The Latest from Iran (28 July): The Regime Crumbles

The Latest from Iran (29 July): The Memorial and the Inauguration
NEW Iran: Or Is It the Supreme Leader v. the Revolutionary Guard?
NEW Iran: Will the Supreme Leader Give Up Ahmadinejad?
Iran Video (27 July): The Nighttime Protest
The Latest from Iran (27 July): A President Dangling in the Wind?

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2200 GMT: Late Breaking News. The reformist website Mardomak reports that the memorial ceremonies for the fallen protesters will most probably be held this Thursday. The website asserts, "Although a rather low-level official of the ministry has objected to holding these ceremonies...there has not been any official objection... It seems that the government officials know that if they officially object, the government would then have to shoulder the responsibility of preventing these ceremony to happen." Mardomak also stated that if the doors of the Mosala are not opened on Thursday, all participants will sit down in the middle of Beheshti Street and light candles and recite the Koran.

2115 GMT: And so to close where we began this morning, considering the problems for President Ahmadinejad.

1. It is clear that the President will now be opposed by the "Principlist" bloc in Parliament. The vocal criticism of Ali Motahari has now been joined by the Islamic Engineers Society, which has criticised both the appointment of the First Vice President and the sacking of the Minister of Intelligence: "It seems you want to be the sole speaker and do not want to hear other voices… therefore it is our duty to convey to you the voice of the people." (Significantly, this news was reported on Press TV's website.)

Principlist legislator Hamid-Reza Katouzian told Tabnak: “Allegiance to the rule of just jurisprudence is not embracing the Leader and kissing his hand; allegiance must be practical....Putting the incidents of the past 10 days together, whether they were purposeful or carried out unintentionally, only show a confrontation with the Leader, and it is my opinion and that of other Principlists that Mr. Ahmadinejad needs to determine the nature of his relationship with the Leader.”

2. A "conservative" Member of Parliament, Gholam-Reza Mesbahi-Moghaddam, has expressed support for Hashemi Rafsanjani and has advocated compensation to the families of slain protesters. He also considered demonstrators to be "young gullible individuals who can be released".

3. Perhaps in response to this pressure, Ahmadinejad has asked the head of Iran's judiciary, Ayatollah Hashemi Shahroudi to deal with the situation of the detainees (which Shahroudi had promised yesterday), hoping that the release of these individuals will coincide with the Birthday of Imam Mahdi. Ahmadinejad claims that most detainees have been "hoodwinked into participating these protests by individuals related to certain internal politicians or the propaganda of foreign enemies".

http://tabnak.ir/fa/pages/?cid=57383

2045 GMT: Mohammad Tavasoli, a senior member of the Freedom Movement of Iran, has been freed after 43 days in detention.

2030 GMT: Ayatollah Bayat-Zanjani, who has emerged as a vocal critic of the Government, has issued another statement criticising those who have ignored "the vote of the majority".

1945 GMT: The Memorial is On. Despite the denial of a permit from the Ministry of Interior, Mir Hossein Mousavi's Facebook page announces the gathering will take place from 6 to 7:30 p.m. local time on Thursday at the Grand Mosala in Tehran. The page also puts up a poster for the event (pictured).

1930 GMT: American Perceptions. After the news of the denial of the permit for the Thursday memorial, a quieter phase in Iran news. Meanwhile, in the US there is a discussion of clerical power, political roles, and individual rights under the Iranian Constitution. Francis Fukuyama started it in The Wall Street Journal, and Kevin Sullivan has continued it on Real Clear World. It's a commentary as notable for the American perception of "Islamic Iran" as it is for insight into the Iranian system.

1755 GMT: The head of the political office of the Ministry of the Interior, Abbaszadeh-Meshkini, has told Fars News that no official permission has been given to any individual or group for a "40th Day" gathering on Thursday. Abbaszdeh said, "Memorial ceremonies are considered to be private issues of citizens and any request for such ceremonies from the interior ministry has obvious political overtones".

1710 GMT: Another Ayatollah for Rafsanjani. Following the public support of Assembly of Experts member Ayatollah Zarandi for Hashemi Rafsanjani (see 1205 GMT), Ayatollah Jaleleddin Taheri has also praised the former President and his speech at Friday prayers in Tehran.

1700 GMT: An Iranian website is reporting that politician Saeed Hajjarian will be among the 140 detainees released after a Parliamentary review.

1540 GMT: Ahmadinejad v. Khamenei? Back to our main story today. Parleman News reports that, after the dismissal of Minister of Intelligence Ejeie, President Ahmadinejad has taken direct control of the Ministry by ordering his replacement, Majid Alavi, to report directly to him. The Intelligence Ministry normally is supervised by the Supreme Leader, according to an English-language interpretation of the story.

1530 GMT: Women's rights lawyer Shadi Sadr has been released on bail of about $50,000.

1520 GMT: Fars News confirms that, after review by the Parliamentary Security Committee including a tour of the prisons and a visit to Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani --- see 0750 GMT), 140 prisoners will be released today. Another 150 will continued to be held because, according to an English translation of the report, they had weapons at the time of arrest.

(Question: Are detainees like politician Saeed Hajjarian and former Government advisors like Abdollah Ramezanzadeh being held because they were carrying weapons?)Sa

141o GMT: A steady stream of Internet chatter this afternoon about the death of Amir Javadifar in prison. His body was reportedly returned to his family on Sunday for burial. There are also claims of the death of Ramin Ghahremani two days after his release from detention.


1205 GMT: The political battle amongst the clerics of the Assembly of Experts continues. Ayatollah Hossein Zarandi, the representative of the city of Kermanshah in the Assembly, has defied the letter issued by "hard-liners" last week and supported the Friday prayer address of former President Rafsanjani.

1200 GMT: Rumour of the Day. Some Iranian websites are reporting that some Grand Ayatollahs may move from Qom to Najaf in Iraq. Clerical authorities in Najaf have indicated they would welcome any cleric who joined them.

1155 GMT: Tabnak is reporting that Hojjatoleslam Mohammad Sadegh Larijani, a member of the Guardian Council and the brother of Speaker of the Parliament Ali Larijani, will succeed Ayatollah Hashemi Shahroudi as the head of Iran's judiciary on 25 August.

0945 GMT: Foreign Policy gives some attention to Iran with an interview with the former cleric Mehdi Khalaji, who is now a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

0940 GMT: We've reposted our first morning update as a separate entry, "Will the Supreme Leader Give Up on Ahmadinejad?"

0830 GMT: Has the State Media Turned? There is a flurry of comment this morning on whether the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) has changed its line. Tabnak is reporting on IRIB's "severe criticism of Ahmadinejad". Until recently, IRIB had been very supportive of the President but, after the dispute over the First Vice President, the broadcaster has given significant airtime to critics of Ahmadinejad, such as the cleric Hojatoleslam Seyed Mehdi Tabatabai and the "principlist" Member of Parliament Ali Motahari.

Our correspondent Mani makes an important point, however. This is more evidence of a dispute within conservative ranks rather than IRIB sympathy for the Green Movement. No "reformist" critic has made an appearance on the channel.

(Ansar News has also published an editorial which is fiercely critical of the President.)

0820 GMT: As the Supreme Leader considers what to do with his President (see separate entry), the fired Minister of Intelligence, Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejeie, has chipped in. He has written a letter, which has not been public, to the Supreme Leader.

0750 GMT: Larijani Does Damage Control. Yesterday we reported how the Speaker of the Parliament, Ali Larijani, stepped in to save the President when Ahmadinejad's attempted firing of four Ministers threatened to cripple the Government.

Now Farda News reports Larijani's attempt to deal with, and limit the damage from, the detainee issue. The chairman of the Parliamentary Security Committee, Kazem Jalali, says that Larijani asked the committee "to study seriously the pathology of these issues and treat all of the detainees (especially the university students and faculty) in a manner compatible with Islamic justice and fairness and kindness tempered with a strong dose of forgiveness2.

According to Jalili, Larijani declared, "Parliament is the refuge of people and as MPs we must listen to the complaints of everyone and try to address and solve the issues....Today society needs peace and calm but foreign media is attempting to inflame our society."

0715 GMT: Preparing for the 40th Day. Mehdi Karroubi has visited the family of Neda Agha-Soltan three days before the "40th Day" memorial/rally on 30 July. Karroubi expressed his sympathy to Neda's mother, "None of us knows our fate or destiny and none can say what events are awaiting us....The dear child that lost her life was the ultimate symbol of being innocent and being wronged, [her death] had a huge effect both inside and outside Iran. Neda's death loudly proclaimed the fact that the Iranian people are being oppressed and at the same time prevented further injustices and hopefully will have great beneficial effects upon the current and future life of [the Iranian] people."

Neda's mother complained about the statements of Ayatollah Seyed Ahmed Khatami, leading Friday prayers in Tehran, and Ezatullah Zarghami, the head of Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, "As if the death of Neda was not enough for me, one of these two called my child an actress and claimed that her death was 'generated by a computer', and the other claimed her to be an actress [faking her death]." She concluded, "Neda, like thousands of other young people, cared for the fate of her country, she like other young people protested the results of the election."

0645 GMT: The Meeting of the Ayatollahs. Meanwhile, the negotiations between the Green Movement and the clerics of Qoms are proceeding. BBC Persian reports, via the website of Grand Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri,that he has been discussing "issues regarding religious law and politics " with Grand Ayatollah Mousavi-Ardebili and Grand Ayatollah Mousa Shobeiri-Zanjani.

The details of the meeting, taking place at the summer residence of Montazeri in the village of Khaveh, have not been announced. However, BBC Persian implies that the Grand Ayatollahs are now considering the open letter of Karroubi-Khatami-Mousavi and other reformists for intervention on detainees. (Yesterday we summarised the first open response to the letter, offered by Ayatollah Yousef Sanei.)

The roles of Montazeri and Mousavi-Ardebili, who have both been critical of the Government during the post-election crisis, are not surprising. However, Shobeiri-Zanjani has not stated his position, and he is a long-time friend of the Supreme Leader. Therefore, religious analyst Hassan Shariatmadari speculates on BBC Persian that Shobeiri-Zanjani may be conveying messages from Khamenei asking for a solution to growing problems.

Iran: Or Is It the Supreme Leader v. the Revolutionary Guard?

The Latest from Iran (28 July): The Government Crumbles
Iran: Will the Supreme Leader Give Up Ahmadinejad?

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We began this morning with an analysis of the relationship between the Supreme Leader and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, asking if Ayatollah Khamenei would stand by or jettison his President. Muhammad Sahimi of Tehran Bureau, drawing from a source, sees another, possibly bigger battle: the Supreme Leader v. the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Showdown between Khamenei and IRGC?

Two important developments over the past few days suggest a possible confrontation in the near future between Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Sayyed Ali Khamenei, and the high command of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).

One development was the order issued by Ayatollah Khamenei overruling Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s appointment of Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei as his First Vice President (Iran’s president has eight vice presidents). The second, firing ultra hardliner Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejehei, the Minister of Intelligence.

A reliable source in Tehran told the author that both episodes were meant to be signals by the IRGC’s high command to Ayatollah Khamenei that they were in control, and that he should toe the line — their line. According to the source, Ayatollah’s Khamenei’s order to fire Mashaei was delivered to the Voice and Visage (VaV) of the Islamic Republic (Iran’s national radio and television network) on the day Mashaei was appointed by Ahmadinejad. The VaV was asked to announce the order on national television and radio, but Ezzatollah Zarghami, the director of VaV and a former officer in the IRGC, refused to do so.

As if to make sure that the Ayatollah got the message loud and clear, it took Ahmadinejad one week to relent and go along with the order. And it was only then that the VaV broadcast the Ayatollah’s order. When he did accept the order, Ahmadinejad sent the Supreme Leader a terse and very formal letter, devoid of the usual praises that his past letters to Ayatollah Khamenei have carried. The letter was considered by many supporters of the Ayatollah as a total insult; but also a clear signal. In order to further demonstrate his defiance, Ahmadinejad appointed Mashaei, a close relative and friend, as his chief of staff and special adviser.

According to the source, Ejehei was fired because he was reporting to the Supreme Leader without first letting Ahmadinejad know. He had reportedly said that the Intelligence Ministry had concluded that the accusations by the IRGC high command, that the demonstrations after the election were linked to foreign powers and represented a “velvet revolution,” were baseless. He had also reportedly said that the demonstrations had neither been planned in advance, nor could they have been predicted. Finally, the Intelligence Ministry is said to have reported that Mashaei, as well as Hossein Taeb, a cleric who is the commander of the Basij militia, represented security risks. The report apparently countered all the accusations made by the IRGC high command.

There is a precedent that helps explain why Ejehei may have been put aside. In the spring of 2008, Mostafa Pourmohammadi, Ahmadinejad’s first Interior Minister, was also fired after he submitted a report to Ayatollah Khamenei about the elections for the 8^th Majles (parliament) without Ahmadinejad’s knowledge. In that report, Pourmohammadi reported irregularities committed by Ahmadinejad’s backers. When Ahmadinejad found out about the report, he fired Pourmohammadi almost immediately.

According to the source, Ayatollah Khamenei had also ordered the closure of one of the jails, one in which the demonstrators and some of the leading reformist leaders are being kept; but the order has been ignored by the intelligence and security unit of the IRGC, which runs the prison. Saeed Jalili, Secretary-General of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, confirmed the Ayatollah’s order for the closure of a jail. Apparently, after the initial order was ignored, it was sent to the Council. While the source did not specify the prison, it might be the Kahrizak prison on the southern edge of Tehran near the Behesht-e Zahra cemetery.

The prison is usually used to hold common criminals and narcotics traffickers, but there have been credible reports indicating that many people arrested in the post-election roundup have also been imprisoned there. Ejehei had apparently complained to Ayatollah Khamenei that the Intelligence Ministry had lost control over those arrested, and that the IRGC unit had taken control of the matter.

There is much speculation about Ejehei’s successor. According to Iranian law, the head of the Ministry of Intelligence must be a mojtahed (an Islamic scholar), and hence, a cleric. It will be interesting to see how Ahmadinejad navigates that one — finding a qualified cleric whose first loyalty is to him and the IRGC high command.

The author’s source also told him that the top commanders of the IRGC are firmly behind Ahmadinejad in his struggle to wrest full control of the government away from the clerics. But, the rank and file of the IRGC is divided into two main groups. The first group supports the reformist movement and remains silent for now (or perhaps it has been forced into silence). The second group is divided. One group is behind Ahmadinejad and the high command of the IRGC; they believe that the clerics should be purged from the government, and that Ayatollah Khamenei should be transformed into an ineffective and irrelevant figurehead. Others in the second group believe that Ayatollah Khamenei is Ma’soom (free of sin, from a religious perspective) and a deputy to Mahdi, the Shiites’ hidden 12^th Imam who is supposed to come back some day to rid the world of injustice and corruption. Members of this group believe that obedience to Ayatollah Khamenei is their duty.

According to the source, Hossein Saffar Harandi, Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance and a former officer in the IRGC, belongs to this group and was forced to resign, after he protested the appointment of Mashaei as First VP. Officially, Saffar Harandi is still part of the cabinet, because if he is formally sacked, the Constitution requires Ahmadinejad to seek a vote of confidence from Majlis since he has replaced half of his cabinet during his four-year term. Since his first term will expire in about 10 days, however, Ahmadinejad does not want the issue before Majles for a vote.

According to a second reliable source in Tehran, seven of Ahmadinejad’s ministers, including Saffar Harandi and Ejehei, wrote a letter to Ayatollah Khamenei last week complaining about their boss and supporting Khamenei to sack Mashaei. It is widely believed that Ahmadinejad intends to fire the remaining five after he begins his second disputed term. The author already reported on two of the five ministers to be fired.

That the IRGC high command may wish to purge the government of clerics is no surprise. In addition to the fact that the IRGC did the bulk of the fighting with Iraq and eliminated the internal opposition to the political establishment in the 1980s, the IRGC has also been guarding and protecting the high-ranking clerics for the past three decades. Therefore, the IRGC has full knowledge of their secret wheeling and dealings. Privy to information on these cases of corruption and nepotism among clerics, their relatives and aids, the IRGC it like the Sword of Damocles over their heads.

When last year, Abbas Palizdar, an ally of Ahmadinejad, spoke of 123 cases of corruption among the clerics and their families, many interpreted that as a clear attempt by Ahmadinejad and his supporters to push most of the clerics out of power. Palizdar was later jailed and Ahmadinejad disowned him. But he was recently released from prison after posting a $300,000 bail. My sources in Tehran told me that the joke there was that after Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani’s Friday Prayer sermon of July 17, calling for the release of political prisoners, the hardliners released Palizadar!

Ayatollah Khamenei himself has played a major role in the rise of the IRGC. When Mohammad Khatami won the presidential election in 1997 by a landslide, a group of reformist leaders met with the supreme leader and asked him to heed the nation’s message of such a victory. In order to leave a credible legacy behind and save a political system in which had had played an important role, they advised the supreme leader to personally take a lead in the reform of the system. Not only did Ayatollah Khamenei refuse to do so, he more closely sided with the hardliners who were trying to gut the Khatami administration. It got to the point that when Khatami was president, he complained that the hardliners were creating a crisis for the country every nine days.

In 2005, after Khatami had to leave office after a second term, Ahmadinejad was elected president with the support of Ayatollah Khamenei. But practically from Day 1, Ahmadinejad began attacking many clerics in the name of fighting corruption. Ayatollah Khamenei continued to throw his support behind Ahmadinejad, presumably because he believed Ahmadinejad could force out his competitor Rafsanjani, his competitor in the power struggle.

Even when Rafsanjani wrote a letter to Ayatollah Khamenei a few days before the election and warned him about possible fraud, the Ayatollah did not take any significant action. It is widely rumored that he told Rafsanjani that “Ahmadinejad’s defeat is my defeat.”

On Tuesday June 16, four days after the election, when the country was in deep crisis due to the huge demonstrations that had erupted, Ayatollah Khamenei summoned to his office representatives of all the presidential candidates, as well as members of the Expediency Council and the staff of the Interior Ministry, which supervises the election, in order to seek a solution to the crisis. Two people in that meeting, former Tehran Mayor Morteza Alviri (representing Mahdi Karroubi, one of the two reformist candidates), and former Oil Minister, Bijan Namdar Zangeneh, proposed that the problem be referred to the Expediency Council. But, Ayatollah Khamenei refused.

Instead, on June 19, during his Friday Prayer sermon, the Ayatollah threatened the Iranian nation and the reformists. When the next day demonstrations erupted again and many young people were killed, many Iranians held the Ayatollah (justifiably) responsible for the bloodshed. According to the author’s sources in Tehran, the high command of the IRGC recognized that the responsibility for the bloodshed would be squarely on the Ayatollah and therefore persuaded him to take a hard line. According to the same sources, the thinking of the high command of the IRGC is that, among conservative voters, Ahmadinejad is far more popular than Ayatollah Khamenei, and that therefore, the Ayatollah has trapped himself and has no clear way out of the difficult situation that he himself has created. This allows the IRGC high command to marginalize him.

What is not clear is the role of Mojtaba Khamenei, the Ayatollah’s son. Mojtaba is believed to be close to the high command of the IRGC. Will he be purged as well? Will the IRGC consider him as irrelevant, now that they have achieved their goal of “re-electing” Ahmadinejad? Or, does he have a role in any of this?

Ahmadinejad’s “re-election” is supposed to be confirmed by Ayatollah Khamenei on August 4, and he will take the oath of office in the Majles the next day. The next 10 days will be every bit as critical as they will be intriguing.

Iran: Will the Supreme Leader Give Up Ahmadinejad?

The Latest from Iran (28 July): The Regime Crumbles
The Latest from Iran (28 July): The Government Crumbles

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Perhaps the most striking headline in yesterday's press was that of The New York Times, "Ahmadinejad Seen as Increasingly Vulnerable". Unfortunately for the paper, the distinction was not that this indicated information or insight, but that it showed reporters who were either naive or coming very late to the political party.

This weekend's events were not the start of the President's slide from power. That process had started as early as 15 June, when the mass demonstrations pointed to at least a significant minority in Iran who were unprepared to give Ahmadinejad any legitimacy. The significance of last week's developments --- the growing unease with detentions, the increase in clerical fatwas calling for Government reform, and then the row over the First Vice President --- was that illegitimacy was now complemented by a sense amongst "conservatives" of Ahmadinejad's negligence or ineptitude.

So the big question after the President's attempt, possibly his last, to regain authority --- the firing of four Ministers, reduced to one when Ahmadinejad realised he could no longer govern without Parliamentary consent --- is not about Mahmoud. Instead, it is about the Supreme Leader: what does Ayatollah Khamenei now do with a terminally wounded political leader?

To this point, the post-election path can be marked by the Supreme Leader's firm refusal to give up Ahmadinejad. Khamenei could have refrained from making the unprecedented move on Election Night of setting aside the official process and declaring a victor; he did not. A week after the election, speaking at Friday prayers, he could have traded some support for the President for a more conciliatory position towards the opposition; he did not. Khamenei could have stepped aside to allow a true recount by the Guardian Council of the Presidential vote; instead, he declared in advance that there would be no change in the outcome.

The symbolism of the battle over the First Vice President, Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai, was that the Supreme Leader, at least in this case, said to the President, "Enough." Whether this was because of Rahim-Mashai's politically dubious views on relations with Israel, "conservative" unease with the choice, the whiff of nepotism, or the concern that Ahmadinejad was publicly being too "independent" is unclear. The extent of Khamenei's slap-down is not, however. When the President refused to budge after he received the Supreme Leader's letter, Khamenei's advisors ensured that the order to remove Rahim-Mashai became very public.

There is a difference, however, between smiting your President in one high-profile case and giving him up completely. And, beyond superficial New York Times headlines, what distinguishes these last 72 hours is that the Supreme Leader has said nothing, made no more letters public, offered no clue even during Ahmadinejad's botched attempt to remove Ministers with whom he had argued.

And that silence is understandable. Because even if Khamenei does not say it, giving up Ahmadinejad means, "I was wrong." Wrong to push so hard on the Presidential election result, wrong not to extend an hand to the Green Movement, wrong to let arrests and beatings and killings spiral.

That silence cannot be maintained, however. The President's inauguration is in eight days. And by that point, Khamenei either has to disown his boy or embrace him, albeit while reminding Ahmadinejad not to stray again.

So far, the Supreme Leader has blundered, both in perception and strategy, by being too firm in his support of the President. Does he dare risk hugging Mahmoud to the point where he goes down with him?

The Latest from Iran (26 July): Four Days to The Green Movement's Next Wave

The Latest from Iran (25 July): A President Retreats

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2115 GMT: Meanwhile, Rafsanjani Plays It Cool. Amidst the Government chaos, the former President is playing down talk of a serious rift within the regime. According to Mehr News Agency, Rafsanjani praised the Supreme Leader, "He is a progressive and forward-looking thinker in different subjects. The propaganda by the foreign media who try to suggest that there is a power struggle in the top level of the regime is unfair injustice to the Islamic revolution."

The statement appears to be a continuation of Rafsanjani's strategy to show allegiance to Ayatollah Khamenei while manoeuvring against a weakened President: "I have hope in the supreme leader to solve the current problems based on his knowledge and experience and I still stick to the solutions I offered in the Friday prayer."

With these comments, Rafsanjani is also maintaining his position against the "hard-line" members of the Assembly of Experts, who attempted to undermine him in a statement earlier this week.

2100 GMT: Well, This is a Fine Mess. Conflicting reports all night over the state of the Ahmadinejad Cabinet. Some accounts now say that the President fired only Minister of Intelligence Ejeie and has not dismissed the other three (Culture, Health, and Labour); Ahmadinejad apparently realised he would face a vote of confidence in Parliament if all four ministers were removed from office.

Other accounts say Minister of Culture Saffar-Harandi resigned in protest. Still others say both Ejeie and Saffar-Harandi were sacked.

1700 GMT: Confusion. There are reports that President Ahmadinejad has withdrawn the dismissal of Minister of Culture Saffar-Harandi (and presumably other ministers), as he did not realise that the Cabinet could no longer meet without a vote of confidence from the Iranian Parliament.

1642 GMT: Our correspondent Mani confirms our suspicions (1325 GMT) that Press TV and Fars News misrepresented the statement of Mehdi Karroubi, which supposedly criticised other opposition politicians for supporting Hashemi Rafsanjani. The "genuine" statement of Karroubi is in Etemade Melli.

1638 GMT: Abdolhossein Roohul Amini, the father of Mohsen Ruholamini, who died in detention, has published a statement after the cancellation of his son's funeral. He has thanked all people expressing their sympathies to his family and said the memorial was cancelled to prevent any violence against the public by "oppurtunistic factions".

1635 GMT: Confirming earlier news --- President Ahmadinejad's inauguration has been scheduled for 5 August.

1630 GMT: Darius Ghanbari, a "reformist" Member of Parliament, has said, "Decisions regarding the participation of reformist MPs in the swearing-in ceremonies of Ahmadinejad, in the votes of confidence in Ahmadinejad's cabinet, and on interaction with the overnment has been postponed to the general meeting of the reformist fraction that will convene this Tuesday."

1615 GMT: Ayatollah Hashim Hashim-Zadeh Hareesi, the representative of East Azerbaijan in the Assembly of Experts, has denied that the statement signed by 16 members, which denounced Hashemi Rafsanjani, represented the opinion of the 86 representatives in the Assembly. Hareesi told journalists, "Collecting signatures by telephone, while most members of the Assembly of Experts are scattered in various cities, cannot constitute a statement."

1445 GMT: Ayatollah Yousef Sanei has declared his readiness to attend the 30 July "40th Day" ceremony for those killed by security forces on 20 June.

1430 GMT: Another Iranian official has joined the chorus against television confessions. Mohammad-Javad Larijani, Secretary of the Human Rights Headquarters of Iran's judiciary, said, “I am against the broadcasting of confessions. I think it is the judiciary officials who should explain to the people the issues and violations of election laws by the Reformists.”

The Press TV article is notable, however, for other reasons. Larijani is a possible successor to the current head of Iran's judiciary, Ayatollah Hashemi Shahroudi, and his interview raises other issues about detention: "When asked why some of the detainees have not been allowed to contact their families yet, Larijani stressed that all the rights of the detainees should be respected." And it breaks the silence on suspicions over abuse of prisoners, prompted by the high profile of one death: "At least one of the detainees, named Mohsen Roholamini [son of an ally of Presidential candidate Mohsen Rezaei], has died in prison."

Larijani is the most possible candidate to replace Judiciary Chief Ayatollah Mahmoud Shahroudi.

1325 GMT: Meanwhile, on Press TV. The state network's website says nothing about the dramatic news of Ministers being fired. Instead, it runs an article trying to break Mehdi Karroubi away from the Green Movement.

The supposed quotes from Karroubi initially portray a leader accepting the election results and working for changes in his party: “Times have changed and there is an urgent need for far-reaching party reforms. We should review the post-election developments and plan our actions accordingly."

There is a hint of Karroubi's wider concerns in his statement, “After all, we are working in an environment that is biased and unfair. Our rivals are well-equipped and we are empty-handed, in the same way we were during the elections," but Press TV then emphasises the difference between Karroubi and other challengers to the Government: "It is most interesting how the very Reformist figures, who had criticized Hashemi-Rafsanjani and had stated that his political heyday is over, are now supporting him. This is not right.”

That attack both on Rafsanjani and other opposition leaders overshadows the final sentences of the article: "Karroubi asserted that he would continue his challenge to the legitimacy of the Ahmadinejad government: 'I will not step down from my complaints to the election results for as long as I live.'"

1305 GMT: The Government Breaks Apart. Now Tabnak reports that Minister of Intelligence Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejeie has been dismissed. Like Minister of Culture Saffar-Harandi, also fired by the President (see 1255 GMT), Ejeie challenged Ahmadinejad in a Cabinet meeting on Wednesday over the selection of the First Vice President.

There are unconfirmed reports that the Minister of Health and the Minister of Labour have also been removed from office.

1255 GMT: Is the Ahmadinejad Government Imploding? Mehr News reports that the President has fired his Minister of Culture, Mohammad-Hossein Saffar-Harandi. Earlier this week Saffar-Harandi walked out of a Cabinet meeting amidst heated debate over the appointment of the First Vice President, Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai.

1245 GMT: Despite its recent setbacks, the Government seems intent on provoking a fight. It is being reported that the funeral of Mohsen Roohul Amini, the son of Presidential candidate Mohsen Rezaei's campaign manager, has been cancelled because of pressure from the authorities. Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi had announced they would attend the funeral of Roohul Amini, who died in detention (see 0640 GMT).

0800 GMT: In our first update just over an hour ago, we asked our Big Question: after the successes of the last week, what will be the next steps for the opposition?

Our correspondent Mani has just given us the Big Answer. Mir Hossein Mousavi Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi have sent the following request to the Minister of the Interior:

We take the oppurtunity to inform you that we intend to hold a memorial service to commemorate fellow citizens of our country who lost their lives due to to the recent horrific events. We request permission to hold this memorial service on mordad 8 1388 [30 July 2009], the 40th day after the starting of these events, at the grand prayer centre of Tehran. We would like to mention that this service will not include any speeches and will only involve listening to recitations from the Holy Koran. We will also request that the participants show their respects to the departed by maintaining silence.

Significantly, this Thursday, 30 July, is not the 40th day after the 12 June election or after the first mass demonstrations (and first deaths of protestors) on 15 June. Instead it is the 40th day after 20 June, when dozens of demonstrators, including Neda Agha Soltan, were killed by Iranian security forces.

(Agence France Press now has the story, which originally appeared in the Iranian Students News Agency.)

0750 GMT: After recent reports, including footage on BBC Persian, indicating that its members have been working with Iranian security forces, Lebanon's Hezbollah has denied any involvement: these are rumours "spreading sedition and division between the two brother nations of Lebanon and Iran".

0740 GMT: The "Power Overload" Protest. Remember the recent attempts to black out Iranian cities, at the start of the 9 p.m. national news, by turning on all applicances to overload the electrical grid?

The Revolutionary Guard certainly does. General Seyed Mohammad Hejazi has announced, "The plugging in of irons at 9 pm every night is an act of subversive sabotage."


0735 GMT: More Cabinet Difficulties. The Ministry of Industry, Ali Akbar Mehrabian, has been found guilty of fraudulently trying to register an invention of another researcher as his own. Last year, the Minister of Science was forced to resign when he falsely claimed to hold a Ph.D. from Oxford University.

0725 GMT: Larijani Breaks Ranks? The Speaker of the Parliament, Ali Larijani, is resigning his position as Majority Whip. Officially, the reason is that he "understands that there is a conflict of interest" between the two roles. Given that the conflict is pretty obvious, it is more likely that Larijani is distancing himself from pro-Ahmadinejad MPs. Larijani has never sat comfortable alongside the President's supporters, and relations were further strained after the election when the Speaker called for investigations of security forces' raids on Tehran University and criticised the Guardian Council.

0715 GMT: Two weeks ago, we reported on the protest of Mohammad Reza Shajarian, the leading Iranian classical singer, against President Ahmadinejad's portrayal of his opposition as "dust". Shajarian has refused to allow Iranian state media to broadcast any of his music.

Etemade Melli has the latest on the dispute, with Shajarian promising to use all legal means to prevent any airplay.

0705 GMT: I Didn't Give In....Really. President Ahmadinejad may have been forced to dismiss the First Vice President, but he is still trying to save some face in the showdown. He has put Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai in charge of his office staff.

0640 GMT: Another boost for the Green Movement yesterday with the impressive show of support in "United4Iran" gatherings across the world. As news came in of more than 2000 people in New York, the "green scroll" from the Eiffel Tower in Paris, and other demonstrations from Amsterdam to Dubai, there was a notable lifting of spirits amongst Iran activists.

Now, however, the opposition has to think through its next steps. Today "reformists" will decide whether to attend next week's inauguration of President Ahmadinejad. In an act of great political as well as humanitarian significance, Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi have announced they will attend the funeral of Mohsen Roohul Amini. Roohul Amini was the son of the campaign manager of Presidential candidate Mohsen Rezaei; he died in prison after he was detained on 9 July.


Meanwhile, the regime is trying to repair internal relations. The Kayhan newspaper, having played a significant role in the pressure on President Ahmadinejad to get rid of his First Vice President, offered a limited apology to restore the image of Ahmadinejad acting in line with the Supreme Leader (see yesterday's updates). Ayatollah Khamenei, speaking to the participants in the 26th Koran competition, said:

The meaning of unity is that we must agree on fundamentals. Although we may disagree on less important issues this must not lead to disunity....Absolute ostracizing of others over these less important issues is not good [for the establishment] everyone must help in rebuilding the country....[The issues of the last few days] must not increase divisions, and one should not defame an individual and subsequently reject all of his capabilities based on a single issue....The Islamic republic allows people [that believe in the establishment] to have different viewpoints.

There was, however, a possible rebuke to Ahmadinejad in the Supreme Leader's warning, "These differences should not be mixed with sinful personal ambitions.

The Latest from Iran (25 July): A President Retreats

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The Latest from Iran (24 July): Waiting for the Next Move

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0630 GMT (26 July): An apology for an exaggeration in the previous entry. The editor of Kayhan did not apologise for the publication of Khamenei's letter; however, he regretted calling First Vice President Rahim-Mashai an "agent of the velvet coup" and claiming that President Ahmadinejad had abandoned the line of the Supreme Leader".

The interpretation, therefore, is not of a Presidential fightback but of a (token) face-saver for Ahmadinejad so he can return to his proper (now very limited) Presidential role in the current political battle.

2120 GMT: A Presidential Fightback? Evening news is dominated by the "United4Iran" demonstrations in 100+ cities across the world, but one intriguing development on the homefront. Ahmadinejad's advisors, through Press Secretary Ali Akbar Javanfekr,  have been criticising the media for publishing the Supreme Leader's letter about Vice President Rahim-Mashai yesterday.

They may have had some effect. This evening. the editor of Kayhan, Hossein Shariatmadari, appeared to apologise for the public attention given to the Khamenei order.


1720 GMT: The Opposition Politicians and Qom. More on the important news of the day, the Khatami-Mousavi-Karroubi letter to Grand Ayatollahs asking them to intervene to free detainees. Keeping the Change has an incisive analysis on both the immediate issue and the wider significance: "Should the Reformists be able to win over a majority of the marjahs [high-ranking clerics], it...would constitute the serious religiously-based challenge to the regime's behavior that the Reformists have been after, but have heretofore been unable to obtain."

1715 GMT: The Confessions Pressure Escalates. Allaeddin Boroujerdi, the head of the Parliamentary commission on national security and foreign policy has also stated his objections to broadcasting the confessions of detainees. Boroujerdi said that, during the meeting of this committee last week with Minister of Intelligence Ejeie, the minister stated "that legal issues make this broadcasting impractical".

1605 GMT: The Next Achilles' Heel? Member of Parliament Ali Motahari has stated: "If the confessions of the detainees are to be broadcast, all instances in which the interrogators have broken the law during the process which sometimes has lead to fatalities must also be investigated".

The statement, echoing the clerical fatwas of Ayatollah Sanei and Bayat-Zanjani, continues, "If these confessions were obtained under normal conditions they would have a useful role in enlightening the public, however, if they are obtained under irregularites they have no use at all....It is possible that the arrests themselves may be legal, but the important issue is whether the detainees have been treated according to islamic regulations, and have they been subjected to mental and physical pressures....We all must uphold the law and try to improve the current situation."

The significance is that Motahari, like Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, is considered a "principlist", the political bloc in Iran distinct from both "conservative" and "reformist" factions. With clerical pressure on the Government increasing, this could be an indication that some outside the Green Movement will be focusing on detentions and interrogations to demand changes in the system.

1600 GMT: Defending the Nation. The lead Iran story on Press TV's website today has been the statement by Revolutionary Guard commander General Mohammad Ali Jafari: "Iranian missiles have the capacity to target Israeli soil if the Zionist regime commits such stupidity including its nuclear sites."

I am sure that the content and timing of Jafari's statement have nothing to do whatsoever with the domestic blows to the Ahmadinejad Presidency, with which the Revolutionary Guard has been closely associated, in the last 48 hours.

1545 GMT: Reports of protests, and action by security forces to break them up, in Vanak and Azadi Squares in Tehran.

1340 GMT: Mir Hossein Mousavi's staff have vigorously denied any contact with foreign embassies over Iran's post-election conflict. The allegation was made on Friday both by Minister of Intelligence Ejeie and Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami, the leader of Tehran's prayers.

1330 GMT: Report that Mohammad Reza Yazdan Panah, a journalist and member of the Islamic Iran Participation Front, has been released from detention.

1035 GMT: I am in the midst of an interesting and challenging discussion with Kevin Sullivan of Real Clear World, sparked by a column by Joe Klein of Time. Which should come first: a focus on Iran and the nuclear issue or consideration of the internal political dynamics between the Government and the post-election Green Movement?

0950 GMT: How serious was the argument over the First Vice President? The head of Iran's armed forces, Major General Seyed Hassan Firouzabadi, had written President Ahmadinejad to ask for Rahim-Mashai's dismissal.

0935 GMT: The resignation letter of former First Vice President Rahim-Mashai has been published. Ahmadinejad's response has also appeared: " I had hoped that with the elimination of some negative pressure, you could remain in the First Deputy position."

0900 GMT: Our correspondent Mani sends in important news:

In an open letter, a number of reformist politicians led by Mohammad Khatami, Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi have asked the Grand Ayatollahs of Qom to remind "relevant segments of the establishment" of "the dire consequences" of their "anti-legal methodologies". The letter asks the Grand Ayatollahs to intervene to free the current post-election detainees.

The reformist politicians, stating that arrests have been done with "no legal justification" and have "blackened the name of the Islamic Republic both within Iran and abroad", declare, "The only solution to this situation would include the following: A clear and serious effort to stop the post-election atmosphere of fear and coercion caused by the increased presence of security forces, freeing all detainees, and restoration of the mechanisms by which the accusations of election irregulariites can be legally addressed."

They add, "The families of the detainees have been stonewalled by officials when they have tried to obtain legal recourse; this has caused many problems for these families". The "disturbing news" regarding the physical and mental well-being of the prisoners has exacerbated the level of anxiety already felt by these families.

The authors also challenge state media, calling Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting "the propaganda machine of the coerced confessions project". IRIB, "by broadcasting staged confessions, is attempting to prove spurious charges that have been made against a popular movement".

0725 GMT: Protests are being held in more than 100 cities across the world today in support of the Green Movement. Information is available on the United4Iran website.

0720 GMT: Amidst the uncertainty over how many of the 86 members of the Assembly of Experts have turned against Hashemi Rafsanjani (see 0645 GMT), one has made his position clear. Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Akbar Qoreyshi has written an open letter criticising Rafsanjani for not separating himself from the post-election opposition: “After the Leader’s strong defense [of you] in his Friday Prayers sermon, I told you in a letter that the leader’s defense had solved everything and it would be best that you apologize to him and tell the nation that you have nothing to do with your child or children’s actions....Unfortunately my letter was ignored.”

0710 GMT: More on Karroubi and Iran's Security Forces (see 0645 GMT). Mehdi Karroubi has criticized the treatment of detainees by the security forces in an open letter to Minister of Information Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejeie. Karroubi said recent information from reliable sources caused him deep concern about the conditions of confinement and demanded that Ejeie, carrying out his responsibilities, identify all parties responsible for recent horrific events and asserts that this is the minister's responsibility.

Karroubi, adidng that the withholding of information from the families of detainees is also a cause for great concern, concluded that it is a sorry state of affairs that citizens are treated so poorly by an Islamic Government.

0645 GMT: A relatively quiet Friday sprang into life during the afternoon with the emerging opposition, not only from the Supreme Leader but from across "conservative" ranks, to President Ahmadinejad over the Vice-Presidential appointment of Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai. Ahmadinejad's capitulation last night is so significant that we've covered it in a separate analysis.

Meanwhile, Ayatollah Yousef Sanei has extended his public support of the protest movement with a fatwa moving religious blame from the detainee to the Iranian authorities:

1) If you are under arrest, coerced and put under extreme pressure and forced to make a false confession to stop torture, your false confession is not a sin. However, those responsible for such methods have committed a sin;
2) Confessions that are obtained under duress and torture have absolutely no validity in an Islamic court;
3) Under Islamic and Shia law, interminable interrogations, especially those done arround midnight, are absolutely forbidden.

Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri has issued a fatwa condemning the behaviour of the security forces towards Mehdi Karroubi as he arrived at Friday prayers in Tehran last week. In an incident picked up in widely-distributed photographs, Iranian police jostled Karroubi, knocking off his turban.

Covering the other side of the clerical debate, Keeping the Change digs into this week's supposed declaration of the 86-member Assembly of Experts reaffirming support of the Supreme Leader and, more importantly, seeking the dismissal of Hashemi Rafsanjani as head of the Assembly. The analysis notes the discrepancy between only 16 signatures and state media's claim that 50 clerics (in other words, a majority) support the declaration. In contrast to our own interpretation that this is a power-play by an important pro-regime minority on the Assembly, Keeping the Change concludes:

Many of the Assembly's members owe their positions to Khamanei and have deep loyalties to the Supreme Leader. For them to support the letter, while withholding their names, may be a compromise position that suits both their political passivity and their fidelity to Khamanei.