Latest Iran Video: University Protests (27 October)

The Latest from Iran (27 October): Domestic and Foreign Collide

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Six videos from Khaje Nasir University (Tehran), Chamran University, (Ahwaz) and Azad University (Tehran)

Khaje Nasir University, Tehran

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TrIoVs1yM5s[/youtube]

Chamran University, Ahvaz

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g1nx77RVtm0[/youtube]

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RFqdD5FDhPA[/youtube]

Azad University, Tehran

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aW0WwifLixg[/youtube]

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wPV0m3hExII[/youtube]

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yr90bnyF2CQ&feature=channel[/youtube]

The Latest from Iran (27 October): Domestic and Foreign Collide

NEW Latest Iran Video: University Protests (27 October)
NEW Iran: More on Kian Tajbakhsh and Tehran’s “Velvet Revolution”
Latest Iran Video/Translation: Karroubi on Events in the Iran Media Fair
Iran’s Political Confusion: Khamenei, Ahmadinejad, and the Nuclear Agreement
Latest from Iran (26 October): After the Fair

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2015 GMT: 13 Aban Does Not Exist. Homy Lafayette offers more detail on the Government's order to state media to "refrain from disseminating any news, photo, or topic which can lead to tension in the society or breach public order" during the demonstrations on 13 Aban (4 November).

The article includes an English translation of the document, issued by Deputy Culture and Islamic Guidance Minister Alireza Malekian.

1810 GMT: Iran's Nuclear Manoeuvre. If this story from Press TV is accurate, then Tehran is haggling over the details of third-party enrichment, rather than walking away from the deal.

The article re-quotes the source who spoke to Al Alam TV (see 1015 GMT), "Iran will announce its response to the proposal put forward by [International Atomic Energy Agency] Director-General [Mohamed] ElBaradei on Friday, October 30." The official added that Iran did not want to send 80 percent of its uranium stock in a single shipment to Russia, as set out in the deal from the Vienna talks: "Iran as a uranium buyer knows best how much uranium, enriched to a level of 19.75 percent, it needs [for its medical research reactor]; based on this argument, it will raise certain issues with this proposal."

In other words, Tehran will insist on a lower amount of uranium --- currently, the deal is for 1.2 million out of 1.5 million tonnes --- being sent to Russia in the first shipment. More would be delivered for enrichment as the medical reactor required new supplies.

The report is seconded by the head of Parliament's Foreign Policy and National Security Commission, Alaeddin Boroujerdi, "Iran can send the scheduled amount in separate shipments so that its fuel supply [provided by foreigners] is guaranteed....Iran can send only a part of its stockpile … and then as it receives its 20 percent enriched fuel it will send the next portion."

A word of caution on this interpretation: Boroujerdi is close to President Ahmadinejad and is putting the pro-deal view. It is unclear whether the dissenting voices such as Ali Larijani (and possibly, behind Larijani, the Supreme Leader) have come around to this position.

1750 GMT: Back from a teaching break to find that Rooz Online, following up a story prominent on the Internet this morning, has published details of an alleged Government order to censor and possibly shut out any news of mass demonstrations on 13 Aban (4 November).

1230 GMT: As reports continue to come in, with claims of 1500 students protesting at Azad University in Tehran, we've posted the first video footage.

1020 GMT: Reports that students gathered to demonstrate at Tehran University but are being forced to move by security forces.

1015 GMT: Reuters is reporting, from Iran's Al-Alam television, that Iran will accept the uranium enrichment agreement but will demand changes. The source is an "unnamed official" who indicates Iran's reply will be made within 48 hours.

0810 GMT: Detentions, Concerns, and Hunger Strikes. Human Rights Activists in Iran has posted a summary of latest developments regarding post-election detainees. Included is the information that journalist Henganeh Shahidi and student Payman Aref have started hunger strikes.

0800 GMT: Myth, Imprisonment, and "Velvet Revolution". We've just posted more on the jailed Iranian-American scholar Kian Tajbakhsh and the regime's accusations and tactics with the claim of foreign-directed regime change in

0715 GMT: A reader has pointed us to a report posted by CNN on a prison riot in Karaj, west of Tehran, on Sunday. Interestingly, the story comes from the National Council of Resistance in Iran, the opposition movement headed by Maryam Rajavi and linked to Mujahedin-e-Khalq.

0635 GMT: Meanwhile CNN International (broadcast, not website) is focusing on a peripheral story. Pakistan detained and has now released 11 Iranians who crossed the border yesterday. The original line was that the detainees were Revolutionary Guard members, possibly pursuing or looking for leads on those linked to last week's bombings. Pakistan, probably after discreet talks with Tehran, is now calling the wanderers "security guards"; Press TV portrays them as "border police" pursuing smugglers.

0630 GMT: Now The Washington Post has picked up on the effect of the internal debate on the enrichment agreement (and vice-versa) with an overview by Thomas Erdbrink, "Iran officials appear split on nuclear plan".

0600 GMT: One of the standing rules for analysis, when students and I consider US foreign policy, is that what happens overseas cannot be separated from what happens at home.

So it is proving --- and may prove in a significant way in the next 72 hours --- in Iran.

Tensions over the decision on the uranium enrichment deal are now beyond simmering and openly bubbling. Even this weekend, all the signals from the Iranian Government were that it would work out any issues and sign the proposal, with a significant portion of Iran's uranium stock going to Russia for enrichment, by Wednesday or Thursday. Now, all bets are off.

Readers took yesterday's analysis of the possible conflict between the Supreme Leader and President Ahmadinejad to a new level with their comments, but this morning I still find myself with questions rather than answers. The straightforward explanation would be that the Supreme Leader, working through the statements of Parliamentary leaders like Ali Larijani and Mohammad Reza Bahonar, is now blocking agreement. But, if so, why did he apparently endorse "engagement" to the point where the deal was almost struck? What could be the calculation in approaching the International Atomic Energy Agency, and thus Washington, in the summer and now walking out on the deal at the 11th hour?

Other theories from our readers include an Iranian "good cop, bad cop" act which would allow Ahmadinejad to portray himself as the guy who wanted to work with Obama but had to give way to Ayatollah Khamenei and the Iranians walking out of the arrangement because their ploy --- getting uranium for the medical reactor enriched for free while retaining enough of their stock to pursue other programmes --- hasn't yielded enough of a result.

Fortunately for my confusion, if not the general situation, there should be some clarification by Friday. Iran can't spin out the post-Vienna deliberations beyond the weekend, given that the US has already let last Friday's deadline slide in expectation of a Tehran decision within a few days. So it's accept, reject, or try to bring the "5+1" powers back to the table for talks.

And that declaration from Iran will in turn give the US Government, as well as the European powers, Russia, and China, a somewhat paradoxical choice. If Tehran does not sign the enrichment agreement, does the Obama Administration continue engagement, possibly strengthening the Iranian President against his own Supreme Leader? Or does it walk away (or is forced away by Congressional and public hostility to any more talks), now watching an internal Iranian situation in which Washington is no more than a bystander?

Iran: More on Kian Tajbakhsh and Tehran's "Velvet Revolution"

Iran’s American Prisoner: The Case of Kian Tajbakhsh (Continued with 15 Years in Jail)
Iran: How the Regime Constructed the “Velvet Revolution”
The Latest from Iran (27 October): Domestic and Foreign Collide

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Despite (or possibly because of) the muted public response by the US Government to the 15-year sentence handed down to Iranian-American academic Kian Tajbakhsh, the campaign for his release has picked up steam in the last week. On Sunday we featured an article by Karim Sadjadpour, and fellow scholar Haleh Esfandiari, who was detained for months with Tajbakhsh in 2007, has blogged for The New York Review of Books.

Gary Sick, a former US Government official who has been named in the regime's indictments as a "foreign operative" working with Tajbakhsh, has also offered his thoughts. Without forgetting that hundreds of others remain in post-election detention, we post this to link Tajbakhsh's case to a wider analysis of the Iranian Government's accusations and tactics in its portrayal of "velvet revolution".

Last week, an Iranian-American colleague of mine, Kian Tajbaksh, was sentenced in Tehran to 15 years in prison. The indictment included the charges that (1) he was in contact with me; (2) that he was part of the Gulf/2000 network that I manage; and (3) that I am an agent of the CIA.

Normally, I simply ignore silly accusations such as this. They are nothing new. On one hand, it has been intimated that I must be under the influence of Iranian intelligence (by prominent neoconservatives who believe that my views on Iran’s political development and especially its nuclear program are not sufficiently alarmist). I have also been accused (by such worthies as Hossein Shariatmadari, the ultra-radical editor of Iran’s Kayhan newspaper, who is also a representative of the supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei) of being a CIA agent. I regard these insinuations as badges of honor, since they merely confirm that I do not subscribe to the ideological extremes of either of these groups. I have always felt that my reputation could speak for itself and required no public defense.

However, this time the accusations are really not about me but about a friend and colleague. Moreover, they are not just newspaper hyperbole by people who have an ax to grind and whose desire to make a political point exceeds their respect for the truth. These assertions are a matter of law—an official indictment by the judicial authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

It is often said that it is impossible to prove a negative. How do I prove that I am NOT an agent of the CIA? How do I prove that the Gulf/2000 Internet project is NOT engaged in overthrowing governments? How do I prove that Kian—a friend and a colleague—was NOT trying to lead a “velvet revolution” against the Islamic Republic of Iran?

Let me simply reverse the questions. I spent 24 years in the U.S. Navy—my only connection with the U.S. government. The Navy sponsored my education at the University of Kansas. It took me to the Persian Gulf for my first exposure to the region that has become my professional specialization. It sponsored my graduate work for a Ph.D. degree at Columbia University. And it paid my salary while I was on the National Security Council staff at the time of the Iranian revolution and the hostage crisis. I never received a paycheck from any other agency of the U.S. government. Do the prosecutors in Iran have evidence to the contrary? If so, please let me know.

There are a number of commentators on Iran, such as Reuel Gerecht, Graham Fuller, and Bruce Riedel, who indeed worked for the CIA. Although their political views disagree sharply, they always identify themselves as former CIA employees. I do not identify myself that way for the very simple reason that I never worked for the CIA.

The prosecutors charge that Kian was in touch with me. Right. We were both academics in New York, and we saw each other from time to time. However, I have gone back over the past 20 years with that in mind, and I am struck by something quite different. Over that period of time, I have known every Iranian ambassador to the United Nations and many members of the staff of the Iranian U.N. mission. I have spent much more time with them than with Kian.

More important, I have been in meetings with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on four different occasions over the past three years. I have spent at least nine hours with him, much more than I ever spent with Kian. In my last meeting with Mr. Ahmadinejad, I told him that if he were simply a lowly academic, instead of the president of Iran, he would be subject to arrest upon his return to Iran for meeting with the roomful of U.S. academics and think tank representatives that he had assembled at his hotel. He scoffed at the idea. Now one of my colleagues, a lowly Iranian-American professor who was about to take up a position at my university, is being condemned to 15 years in prison because, among other things, he had contact with me.

Iranian security officials are notably lacking in any sense of irony or humor. But I do wonder whether President Ahmadinejad is being considered for indictment because of his extensive contacts with me over the past four years.

The Gulf/2000 network is an Internet project that began 16 years ago to facilitate communication and information sharing among individuals who have a professional association with issues involving the Persian Gulf. It includes individuals of widely differing backgrounds and opinions, including both private citizens and government officials from countries around the world, including Iran. If any Iranian government official wishes to know about G2K, as we call it, he need only consult his colleagues who are members.

G2K is routinely cited in international conferences in Tehran and elsewhere as a reliable source of informed commentary and factual information about issues involving the Persian Gulf. It is limited to specialists, but it is not a secret. It includes individuals of every possible political persuasion. And it is not engaged in overthrowing governments.

The indictment against Kian is in fact an indictment of the legal and security structure of the Iranian government. The charges are false, deliberately false. They consist of a series of political fabrications devoid of even the flimsiest effort to verify the truth.

These accusations cast shame on any institution that professes respect for justice and law. They substantiate the words of Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, one the founders of the Islamic Republic of Iran, that this government is no longer either Islamic or a republic but merely the latest in the shabby succession of Middle Eastern military regimes. These charges remind us of the excesses of the Stalinist show trials and the abominations of the Chinese Red Guards—examples of revolutions that betrayed their own ideals.

This is not about Kian, and it is certainly not about me. It is about the abject failure of a ruling clique that has lost the confidence and support of its own people and must contrive scapegoats to excuse its own deficiencies.

Latest Iran Video/Translation: Karroubi on Events in the Iran Media Fair

Iran: The Karroubi Effect
Iran: Karroubi Statement on Events at Iran Media Fair
Video: Karroubi & Crowd at Iran Media Fair (23 October)
Video: The Media Fair Demonstrations (25 October)
Latest from Iran (26 October): After the Fair

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English translation follows video --- many thanks to HomyLafayette:

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7CLJfmkEqYM[/youtube]

In the name of God, most gracious, most merciful.

Three points must be stressed concerning the events that took place at the press fair last Friday: One has to do with the circumstances, another with the motives, and the last with myself.

As for the circumstances, I have always gone to exhibitions and continue to do so. This time when I visited, on the one hand the people generously expressed their kindness and I would even turn around and ask them not to chant slogans, and on the other, a few individuals began --- and they're the ones who started it --- saying, "Death to the hypocrite", trying to provoke the people. The great mass of the people was standing and chanting, and the other individuals chanted too, and then we left the exhibition after a while. But on the way out, and this is the scheme that certain individuals had planned, they guided us in a direction through which the people behind us could not freely follow us, and in this manner they became a bit more radical.

The second point is about the motives. This is not the first time [this has occurred, it also happened] during my visit to Masoumeh's shrine on the occasion of Imam Sadegh's martyrdom. Wherever I go, such actions are becoming commonplace. Fortunately, the people are responding spontaneously. Their intention is to prevent me from attending gatherings and to isolate me, in the same way that they closed the offices of the party and [inaudible]. [The offices of Karroubi's Etemade Melli political party and his newspaper were shut down in early September.] They want me to sit at home and not venture outside. So they're taking these steps to prevent me from going outside.

The third point that I want to mention is that I'm amazed that they're carrying out these measures with respect to me. I'm not new to these actions, and I haven't started making these types of comments recently. In 1989, after the death of Imam Khomeini, I clashed with the 3rd Majlis [Parliament], I denounced the deviation of the Assembly of Experts....In all those cases, I maintained a clear position, I constantly spoke out, and I went through difficult situations. Even back then, many of my friends were summoned daily to the Special Clergy Court or normal courts. I stood strong and endured those hardships.

On top of which, in those days, I was isolated and the people were not aware of the issue of oversight and the Assembly of Experts....But today, the people are standing as one, or at least a majority of the people are and they have a position and are standing firm.

In such circumstances, I shall be present on any stage....Be it a demonstration, the commemoration of the 22nd of Bahman [11 February,date of the victory of the 1979 revolution] or Ashura [holiday marking the martyrdom of Hossein]. Whatever the day, whatever the place, we shall be present. But we're going to take an additional step. Previously, we wouldn't tell our friends where we'd be going and other details. Now we announce it, though we may be the object of our friends' criticisms. We will not retreat. Keeping in mind our pact with the Imam and the people, we remain loyal to the Islamic Republic and the constitution. We are standing firm on this path, with God's blessing, and we fear nothing.

God willing, we shall see who has remained true and who has not. In appropriate conditions, when either both factions are in power or neither one is, we shall see who has to repent and who does not need to. When you have one faction in power and the other faction has nothing at all, they can talk about repentance as much as they want. Those who need to repent are the traitors to the Islamic Republic who have deviated it, who have emptied it of its Islamic nature and destroyed its republican identity, and left nothing but its name.

Iran's Political Confusion: Khamenei, Ahmadinejad, and the Nuclear Agreement

Latest from Iran (26 October): After the Fair

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This short, little-noticed story may be important in more than one way.

Yesterday, speaking to an association of engineers, Deputy Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Reza Bahonar declared:

Presently, the Supreme National Security Council and the Supreme Leader emphasize that our strategic policies are based on the absence of negotiations with the United States.That is why we will not have any direct negotiations with the United States.....The conditions for such negotiations must emerge, which have not as yet emerged.

With those three sentences, Bahonar attempted to sweep away both the current talks on Iran's nuclear programme and the concept of "engagement" with Washington. The immediate effect, if his words were heeded, would be Tehran's refusal --- after last week's Vienna discussions and the original deadline of last Friday --- to accept the proposal for "third-party enrichment".

That alone would let the conflict genie out of the diplomatic bottle, with the Obama Administration backed into a corner to set aside talks for harsher economic sanctions. That's pretty big, but it is still not as big as the internal outcome. Bahonar may be the messenger not only for a blow against engagement, but also a smack-down of President Ahmadinejad

Last week, when Bahonar came out against the nuclear discussions, we downplayed his remarks, seeing him as a bystander. When Speaker of the Parliament jumped in with his criticisms of Vienna, however, we raised an eyebrow: was this Ayatollah Khamenei's signal that he was drawing a line across engagement?

Bahonar's latest public declaration indicates, "Yes". And with that Yes comes an even bigger turn of the Iranian political wheel: is the Supreme Leader challenging not only engagement but his own President's authority?

If the signals continue, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has a decision to make. He either defies Ayatollah Khamenei for the sake of his foreign policy, but this risks a showdown with the leader of the Iranian system. On the other hand, if he accepts the Supreme Leader's veto, ensuring a renewed diplomatic isolation for Iran.

More importantly, if Ahmadinejad bows down, he risks unveiling the conditional footing of his own legitimacy. For almost five months, he has fought --- with much more success than we initially predicted --- to establish his position not only against the Green opposition but against the Supreme Leader. He gave way in the dispute over First Vice President Rahim-Mashai, only to bring his ally back into the Government as Chief of Staff, and he made an aggressive move to control of the Ministry of Intelligence. Against doubts within the establishment, Ahmadinejad got Khamenei's approval for his Inauguration and the Supreme Leader's intervention for Parliamentary endorsement of his Cabinet.

Now all that might be unsettled.

In one sense, this is business as usual. The Supreme Leader is the nominal Number One in the Islamic Republic, and that is especially pertinent on issues of Iran's foreign policy and national security.

But this business as usual comes in a most unusual situation. Those not so fond of Ahmadinejad, both outside and inside the political establishment, will see this as a cutting-back of the President's autonomy. And that trimming opens up political space for others to stake their own positions.

Your move, Mahmoud.