the most widely followed marjas, "sources of
emulation" whose rulings are regarded as binding by devout Shiite believers. Larijani's two older and well-known brothers -- Ali Larijani, speaker of the Majlis (Iranian parliament) and former nuclear negotiator, and Mohammad Javad Larijani, the deputy head of the judiciary, former deputy foreign affairs minister, and mathematics graduate from the University of California, Berkeley -- are also married into respected clerical families: Ali is the son-in-law of the late Morteza Motahhari, an ideologue of the Islamic government, and Mohammad Javad is the son-in-law of Hassan Hassanzadeh, an ayatollah in Qom. Khamenei, at one point the supervisor of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), became
intimate with the Larijani family during Ali's several-year post as deputy commander of the IRGC.

Sadeq justifies his lack of political experience in a short autobiography on his website. Because he "felt that the West's cultural invasion was no less important than a military invasion," he decided to prepare himself
for "confronting the cultural invasion," in part by learning English. He used his new language skills to translate several philosophical works,such as an article by Karl Popper on the philosophy of science and G. J.
Warnock's Contemporary Moral Philosophy, the latter of which he annotated and critiqued from the Islamic point of view. Sadeq first made a name for himself by criticizing religious intellectuals such as Abdulkarim Soroush and eventually became one of the main voices of the Islamic Republic. Larijani taught courses on Islamic ideology, both at the seminary in Qom and at various IRGC bases around the country.

In 2001, Sadeq Larijani was the youngest jurist ever to be appointed to the Guardian Council, the twelve-person body responsible for approving all laws passed by the Majlis and for supervising elections. In the course of his Guardian Council activities, he has tried to remain under the radar by avoiding public appearances and media interviews. He has also made every effort to keep his relationships with Khamenei, the intelligence apparatus, and the IRGC under wraps.

Militarizing Iran's Institutions

In his twenty years in office, particularly in recent years, Khamenei has replaced military, political, economic, cultural, and clerical officials with a new generation of politicians and clerics who owe their political
or religious credentials to him. The IRGC and intelligence apparatuses became the main avenues through which young ambitious men loyal to Khamenei could enter the political scene.

Although most of these new politicians and clerics are close to Khamenei, they are not traditional clerics with independent political and religious credentials, such as those who participated in the 1979 Revolution.

Instead, most of the new generation began their careers in the military, the IRGC, and the intelligence services. Notable examples include Ahmad Khatami (no relation to former president Muhammad Khatami), an influential intelligence agent who is now a member of the Assembly of Experts and the Friday prayer Imam of Tehran; Ahmad Salek, Khamenei's representative in both the Qods Force and IRGC intelligence and a member of the Militant Clerics Society of Tehran; Hossein Taeb, the commander of Basij militia and former head of IRGC intelligence; and Sadeq Larijani.

Khamenei's Judiciary

Khamenei keeps close control of the Iranian judiciary: he not only appoints its head, but also gives unofficial recommendations to other high-ranking judiciary officials. Often a micromanager, Khamenei has been
known to go over the judiciary's head, exemplified by his recent order to close the Kahrizak detention center in Tehran (a move that usually requires a court order). Critics say the closure was meant to prevent a Majlis investigation into abuse of the facility's prisoners -- most of whom were arrested following the postelection demonstrations.

Although the Iranian constitution states that the judiciary supervise all juridical and legal processes, some bodies, such as the Special Court of Clerics, work under Khamenei's direct supervision outside the judiciary's
framework. Moreover, even though the IRGC, Basij, police, Intelligence Ministry, and Special Court of Clerics run many of Iran's detention centers, the judiciary has no jurisdiction over any of them. Further
complicating matters, Khamenei is constitutionally the final arbiter in any dispute between government officials, with the right to overrule Islamic law when necessary to safeguard the interests of the regime. As
such, the judiciary uses Islamic law as the basis for its decisions only when Khamenei sees such use as not in conflict with the regime's interests -- as he defines it.

Not only is the judiciary empowered to ignore Islamic law, it also bypasses the country's criminal law, particularly in politically related cases. This has led to harsh criticism by secular lawyers as well as
clerics in the last two decades. In an open letter to Hashemi Shahroodi, for instance, published in Ettelaat newspaper on August 2, Ayatollah Mustafa Mohaqeq Damad, a prominent scholar of Islamic law, criticized the concept of the "interests of the regime," complaining, "The bitter taste of what happened in the judiciary under you, especially in recent days, would not be forgettable for Iranian people ... Under you, the judiciary,
which is the pivot of society's security, is not only shaken but destroyed."

Conclusion

Iran's judiciary -- under the watchful eye of Iran's top leader -- has a great deal of power to shape the country's legal system and environment. Sadeq Larajani's ties to the IRGC and intelligence agencies provide ample reason to believe that he will use his new powers to crack down even further on human rights and civil liberties than did his predecessors. Moreover, Larijani's appointment signals that the judiciary, the IRGC, and the intelligence agencies will be more closely aligned then ever. Presumably, this state of affairs indicates that traditional ayatollahs deeply trained in Islamic law -- but who are not members of the
intelligence-military-political circles -- will have a lesser role in government in years to come. Given the unstable situation in post-election Iran, such a scenario could be a recipe for continued and ongoing chaos.

Iran: The Inside Line on Hashemi Rafsanjani (from His Brother)

The Latest from Iran (15 August): Battles Within the Establishment

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Hashemi Rafsanjani's siding with the reformists came out in the open with his sermon of July 17 at Tehran University. However, little information on his point of view was in the public view until Friday, when the Islamic Labor News Agency news agency published a long interview with Mohammad Hashemi, younger brother and close confidant of the former president. It offers revealing glimpses on the wily cleric's frame of mind and suggests that he is not sitting idly, despite being thwarted in attempts to perform routine tasks such as leading Friday prayers.

Of particular interest are Mohammad Hashemi's statements that Rafsanjani believes that Ahmadinejad, and implictly Khamenei, have veered off the course of the Islamic Revolution. All this makes Rafsanjani's position in the run-up to the next meeting of the Assembly of Experts, which should take place within the next 30 days, all the more interesting. Will the leader of the sole body that can dismiss the Supreme Leader finally act according to his constitutional powers and steer Khamenei back on a course of "allegiance" to the Imam's line?

Extracts from the interview:

MH: People were unhappy about the Ahmadinejad government since 1386 [2006], and these people were not restricted to any particular faction. At least 15 million people are still unhappy today. The Guardian Council cannot be the only side to be able to talk on the national media --- the unsatisfied people must be allowed to talk as well.

A lot of people think that their rights have been trampled upon. The way to restore the confidence of the latter in the system is not through violence and jailing. The solidity of the political system will not be reinforced through this sort of behaviour. People acting in this way must change attitude.

These days are really testing for [Hashemi Rafsanjani]. He cannot be upbeat or feel glad when he notices that a group of our compatriots are in jail or are beaten up or even have their relatives arrested and violently dealt with. This situation is not one that generates joy and sweetness for Mr. Hashemi."

During the ninth presidential elections of 1384 [2005] those events [attacks on Rafsanjani] occurred , there was a discussion on these events in the first session of the [Expediency] Council itself. Some of the members asked Hashemi why he did not respond to the allegations. During that meeting, Shaykh Hassan Sanei [brother of Grand Ayatollah Yusuf Sanei and head of the 15 Khordad Foundation] is afraid. After the rest expressed bewilderment, Sanei explained that Hashemi is afraid that the Revolution might be slighted. It is for this reason that he is ready to face these hardships.

Hashemi Rafsanjani is deeply unpleased and unsatisfied by the current situation and does not consider it to be in line with the programme and development of the path of the Revolution. Hashemi Rafsanjani is distressed when he observes doubts being cast over human dignity.

They want to move Hashemi Rafsanjani out of the way in order to establish an Islamic Government.

[Why have attacks against Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani increased?] An issue came up after the passing away of the Imam [Khomeini]: Do we want an Islamic Republic or an Islamic government/state. The Imam desired an Islamic Republic. Some, however, later said that the Imam would not have wanted a Republic had he been alive today. He had brought up the idea during his lifetime for the sake of appearing courteous and respectful of others. However, Mr. Hashemi wants the same Islamic Republic that the Imam preferred. Presently, there are some [political] figures that do not want this and, for this reason, they need to force Mr. Hashemi out of the way in order to achieve an Islamic government. In order to reach their preferred goal, they resort to insults and lies. This group assigns no rights whatsoever to the people within their government. This comes despite the fact that the Imam said that everything the state does has to be for the people's sake. During Mr. Mousavi's government, the Imam would say that the government should not get involved in what the people can perform autonomously, and stated that the people should be able to express their wishes and desires.

Unfortunately, we have now reached a point in which some people get to the level of announcing on radio, TV, and the press that the Imam would not want a Republic had he been alive now.

Hashemi, the right man in times of crisis

Hashemi had the ability to resolve certain crises during the Imam's time due to the Imam's support and cooperation. We are not witnessing a similar situation now, due to certain decisions being taken the way they were. Mr. Hashemi cannot be as effective alone as he could have been back then. We should also not forget that Mr. Hashemi does not have state-governmental power in his hands; due to the lack of the latter, Mr. Hashemi cannot take practical steps. He does not want to act in a way as to allow foreign megaphones to claim that there is a power struggle going on inside Iran.

[MH referred to his brother's suggestions, as made at the July 17 Friday Prayers, as a "Three-point Decree"] Unfortunately, these suggestions were not received as they should have been: Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi acted in a very insulting way. The faction opposing Mr. Hashemi are waiting for him to say anything in order to insult him.

As stated by Mr. Hashemi, the Leader of the Revolution is able to resolve this crisis. Otherwise, violence and the imprisonment of political personalities will not resolve the current crisis - our revolution would have not succeeded had we been supposed to proceed along these paths.

On the "confessions" of former Vice President Mohammad Ali Abtahi and journalist Mohammad Atrianfar in the Tehran trials:

Both Atrianfar and Abtahi reached the conclusion, in jail, that there has been no rigging in the elections. The question rises as to what sort of facilities were provided to these gentlemen in prison, given that extensive documentation is necessary to prove that rigging or otherwise happened during the course of the last elections. [These] speeches are costly for the regime and the country.

[Would MH, as head of Iran Radio and TV in the 1980s, have shown these confessions?]
The broadcast of these types of confessions is external to the decision-making of the Radio-TV management. I was personally against the airing of the confessions of Ayatollah Shariatmadari, which the Information Ministry insisted upon. I visited the Imam after the first sessions was televised and he concurred, saying, "You don't have to pay attention to Mr. Shariatmadari anymore." This was due to the fact that Mr. Shariatmadari was a marja [senior cleric] with plenty of followers, pursuing his case further would have had adverse results.

The airing of confessions today can be linked to a pre-ordained plan to rid the political system of several ["reformist"] political parties.

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2025 GMT: Mowj-e-Sabz, which has been very active today in portraying division within the Government, leaves another explosive story tonight. It claims that a member of Parliament from the "majority (conservative) faction" has "revealed that Hossein Fadaii, Tehran’s pro-Ahmadinejad MP and chairman of [the hardline pro-Ahmadinejad organisation] Isargaran was responsible for the crimes committed in Kahrizak prison [where some detainees were killed] and this has been proven for the Parliament".

2005 GMT: Another ominous (and official) signal. The political director of the Revolutionary Guard, General Yudollah Javani, has reissued the threat to arrest opposition leaders. Having sent out the message in the Guard's journal last week, Javani said yesterday that prosecution of Mir Hossein Mousavi would end opposition and the “blow that has been dealt to the prestige of the establishment.”

After criticising Mohammad Khatami, Javani identified his main target: "This flame of sedition cannot be put out unless through clarifying and trying the real elements [of the movement]. Mousavi should stand before the court to be enlightened.”

2000 GMT: All day there has been Twitter chatter about leaflets, circulated at Friday prayers in Tehran, calling for an attack on the main office of Etemade Melli, the party of Mehdi Karroubi, tomorrow at 4 p.m. local time.

Mowj-e-Sabz, the website of the Green movement, has picked up the story, saying that the leaflets were circulated by Ansar-e Hezbollah on the fringes of the prayer meeting. It notes websites and Facebook pages calling for Green activists to show up at the office.

1700 GMT: Another Rift in Parliament. This time it's over the post-election death toll. Press TV is reporting:

A senior lawmaker says he will put forth a detailed list of those who were killed in the street violence. Morteza Alviri, a...member of the special committee investigating the death and detention of election protestors, said he would list all individuals killed in the demonstrations that spiraled out of control....

His remarks come only days after Alaeddin Boroujerdi, Head of the Parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, said the committee's list of the death toll had been proven “inconclusive”.

1440 GMT: An Important Friday Prayer Correction. Ahmed Khatami did name one of the "enemies" doing the Devil's work in his address. He referred to the now-famous and very significant letter from Mehdi Karroubi, which has alleged abuse of detainees, claiming that it was a "letter of diversion" doing "the work of the USA and Israel". Khatami said Iran's judiciary explicitly ruled that the claims were a lie, a Parliamentar special committee said that the claims were a lie, "so all this article said is a lie".

1355 GMT: An EA correspondent offers the following, based on Mowj-e-Sabz, on the delay of Mohammad Sadegh Larijani's appointment as head of Iran's judiciary (1220 GMT):

Larijani's inauguration has been delayed because he has requested the complete termination of judicial inquiries and investigations of political prisoners arrested after June 12 before he assumes office. According to the prosecutor general, Ayatollah Dorri-Najafabadi, Larijani wants to start with a clean slate, and this request was taken to the Supreme leader.

To an extent, this can be seen as a joint effort by the Larijanis, Ali and Mohammad Sadegh, to distance themselves from Ahmadinejad and avoid being lumped together with him. Given the ostensible closeness between Ali and Sadegh, I expect Ahmadinejad to be in for a bumpy ride in Parliament should he bethe reason for Sadegh's delayed start as head of judiciary.

The article adds, however, that Mohammad Sadegh has a lot of opponents within the Qom seminary system, who have raised doubts on his theological prowess and on whether he can actually run the judiciary in an impartial way given his young age and thin academic profile.

1350 GMT: Fereshteh Ghazi reports that "several Majlis lawmakers confirmed...reports", raised in Mehdi Karroubi's letter, of sexual abuse of detainees; "they added, however, that they had been banned from discussing the matter".

1320 GMT: The "reformist" site Norooz News is reporting that President Ahmadinejad and his supporters tabled a proposal for the arrest of Mir Hossein Mousavi and "10 other leaders of the reform movement", including some unspecified members of the reformist association Rowhaniooon Mobarez, at the National Security Council. The plan was pushed through, despite opposition within the Council, but then shelved by the "highest authorities of state" (a likely reference to the Supreme Leader) as this could lead to the "collapse of the political system".

1255 GMT: Mowj-e-Sabz, the website of the Green movement, claims, from "an informed source in the Ministry of Science", that Tehran University and other universities will be closed this semester to prevent student protests.

1220 GMT: Iranian Labor News Agency reports that the installation of Mohammad Sadegh Larijani as head of Iran's judiciary (see separate entry), scheduled for tomorrow, has been delayed. No rescheduled time has been announced.

1105 GMT: Mir Hossein Mousavi's website Ghalam News is down. There is concern that this may be that may be in the aftermath of an attack by hackers.

1045 GMT: It appears that the Fars report (1030 GMT) downplayed the references to the opposition in Ahmed Khatami's Friday prayer address. Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting summarises the speech as a call to Iranians to maintain their "consciousness of conspiracy". Khatami said that people "now know the enemy of the Islamic system" with its "tales of war and the arrogance of the government".

1040 GMT: Reuters, however, does give an indication of Khatami's specific attention to the post-election crisis and, significantly, the issues of detainees and trials: "Iranians expect the judiciary to act strongly and firmly and not to yield to Western pressure [to release detainees]."

As we predicted in our first update this morning (0630 GMT), "[Khatami's address will be] an important clue that the regime may refuse to give any ground. If so, that could be a significant blunder.....It won’t be a question of how many protestors come out on the streets today. It will be a question of how many are brought out on future days by the regime’s continued intransigence."

1030 GMT: Fars News has posted its summary of Ayatollah Ahmed Khatami's Friday prayer address. Khatami spoke of "the devil's methods" of creating differences between people. Khatami referred to Satan's "working tools and facilities" to justify sin, guilt, and humiliation and to make the devout forget God.

Khatami, at least in Fars' summary, did not specify who exactly were the "working tools and facilities" of the devil, leaving it to listeners to draw their own conclusions.

0845 GMT: The Iraq Dimension? Tabnak reports, from "an informed source close to Hashemi Rafsanjani", that Rafsanjani recently met Seyed Abdolaziz Hakim, the head of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, in Hakim's house in north Tehran.

Ostensibly, Rafsanjani visited to enquire about the health of Hakim, who has been in Iran for a year for treatment of cancer. However, Tabnak's source said that Rafsanjani also stressed that it was essential that, at this time, the Iraqis should maintain their unity in forming a new Shia coalition.

The big question, however, is not what was discussed about Iraq's politics but about Iran's in the meeting, which also included Hakim's son, Seyed Mohsen Hakim. The encounter follows the intervention of Iraq-based Ayatollah Ali Sistani, with its oblique criticism of Iran's Supreme Leader, and reported meetings between Rafsanjani and Sistani earlier in the post-election crisis.

0630 GMT: This Friday opens with a strange sense of uncertainty. Thursday may have been a relatively quiet one in this crisis, but it still introduced three issues that may or may not mark a new phase in the challenge to the Iranian regime. Two of these, each of which could be turn into high political drama, are being considered in separate analyses: 1) "Karroubi, Rafsanjani, and Detainees" and 2) "New Move Against the Supreme Leader?"

The third issue, the developments in and around Friday prayers in Tehran, will be tracked in our updates. Hashemi Rafsanjani may no longer be leading the prayers, but the withdrawal does not reduce today to a non-event. To the contrary, Green movement activists are calling for a show of protest. And then there is the presence of the "replacement" leader of prayers, Ayatollah Ahmed Khatami.

Khatami has already make his mark in this post-election crisis when he called from the prayer platform for harsh treatment, including the death penalty, for demonstrators. And yesterday, speaking to the clerics of the Political-Ideological Organization of the Ministry of Defense, he turned his attention to one of the "ringleaders", Mehdi Karroubi, and his letter alleging mistreatment of detainees:

If a person libels someone with allegations of sexual abuse, then he deserves to be punished for libel. If someone libels the system by saying that rape takes place in prisons, then he must either prove it or, if he cannot, then the system must press charges and the public prosecutor must act.

If allegations are proven with witnesses, then, without any considerations, the perpetrators must be severely punished. But, what if they are not proven? How long should the system remain silent, in the face of such attacks?

Interpretation? First, Khatami's statement is a tip-off that, as we noted in our separate analysis this morning, the regime is feeling the pressure from Karroubi's letter, especially now that Hashemi Rafsanjani has used it to get a response from the judiciary.

But second, and more important, this is an important clue that the regime may refuse to give any ground. If so, that could be a significant blunder. At several points in this crisis, Iranian leaders could have eased the situation by offering some concession to the demands of protestors. And on each occasion --- the Supreme Leader's prayer address on 19 June; the refusal to sanction any demonstration as legal; the mis-handling of the Guardian Council's "recount" of the vote; the uncertain response to the "40th Day" memorial on 30 July; the insistence on holding the Tehran trails--- those leaders have not only refused to take even a minor step towards compromise, they have shaken a fist at the opposition.

Now, as the regime is faced once more with a possibile avenue to a settlement --- this time over the treatment of detainees --- Ahmed Khatami is indicating that the reply of "No" will be shouted out. If he does so from his Friday prayer platform today, it won't be a question of how many protestors come out on the streets today. It will be a question of how many are brought out on future days by the regime's continued intransigence.