Iran Analysis: Are Rafsanjani and National Unity Plan "Spent Forces"?

Many thanks to readers and EA colleagues who gave valuable feedback and criticism on yesterday's analysis of the meetings between clerics and Hashemi Rafsanjani discussing moves for a National Unity Plan manoeuvring between the Ahmadinejad Government and the Green opposition.

A basic but, I think, important start to a reply: there is a big difference between questioning whether meetings took place and questioning whether those meetings will be effective.

Iran Exclusive: Clerics and Rafsanjani Plan The “Third Way” of Unity
The Latest from Iran (10 December): Reading the Chessboard

Almost all the reaction has focused on that second question. Some readers noted, quite rightly, that Nasser Makarem-Shirazi is the only Ayatollah who has gone public, and then in general terms regarding "unity" rather than in reference to the meetings. That's a fair point, even though we have information that other senior clerics have been involved in the discussions.

Some readers have questioned whether any Plan can get the approval of the Supreme Leader or, alternatively, the Revolutionary Guard.

Again, that is a necessary challenge, but any Plan is likely to be a tactical move against the authority of the President rather than a strategic approach for re-alignment or major change in the Iranian system. The question then becomes not whether Ayatollah Khamenei will defy any proposal revising velayat-e-faqih but whether he will side with the "third way" against Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. (I agree that, if the Revolutionary Guard rather than the Supreme Leader are in charge that even this is problematic, but I don't start from that assumption at this point.)

Note: there is a related issue here as to whether the Supreme Leader is in an unshakeable position where he can wield a veto without any repercussions on his position. So far, I think that is true, but there have been rumblings during this crisis aimed at Khamenei's undisputed authority. While these seemed to have been quelled, a firm No No No by the Supreme Leader to a Plan which has wide support could risk a backlash such as that against his 19 June speech trying to close off the Presidential election.

Perhaps the most significant criticism, however, is that neither the clerics nor Rafsanjani now have that much influence. As one EA colleague put it bluntly yesterday, Grand Ayatollah Makarem-Shirazi is a "spent force" and Rafsanjani "no longer has substantial power".

That, to me, is a telling statement. Throughout this crisis, one of the recurrent assumptions has been that Rafsanjani --- the master political operator, "the Shark" --- could play a decisive role in this conflict. That assumption underlay the excitement around his mid-July Friday Prayer speech and the disappointment over his non-appearance at prayers in August (and since) and the weak statement of the Assembly of Experts under his leadership.

In September, however, protesters were chanting on Qods Day, "Hashemi, where are you?". The possibility arose that they were chanting this not because they needed Rafsanjani but because they now felt they could get along without him.

In October we carried the news, offered by Habibollah Asgharoladi, that Rafsanjani had taken the National Unity Plan to the Supreme Leader. Since nothing more was heard, that approach was probably rebuffed.

So, to me, it is quite likely that Rafsanjani has tried to re-establish not only the Plan but his own place in Iranian politics with the recent meetings. Arguing that the Plan is likely to go nowhere implies that Rafsanjani, amidst the continued threats to his family and his own retreat from public apprearances since August, is likely to go nowhere. He is now an isolated as well as a spent force.

But is that the case? An EA source reports that Asgharoladi, in addition to his recent meeting with Rafsanjani, also saw the President. He criticised Ahmadinejad for his weak relationships with the senior clerics and Rafsanjani and for his support of the controversial former 1st Vice President and current Chief of Staff Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai.

An EA colleague cautions that Asgharoladi and his party are now marginal political actors, but the Deputy Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Reza Bahonar renewed his attack on Ahmadinejad yesterday. He criticised Ahmadinejad for the way the President has dealt with and treated the parliament, and he also derided the interference of the Revolutionary Guard in politics and the economy. It may be far from incidental that Bahonar had been a supporter of the National Unity Plan earlier in the autumn.

An EA colleague may have gotten to the heart of the matter and any "Third Way": "The one element that could tip the balance, as said in the past, would be the Larijani brothers swaying towards the Rafs camp. That has hasn't happened yet."

Yet. Ali Larijani, as Speaker of Parliament, could be a catalytic force given the hostility to Ahmadinejad amongst key Parliamentary members. His brother Sadegh, head of Iran's judiciary, may also have a role: yesterday, the newspaper Jomhoori Islami --- owned by Masih Mohajeri, who accompanied Rafsanjani to the Mashhad meetings last week --- asked Sadegh Larijani, "Why don’t you take action against Ahmadinejad and his friends who corrupt and play with people's religious beliefs?"

After 24 hours of reflection, the easy decision is to stand by the exclusive we published yesterday: at least in the eyes of those who met last week --- clerics, Asgharoladi, and Rafsanjani --- the National Unity Plan is not a "spent force".

The tougher analysis is: what next? Given the caveats that readers put yesterday, it is time to put away any thought of Rafsanjani --- for all his past prowess --- being the Shark who changes the political waters. More big fish are needed.

But will they surface?

Iran: A Discussion on "Engagement" and The State of the Regime (Sadjadpour and Lucas)

With all the developments of and beyond 16 Azar, we have had to put our analysis of US-Iranian relations on the back burner (especially given that the US Government seems to have taken no official notice of this week's demonstrations). So we thank an EA reader who has brought this dimension back to the forefront by sending us Karim Sadjadpour's analysis, in an interview with Middle East Progress, of the current state of "engagement". Points from the interview that I think merit further discussion:

1) Sadjadpour's portrayal is of a regime that, primarily because the Supreme Leader remains beyond challenge, has successfully ostracised "opposition within" such as Hashemi Rafsanjani, despite the hostility that he notes to President Ahmadinejad.

My own view is that the regime is more fragmented than he portrays. As we have highlighted today, there are moves from within the Establishment against President Ahmadinejad in the name of "national unity", but this is not just a case of removing one political figurehead. Simply placing an unchallenged Supreme Leader on top of this system --- apart from the fact that the Supreme Leader has himself been challenged on occasion "from within" since June --- obscures this fragmentation.

2) So Sadjadpour is on the mark that the prospect of a resolution between the US and Iran on uranium enrichment is receding, albeit not because the Iranian regime is unified under Ayatollah Khamenei but because it is riven with divisions. Indeed, if you put the nuclear issue in a wider context, those divisions come out in Sadjadpour's answer on the issue of subsidies and Ahmadinejad's economic plans.

3) Sadjadpour is right that the Obama Administration will now be "bumped", especially by Congress, into putting forth sanctions proposals. However, I think he is too optimistic about international acceptance, especially from Russia and China. The more pragmatic Obama officials recognise this, I suspect, and will try to limit the sanctions package as well as taking it outside the United Nations Security Council.

4) The most interesting part of the interview, perhaps ironically given the initial attention to "engagement", is Sadjadpour's return to the internal politics beyond the influence (and possibly cognizance) of the US Government. Thus the observation without immediate answers, as this is a marathon, not a sprint:

Both the government and the opposition are in precarious positions....I think the regime’s legitimacy will continue to decay, and they will be forced to rely on repressive measures to keep order....At the same time, the opposition leadership, partly by design, has not defined a clear game plan or end game, a clear alternative vision for Iran.

5) Speaking personally, while I may have differences in interpretation from Sadjadpour, I am alongside him on this sentiment (with the provision that one has to be very careful in explaining what it means to "facilitate...political change"):

This is an incredibly important time in Iran’s history and we want to be able to look back years from now and say we were on the right side of history. I sometimes fear that we may look back years from now and see that there was a tremendous opportunity to help champion and facilitate the cause of political change in Iran, but rather than taking it seriously we focused all of our attention on the nuclear issue.

Middle East Progress: The Iranian government has yet to agree to the IAEA proposal for enrichment of Iran’s low enriched uranium in a third country. What do you think are the aims of the government with regards to the proposal?

Karim Sadjadpour: Over the last several years—and especially since last June’s tainted presidential elections—any remaining moderates or pragmatists that were once part of the Iranian government’s decision-making structure have essentially been purged from the system.

Today the country is being run by a hardline Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, who is surrounded by likeminded ideologues who have two overarching instincts: mistrust and defiance. They generally perceive proposals and overtures that are endorsed by the United States as poison pills. Individuals who were capable of deal-making—like former President Hashemi Rafsanjani—are now on the outside looking

MEP: But what about someone like Speaker of the Parliament Ali Larijani, who seemed willing to make deals when he was Iran’s nuclear negotiator, but is now sounding more strident?

Sadjadpour: Larijani is a good litmus test. While less than a decade ago he was referred to in the Western press as an arch hard-liner, in the current context he’s thought of as a pragmatist. If the color spectrum of the Iranian regime now ranges from pitch black to dark grey, Larijani is dark grey. But given that Larijani’s rise to power has been based on his fealty to Khamenei, he’s not going to say anything out of step with the Leader.

MEP: What do you make of the recent announcement about the ten new uranium enrichment plants?

Sadjadpour: I think it’s mostly bluster. To put it into perspective: it has taken Iran over two decades to complete the enrichment facility at Natanz, and it’s still not fully operational. Creating ten Natanz-size enrichment facilities, at a time when they’re facing more international scrutiny than ever, would take decades, and is certainly not an imminent threat. To the credit of the Obama administration they’ve projected the poise of a superpower and have largely chosen to ignore Iran’s bombast.

MEP: If the IAEA proposal doesn’t lead anywhere, what are the options for next steps for the United States and the international community?

Sadjadpour: I think the door of dialogue and engagement will remain open, but the Obama administration will be forced into policies—sanctions and other punitive measures—they would have liked to avoid.

In contrast to the Bush administration, I think the Europeans, and even the Russians and Chinese, recognize that since Obama’s inauguration last June the United States has made numerous overtures to Iran, made a good-faith diplomatic effort to change the tone and context of the U.S.-Iran relationship, but Tehran was either unable or unwilling to reciprocate. For this reason the Obama administration is in a much better position to attain a robust international sanctions regime than the Bush administration was.

MEP: You spoke a little bit about Russia and China. What is your sense of how far they are willing to go in terms of putting pressure on Iran?

Sadjadpour: Both countries are instinctively opposed to sanctions, but Iranian intransigence has put them in a bind. In the last few years, Russia’s modus operandi has been to endorse sanctions against Iran that they themselves have watered down. This way they can claim to the U.S. and EU that they’re supportive of their position, while privately also reassuring the Iranians that they’re sympathetic to Tehran’s position. U.S. officials feel more confident than ever that Russian patience with Iran is waning, but it remains to be seen what that means in concrete terms.

One of the reasons why Russian support is so important to the U.S. is because China has tended to follow Moscow’s lead on Iran policy. The China-Iran relationship is a more straightforward commercial relationship—China needs Iran’s energy—and I don’t think anyone believes that China will completely sever its economic ties with Iran. That said, though China has signed a lot of seemingly lucrative memorandums of understanding (MOUs) with Tehran, few deals have actually been executed, and because of the headaches of dealing with Iran the Chinese have increasingly sought out energy relationships with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In essence, China will not be willing or able to singlehandedly fill the enormous vacuum left behind by Western companies in Iran.

MEP: What do you think is going on with the Ahmadinejad government’s plan to phase out the subsidies? Do you think that’s linked to sanctions?

Sadjadpour: Phasing out the subsidies has been discussed for years but has always been seen as too risky a move for any Iranian politician. Ahmadinejad’s idea is to discontinue the blanket subsidies on food items and petrol—which cost the government as much $100 billion per annum—and instead dole out some of that money directly to lower income classes that need it most.

There is a great deal of opposition to the plan from across the political spectrum; many lawmakers, including some Ahmadinejad supporters, fear that it will cause rampant inflation and further alienate middle class Iranians whose cost of living will rise dramatically but who will not receive government stipends. At a time when the government is seeking to restore stability, they fear that phasing out the subsidies could provoke further unrest.

It’s unclear how much the timing of the subsidy withdrawal debate is linked to the sanctions debate. I’m sure some elements of the regime believe that if they phase out the subsidies at the same time they’re hit with sanctions, they can blame foreign powers for the economic tumult. They may be playing with fire, however; in my experience living in Iran I always found that people overwhelmingly cited mismanage and corruption as the primary culprits of the country’s economic malaise, not sanctions. Post-June I think the government will get even less benefit of the doubt.

MEP: What is your sense of the regional perspective on Iran and what role Iran’s neighbors could play, or are playing?

Sadjadpour: I think Arab governments were happy to see the Iranian regime get its nose bloodied after last June’s elections, but they are concerned about the prospect of profound change in Tehran for a couple reasons. First, the arrival of a democratic Iran has potentially problematic implications for a predominantly autocratic region. Second, many Arab countries are deeply ambivalent if not down-right opposed to the prospect of Iran—with its vast natural and human resources—finally emerging from its largely self-inflicted isolation and beginning to realize its enormous potential.

With regards to the nuclear issue, in a nutshell, Arab governments don’t want Iran to get the bomb, and they don’t want Iran to get bombed. Their strategy is to essentially let the United States take care of the problem, though in recent weeks I’ve heard Arab officials express concern that the U.S. hasn’t presented them with a clear Iran strategy, and how they fit into that strategy.

Regarding the Arab public, there is an inverse correlation between U.S. and Iranian popularity in the region. Meaning, when the U.S. is most unpopular, Iran’s ideology resonates the loudest. Opinion polls indicate that since Obama’s arrival, Ahmadinejad and Iran’s stock has dropped among people in the region. I suspect that the post-election tumult also dismayed many Arabs who once romanticized Iran as a popular government intent on fighting injustice.

MEP: Israel has so far let the United States take the lead in dealing with Iran. What is your sense of their perspective?

Sadjadpour: The Israelis are impatient; by all accounts Prime Minister Netanyahu genuinely believes that a nuclear-armed Iran poses an existential threat to Israel, so they obviously have a far greater sense of urgency. While U.S. officials take the prospect of an independent Israeli strike against Iran seriously, I think many Israelis understand that the ramifications would likely be calamitous, particularly within Iran. I sincerely believe that Khamenei and Ahmadinejad would welcome an Israeli strike on their nuclear facilities; it is perhaps the only thing that could mend internal political rifts, silence the opposition movement, and entrench the most radical elements of this regime for years to come.

MEP: Where do things stand internally in Iran six months after the election?

Sadjadpour: Both the government and the opposition are in precarious positions. The regime hasn’t recouped its lost legitimacy, and will continue to lose supporters as the economic situation deteriorates. They increasingly resemble a military junta, and there is serious dissent among them; even folks close to Khamenei, like Larijani and Tehran mayor Mohammed Bagher Ghalibaf, would like to get rid of Ahmadinejad.

As for the opposition, its leadership and brain trust remains either in prison, under house arrest or unable to freely operate. Though the scale and frequency of popular protests has subsided, the millions who took to the streets post-election have not been pacified or co-opted. Smaller-sized protests, especially at universities around the country, have continued with great intensity, as we witnessed again yesterday.

MEP: What do you see happening? Where do you see things heading?

Sadjadpour: I think the regime’s legitimacy will continue to decay, and they will be forced to rely on repressive measures to keep order. I don’t question their willingness to shed blood to stay in power. Khamenei is unwilling to make any meaningful compromises with the opposition, for he believes it will make him look weak. Whatever they choose to do, history is not on their side.

At the same time, the opposition leadership, partly by design, has not defined a clear game plan or end game, a clear alternative vision for Iran. They’re taking a very deliberate approach, trying to recruit as many people as possible under the tent of the green movement, including disaffected clerics and Revolutionary Guardsmen.

It remains to be seen whether the current opposition leadership—Mousavi, Karoubi, and Khatami—has the will to see this movement through, or whether they will eventually have to hand the baton off to new blood.

Just as nobody predicted that millions would take to the streets post-election, it’s a fool’s errand to try and foretell how this might play out. I think the opposition could remain on simmer for quite some time—years even—but we could reach a tipping point that could change things quite abruptly.

MEP: How do you think that the United States and the international community can strike the right balance between moving forwards and dealing with the Iranian government but also being sensitive to what you’re talking about?

Sadjadpour: I think the United States should be more outspoken about Iran’s inability to adhere to international standards of justice—a word that Iran’s leadership frequently uses—and human rights and President Obama SHould be more outspoken in expressing solidarity with the Iranian people. I know that young people in Iran would like to see President Obama make it more clear that he’s not indifferent to their cause, that he’s rooting for them.

I think there is a way to dialogue with the Iranian government on urgent national security issues—like nuclear proliferation, Afghanistan, and Iraq—without betraying the millions of Iranians who view their government as illegitimate and continue to strive for political change. U.S. dialogue with the Soviet Union during the 1980s is perhaps a useful template.

This is an incredibly important time in Iran’s history and we want to be able to look back years from now and say we were on the right side of history. I sometimes fear that we may look back years from now and see that there was a tremendous opportunity to help champion and facilitate the cause of political change in Iran, but rather than taking it seriously we focused all of our attention on the nuclear issue.

MEP: Part of the reason that it appears that the U.S. and Iran continue to be unable to communicate with one another is that they don’t trust one another. How then do you balance the fact that in supporting the opposition you would be playing into the exact fears of the Iranian regime while trying to communicate with them?

Sadjadpour: The short answer to that question is I don’t think the regime, particularly Khamenei, wants to be disabused of their mistrust of the United States. It is politically and ideologically expedient for them to have the U.S. as an adversary, so they have a convenient culprit when, among other things, their population rises up, economic malaise worsens, or ethnic minorities agitate.

President Obama has made more effort than any U.S. president in the last three decades to try and build confidence with Tehran—including writing two private letters to Khamenei—and the U.S. took great pains not to intervene in Iran’s internal affairs at a time, post-election, when they were most vulnerable. I think this is clear to most Iranians, and most European, Russian, and Chinese officials I encounter acknowledge as much.

For many years now, so many of us have argued that if the U.S. can engage Iran and reintegrate it in the international community and open up its economy, this would foment political reform in Tehran. I think people fail to realize that Khamenei understands that argument very well, in fact he probably agrees with it, and for precisely that reason he’s resisted confidence building with the U.S.

MEP: Then the question is do you think there is any chance of progress, if accommodation is Khamenei’s ultimate fear?

Sadjadpour: I’m very skeptical about the prospect of a major diplomatic breakthrough with this Iranian government. I believe the underlying problem we have with Iran has more to do with the character of its regime than its nuclear ambitions. In other words, as long as Khamenei is leader and Ahmadinejad is president, Tehran will not be able or willing to meet us half-way, or even a third Of the way, on our various issues of contention.

The Latest from Iran (8 December): The Half-Full Victory?

2140 GMT: A Special Note for Closing (and for Opening Tomorrow). In another portion of his press confernce, Iran Prosecutor General Gholam Hossein Mohseni-Ejei took aim at the son of former President Hashemi Rafsanjani: “If there are any charges against Mehdi Hashemi, he should be summoned and his case investigated. If he is found guilty, he should be punished without any mercy."

Subtext? The Government is pulling out the threats because it is worried that Rafsanjani is up to something big.

And guess what? He is. Tune in first thing tomorrow morning.

2100 GMT: Cyber-Protest. The Green Movement has hacked the website of Gilan University. The homepage still features a protest poster and the slogan, "Green Movement is Alive".

Iran: It Isn’t Over – The Protests of 17 Azar (8 December)
Iran 16 Azar Analysis: “Something is Happening”
Iran Special: Putting 16 Azar In Context
Latest Iran Video: The Marches of 16 Azar – 4rd Set (8 December)
Latest Iran Video: The Marches of 16 Azar – 3rd Set (7 December)
Iran’s 16 Azar: The Arrest of Majid Tavakoli
Iran’s 16 Azar: Eyewitness Summaries from Tehran
Iran’s 16 Azar: A Tribute to Activism, Video, & EA’s Readers (Wall Street Journal)
At the End of 16 Azar: A Musical Thought
Iran’s 16 Azar: A Review of the Day’s Events Throughout the Country
Latest Iran Video: The Marches of 16 Azar – 2nd Set (7 December)
Iran’s 16 Azar Protests: An Interim Analysis & Questions for the Green Movement
Latest Iran Video: The Marches of 16 Azar (7 December)
The Latest from Iran (7 December): The Marches of 16 Azar

2040 GMT: Thinking through the Protests of 16 Azar (and 17 Azar as Well). With events finally slowing a bit tonight, we have a couple of treats for thinking for you. Josh Shahryar has reviewed today's developments, including the renewed protests and clashes at Iran's universities. Complementing the analysis of 16 Azar by our Mr Smith, we've got the interpretation of Masoud at The Newest Deal, "Something is Happening".

1818 GMT: We're hoping to have an evening summary soon of the ongoing protests and clashes today. Our estimate from reports is more than 200 arrested in the continuing demonstrations on University campuses.

1726 GMT: No confirmation yet about Mousavi's alleged arrest. Meanwhile, more from judiciary official Gholam Hossein Mohsen-Ejei (see 1325 GMT): "I declare that from today on there will be no tolerance....We will warn and take other necessary measures even against the Tehran prosecutor if he is not sensitive about those who violate people's rights and disrupt the order in the city every day."

1715 GMT: Establishment Split of the Day. A good EA source reports that Jahan News, the newspaper of the Revolutionary Guard, has criticised close Ahmadinejad aide Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai as being "not a true friend" of the President. The newspaper notes that two of Mashai's brothers are in the US, implying a possible connection to foreign intelligence services, and suggests that Mashai convened political meetings without the full knowledge of Ahmadinejad.

1700 GMT: A reliable EA source reports that the Iranian authorities are indicating they will soon lift the suspension of the newspaper Hayat-e-No (see 1130 GMT) for criticising security forces on 16 Azar.

However, Ayande is in serious trouble. Its editor was called into the Press Court yesterday for criticising President Ahmadinejad, and Tehran Prosecutor General Abbas Jafari Doulatabadi has now indicted the editor.

1636 GMT: Unconfirmed reports from Iran (and apparently also on German TV) indicate that Mir Housein Mousavi has been arrested. However, this has been denied so far by his adviser Alireza Beheshti.

1441 GMT: Many reports are coming in of security forces attacking students within Tehran University. Videos are here.

1325 GMT: 16 Azar Didn't End. There is heavy Internet chatter of continuing protests and clashes on and near Tehran's university campuses. We are monitoring to try and sift out news from the claims.

Meanwhile, judiciary official (and former Minister of Intelligence) Gholam Hossein Mohseni-Ejeie has declared that the gloves are now off with protesters: "From now on, we will show no mercy towards anyone who acts against national security. They will be confronted firmly."

1310 GMT: The Mousavi Incident Today. An Iranian activist has summarised:

Plainclothes forces on motorcycles surrounded Arts Institute [Mousavi's offices]. As Mousavi was leaving this afternoon, they started chanting anti-Mousavi slogans. (These same people were riding around Arts Institute yesterday too.)

Against advice of his security people, Mousavi got out of his car and walked towards plainclothes and shouted at them, "You are on a mission, do your job; threaten me, beat me, kill me." Mousavi's security detail took him back inside the building.

A Kalameh reporter who was on the scene, without introducing himself, asked a plainclothes officer what they were doing. The officer answered, "We have been ordered to make Mousavi's movements difficult."

1150 GMT: Urgent - Mousavi Detained? First, an apology in that I got story tangled in posting at 0943 GMT: it appears Mir Hossein Mousavi was surrounded in his offices this morning, not yesterday. Unconfirmed reports were that he has been taken away by plainclothes security, but it is now claimed that the security has backed away and Mousavi has left the building safely.

1135 GMT: Karroubi's Latest Interview and "Unity". Amidst yesterday's events, we briefly mentioned Mehdi Karroubi's only "public" appearance, an interview with France's Le Monde. The headline of the interview is "Repression is Not the Solution", but perhaps the most intriguing passage, in the current political climate, is this:

A national reconciliation? The option is good and reasonable, as the "wise men" of the two sides are not opposed. But to get there, prepare the ground. And right now, the conditions are not met: some do not want to give up and want to keep everything for themselves. Repression, in any case, is not the answer either today or tomorrow.

The solution to achieve reconciliation, tolerance, and acceptance of criticism. We must work to restore trust between the people and authorities. Among fundamentalists, some moderates share this view but, unfortunately, they do not have much power. But I know that the Iranian people are a great people, smart and patient, and I am optimistic about the future of this country.

1130 GMT: More Clues on Internal Turmoil. A top EA source has brought us up to date on yesterday's closure of Hayat-e-No newspaper, now reported on a pro-Mousavi website.

The newspaper is considered "reformist" but is owned by Hadi Khamenei, brother of the Supreme Leader. The EA source says the paper has been banned because of a headline yesterday morning that the commemoration of 16 Azar was being suppressed by police force.

1120 GMT: Updates will be scattered and post-16 Azar put off to Wednesday, as we're in the middle of academic duties.

However, we can dangle this prospect before you: we have an exclusive information pointing to a major development in Iranian politics. It involves leading clerics, Hashemi Rafsanjani, and the National Unity Plan. There is a big clue in the 0815 GMT entry on Ayatollah Makarem-Shirazi.

0943 GMT: Mousavi Again Prevented from Attending Rally? Mardomak is reporting that Mir Hossein Mousavi, as on 13 Aban, was blockaded in his offices by plainclothes security officers. In this case, there were about 40 who blocking Mousavi's departure. He allegedly told them, "Kill me, beat me, threaten me."

0815 GMT: Clerical Call for the National Unity Plan? One interesting development that we missed yesterday: Grand Ayatollah Nasser Makarem-Shirazi, interviewed last Thursday, offered the following call for unity:

Wherever there is war, a peace treaty is not suddenly achieved. They should introduce a truce first and then after a while when the tensions settle, they hold negotiations in a calm environment. I believe that a truce should be worked out. If we want to reach unity, there is a strategy for it.

When we talk about unity, we are talking about people who believe in the constitution, leadership, Islam, and the interests of the country. Those who believe in those issues can reach unity. However, the precondition is to create a calm environment and then some people, who are respected by society and are moderate thinkers, should agree on the principles of unity. I do not believe that we have reached the end of the road, there is no deadlock.

I have worked out a few principles but cannot discuss them under the current circumstances. If a calm atmosphere is created and if some people step forward to reach unity, then I will pronounce my views, too. I believe we can reach unity.

I have repeatedly said that there were a few rioters who should be dealt with separately. However, a large number of people formed the majority in the elections and another large number of people the minority. We should create understanding between the two groups. After all they are 13-14 million people who live in this country and the 24-25 million people (referring to pro-Ahmadinejad voters) who live in this country, too. In other countries, figures less than these are cared for and governments negotiate with 2-3 million people.

We should sit together and negotiate and the precondition to that is the creation of a calm atmosphere.

0730 GMT: We're still going through yesterday's events, picking up news and thinking through the significance. The title of this LiveBlog relates to the analysis that we're discussing and debating, hopefully to post later today: what was the extent of the victory in the marches of 16 Azar and what questions does it pose --- for the regime, for prominent opposition figures, and for the Green Wave(s)?

We have two summaries of what happened: from EA correspondent Josh Shahryar, who was involved in the live-blog throughout the day, and from an EA source who collected information from eyewitnesses in Tehran. We've got Set 1 and Set 2 of the best videos of the day.

An EA reader reports this morning on the arrest of student activist Majid Tavakoli in yesterday's protests.

There's a tribute to the work of EA readers from The Wall Street Journal. There's a personal thanks from Scott Lucas via a musical thought. And don't forget to vote in our Iran-related Caption Contest.

Iran 16 Azar Analysis: "Something is Happening"

Earlier today we posted an analysis by our Mr Smith of the significance of 16 Azar and the possibilities for the future. His points are complemented by those made by Masoud at The Newest Deal, who has kindly sent us a copy of the blog:

Though impossible to tell with the blanket censorship draped over Iran at present, it appears that the size of yesterday's protests were smaller than what was seen on 13 Aban, and on Qods Day before it. No matter. The demonstrations of 16 Azar signaled a shift -- if not response -- on the part of the Green movement to the tyranny and brutality that the regime has come to represent. The message was clear: there is no turning back. In fact, the Islamic Republic's future has never been more uncertain.

Iran Special: Putting 16 Azar In Context
The Latest from Iran (8 December): The Half-Full Victory?

As things stand now, this movement is no longer about a stolen election. Truthfully, it hasn't been for quite some time, but that conclusion only became crystalline today. Only four months ago, this was hardly the case. At that time, the Greens represented a peaceful, non-violent movement asking "Where is my vote?" and led by a Prime Minister [Mir Hossein Mousavi] who stressed -- no, urged -- the need to stay true to the Islamic Republic's framework and constitutional structure, not to mention the wisdom and guidance of the late Ayatollah Khomeini.

No longer. Yesterday's demonstrations were organized by a fractal grassroots whose structure is horizontal rather than hierarchical. That is to say, it has no leader. (Incidentally, neither Mousavi, Karoubi, or Khatami apparently took part in yesterday's marches.) These were protests that saw Iranian flags whose white centers were bare, missing the iconic 'Allah' written in form of a red, martyr's tulip. Gone was the silent marching of peaceful demonstrators holding up 'V's' in the air. Instead, pockets of protesters confronted the Basij physically, and at times, overwhelmingly. And protests were not just limited to Tehran, either. Demonstrations have been verified in Mashhad, Shiraz, Rasht, Kermanshah, Hamedan, Arak, Kerman and Najafabad.

Most telling of all, chants of "Death to Khamenei" have now become a demonstration fixture, no longer the sacred red-line that protesters never dared to cross. Indeed, cross they have as his name was cursed repeatedly and as often as Ahmadinejad's yesterday. Only a few months earlier, [Supreme Leader Ali] Khamenei could have caved in, given up Ahmadinejad as a sacrificial lamb, and saved himself, if only to survive in a weaker capacity. He no longer has the luxury of that option. Through his political ineptitude, the Islamic Republic has itself become illegitimate, and that inevitably means that at the very least, the doctrine of Velayat-e-Faqih must go. The regime has essentially placed itself in an unsustainable dynamic: it insistingly continues to alienate a larger and larger portion of the base from which it derives its legitimacy (the clerical class) while at the same time takes actions against the people that are far too unforgivable to allow for any future possibility of reconciliation, as [Hashemi] Rafsanjani was pushing for in September.

Which makes the timing of Rafsanjani's sudden reappearance the day before the protests all the more significant. In a meeting with students in the city of Mashhad, Rafsanjani addressed criticisms of his recent silence by issuing his strongest and most pointed rebuke of the regime yet. Stating that the demands of his July sermon had gone unheeded, Rafsanjani issued a not-so-thinly veiled and ominous warning: "If the people of Iran want us we to govern them, then we may stay. If not, then we should step aside."

Rafsanjani went on to state that the Basij and Revolutionary Guard should have never stood against the people and confirmed the Green movement's right to protest. Though the finger was not directly pointed and Khamenei's name was never spoken, the message was clear: this crisis is the Supreme Leader's doing, and it is only he who can resolve it. Rafsanjani, it should not be forgotten, is Iran's de facto number-two as well as the head of the Assembly of Experts, the constitutional body that is assigned with the task of selecting the next Supreme Leader, and if need be, disposing of the current one. His statement -- and indeed, warning to Khamenei -- was essentially a declaration that if the Islamic Republic's constitutional law and structure is going to be discarded, then he will not stand in the way of its inevitable demise.

Which with yesterday's protests should give the Islamic Republic even more cause for concern. Although state television still broadcasts a confident (read: propagandist) self-image, the regime is undoubtedly scared. Mohammad Reza Naghdi, the Revolutionary Guards General who was recently appointed the new head of the Basij, apparently even shot Tehran's Traffic Control Chief in the foot when he was told in a meeting last week that it would be "impossible" to neutralize widespread attempts to bring Tehran's traffic to a halt. Incidents such this -- likely one of many occurring behind closed doors -- speaks of the panic and desperation that is surely beginning to settle into the minds of those in power. It has been seen before, some thirty years ago.

Latest Iran Video: The Marches of 16 Azar (7 December)

With the amount of footage that has come out of Iran, despite restrictions, also see our second set of videos from today.

Amir Kabir University, Tehran, "The Roar of Victory"

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-IZ872BX1Ro[/youtube]

Latest Iran Video: The Marches of 16 Azar – 2nd Set (7 December)
The Latest from Iran (7 December): The Marches of 16 Azar

Tehran University "Death to Dictator"

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-bXtFgvBJnk[/youtube]

Tehran University

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BmrR_s1rZKQ[/youtube]

Sharif University "Students May Die But They Never Give Up"

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aELHSHwYGA4[/youtube]

Anti-Riot Forces on the Move

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JJfcuFlH7yk[/youtube]
Tehran University

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=opf2T2JHS4c[/youtube]

Amir Kabir University (shaky quality)


Original Video- More videos at TinyPic

Mashhad University

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gUWC-6Ades4[/youtube]

Students Gathering at Sharif University

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OTrVyjjpi24&feature=channel[/youtube]

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EBqKTBc_A_8[/youtube]

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IxNaDZ84X1c&feature=channel[/youtube]