Iran Document: Latest Karroubi Interview "The Shah Didn't Behave Like This"

An interview in Italy's Corriere della Sera with Mehdi Karroubi,first published in Italian in 22 February:

How is your son now?

Physically, my son Ali is feeling better. In the first days, his condition was terrible. Now we are worried about his mental state. The damage Ali suffered is a small example of all that is happening to the children of this nation. But the regime is already paying for this.

What happened on February 11?

The repression was violent, no doubt. There was an unprecedented conflict with the population. This time, the regime didn’t want to allow any gathering of protesters and it used all its strength; it gathered its forces from all the different governmental organs. They arrested our friends and family members, and they threatened the others. But their mobilization and organization didn’t stop us.


I knew how it would end, but I went to demonstrate anyway. I will go again if there will be other demonstrations, even if the outcome is worse than the last one. The newspapers wrote that the people prevented the conspirators (e.g., Karroubi and Mir Hossein Mousavi) from entering the square. I would like to ask those newspapers, which are controlled by the regime and the government: do you think that ordinary people use tear gas? Do you think ordinary people use metal bars and knives? The masters need to know that these days will pass but their sign will remain.

The events of these months have often been compared to the Revolution of 1979. You compared the violence of the repression to that of the Shah’s time, but you said that his army had shown more restraint. Do you see other similarities between our times and those?

The Shah’s regime was corrupt at its core, but he didn’t behave like this with the people. What do the armed forces have to do with the election’s results? Why did they treat the people like this on the 22nd of Bahman (11 February)? During the reign of the Shah there were rules; they did not take the people arrested to the mosque to beat them to death even before they appeared in front of the judiciary. These people make arrests without a warrant, beat them and keep them in detention. Not to mention the rest (such as the alleged rape of detainees).

Under what conditions would you be ready to find a compromise with Ahmadinejad and recognise him as the legitimate president of Iran? Do you consider yourself to be a leader of this Green Movement?

I don’t consider myself the leader of the popular Green Movement. I consider myself a member of this movement and of the reformist movement. My actions aim to a return to the will and the ideals of the people, that is to say to the people’s sovereignty. I don’t have a personal conflict, nor a reason to reach an agreement or make peace with Ahmadinejad. We consider Ahmadinejad’s government an established government that has to answer for its actions, but not a lawful or legitimate government. I am nobody: it’s not up to me to find an agreement or a compromise. It is the people who have to decide whether or not they want a compromise with the government. It is the people who are in conflict with the government, and who do not accept its management of the country. The people don’t agree with the strategy that puts us in conflict with the world taken on by Ahmadinejad, and we are a part of this same people.

You said that chanting slogans against the Supreme Leader and for a secular state is wrong. What slogans should people chant?

The things should be kept separate. We are not trying to make the regime fall. On the other hand, the Constitution is not a divine revelation and therefore is not unchangeable. But, at the moment, not even this Constitution is applied in this country.

Before the election could you imagine that the Iranian people would go so far in asking for their rights and that their anger would grow so much?

I did not imagine or foresee that the Iranian regime would go as far as rigging the popular vote as it did. On the other hand, the regime has adopted an obstinate and non conciliatory attitude with the people, which is the cause of the current problems. In the first days, the people said, “Where is my vote?” The people are still the same. So what happened that lead them to adopt the current slogans? The people want healthy elections and to see their votes counted.

As a student of Khomeini, I read that you were extraordinarily absorbed by him. Is he still a model for your actions?

I loved the Imam and I still love him. Yes, he is a model and an example for me. He was a devout cleric, he had insight and far-sightedness. My love for him increased after his death because of what happened. The Imam lead the country in its most difficult time: the first decade after the Islamic Revolution. The country was at war, prominent figures and other important politicians were killed in attacks and in the war. In that situation, perhaps some special and sometimes excessive measures were taken. I don’t say that he was a perfect model. But actions and decisions have to be evaluated taking the times into account.

What is the worst thing that has been done in the name of the revolution? What were the most joyful moments of the revolution? Why do you still believe in the Islamic Republic?

The Islamic Republic consists of two concepts: republicanism and Islam. The worst thing is the damage done to both those concepts and principles. I’m not saying that nothing is left anymore, but the damage done is very serious, both to Islam and to the concept of “republicanism” which means “the opinion and the vote of the people”.

The Imam said that the final decision is up to the people. He always considered the public opinion and never allowed, even under the worse conditions, ambiguity and lack of clarity during the elections. What was damaged were the promises that we made to the people. The issue is not to make the regime fall, but to reform it.

I still believe in the Islamic Republic, but not in this kind of Islamic Republic! The Islamic Republic that we promised the people had the support and the vote of 98% of the population: it was the Islamic Republic of free elections and not of rigged elections. I believe in modern Islam, an Islam full of kindness and affection, not a violent or fanatic Islam.

Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi pledged to reduce the business with Tehran and to support new international sanctions. Do you think these measures would help the opposition in any way? What effects do you think UN sanctions will have on the government and on the people?

When I was the speaker of the Iranian parliament, the relationship between our parliaments was excellent. My official visit to Italy at that time, and the visit of two presidents of the Italian House to Iran are a sign of the good political relationship between the two countries. Even the letter sent by the presidents of the Italian House and Senate to the chiefs of the Iranian regime regarding the consequences of my (possible) arrest is a demonstration of the good relationship we had at that time. For this, I am grateful to the presidents and to the members of the Italian parliament. But I am absolutely against sanctions; they increase the economic pressure that the people already suffer because of the wrong policies of the government.

Iran: Mousavi, The Regime, & "The Prerequisites of Escalation"

From The Newest Deal:

In his 17th statement, Mir-Hossein Mousavi made five specific points that he deemed necessary to start the political (and national) reconciliation process. The proposal lead to a noticeable uptick in the weeks leading up to 22 Bahman in talk of the need for national "unity" and also garnered much attention from Iranian intellectuals and dissidents. Ultimately, the regime's more radical elements reemerged and silenced the chatter before the security apparatus prevented a strong opposition showing on the revolution's 31st anniversary. But Mousavi's "five points," as they have come to be called, still carry much weight. Generally, they are:

1. Government accountability for post-election violations


2. Legislation of new election laws that would safeguard reform-minded candidates from regime's current vetting process


3. Release of all political prisoners


4. Freedom of the press and political-neutrality on state-run IRIB television


5. Freedom to assemble, as guaranteed by the Islamic Republic's constitution

Were these five conditions to be met, the Green movement would arguably have the breathing space it needs to mobilize and begin the long process of transforming Iranian society. For if anything became apparent in the weeks leading up to and after the June election, it was that Iran has undergone an awakening. It has simply been the repression that the above five grievances capture that has prevented the social movement's aspirations from coming to fruition.


Therefore, perhaps an alternative frame can be adopted to view Mousavi's five points. As a recent Tehran Bureau profile wonderfully captured, the reluctant leader of Iran's opposition has matured into a rather shrewd, cautious, and patient figure. While circumstances prevent him from voicing such a sentiment in public, the leader of the Green movement likely recognizes that the regime has reached a point of no return. The tyranny, the executions, the outright fascism -- all of it is, to quote his Mousavi from an interview on the eve of 22 Bahman, an outgrowth of the "revolution's failures" and the "roots of tyranny and dictatorship" that persist in society from the reign of the Shah. These are damning (and yet still very measured) words from one of the Islamic Republic's own founding fathers.

Thus, seeing the regime in this light gives Mousavi's five points new significance. The demands would no longer be five steps the regime must take in order to rescue the country from its current crisis, but rather, five blatant and particularly egregious shortcomings that the regime will inevitably be unwilling to address, and that will thus escalate the conflict between the Greens and the regime. For in the wake of the June coup d'etat, if one thing has become clear it is that those currently in control will never meet any such conditions, even if moderate voices within their camp plead otherwise. Political calculus has been replaced by megalomania, with the possibility of reconciliation falling victim.

And so if these five points are instead five tests that the regime must fail before confrontation with the regime escalates to the next phase, the news emerging this week from the Expediency Council and Assembly of Experts -- both bodies chaired by Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani -- is indeed very telling. First, the Council began considering aproposal being pushed by Rafsanjani and Mohsen Rezaei that would take away the Guardian Council's vetting role and instead give it to a new "National Election Committee" of sorts, which would conveniently be under Rafsanjani's supervision in the Expediency Council. (Ironically, the proposal to revise the country's election laws was made to Supreme Leader two years ago, after which he ordered for a new plan to be drawn up).

Make no mistake: this would essentially be a first step in meeting the second condition laid of Mousavi's 17th statement. Were the change to the vetting process be enacted, the Guardian Council would no longer be able to disqualify candidates from running for president or parliament, as it did when it disqualified all but four candidates from running in the 2009 presidential election.

The chances of the plan coming to fruition, however, appear slim. With the regime still reeling from the aftermath of the June elections and still off-balance going forward, it would have no reason to suddenly invite more political opposition in Majlis through freer elections in 2012. Hossein Shariatmadari, editor of the ultra-conservative Kayhandaily and someone who is regarded as being close to Khamenei, has already come out on the attack, stating that any propsoal to create such an electoral commission would be "against the Islamic Republic's constitution."

No sooner than the proposal was being discussed, more divisive conservative rhetoric emerged from the other body Rafsanjani chairs, the Assembly of Experts. In a statement reported by Fars News, the Assembly allegedly declared that the regime's patience with the opposition "ended in December after sedition leaders missed numerous chances to repent and return into the gown of the revolution." (Enduring America notes, however, that the statement is missing on the Assembly of Experts' official website and that several prominent members were absent from the Assembly's two-day meeting). Khamenei, for his part, has reiterated the statement's pronouncement in his own statement, saying that those who still do not accept the June presidential election result "would be disqualified from participating in the Islamic system."

The obstacles in revising the regime's election laws aside, the other four points from Mousavi's 17th statement have gone unheeded as well. Saeed Mortazavi, though implicated by Majlis [Iran's Parliament] in the Kahrizak torture-murders, remains a free man. Rather than having political prisoners freed, the country recently saw the greatest wave of arrests sweep dissidents since late June and early July. Meanwhile, state-controlled media remains entirely propagandized while any questions regarding citizens' right to freely assemble were surly answered by the enormous security presence deployed on 22 Bahman.

Not even appearing to consider the proposals, the regime seems bent on acting counter to each of Mousavi's five points. Despite the intentions of some del-soozan, (or "heartbroken" moderate conservatives), any promise for political reconciliation also appears dead. Rather, the crisis seems destined to continue indefinitely, and with neither side refusing to back down, Mousavi's five grievances may come to be prerequisites for the regime to unconditionally reject before the opposition begins to decide on how to take the uprising to the next level.

Iran Analysis: Khamenei's Not-So-Big Push

No doubt this morning about the big news out of Iran. On Thursday, the Supreme Leader tried to lock down the security of his position once and for all, declaring that opposition leaders “have lost their credibility by denying the results of the elections. They did not surrender to the law and committed a great sin....[They] have stepped down from the rescue ship and have lost their credibility to remain within the framework of the Islamic establishment.”

Iran Follow-Up: Interpreting the Assembly of Experts “The Certainty of the Uncertain”
Iran Analysis: The Assembly of Experts Mystery

So that's an unambiguous warning to Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi to shut up, for example, giving up on Karroubi's latest call for a referendum on the Guardian Council and for the regime's permission for mass protest. But Khamenei has made such statements before: he did so just after the June election, before the Qods Day marches in September, and before the Ashura demonstrations in December.


What is distinctive this time is that the Supreme Leader issued his declaration in a meeting with the Assembly of Experts, which had just finished its two-day meeting. The regime blueprint was for the Assembly to add its 86-member weight to a resolution of the crisis; the problem is that, for reasons which will take some time to establish, it did not so. The "statement" published on Fars News condemning the "sedition" of the opposition (was it a draft? a "leak" from a few pro-Khamenei or pro-Ahmadinejad members of the Assembly?) was never officially confirmed.

So, in the absence of that resolution, here was the Supreme Leader's message. It was not the authorisation of the arrest of Mousavi and Karroubi (although, if either make a high-profile declaration with further demands and the prospect of a rally, this may change). Despite the insistence that the June election was settled, it was not support of President Ahmadinejad.

It was, to use the language of American football, "Protect Your Quarterback". Me.

Personal security, for the moment, equates to the security of the system of velayat-e-faqih (clerical supremacy). And, for the moment, that is accepted by all high-profile political figures. For all his ambiguities, Rafsanjani has done somersaults to be unambiguous on this point. Mousavi has never made a direct attack on Khamenei's position. And Karroubi, despite his "Mr Khamenei" statement last month, has ensured that his demands are narrowly focused on certain institutions --- the Iranian judiciary, the Guardian Council, the Presidency --- and not on velayat-e-faqih.

So, Supreme Leader/Quarterback, you're OK. And that is about all that can be settled....for the moment.

Iran Analysis: The Assembly of Experts Mystery

UPDATE 1550 GMT: And, as the supposed statement of the Assembly seems to have disappeared, here's another puzzler. The following clerics were not present during the final meeting of the session: Amini, Mesbah Yazdi, Hassan Rohani, Moghtadaiee, Mahdavi-Kani and Mousavi-Jazayeri.

Amini. though conservative, has been reported to be very unhappy with the post-election events. Amini is reportedly in hospital. Hassan Rohani is close to Rafsanjani.Mahdavi-Kani is conservative cleric, with very strong links and possible influence within the regime; he was also reportedly a proponent of the National Unity Plan.

OK, so each may have had a reason to be absent. But was Mesbah Yazdi, perhaps Ahmadinejad's most fervent backer, not present at a session that supposedly declared opposition "sedition"?

UPDATE 1430 GMT: Let's add to the mystery. At the beginning of the Assembly of Experts session, Rafsanjani said that Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, the Deputy Chair of the Assembly was not present; instead, his son was attending. (Yazdi Senior also missed the autumn session, saying he was ill, and he tried to resign from the secretariat of the Assembly, but Rafsanjani rejected the resignation.)

Legally Yazdi Junior cannot represent his father in Assembly meetings. So was Rafsanjani making the point that Mohammad Yazdi, a backer of President Ahmadinejad, is so used to illegal activity that he sends his son to represent him? And/or was Rafsanjani diminishing the legitimacy of a meeting "under special circumstances" where non-members could sit in?

When the news came through, it hit like a hammer blow. The Assembly of Experts, headed by Hashemi Rafsanjani, had issued their statement after a widely-anticipated two-day meeting. The 86-member body had declared its loyalty to the Supreme Leader:

The more we go ahead, the more our supreme leader proves his competence. Ayatollah Khamenei shed light on realities in dealing with the post-election sedition and undertook huge efforts in view of bringing unity to the nation.

So far, nothing surprising. Last summer's possibility of an Assembly challenge to Khamenei is long gone; all "establishment" figures, including Rafsanjani, have circled political wagons around the concept of clerical supremacy (velayat-e-faqih). But then the unexpected:

The revolutionary patience of the Iranian nation and the Islamic Republic ended in December after sedition leaders missed numerous chances to repent and return into the gown of the revolution. Sedition leaders flunked the Dec 30 final exam and they were removed from Iran's political spirit.

Bam. Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi, Mohammad Khatami: your resistance is over. Not just over, forbidden. With that doubly-offered word "sedition", the threat of arrest had been made, not by the Revolutionary Guard or the Iranian judiciary but by clerics, some of whom were supposedly sympathetic to the opposition demands.

No wonder a prominent (and shrewd) activist e-mailed me, "This statement has me worried. And it takes a lot to get me worried."

But then the story moves from drama to mystery. Did the Assembly really put down this challenge to Mousavi-Karroubi-Khatami?

The original source for the statement appears to have been Fars News. The Iranian Students News Agency also featured the story but simply summarised the  Fars account. However, as far as I can tell, the supposed statement has not been covered by the Islamic Republic News Agency, and it certainly has escaped any mention on Press TV's website.

Perhaps most importantly, there is still no sign of the statement on the official website of the Assembly.

So this morning, we are left, not with the certain shock of a once-and-for-all challenge to opposition leaders but with the uncertainty of whether Fars --- which has been known to create or distort stories --- has been the source of either outright fabrication or the channel for someone (who? take your pick) to "leak" a statement which had not been agreed by the Assembly.

A bit of recent history may be in order. Last summer a statement appeared, in the name of the Assembly, criticising the leadership of Hashemi Rafsanjani and calling on him to step down as chair. The initial reading, given Rafsanjani's high-profile Friday Prayer speech in mid-July standing up to the Government and the subsequent pressure and threats against him and his family, was that the regime had rallied against the former President.

Not so. Within days, it emerged that the statement had been drawn up by only a handful of clerics and signed by the fiercely pro-Ahmadinejad Ayatollah Mesbah Mohammad Yazdi. A number of Assembly members made it clear that they had no part of the effort, and Rafsanjani remained in his post.

So now, rather than the intended portrait of a regime now united against the opposition, we have the picture --- should the speculation of a clumsy propaganda effort be borne out --- of a system whose heart is still divided. There will be no resolution.

Watch this space.

The Latest from Iran (23 February): Videoing the Attacks

2145 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. An activist reports that Layla Tavasoli and Mohamad Naeimpour of the Freedom Movement of Iran have been released from Evin Prison.

2130 GMT: Rafsanjani Watch. Another sign of the "conservative" push for changes within the system. The brother of former President Hashemi Rafsanjani, Mohammad Hashemi Rafsanjani, has told Khabar Online that the Expediency Council will seek to remove "ambiguities" in Iran's election law. At the same time, Mohammad Rafsanjani denied that the Expediency Council will seek to remove the Guardian Council's monitoring of elections.

NEW Iran Special: Interpreting the Videos of the Tehran Dorm Attacks
NEW Iran Document: Karroubi Statement on 22 Bahman & The Way Forward (22 February)
UPDATED Iran 18-Minute Video: Attack on Tehran University Dormitories (14/15 June 2009)
New Jersey to Iran (and Back Again): The Activism of Mehdi Saharkhiz
The Latest from Iran (22 February): Karroubi’s Challenge

1840 GMT: WaPo'ed (definition: "declaring an opposition movement dead without evidence and with dubious motives). Just a quick note to folks at The Washington Post: in the past 72 hours, you have distorted a piece by your own Iran correspondent to portray the demise of the Green movement on 22 Bahman and you have run an Associated Press report which declares from thin air:


Opposition forces were left disillusioned Feb. 11 after police and hard-line militiamen snuffed out protest marches to coincide with the anniversary of Ayatollah Khomeini's 1979 revolution. Many opposition blogs and Web sites are increasingly questioning whether Mousavi or other pro-reform leaders have run their course.

Today you run not one but two opinion pieces which call for a "war of necessity" with Iran: Anne Applebaum's "Prepare for war with Iran -- in case Israel strikes" and Richard Cohen's pronouncement, "It may be time for Barack Obama, ever the soul of moderation, to borrow a tactic from Richard Nixon and fight crazy with crazy."

I do hope the poor editing/reporting and war whoops are unconnected, because there's the uncomfortable impression that you're trying to shove the opposition into the corner so you can have a bomb-bomb-bomb showdown with Tehran.

1835 GMT: Former President Mohammad Khatami has shown solidarity with a visit to Mehdi Karroubi's son Ali, who was taken away and beaten on 22 Bahman.

1830 GMT: The Tehran Dorm Attacks. We have a double special this evening with Mr Verde analysing the footage of the assault and with the full 18-minute video of the attack.

1750 GMT: Political Prisoner Update. Fereshteh Ghazi offers a useful round-up of news on detainees, "Constant Intimidation; Repeated Charges".

1745 GMT: A Clerical Voice Is Heard Once More. Ayatollah Bayat-Zanjani has spoken up again about the abuses of the Government: “Power is a tool to defend people’s rights and, if rights cannot be defended based on that power, then that power will lose its legitimacy even if some would try to make up legitimacy for it.”

1740 GMT: Full-Court Press. As we predicted this morning, a big day for the regime's propagandists on the "foreign enemies" front: Press TV has another article on the capture of Jundullah leader Abdolmalek Rigi, this time highlighting his "US-issued passport".

1735 GMT: Yah, Yah, Whatever. More spinning of rhetorical wheels in the uranium enrichment discussions. Iran’s Ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Ali Ashgar Soltanieh, has submitted a letter that Iran is “still ready to purchase the fuel it needs for Tehran’s research reactor”. However, if buying is not an option, “Iran is ready to simultaneously exchange the fuel required for the Tehran research reactor with its low-enriched uranium within Iranian territory if the I.A.E.A. lacks the ability to fulfill its duties.”

In other words, Tehran has re-stated the position held since November, so no apparent breakthrough from the recent Turkish mission to Iran.

The Guardian of London has posted a copy of the letter.

1730 GMT: Karroubi Watch. Thanks to Khordaad 88, we've finally posted the English translation of Mehdi Karroubi's Monday statement on 22 Bahman and the way forward for the opposition.

1640 GMT: Going Off-Script (Economy Watch). But, in a break from regularly scheduled progaganda, Press TV has this surprise:

Iran needs to invest $24bn to $30bn per year in its oil industry to reach the 20-year goals of the country the Head of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) says....

[Seifollah] Jashnsaz stressed that Iran needs to attract more foreign investment to keep the oil industry alive. "If we do not make the necessary investment, the harm of the lack of timely investment in the oil industry will be irreversible to the country," he pointed out.

Iran faces an uphill effort to develop its oil and gas reserves because of credit concerns and issues stemming from sanctions backed by Western nations over its peaceful nuclear program.

1630 GMT: No Complications Here. Of course, for Press TV, there are no nuances in today's Rafsanjani statement (see 1335 GMT):

Head of Iran's Assembly of Experts Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani has criticized the head of the UN nuclear watchdog over his recent report on Iran's nuclear energy program.

Speaking at the opening of an Assembly of Experts meeting, Ayatollah Rafsanjani said the recent report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) repeated the previous US accusations against Iran....Ayatollah Rafsanjani said, “It seems all the Western countries were prepared for and informed about such a report, which they welcomed after its release.”

He further criticized the 'failed' US policies in the Middle East, including Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine.

1345 GMT: Before going on academic break, two important points from an EA source:

1. The BBC Persian video of the attacks on Tehran University's dormitories on 15 June is being seen inside Iran, and it is causing much comment and anger.

2. Jundullah Abdolmalek Rigi was captured last week by Iranian forces. Some believe that this morning's regime announcement of Rigi's detention is a reaction to divert attention from the BBC Persian video.

1335 GMT: Non-Surprise of the Day. So Hashemi Rafsanjani launches the two-day Assembly of Experts meeting with this not-very-provocative statement:

Our focal point is clear and that is the constitution, Islam, the principle of the office of the jurisprudent and supreme leadership. There are those who do not recognise these, but that is not the case with the majority of people in our society. It is very important for us to try to safeguard these.

OK, so that Rafsanjani's now-obligatory alignment with the legitimacy of the Supreme Leader. What will be significant is how he uses that to press for changes in the system. Here was a clue: acceptance of
responsibility by those who permitted or carried out post-election abuses:

The events that took place at Kahrizak [with the Supreme Leader's order to close the prison] and the consoling of those who were hurt in these events, or the release of those who were arrested, have been along this axis [of responsibility]. [The Leader] is vigilant that there should be no turmoil.

1330 GMT: Citizen Journalism Alert. It's a convenient coincidence, as we post our special feature on Iran and citizen journalists, that one of the most prominent activists on Twitter has used his/her 50,000th tweet to announce the launch of a new initiative, the Global Freedom Movement.

1200 GMT: Prediction Fulfilled (0645 GMT). Press TV plays out the propaganda line over the arrest of Jundullah leader Abdolmalek Rigi:

Interior Minister Mostafa Mohammad-Najar told reporters on Tuesday that Rigi was arrested outside the country as he was preparing for a new act of sabotage. He was consequently transferred to Iran.

In a news conference following Rigi's capture Tuesday, Iran's Intelligence Minister Heidar Moslehi shed light on certain details regarding Rigi's arrest as well as his links with foreign elements.

Moslehi said that Americans utilized an Afghan passport for Rigi, a declaration which adds to already existing evidence on Rigi's links with the US.

Moslehi said that Rigi had contacts with CIA and Mossad and had even met the NATO military chief Jaap de Hoop Scheffer in Afghanistan in April 2008.

According to the minister, Rigi had also contacts with certain EU countries and traveled to them.

1055 GMT: Just before going on an academic break, we have posted a special feature, "In Praise of Citizen Journalists".

1050 GMT: No Comment Necessary. From Reuters:

"No power can harm Iran ... The Iranian nation will chop off the hands from the arm of any attacker from any part of the world," [Mahmoud] Ahmadinejad said in a televised speech in eastern Khorasan-e Jonubi province.

0935 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Moussavi supporter Mohammad Estaki has been arrested in Isfahan. Journalist Kayvan Samimi has been moved back to solitary confinement in Evin Prison. Mohammadreza Razaghi of the Mousavi campaign and Asghar Khandan have been freed. Sara Tavassoli, daughter of the director of the Freedom Movement of Iran, has been released.

0933 GMT: "An Assembly with Eyes Wide Shut". Anticipating the start of the two-day meeting of the Assembly of Experts, Rah-e-Sabz has a lengthy analysis of the divisions between hardliners and moderates in the body.

0900 GMT: Karroubi v. Larijani Watch. Now to the serious news. The pro-Larijani Khabar Online takes Mehdi Karroubi's seriously enough to launch a full attack on it as "destroying the structures" (sakhtar-shekanane) of the Islamic Republic. Khabar then pretends that there's nothing significant at all, as Karroubi's declaration comes 11 days after the downfall of the Greens on 22 Bahman.

0855 GMT: Mars Attacks? It really is a banner day for headlines. The English service of Fars News contributes with "Sunni Scholars: Aliens Seeking to Sow Discord among Muslims".

0735 GMT: Later this morning, we're hoping to get out an analysis of the significance of social media and "citizen journalism" in this conflict. For now, just note (somewhat ironically, since the film was initially shot by the attackers) the impact of BBC Persian and YouTube footage --- shown in a separate EA entry --- of the assault on the Tehran University dormitories on 15 June. As with previous YouTube video, publicised by Twitter and Facebook, the anger over the video is likely to support the resurgence of opposition.

0730 GMT: Over-the-Top Headline of the Day (2). In The Huffington Post, "Iran Invites Israeli Bombers to Visit Its Nuclear Facilities".

0720 GMT: Full marks to Nazila Fathi of The New York Times (and to The Los Angeles Times yesterday) for valuable coverage of the Karroubi statement: "It was clear from Mr. Karroubi’s call for a referendum that he did not expect the government to take it seriously. But his ability even to make such a demand and spread the message over the Internet seemed calculated to frustrate the Iranian authorities."

0715 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. The International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran has published a letter that it claims is from imprisoned student Seyed Zia Nabavi to the head of Iran's judiciary, Sadegh Larijani. Nabavi, jailed for 15 years, declares, "I have yet to see a document authorizing my arrest and stating the reason.”

The student was detained on 15 June, during the first mass marches after the election. His sentence claims he was conspiring against national security and associating with opposition group Mujahedin-e-Khalq.

0710 GMT: Over-the-Top Headline of the Day? The New Republic, featuring Abbas Milani's profile of Mir Hossein Mousavi: "Iran Finds Its Nelson Mandela".

0645 GMT: An interesting comparison emerges this morning in news from Iran. On the regime side, the headline is the announcement by the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence that the leader of the Baluch insurgent group Jundullah, Abdolmalek Rigi, has been captured in eastern Iran.

I suspect the news will be trumpeted loudly today. Jundullah's suicide bombing last October killed 42 people, including six Revolutionary Guard commanders, and shook up and distracted Iranian security forces. This turns around the political situation: Rigi's detention and the blow to Jundullah will be held up as a symbol of the regime's triumph over foreign-supported threats to the Islamic Republic.

On the opposition side, however, the news about Rigi will be irrelevant. Instead, Mehdi Karroubi's declaration yesterday turns another page in the post-22 Bahman rebuilding of the challenge to the Ahmadinejad Government. Following the two meetings between Karroubi and Mir Hossein Mousavi, which have promised significant news, i.e., a plan of action, for the Iranian people, Karroubi's call is doubly significant. It is immediately important because it offers a specific political focus in the demand for a referendum on the Guardian Council. Its wider importance, however, is that it indicates --- despite all the repressive measures and propaganda of the Government --- that the resistance is far from over.

The key here is that the two events don't match up. So while the Government puts out its victory message today, listen but also watch for any Green steps. There are dramatic and significanct sideshows, and then there are main events.