Iran: Re-Evaluating the Green Movement After 5+ Months

The Latest from Iran (17 November): An Obama-Ahmadinejad Alliance?

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

0800 GMT: In recent days there has been an apparent shift in the content of the statements of opposition leaders. Despite Government restrictions, Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi, and Mohammad Khatami have continued to get out public declarations, mainly through meetings with reformist groups or appearances such as Karroubi's visit to Ayatollah Bayat-Zanjani in hospital, but their content now seems to be carefully hedged. While the abuses of the Government are still identified, all three have been at great pains to put their calls for changes within the framework of the Constitution and the Iranian system, as well as warning their followers not to resort to extreme action.

In tone, this is not new. The Green movement has always maintained that it is upholding the laws and values of the Islamic Republic and that it is the Government which has dismissed or violated those foundations of 1979. There has been far less in content, however, from Mousavi, Karroubi, and Khatami on political objectives, and even specific issues such as the enquiry into detainee abuses, spurred by Khatami's letter of 29 July to Hashemi Rafsanjani, have not featured so prominently.



One explanation for the shift may be that the Government's 5+ months of restrictions on the communications and movements of the oppositonal leadership, “supported” by detentions and trials, have worn down the scope of the leadership's declarations and ambitions. Another is that figures like Rafsanjani have moved away from open co-operation and that initiatives such as the National Unity Plan appear to have run into the ground. A third is that the leaders have a growing fear of a movement which, angry and frustrated, may strike out violently against the Government.

Whatever the reason for a more cautious approach from the top, this should not be mistaken as the settling of the Green Wave. Dissent bubbles --- yesterday, catching up with news, it was notable that there were not only the statements of Karroubi and Khatami but also the more pointed criticisms of Grand Ayatollahs Sane'i and Montazeri and a show of support for the challenge of Grand Ayatollah Dastgheib. (I also understand, from a private source, that Ayatollah Makarem-Shirazi --- considered a “conservative” in clerical approach --- has launched a scathing attack on the Government in a closed-door session which has not been made public.)

And, of course, there is the simmering at the Universities and other locations of protests, which emerges somewhere as public demonstration on a daily basis. Even if this is not picked up by the media, it should not be missed: note, as EA readers have, the dramatic challenge at the international university at Qazvin to the appearance of regime supporter Hamid Rasaee.

The thoughtful discussion on EA's comments board --- is this now a challenge which is long-term but which will not abate until there are major changes in the Iranian system? --- continues. I don't think there is a definitive answer, but I do think it exposes the fatuousness of mainstream assertions such as that in The New York Times (see yesterday's updates), "[Iran] now looks as if it’s back to business as usual." Indeed, for all the difficulties at the top of the opposition, I was struck recently by the comment of a shrewd but normally cautious Iranian activist, “This is no longer about the election. This is about the concept of velayat-e-faqih [the concept of clerical rule through the Supreme Leader].”

At the same time, that prospect of a demand for action which extends over time but expands in scope raises an equally long-term question. Up to now, I could be secure in the easy fit of a Green leadership, complemented by those like Rafsanjani who also wanted to curb Ahmadinejad's authority, with the mass if somewhat disjointed effort from below. Now I wonder what will be the new dynamic amongst a political leadership, manoeuvring not only against Government forces but against its own concerns and fear, senior clerics who will not go away quietly, and that Green Wave --- sometimes abstract, sometimes below the surface, but also visible in the shows of anger, frustration, and hope --- which ebbs but is never stilled?

The Iran Cul-de-Sac: 4 Points on Obama's Embrace of Ahmadinejad (and Rejection of the Green Movement)

The Bomb, The Bomb: Distorting the Latest Report on Iran’s Nuclear Programme
Iran Document: The International Atomic Energy Agency Report on Nuclear Facilities
The Latest from Iran (16 November): Catching Up

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

1. IT'S THE NUKES, STUPID

If anyone in the Iranian Government still believes in the
Washington-directed "velvet revolution", rather than using it as a stick to beat the opposition, he/she can breathe easy. The driving force for the Obama Administration's approach to Iran is the quest for an agreement on uranium enrichment.

That ambition is led by the President, and his determination has brought general consensus in an Administration that was arguing over the value of talks earlier in 2009. Broadly speaking, the White House, the National Security Council, and the State Department are all on the same page now.

Any reference to the internal situation in Iran, as in the Obama recent statement calling for recognition of the rights of protesters, is a gloss. The President and his advisors may have a legal and humanitarian interest in what happens to demonstrators, as well to US citizens detained and sentenced to years in prison in Iran, but it is not their top policy priority.

Indeed, Washington's position is now fixed firmly enough to withstand not only the demands of reformists but figures like Hashemi Rafsanjani to go slow on deal with President Ahmadinejad. I suspect we will find that Obama has personally gone farther --- much farther --- than any President since 1979 to get an accommodation with Tehran.

2. GETTING THE GREEN MOVEMENT WRONG

The quest for a nuclear deal has been accompanied by a disturbing if tangential story of how "intelligence" and "analysis" has undermined the Iranian opposition.

Ever since the June election, some US officials, primarily in the intelligence community, have been putting out the line that the Green Movement is insignificant and/or not to be trusted on issues such as nuclear weapons, Israel, and
"anti-Americanism". (The public face of this line is the commentaries of Flynt Leverett, formerly of the National Security Council, and Hillary Mann Leverett, formerly of the State Department.)

This assessment was reinforced by the appearance in October of former Khatami Government official and "Karroubi advisor" Ataollah Mojaherani at the conference of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. His strident caution to the audience that a "Green Government" was unlikely to give ground on Iran's nuclear programme or on the position towards Israel apparently sent shock waves through the audience, angering other reformists present in the audience who feared Mohajerani had just damaged their cause.

They were right. It is the Mojaherani incident that is behind the clamour of well-placed Washington columnists like Jackson Diehl and David Ignatius to beware the Greens. More importantly, the speech fuelled the "analysis" within the CIA that the politics of Mousavi-Karroubi-Khatami were not to be trusted, a belief that accompanied (and possibly fed by) sources such as those in Borzou Daragahi's pre-13 Aban article assaulting the Green Movement.

What is intriguing is how a Washington distraction became the foundation for some in the CIA to bury or fear the Greens. It is true that Mohajerani was a prominent member of the Karroubi campaign and wore the badge of a glittering if past political career: youngest deputy of the first post-Revolution Parliament, Vice-President in the Rafsanjani Government, Minister of Culture under Mohammad Khatami.

Still, at the time, we gave almost no space to the Mojaherani speech because it was so disconnected from events and political strategy in Iran. Before and after the Washington episode, I have not seen Mojaherani's name rise up in the movements of the Green Wave. In short, he was one of a number of former officials who have or had connections with a complex network of "reformists".

For many in Washington, however, Mojaherani was thought to be no less than the ambassador for the Green Movement, presenting its manifesto. And when the approach of his speech did not match up to the "revolution" --- in presentation and policy, if not Islamic system --- that they wanted, those officials and commentators reacted like a lover spurned.

(There is a wider point here. The Iranian Government has had success in disrupting communications within Iran
but it is also important that it has limited any dialogue between the reformist opposition and the "outside", in this case the
US Government. With no direct line
established as the Green Movement evolved, American officials have
relied upon a variety of people, usually located outside Iran presenting a wide range of often contradictory advice and speculation rather than solid information.

While the situation may have been inevitable, given the detentions of many reformists and de facto house arrest of leaders like Mir Hossein Mousavi, it strikes me that the Obama Administration has not worked around these restrictions to read the lines --- and between the lines --- of statements not only of Mousavi, Karroubi, and Khatami but of other activists like Alireza Beheshti and senior clerics from and beyond Qom.)

3. THE MYTH OF THE PLAN B: SANCTIONS

As a case study in internal politics,
the beauty of the Obama nuclear-first, engagement-first approach has been how it has brought consensus amongst differing groups within the Administration. If the talks brought nuclear agreement, that would be a significant result for the unclenched fist (the line often attributed to some State Department officials and envoys like Richard Holbrooke). If they were finally collapsed by Iranian stalling and intransigence, the platform for aggressive sanctions would be laid (the line often
attributed to Dennis Ross, now at the National Security Council).

The only problem comes if, having grasped the hand of the Iranian Government in talks, the Obama Administration then has to slap Ahmadinejad's face in the absence of an agreement.

Washington's current calculation, supported by its diplomatic strategy, turns the Russian key. Moscow's envoys are working on the Iranian Government to accept the uranium enrichment plan, while Russian President Dmitri Medvedev issues unsubtle hints that he will not stand back if Tehran balks.

That is not the same as a Russian commitment to sanctions. Let's assume, however, that Moscow accepts a US-led multilateral effort inside or outside the United Nations. And let's assume that President Obama, who no doubt has mentioned this in Beijing this week, gets a Chinese promise to stand aside.

What next? If there is no nuclear agreement, it will quite likely be because the Supreme Leader has objected, despite Obama's sustained direct efforts. So how does a stricter round of sanctions change Ayatollah Khamenei's position?

It doesn't. So the Obama Administration is presumably counting on a diplomatic and economic containment, indeed isolation, of Iran.

That, however, does nothing to address the issue of President Ahmadinejad, who remains in office. It does nothing to deal with the increasing role of the Revolutionary Guards in matters beyond the nuclear and even military realm. (Indeed, as some analysts have contended, further sanctions may assist the Guard's economic ventures, although this effect may be mitigated if the restrictions can specifically target Guard "investments".)

Sanctions certainly do nothing with respect to the reformists and the Green movement. Even if Washington recants and tries to bring them back into political consideration, it is unclear --- given the perceived snub by Obama's officials in recent weeks --- if the opposition will offer even a cautious welcome.

4. BACK TO THE CUL-DE-SAC

In the Bush years, the cul-de-sac for American policy was the threat that could not be carried out. Whether the vision was a "turn left from Baghdad" intervention, briefly considered in 2003, the military strikes advocated by Vice President Cheney in 2007, or a sledgehammer set of economic sanctions, the Administration could not deliver the blow. The "best" it could manage was the muddled if funded programme of "soft power" in the 2nd term, which was never defined as either a live-and-let-live civic engagement or the cover for "velvet revolution".

The hope of the Obama approach has been to get out of that dead end, opening up space for other initiatives such as Middle Eastern agreements, through engagement. And, considered narrowly in the context of discussions on nuclear programmes and regional politics, that was solid, realist common sense.

But "narrowly" became very narrow after the elections of 12 June. If Obama wanted to dance, he had to dance with an Iranian President who now lacked legitimacy (despite the efforts of engagement advocates like the Leveretts to explain how Ahmadinejad had really won the election and a clear mandate).

That legitimacy, within weeks of the election, was not just a question of a "reformist" challenge. Ahmadinejad has also been in a tenuous position vis-a-vis political rivals like Hashemi Rafsanjani, the conservatives/principlists in the Iranian Parliament, Ayatollahs (and thus bodies such as the Assembly of Experts), and at times the Supreme Leader. That is why the Iranian President, far from breaking off talks to pursue The Bomb, is hugging the nuclear discussions so close --- with no prospect of salvation through an economic miracle, this is his prescription for political longevity.

Now Obama's engagement gamble, re-shaped in this post-June cauldron, may still succeed if the Supreme Leader gives his backing to an agreement on uranium enrichment. (Which is why, just to repeat, this President is going farther than any predecessor in 30 years) A wider US agenda, which may adapt engagement for exchanges on Iran's political and legal issues as well as geopolitical interests, could then be drafted.

But, if the nuclear deal does not go through, Obama and Ahmadinejad now dance in a downward spiral. The Iranian President will struggle to serve out his disputed second term. And the US President will be back in the cul-de-sac: pressed by some advisors and a lot of Congressmen to pursue sanctions which offer no remedy for --- and no exit from --- the political dilemma of his failed engagement.

The Latest from Iran (17 November): An Obama-Ahmadinejad Alliance?

NEW Latest Iran Video: The Protests of Ehsan Fattahian's Execution (16 November)
NEW The Bomb, The Bomb: Distorting the Latest Report on Iran's Nuclear Programme
NEW The Iran Cul-de-Sac: 4 Points on Obama’s Embrace of Ahmadinejad (and Rejection of the Green Movement)
Iran Document: The International Atomic Energy Agency Report on Nuclear Facilities
The Latest from Iran (16 November): Catching Up

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

1925 GMT: On a Positive Note (see 1855 GMT). The Public Broadcasting Service documentary, "Death in Tehran", on the shooting of Neda Agha Soltan airs at 8 p.m., Eastern Standard Time in the US (0100 GMT). It has been developed and filmed in conjunction with the good folks at Tehran Bureau.

1915 GMT: Former President Mohammad Khatami, speaking to Tehran University students, has called for reform of Iran's election laws and condemned violent government policies. He maintained that the “Iranian movement” cannot be suppressed by “fear":

This movement is a deep and widespread movement....The people of Iran want freedom; they want financial, economic, social and political security and because they have suffered through despotism, they want to be masters of their destiny.

1855 GMT: Worst Iran Coverage of the Day. From The New York Times review of a Public Broadcasting Service TV documentary on the death of Neda Agha Soltan:

“A Death in Tehran,” Tuesday’s “Frontline” [documentary] on PBS, is dismaying not just because it deals with a life ended in its prime. It also makes us realize just how quickly the protest movement vanished from the headlines. A part of the world that seemed on the verge of grass-roots-generated change now looks as if it’s back to business as usual.

Vanished from which headlines? Perhaps those of newspapers who are under the delusion that all is "back to business as usual" in Iran?

1850 GMT: The Convictions So Far. Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting reports that five people have been sentenced to death and 81 have received jail terms of up to 15 years in connection with post-election protests.



1840 GMT: The Iranian Parliament has confirmed Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s nominees for the Ministries of Welfare and Social Security (Sadegh Mahsuli), Education (Hamid-Reza Haji Babai), and Power (Majid Namjoo).

The votes complete Ahmadinejad's Cabinet; the Parliament rejected his original appointees for the three ministries last month.

1810 GMT: New Trials. Back from an afternoon of teaching to catch up with today's trials of French student Clotilde Reiss and Iranian economist and journalist Saeed Laylaz. Al Jazeera has a video report.

1315 GMT: Widening Engagement. We've said for months that the US need for support in Afghanistan was one factor propelling the extension of the "unclenched fist" to Tehran. We have even suggested that there were quiet, back-channel talks between the US and Iran on the matter.

So this statement from Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki, speaking in New Delhi: "In responding to the current Obama and US administration messages asking Iran's help in dealing with the problem in Afghanistan, we have defined the new approach....We are hopeful of taking some steps in this regard."

1125 GMT: The Death of the Prison Doctor. Another revelation in the case of Ramin Pourandarjan, the 26-year-old physician at Kahrizak Prison, who supposedly died of a heart attack or stroke (see yesterday's updates). Shortly before he died, Pourandarjan had told a Parliamentary committee of abuses of detainees at Kahrizak.

1120 GMT: We've posted video of the Tehran University demonstration protesting the 11 November execution of Ehsan Fattahian.

1055 GMT: More Leaking & Sabotage. Now I can't keep up. The Times of London benefits from a leak with a different slant: "UN nuclear chief in secret talks with Iran over deal to end sanctions".

The mission of IAEA head Mohammad El Baradei for a compromise agreement isn't exactly "secret", since we have revealed --- from the very non-secret Press TV --- that El Baradei was proposing Turkey as the third country in an Iran-Russia uranium enrichment plan and that the Iranian establishment is split over the suggestion. What makes The Times story distinctive is that the newspaper was handed a 13-page IAEA document outlining El Baradei's approach. In addition to the third-party enrichment scheme, Iran would also be a participant in a globally-managed nuclear fuel bank.

And who else has put forward that notion of a nuclear fuel bank? Step up, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

1050 GMT: Counter-Spin. And in the opposition corner from The New York Times on the IAEA report on Iran, it's the Iranian Ambassador to the IAEA, Ali-Asghar Soltanieh:

The latest report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) chief Mohamed ElBaradei proved that political hype and propaganda about Fordo plant were baseless. The report confirmed that no centrifuges had been introduced into the facility and that no nuclear material had been used in it.

1035 GMT: And from Montazeri: Grand Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri, has replied to a letter from the mother of a detained senior member of the reformist Islamic Iran Participation Front:

The situation which has happened for the country is very regretful.....Calling peaceful demonstration of people a 'riot' does not solve anything. There is only one acceptable legal solution and that is returning from the path of mistake and making up for it. Freeing the political prisoners is the first step that the officials must do immediately and even preventing the freedom of innocent people for one hour is a major sin.

1025 GMT: And With Sane'i.... Grand Ayatollah Yusuf Sane'i told members of the Islamic Association of Art School on Sunday:

The increase and exacerbation of problems does not point to the domination and rule of oppression but rather is a sign of weakness....Be certain the efforts and suffering of the people, especially the academics, will be fruitful....Lying is the characteristic of oppressors, when they see they are losing ground they turn to lying and rely on lies....Increased pressure is a sign of weakness; arresting, imprisoning, and torturing are signs of weakness.

1010 GMT: Catching Up With Karroubi.... Mehdi Karroubi visited Ayatollah Bayat-Zanjani, who suffered a heart attack last month, in hospital yesterday. Before his illness, Bayat-Zanjani had been a strident critic of the Ahmadinejad Government.

Earlier Karroubi had spoken to reformist members of Parliament, advising youth to "avoid the violent acts which is what certain movements would want to happen....Don’t let some sick individuals provoke people to radical behaviours and as always keep rationality and humanity as the role model for the Green movement."

0925 GMT: Whipping Up the Fear. Following our updates yesterday on the initial exaggerations of the IAEA's report on Iran's nuclear programmes, we have a snap analysis of the misleading media coverage, fed by sources trying to "break" the talks with Tehran, drawing on this morning's treatment in The New York Times.

USA Today drops by to offer us further evidence: "U.N. report: Iran nuke site apt for bombs, not power".

0915 GMT: The Public Finger-Wagging. The Obama Administration's engagement strategy depends on Mahmoud Ahmadinejad overcoming domestic opposition to a nuclear deal, and Obama has to keep his own opposition at bay. So the US President issued a boiler-plate warning this morning during his press conference with Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao: "Iran has an opportunity to present and demonstrate its peaceful intentions, but if it fails to take this opportunity, there will be consequences."

0900 GMT: We're back in place after an excellent seminar in Dublin in "Blogging in Iran" with our partners at the Clinton Institute, University College Dublin. To mark the occasion (and match the headline), we've posted what we hope will be an important evaluation --- based on inside information and open sources --- of the Obama Administration's current policy on Iran.

We're also following the latest developments surrounding Iran's nuclear programme, building on the text of the International Atomic Energy Agency's report on Iranian facilities.

The Latest from Iran (14 November): Political Fatigue?

NEW Iran: The Political Attack on the National Iranian American Council
Iran Text: Khatami on Legitimate Protest and Illegitimate Government (13 November)
Iran: Is This an “Unravelling” Protest Beyond Mousavi and Karroubi?
Iran: Why is Washington Belittling the Green Movement?
The Latest from Iran (13 November): Accusations

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

1330 GMT: Iranian sources report that a fifth post-election death sentence for threatening national security has been handed down in the case of Reza Khademi.

1325 GMT: A summary of Mir Hossein Mousavi's comments in his meeting with Mehdi Karroubi on Friday: "This great movement defends basic values. This movement says, 'Do not tell lies. Falsehood is condemned. Fraud is condemned.'

"Those who beat people must not think that by intimidating people they can make people stay home. Islam has taught people seek their rights without fear."

1145 GMT: Reviving? Mir Hossein Mousavi has met Mehdi Karroubi "to comfort [cleric]. about the physical assult on him by the security forces and plainclothes militia at the November 4th [13 Aban] rallies and to condemn and talk about the violent acts of the security and Basij militia forces against people, especially women on that day".

1140 GMT:Cracking Down on the Students. Abdollah Momeni, the spokesman of the reformist student organisation Darhat-Tahkim-Vahdat, has been sentenced to eight years in prison!

1130 GMT: When Arts and Politics Mix. President Ahmadinejad, acting as the head of the Revolutionary Cultural Council, has changed the existing constitution of the Academy of Arts, possibly to prepare for the dismissal of Mir Hossein Mousavi as the President of the Academy. Under the amendment, the President of the Academy would be appointed directly by the Iranian President, without any requirement for consultation with the members of the Academy.

During President Khatami’s administration, it was established that the President of the Academy would be elected by the permanent members of the Academy’s General Assembly, and the president as the head of the Revolutionary Cultural Court would approve the nominee.

0955 GMT: The Department to Combat US Conspiracies.

The Chair of the Human Rights Committee of Parliament's Human Rights Commmittee has suggested raising the amount devoted to exposing US human rights violations and combatting its conspiracies to $50 million. Earlier this year, the Ministry of Information formed a special agency with a $20 million budget to foreign-backed "velvet revolution".

0945 GMT: Oh, Yeah, We're Tough. A bit of posturing from the Iranian military, declaring that Iran is will mass-produce a new generation of air-to-air, heat-seeking missiles tracking targets via infrared emission.

Air Force commander Brigadier General Hassan Shah-Safi said that the missile haved been successfully test-fired in different situations. It has a range of up to 100 kilometers.

0750 GMT: At the risk of walking into a political firestorm, I have posted a separate entry on the current attacks on the National Iranian American Council.

0630 GMT: Days after the execution of Ehsan Fattahian, another Kurdish political dissident, Shirkooh Maarefi, is facing death for "activities against national security and armed combat".

0550 GMT: A very quiet morning for news from Iran. Indeed, looking back over the updates, a relatively development-free 48 hours. President Ahmadinejad's Wednesday night interview, for all its  important signals on the nuclear issue as well as his grab for power against the Tehran local government, has drifted away with little discussion. On the other side, the Khatami statement to academics on legitimate protest and illegitimate power has also received scant attention --- the reaction I have seen and heard points to scepticism over whether the former President has said anything of significance, particularly given his public absence on 13 Aban. The Mousavi statement on Monday to Jamaran has not resonated, and Mehdi Karroubi has been silent this week.

Of course, none of this means that everyone can pack up and go home --- no more to see in this post-election crisis. It does highlight, however, the debate over the path of the Green movement as it moves towards the next marker of 16 Azar (7 December) for mass demonstrations. Throughout this conflict, I have thought of the necessary linkage of a widespread movement "from below", with its energy and demands to be recognised and respected, with the political moves of political and clerical figures. However, Hashemi Rafsanjani is now pursuing a divergent agenda. Mousavi appears at a loss how to act beyond periodic statements, especially as he cannot link them to a symbolic public appearance. While Karroubi continues to inspire interest and hope in many, the last few days illustrate the fragility of relying on him. And, lacking that political lighting rod for their criticisms, the dissenting clerics of Qom have been muted since 13 Aban.

So, given the effect of the Government's constrictions and the toll of political complications on the efforts of "leaders", can the linkage be set aside for a different movement? In other words, can the Green Wave not only be propelled but directed from below? 13 Aban was a success in the sense that it proved resistance was ongoing, despite the lack of leadership from the top. The question may be whether that resistance, planning its next big move in just over three weeks, can translate symbolic defiance into pressure upon the regime between as well as during those high-profile moments.

Iran: Is This an "Unravelling" Protest Beyond Mousavi and Karroubi?

Iran: Why is Washington Belittling the Green Movement?
The Latest from Iran (12 November): Ahmadinejad Moves for Nuclear Deal

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

I will be honest. I saw this article by Brian Murphy of the Associated Press earlier in the week but decided not to post it or even refer to it. I did so because I could not find the basis for his claims about the Green movement. Neither the quotes from his "some experts" do not or his knowledge of the situation (he claims, for example, that only "several thousand" demonstrators turned out in Iran on 13 Aban) support his sweeping conclusion of a "potential unravelling" of the opposition. They do not back his speculation that "Mousavi and Karroubi's reluctance could leave room for more militant opposition leaders to emerge in the future" --- indeed, Murphy's implication is that the mainstream of the Green protest desire revolution while Mousavi and Karroubi "have repeatedly said they do not seek to overthrow the ruling clerics".



On second thought, however, the far better-informed and thoughtful discussion amongst EA readers has considered the direction of the Green Wave after the latest protests and statements and actions by its leaders. So I'm posting Murphy's piece as his personal contribution to the debate and looking forward to the ideas and critiques of our own "experts" on the Comment board.

Iran's opposition steers challenge toward the top
Brian Murphy

Just minutes before anti-riot police charged opposition marchers in Tehran last week, a new chant bubbled up from the crowd: "Death to Nobody."

It was more than just a play on the "Death to America" slogans that are staples of Iran's political life. The cries give a sense of how much the protest movement has evolved since the raw outrage of last summer.

The demonstrations have moved beyond narrow attacks on President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his disputed re-election in June. They are now drifting toward a blanket challenge of the Islamic leadership's right to rule.

"It's gone from anti-Ahmadinejad to more of anti-regime in general," said Mustafa Alani, a regional analyst at the Gulf Research Center in Dubai. "That's an important shift."

And here lies the protesters' strength, but also their potential unraveling, some experts say.

An overall challenge to the powers of non-elected clerics — headed by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei — could provide the big picture goal to sustain the demonstrations for years. But it also carries risks. Top among them: alienating the opposition leadership, who remain still loyal to the Islamic system, and bringing even harsher crackdowns by authorities who can justify use of violence to protect the status quo.

The two senior figures in the opposition, Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mahdi Karroubi, have repeatedly said they do not seek to overthrow the ruling clerics. Since July, authorities have put on trial more than 100 pro-reform figures accused of being part of a plot to topple this religious hierarchy.

Mousavi and Karroubi's reluctance could leave room for more militant opposition leaders to emerge in the future.

The protests last week coincided with state-run rallies marking the 30th anniversary of the takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. The timing, like the shouts of "Death to Nobody," were a symbolic challenge to one of the ideological pillars of the regime — the anti-U.S. fervor of the 1979 Islamic Revolution that toppled the pro-American shah.

Just blocks away from the opposition marches, the pro-government demonstrators were bellowing the standard beat of "Death to America" to mark the Nov. 4 embassy seizure.

Many pro-reform marchers still wore the green colors of Mousavi, who claims he is the rightful winner of the June 12 presidential election.

But much of the protesters' defiance went beyond Mousavi's complaints over the election and the subsequent crackdown and targeted Khamenei in acts that were almost unthinkable before the postelection meltdown. Protesters tore up or trampled images of the supreme leader, whose most ardent backers believe is answerable only to God.

Demonstrators also called on President Barack Obama to pick a side, in apparent frustration with White House efforts for direct talks with Iran's leaders. "Obama, Obama, you are either with them, or with us," they chanted.

The opposition leaders were not among the crowd. Reformist web sites say hard-line vigilantes kept Mousavi from leaving his office. Karroubi was overcome by tear gas and left before riot police moved in, according to his Web site.

More than 100 people were detained, including several journalists, but most were later released.

Karroubi later denounced the "very ugly" tactics of police, which he claimed included attacking women. Mousavi issued a statement calling for the rights of all Iranians to be respected. But there was nothing to suggest they would follow the protesters' lead in hardening their stance against Iran's political system.

After security forces crushed that massive protests that erupted after the election, opposition groups in recent months have used major state-backed events to stage rival rallies.

The next test could come Dec. 7, which marks the death of three students in 1953 during protests of a visit by then-Vice President Richard Nixon for talks with the shah.

Reform groups appear focused on trying to build a credible turnout for the next marches after just several thousand joined last week's protests.

Some reformist Web sites have urged students to stay off campus on the days of future marches so they can't be blocked from joining by security forces. Many other sites are carrying one of the new symbols of the opposition: a green-hued drawing of a young woman wearing a headscarf and thrusting up her fist in protest.

"The long-term crisis for the government isn't over," said Alireza Nader, an analyst of Iranian affairs at the RAND Corp. in Washington.

Still, authorities must be careful about how hard they push back or else they risk a backlash. The government crackdown so far "has been very violent but measured in some ways," Nader said. But if authorities carry out threats to arrest Mousavi and Karroubi, "this could fan the flames," he said.

Some high-level officials have offered talks with the opposition as a way to keep the tensions from spilling over to recurring cycles of protests and violence.

The former chief of the judiciary and close ally of Khamenei, Ayatollah [Hashemi] Shahroudi, was quoted Monday in Iranian newspapers as calling the postelection rifts a "family dispute" that can be worked out through dialogue.

But Meir Javedanfar, an Iran analyst based in Israel, said Khamenei "sees the reformist movement as a threat" and aims to "stifle its growth and, if he can, to completely suffocate them."

But the greater the pressure, the more risk he could rally people around the protests.

"Khamenei's actions could actually strengthen the reformist movement," he said.