Is Israel Winning a Covert War Against Iran?: An Alternative Analysis

Responding to Scott Lucas' analysis yesterday of the "revelations" of an Israeli covert programme to disrupt Iran's nuclear programme, including economic sabotage and assassinations, Josh Mull offers a far different point of view. The story in The Daily Telegraph is not Western/Israeli psychological warfare against Tehran; instead, it indicates that Israeli pressure has lost and an American engagement with Iran has triumphed.

Earlier this week in The Daily Telegraph, it was revealed by former US intelligence operatives that Israel and the United States have allegedly been waging a covert campaign of kidnappings, assassinations, and sabotage against Iran's nuclear program. In his post "Is Israel Winning a Covert War Against Iran?", Professor Lucas proposes that this revelation is "a bit of 'psychological warfare' to keep Tehran off-balance over what might and might not be attempted to undermine its nuclear programme" as well as a "stick" in non-proliferation discussions.

However, the leak could also be interpreted as exactly the opposite of Prof. Lucas's assessment. Not only is this revelation more concrete than mere "psychological" warfare. It is a Loss, not a Win, for Israel and a Carrot, not a Stick, for Iran.

There are already reports that the United States and Israel have targeted Iranian nuclear operatives in the past. In December 2006, the Iranian Deputy Defense Minister, Ali Reza Asgari, disappeared while travelling in Istanbul, Turkey. The Turkish newspaper Hurriyet speculated at the time that Asgari had hidden his family in Damascus, Syria before defecting to the West. However, according to the Iranian Labor News Agency, Asgari's family was actually back in Iran. They denied Asgari would seek asylum with the west, and Iran publicly accused the US and Israel of kidnapping Asgari, a process known as "extraordinary rendition." Four months later, US non-proliferation expert Robert Levinson disappeared under equally mysterious circumstances in Iran, a possible retaliation for Asgari.

There is also evidence possibly verifying the existence of the shell companies which, the Telegraph article suggests, are used to "dupe" and sabotage Iranian companies involved in the nuclear program. The US Treasury Department regularly designates, or "burns" to use apt intelligence lingo, corporations and financial entities it knows to be connected to illicit Iranian activities. For instance, in December 2008, in a possible closing act of the exiting Bush Administration, the Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) burned one of its largest shell companies, Assa Corporation.

World Check reported at the time "the corporate name chosen, Assa Corp. and Co., is deceptively similar to that of a well-known European corporation and of several US companies. This is a tactic frequently employed by financial criminals to confuse and mislead." World Check also pointed out "the address of the New York corporation appears to be that of the law firm that organised the company, which could indicate that it is a shell company with no actual address. The company has no telephone listing in New York, has no Internet footprint, and does not have a principal place of business."

Note there are never any subsequent indictments or investigations into these "designated" entities, just a simple burning, or public destruction, of the intelligence asset. While parallel information from Iran regarding their financial investigations is unavailable, it could be presumed that companies are burned by OFAC after being discovered by Iranian counter-intelligence officials.

The leak can be seen as a major loss, not a win, for Israel. As the CIA officer told the Telegraph, "Disruption is designed to slow progress on the programme, done in such a way that they don't realise what's happening." Obviously, Iran is now fully aware of the operation. Israeli intelligence services will be, or more likely have already been, forced to abort all facets of the operation and Iranian nuclear officials will likely be even more closely scrutinized, controlled, and monitored by state security services.

One of the most grim aspects of Israel's loss is, of course, the gruesome destruction of its intelligence assets remaining in Iran. Fars, an Iranian news agency, reported in November 2008 that three people suspected of spying for Israel, specifically a connection to Defense Minister Asgari's kidnapping, were executed by the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps. CNN also reports on another man, Ali Ashtari, who "was convicted by [the IRGC) in June of spying for Israel's intelligence agency, Mossad." Furthermore "according to Ashtari's 'confession,' published by Fars, he was a salesman who obtained high-end but security-compromised pieces of electronic equipment...and sold them to military and defense centers in Iran." The covert war, clearly already suffering losses, will now possibly be completely dismantled.

With that in mind, it's possible to see this as not only a "stick" for Israel, but also as a "carrot" for Iran. The consequences for Israel have been noted, but the direct benefits to Iran require more subtlty to discern. As Prof. Lucas points out in his analysis, the sources Radio Farda and STRATFOR, used in the Telegraph leak as well as other similar leaks, have been linked to the US Government and its intelligence agencies in the past. However, rather than interpreting their connection to US intelligence as a disqualification, it should more accurately interpreted as adding legitimacy to the claims. Quite plainly, it could mean the US Government explicitly authorized the release of this information.

The benefit to Iran would be tangible evidence that the administration of President Barack Obama was ending the policy of regime change in Iran. Furthermore, he is willing to use US psychological operations assets previously devoted to targeting Iran to instead target Israel. It will be difficult for Iranian hardliners to argue that the US is a either a puppet or puppeteer of Zionist interests when Obama is burning Israeli intelligence assets on the front page of the Daily Telegraph.

If there is in fact an American and Israeli covert war of disruption being waged against Iran's nuclear program, it is now in my judgement, completely over, with the results being a humiliating loss for Israel, a lowering of hostilities with Iran, and a vastly strengthened American diplomatic position vis-a-vis the Iranian nuclear negotiations.

Mr Obama's World: Latest Alerts in US Foreign Policy (17 January)

Latest Post: Obama Announcement of Troop Increase in Afghanistan
War on Terror Watch: The Guantanamo Guard's Story and British Intelligence Chief, Judges/Lawyers Break Ranks
Latest Post: Professor Gary Sick on the Future of US-Iranian Relations
Latest Post: Is Israel Winning a Covert War Against Iran?



10:30 p.m. We've just posted a separate entry on the significance of President Obama's announcement of additional US troops to Afghanistan.

Evening Update (7:30 p.m.): President Obama has spoken to the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation about Afghanistan, promising, "Very soon we will be releasing some initial plans in terms of how we are going to approach the military side of the equation in Afghanistan." He added, however, that he was "absolutely convinced that you cannot solve the problem of Afghanistan, the Taliban, the spread of extremism in that region, solely through military means" in a comprehensive strategy. ""We're going to have use diplomacy, we're going to have to use development."

12:55 p.m. A car bomb near Peshawar outside the home of a Pakistani official has killed 5 and wounded 16.

12:45 p.m. The Pakistani military, following Islamabad's acceptance of local autonomy in the Swat Valley, has agreed to match the cease-fire declared by insurgents yesterday.

12:45 p.m. Repeating Bad News. The UN released these statistics on civilian deaths in Afghanistan last month, but for some reason the media have decided to headline them today. Still they're worth repeating, especially in the current situation: the figure rose 39% in 2008 to 2118 deaths. Militants were blamed for 55% of the killings, while US, Nato and Afghan forces were responsible for 39%. (US military spokesman have claimed that US and NATO forces killed less than 100 civilians last year.)

12:30 p.m. Missile Symmetry. As the US tries to persuade Russia that missile defence is really only directed at Tehran, Iranian Defense Minister Mostafa Mohammad Najjar is meeting Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov in Moscow today. Najjar, according to Russian media, "will seek to convince Russia on Tuesday to deliver air defense systems which could help repel possible Israel and U.S. air strikes".

7:35 a.m. General David Petraeus, the head of US Central Command, is in Uzbekistan today trying to obtain new routes for military supplies to American and NATO forces in Afghanistan. The Uzbek Government has only agreed to transport of non-military items.

7:25 a.m. Yesterday we asked what Washington's reaction would be to Venezuela's approval of a referendum allowing Hugo Chavez (pictured) to run for unlimited terms of office as President.

Here's the answer. State Department spokesman Noel Clay said, ""We congratulate the civic and participatory spirit of the millions of Venezuelans who exercized their democratic right to vote." There was no condemnation of Chavez, only the injunction, "It is important that elected officials now focus on governing democratically and addressing the issues of concern to the Venezuelan people."

Morning Update (6:10 a.m. GMT; 1:10 a.m. Washington): US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has offered a clue that the Obama Administration will pursue diplomacy rather than confrontation with North Korea. Her comment on a possible test of a long-range missile by Pyongyang? It would be "very unhelpful".

Next: Clinton says a North Korean attack on Japan would be "a bit inconvenient"?

(Removing the tongue from my cheek: Clinton continued with the emphasis on a diplomatic approach, ""If North Korea abides by the obligations it has already entered into and verifiably and completely eliminates its nuclear programme, then there will be a reciprocal response, certainly from the United States."

The Latest on Israel-Gaza-Palestine (17 February)

Evening Update (8 p.m.): Another obstacle to the Egyptian-brokered talks, this time over Palestinian unity. Reuters claims the "efforts may be doomed by Western powers' reluctance to accept ministers from the Islamist party. Neither the Obama administration nor the European Union is ready to offer more than vague and conditional encouragement to a coalition intended to heal the schism in Palestinian politics."

The BBC are reporting that the UN has protested the removal of unexploded munitions from its warehouses in Gaza. The facilities were being guarded by Hamas personnel, and it is suspected that the organisation has revolved the ordnance.

The UN was waiting for Israel to allow technical support into Gaza to defuse the ordnance (see 6 a.m.)

3:30 p.m. How little political movement has there been today? More than nine hours ago, we wrote, "The question is whether Tel Aviv will accept the [prisoner swap] arrangement, and we won't have any indication of that until Wednesday's Security Cabinet meeting."

This from Agence France Presse:

"We want first to resolve the Shalit issue and then will look into the reopening of crossings and the rehabilitation of the Gaza Strip," [Israeli Prime Minister Ehud] Olmert said. His demand was swiftly rejected by Hamas's exiled leader Khaled Meshaal, who again accused Israel of backtracking on the terms of a proposed long-term truce by linking the lifting of the blockade to the soldier's release.

6:50 a.m. An interesting political development, however, which may have long-term significance in Israeli politics and Israel-Palestine relations. Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, still trying to form the next Israeli Government in which she would be Prime Minister, told US Jewish leaders in Jerusalem yesterday that Tel Aviv would have to "give up parts of the Land of Israel" in a settlement.

The comments are in sharp contrast to those of Livni's rival, Benjamin Netanyahu, who insists on "biblical borders" including parts of Gaza and the West Bank.

Livni put her support for the two-state solution in a wider regional perspective: ""If we don't continue with the plan, we will not be able to count on the support of the international community against Iran, Hezbollah, or Hamas."

Morning Update (6 a.m. GMT; 8 a.m. Israel/Palestine): A relatively quiet day yesterday and likely to be so again today. News services are reporting that Hamas is ready to consider prisoner swap, which in fact is not news --- the Gazan leadership have been discussing this for some days. The issue is whether a prisoner swap will be agreed in advance of any settlement of issues such as border crossings, setting up a two-stage process. Hamas wants to keep the strands separate: the release of kidnapped Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit (pictured) must not be "part of a broader cease-fire agreement with Israel".

No, the question is whether Tel Aviv will accept the arrangement, and we won't have any indication of that until Wednesday's Security Cabinet meeting.

Meanwhile safety, let alone reconstruction, is being held up by continued restrictions on supplies and movement in Gaza:

A team trained to remove and destroy unexploded ordnance has been operating in the Gaza Strip for three weeks, but its work is being held up because Israel has not approved the entry of its equipment nor an area for storing and neutralizing ordnance. For now some of the latter, located by the Palestinian police, is being stored in locations that are dangerously close to population centers in Rafah, Khan Yunis and Gaza City.

One Gazan died and five were wounded yesterday when unexploded munitions were thrown onto a fire melting scrap metal.

Interpreting Tehran: Professor Gary Sick on the Future of US-Iranian Relations

Last Thursday, In front of an audience at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London that included members of Parliaments, diplomats, senior academics, journalists and representatives from more than a dozen embassies Professor Gary Sick delivered a fascinating survey of the last 30 years of US-Iranian relations. The presentation was made “on the record”, and Chris Emery, our colleague at the University of Birmingham, was there to summarise the remarks.

Professor Sick has served in three US administrations and was the National Security Council’s Iran expert at the time of the Iranian Revolution and US Embassy Crisis. He is now Professor of International Affairs at Columbia University and Director of Gulf2000.

The problem is not a foreign policy problem; it is a domestic policy problem. The baggage of the past is more relevant than any strategic rivalry or threat. Most importantly, the US has never given Iran the opportunity to have an internal debate on the possibilities and consequences of rapprochement with America. The Iranians have therefore not had to think through the important political effects, for example, of ending the chants of “Death to America” at Friday prayers. This statement has become an important expression of the Iranian Revolution; rapprochement, which would surely be incompatible with its encouragement byt the State, may accompany some modifications to Iran’s revolutionary identity.

The Iranian threat to US interests, contrary to the “perceived wisdom” of the Bush Administration and Israeli government, has been wildly blown out of proportion. The newfound strategic confidence of Iran was largely the legacy of recent US foreign policy and the elimination of Iran’s two gravest enemies, the Taliban to the east and Saddam Hussein to the west. The growth of Iran’s influence in the region could not have been achieved, solely by its own actions, as Iran lacks either inclination or capability to project its powers beyond its borders.

Iran is not the most dangerous threat facing the US and Europe. The Afghan-Pakistan nexus, with Pakistan’s nuclear weapons capability, was far graver. Even America’s exit from Iraq posed a greater threat.

Iran and Israel are the new polar rivals in the Middle East. The Sunni Arabs are not as important now and ultimately fear any emerging strategic relationship between the US and Iran. (N.B.: Sick later qualified this statement, asserting that the Arabs were not threatened strategically but, instead, feared marginalisation. This sentiment must be factored into US diplomacy: US-Iranian rapprochement, if and when it occurs, should be matched with the complimentary reassurance of America’s Arab allies.)

Israel has viewed US-Iranian rapprochement with a degree of anxiety, and,the recent conflict in Gaza partly demonstrated Israel’s fear of political alienation. Israel has for some time been engaging in signalling actions, and recent Israel manoeuvres, such as the rehearsal of long-distance bombing operations in the Mediterranean, are particularly aimed at Europe. The message is that the pressure on Iran must be maintained or Israel may respond unilaterally to what it maintains is an existential threat to its existence. This signa was also seen in Israel’s recent request to America to use Iraqi airspace.

Israel, however, will not bomb Iran because it is logistically and politically impossible. Having been unable to eliminate Hezbollah or Hamas’s operational capability, despite several weeks of intensive bombing, Israel would be unable to perform any surgical strike. Instead, Tel Aviv would have to commit to sustained bombing missions, with a hitherto unknown degree of accuracy, on a range of targets. An Israeli strike would also effectively take America to war with Iran, who would reasonably assume permission had been given, and Iranian reprisals in Iraq, Palestine, Lebanon and to Persian Gulf shipping would be disastrous for US interests. Any military strike would thus never be sanctioned by the US.

Iran’s motivation for developing nuclear weapons had been connected to its correct perception that Saddam Hussein was trying to develop nuclear armaments at a time when Iran and Iraq were engaged in a brutal war in which Saddam had shown a ready willingness to use weapons of mass destruction. It is no coincidence that Iran apparently halted all of its weapons designs in the fall of 2003, following Saddam’s removal by US forces.

A reasonably strong case can be made that Saddam “saved” the Islamic Revolution. His attack on Iran created an outpouring of Iranian nationalism which mobilised support for the state at a time when the Revolution looked to be floundering. It also forced the Iranians to organise more efficiently both their financial and political arms of the government and, more importantly, their armed forces which were in chaos in the Revolutionary period. The Islamic Republic of Iran remained a much more nationalist than Islamist state.

Iran is incredibly inefficient in its pursuit of nuclear technology or the West is very wrong about the urgency of preventing it from doing so. Iran has had a nuclear programme, in at least one form or another, for 25 years and yet its only nuclear facility is still not working, despite persistent claims by the Iranian authorities that it would. Considering it took India, Israel and others just 10 years from making the decision to produce a bomb to successful testing, this could be clear evidence of a lack of determination in Tehran. Iran’s enrichment program is also subject to close monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency..

With respect to nuclear technology, there is much continuity between the current and former regimes in Iran. The Shah himself talked, probably unrealistically, of an 18-month “surge” period in which a bomb could be produced after an effective enrichment cycle had been achieved. The Islamic Republic, similarly, probably wants a nuclear program which is capable of delivering a bomb if they decided some time in the future that they needed one. The recognition that a civilian nuclear program gives a certain degree of flexibility, if major geo-political or strategic changes pose a grave future threat to Iranian security, is of course a very different proposition than that currently made by Western and Israeli hawks. At the same time, claims that Iran’s protestations that Islamic law prohibits WMD should be taken with a large dose of salt. As Ayatollah Khomeini said, the “survival of the state takes precedence over Islam”.

How then should the international community respond to the ‘”uclear issue”? US intelligence has regularly claimed, since the early 1990s, that Iran was 3-6 years away from acquiring a bomb This reliable information, which contradicts the assumption that Iran is determined to produce nuclear weapons, can be used more effectively. Certainly, it argues very strongly against any military response. Even if a civilian nuclear program including enrichment allows Iran greater flexibility to produce a weapon sometime in the future, about 40 countries currently have this same potential. The world lives with this prospect every day and doesn’t take countries like Brazil to the UN Security Council.

What is needed, however, is consistent transparency, which Iran is willing to accept. This would allow the world to accurately guage the extent of Iran’s nuclear programme and, with an early warning based on credible non-politicised information, react accordingly and without hysteria.

The Obama Administration’s policy approach has to be seen in the context of previous US and Iranian administrations and the prospect of a new administration in Tehran this summer. There should be no substantial US overtures until after the Iranian elections. America has little to gain by being seen as interfering in this process.

(N.B.: Perhaps disappointingly, Professor Sick did not make any major predictions as to who would be influential in formulating and executing US-Iran policy. Nothing was said, for instance, on the controversial selection of Dennis Ross as Obama’s Middle East envoy. Nor did he examine any potential emerging bureaucratic tensions within the conception of US policy in Iran- of the kind that had blighted the administrations that he himself had served.)

The US has not yet began to decide where Iran policy is going and what its end goal should be. The preceding George H.W. Bush and Clinton Administrations, and their predecessors before them, had no meaningful policy beyond rhetoric. The Obama Administration would thus have to be prepared to make hard decisions, in a way that previous administrations had failed to contemplate. It would need time to do so.

(N.B.: Professor Sick reserved stinging criticism for the efforts of the previous administration and particularly its contradictory and counter-productive attempts to engage with Iran’s civil society. Whilst Professor Sick praised the work of NGO’s and human rights activists in exposing some of the abuses committed by the Iranian government, he condemned the mixed messages Bush has sent to the Iranian public in its support for outside groups. The Bush administration, he claimed, had fleeted between supporting unpopular external Iranian groups, pursuing (and then denying to be pursuing) regime change and promoting a ‘velvet revolution’. The damage of this approach can not be underestimated and has contributed to the substantial mistrust and paranoia in which Tehran frames US engagement.)

There are some very practical problems that need to be overcome. Optimally, the US should try and forge direct links with the Supreme Leader. America’s isolation from this ultimate source of political authority in Iran places limits on rapprochement. In his final analysis, however, this avenue had been sought, especially during the hostage crisis, and consistently refused. Put simply, Ayatollah Khamenei had shown no interest of talking to America.

There is another practical problem for US diplomacy. A whole generation of career diplomats have never set foot on Iranian soil and thus lack any exposure to its political or popular culture. This makes it critically important for diplomatic relations to be restored. A potential starting point is for the US to open a US “Interests” office in Tehran. As a matter of protocol, it was the Americans who broke relations in 1980, so it is the US that has to formally restore them.

(N.B. Professor Sick also recounted some of his own personal experiences of meeting with president Ahmadinejad, in whose company he had spent roughly eight hours since his election in 2005. Professor Sick noted a partial softening of his attitudes since then and observed that the president genuinely, though it is often dismissed in the western media, believed he was a peacemaker.

Sick recounted one meeting in which US-based specialists had participated, with Ahmadinejad, in a seminar in Washington. Professor Sick asked the Iranian president to imagine he was simply an Iranian academic participating in a discussion with American academics in America. Would he not be arrested by Iranian authorities on his return to Iran? The president laughed off the assumption as inaccurate, but Sick proceeded to supply evidence of Iranian academics who had suffered this very fate. Professor Sick chose not to elaborate further on this discussion. Nor did he comment on the much wider issue of the role academics can play in increasing constructive dialogue, and the limits placed upon them doing so in both countries.

Despite this perhaps provocative anecdote, and a sweeping though not uncommonly made statement that Arabs and Persians generally dislike each other, Sick’s analysis was mostly pragmatic. Yes, some aspects of Iran’s behaviour were cause for some concern in the west. In fact no country, according to Sick, had done a better job of diplomatically shooting itself in the foot. In this latter regard, Ahmadinejad’s unnecessary rhetoric had significantly damaged Iranian diplomacy. However, the threat Iran poses has been widely blown out of proportion.

Professor Sick also acknowledged many of the long term grievances held in Iran towards America as legitimate. More importantly, he observed that US policy had been proved counter-productive. Rather than continue the mistakes made by all US administrations since the Revolution, the US had to be prepared to make hard decisions and recognise the basic failure of all its previous assumptions to achieve tangible benefits to US diplomacy or US interests. A large part of this process involved the abandonment of historical baggage on both sides.)

Is Israel Winning a Covert War Against Iran?

Latest Post: Is Israel Winning a Covert War Against Iran?: An Alternative Analysis

The Daily Telegraph of London splashes a contemporary spy drama on its pages this morning:

Israel has launched a covert war against Iran as an alternative to direct military strikes against Tehran's nuclear programme, US intelligence sources have revealed. It is using hitmen, sabotage, front companies and double agents to disrupt the regime's illicit weapons project.

That's quite plausible, of course, given declarations such as that of Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak yesterday that an Iran nuclear weapons programme would be an "existential threat" to Tel Aviv.

But then the story gets almost as murky as the covert project. The only source is a "former CIA officer on Iran" who claims, "Disruption is designed to slow progress on the programme, done in such a way that [the Iranians] don't realise what's happening....The goal is delay, delay, delay [the weapons programme] until you can come up with some other solution or approach."

No direct evidence there and the only cited case is that "Mossad was rumoured to be behind the death of Ardeshire Hassanpour, a top nuclear scientist at Iran's Isfahan uranium plant, who died in mysterious circumstances from reported 'gas poisoning' in [January] 2007". At the time, the US Government's Radio Farda circulated the report, supported by a Reva Bhalla of Stratfor who insisted there was "very strong intelligence" that Hassanpour had been targeted by Israel. Iranian news services countered that Hassanpour had not been employed by the Atomic Energy Organisation: "[All] nuclear experts, Thank God, are sound and safe."

Unsurprisingly, Bhalla pops up in The Telegraph for a sound-bite but adds no evidence. And the article has no other cases to test; it just asserts, based on "Western intelligence sources": "Other recent deaths of important figures in the procurement and enrichment process in Iran and Europe have been the result of Israeli 'hits', intended to deprive Tehran of key technical skills at the head of the programme."

The article lists other operations which are far more likely to be significant, such as "Israeli and US intelligence co-operated with European companies working in Iran to obtain photographs and other confidential material about Iranian nuclear and missile sites" and "Israel has also used front companies to infiltrate the Iranian purchasing network for 'dual use' items – metals, valves, electronics, machinery – for its nuclear programme".

Overall, however, this reads as a different type of operation, a bit of "psychological warfare" to keep Tehran off-balance over what might and might not be attempted to undermine its nuclear programme and to add the stick to the carrot of "engagement". And, given that the main sources are "Western" and the story is out of New York, this has the feel of folks in the US Government --- possibly supported by London --- putting the pressure on Iran.