Iran's Nukes: Text of IAEA Head El Baradei Statement (21 October)

UPDATED Iran’s Nukes: The Real Story on Vienna Talks and the Deal for Uranium Enrichment
The Latest from Iran (21 October): Room for a Challenge?

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On Wednesday afternoon Mohammad El Baradei, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, issued the following statement to the press on the Vienna talks between Iran and the "5+1" powers (US, UK, France, Russia, China, and Germany):

We just concluded our meeting of 2 1/2 days on "how-to" modalities, and how to ensure that Iran will have the fuel required for its research reactor.

As you know that research reactor is used for producing medical isotopes for diagnosis and treatment of cancer, so it is a purely humanitarian mission, objective.

However, everybody is aware that that transaction using Iran´s low enriched uranium to be manufactured into fuel is a very important confidence building measure that can diffuse a crisis that has been going on for a number of years and open space for negotiation.

I must say that, everybody who participated at the meeting was trying to help, trying to look to the future and not to the past, trying to heal the wounds that existed for many, many years.

I have circulated a draft agreement that reflects, in my judgement, a balanced approach on how to move forward.

The deadline for the parties to give, I hope, affirmative action, is Friday, two days from now. And if we do get an affirmative action, then I hope that we will have an agreement we can send to the BoG.

There has been talks on technical issues, legal issues, policy issues, issues of confidence and trust and that is why it has taken us some time and that is why we need to send the agreement to the capitals for final approval.

I very much hope that people see the big picture, see that this agreement could open the way for a complete normalization of relations between Iran and the international community.

It´s a very unique technical meeting, because it is a technical meeting although, that has been followed by heads of States, in fact with the actual engagement in the process. I would cross my fingers that by Friday we should have an okay, an approval, by all parties concerned.

Q: Can you tell us details?

Everybody should, including of course Iran, should sign up on this by Friday.

Q: France will also be included?

My proposal has France included.

Q: Do you think by the end of your term, this agreement could be endorsed?

I hope so, if we get an affirmative response by all parties by Friday then we have an agreement, then we just go to the Board for formal ratification. I will have to wait until Friday, I am optimistic and as I said, the spirit here was very constructive and forward-looking.

The Latest from Iran (21 October): Room for a Challenge?

NEW Iran Newsflash: Lawyer Shadi Sadr Wins Dutch Human Rights Award
NEW Iran: Taking Apart the Jundallah-US Narrative
Video (19-20 October): More University Demonstrations (Tehran & Karaj)
UPDATED Iran’s Nukes: The Real Story on Vienna Talks and the Deal for Uranium Enrichment
The Latest from Iran (20 October): Green Waves or Green Mirage?

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1850 GMT: Spoiler Alert. And while Tehran is being encouraging about the draft enrichment agreement, the "Western" campaign to undercut it has already begun.

David Sanger of The New York Times, who seems to hang around in a hallway until a Government official tells him how to interpret a story, has fired the warning shot. After headlining, "Iran Agrees to Draft of Deal on Exporting Nuclear Fuel", Sanger swings a journalistic hammer at the apparent success. Making clear that "Western suspicions that Iran is secretly developing a nuclear weapon despite its repeated denials", rather than say, Iran's approach to the IAEA over its medical research reactor, "are at the heart of the negotiations", he "reports":

If the 2,600 pounds of fuel leave Iran in batches...experts warn, Iran would be able to replace it almost as quickly as it leaves the country....The estimate that Iran has about 3,500 pounds of low-enriched uranium “assumes that Iran has accurately declared how much fuel it possesses, and does not have a secret supply,” as one senior European diplomat [French? See 1835 GMT] put it....[President Obama] has not made the cessation of enrichment a prerequisite to talks, and the work is still under way, in violation of three United Nations Security Council resolutions.

Perhaps needless to say, Sanger doesn't name any of his "experts". Because this is not an analysis, it's a scare story. [Remember, it was Sanger who only on Monday was saying that Iran was threatening to walk out of the talks.] You Just Can't Trust the Big, Bad Iranians.

Well, perhaps not. But I'm not sure You Can Trust the Objective New York Times either.

1835 GMT: Iran Presses Its Nuclear Advantage. Ali Aghbar Soltanieh has offered a revealing summary of the Vienna talks to the Iranian Student News Agency. First, he made clear that Tehran would be holding Moscow close as the talks progressed:

We have announced that we are willing to cooperate with Russia within the framework of an agreement. Although certain other countries, including the U.S. and France, have been mentioned in the draft agreement, the main party in the agreement will be Russia.

Then Iranian diplomats celebrated an apparent victory over France. Not only had Paris been a vehement critic of Iran's nuclear programme in the run-up to the talks, but Iran --- as our readers noticed --- has a long-standing grievance against Paris over money paid for pre-1979 nuclear projects that were never completed. According to ISNA, "The French delegation apologized to Iran on Wednesday for their country’s past conduct toward Iran and asked IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei to make an effort to put France back in the draft agreement with Tehran."

1635 GMT: Not So Quiet Anymore. This may be the most significant piece of news that will go unnoticed this week.

This morning we wrote, "Watch Qom....The Grand Ayatollahs and Ayatollahs --- Dastgheib, Bayat-Zanjani, Sane'i, Safi Golpaygani --- are pressing for reforms to meet the post-election challenge, and he adds that none of those clerics are fans of Ahmadinejad. Just as significant, they do not operate in a vacuum but interact with secular' players in the political game."

Mehr News now reports:

Majlis Cleric Committee members are going to visit Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Mahdavi Kanni, MP Mohammad Taqi Rahbar said on Wednesday. The committee members, during their meeting, will discuss the incidents that followed up the June 12 presidential election and the proposal for the establishment of a national election committee, Rahbar, who also heads the committee, added.

The National Election Committee, put forward by 2009 Presidential candidate Mohsen Rezaei, may not be as prominent in discussions as the National Unity Plan, but it has still provoked heated opposition, both from those who think President Ahmadinejad's legitimacy is being questioned and those who believe it would curb the powers of the Supreme Leader. Conversely, it is galvanising senior clerics who are looking to press their challenge against the post-election abuses of the regime.

1445 GMT: A relatively quiet afternoon. There are rumours and uncertainty over whether or not President Ahmadinejad went to Tehran University today (see 1050 GMT). In the Parliament, there are twists over the complaint that pro-Ahmadinejad MPs were going to file about post-election behaviour by their opponents; the latest story is that Mir Hossein Mousavi is not named.

Meanwhile Press TV is featuring the story that the IAEA has passed the draft plan for uranium enrichment to national delegations for confirmation. It adds no details to reports from Western journalists.

1135 GMT: With many thanks to an EA reader, we've posted the news of a Dutch human rights awards for lawyer Shadi Sadr.

1055 GMT: Breakthrough? According to reporters in Vienna, International Atomic Energy Agency head Mohammad El Baradei has declared that a draft agreement on Iran's uranium enrichment has been reached. Deadline for confirmation by states is Friday.

1050 GMT: We're chasing the report that President Ahmadinejad has made a surprise visit to Tehran University and has been greeted by student protests.

1045 GMT: We've updated our page on the Supreme Leader's health after his appearance with female scholars yesterday.

0900 GMT: Following up our analysis of the effect of Sunday's bombing on Iranian politics and its relations with countries such as the US, we've posted an analysis by Josh Mull posing questions over the alleged link between the Baluch insurgent group Jundallah and the US Government.

0750 GMT: As the death toll from Sunday's bombing rose to 57, the UN Security Council "underlined the need to bring perpetrators, organisers, financiers and sponsors of this reprehensible act of terrorism to justice and urged all states ... to co-operate actively with the Iranian authorities in this regard".

0735 GMT: And just to add one more not-so-weak signal of both opposition potential and Government uncertainty from the last 48 hours. The videos from the University protests are striking: a Government representative shows up at a discussion to face loud protests and even a thrown shoe; 1000s gather despite the threat of academic punishment if not detention.

0645 GMT: Never underestimate the importance of timing. For all the plans and resources that a Government might have, the convergence of events can put a question mark over its efforts. For all the challenges that an opposition faces, developments far removed from their immediate concerns can provide opportunities.

And so, 96 hours after the Supreme Leader's reappeared, 72 hours after the bombings in southeastern Iran, 48 hours after the opening of the technical talks on Iran's nuclear programme, the Ahmadinejad Government --- which had been reasserting its position after the 18 September demonstrations --- seems to be drifting in the political arena. And, to add to its concerns, those who might take advantage are not just the Green Wave; "conservatives" and "principlists" who back the National Unity Plan that has gone to the Supreme Leader know that its first effects will be upon the authority of the President.

Ironically, the present show of strength for Ahmadinejad and Co. is in Vienna rather than Tehran. Iran's diva-ish manoeuvres yesterday, apparently refusing to show up for talks and then pursuing bilateral talks with the US to limit or exclude France in any plan, put the message that any "third-party enrichment" will not be imposed on Tehran but will be framed to meet its concerns. Whether this is because Iran wants a direct return of processed uranium from Russia or --- as a reader helpfully evaluates --- because it is punishing France for holding Iranian payments for pre-1979 nuclear contracts that were never fulfilled, the Iranian Government is dividing the "5+1" countries while maintaining engagement with Washington.

The regime's response to Jundallah's Sunday attacks is not so secure. Politically, the line set out by Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki yesterday was quite clever, looking to turn the bombing into co-operation with the Pakistani Government. The Revolutionary Guard appears to be spiralling into threats of vengeance, not only against Jundallah but against any foreign Government that comes to mind. The Guard's latest demand, that Pakistan allow Iranian troops to enter the country and hunt down insurgents, seems to be pointless bluster, as Islamabad will turn down the request quickly, if not sharply. This follows statements by Guard commander General Jafari, with the promise to retaliate against the US and Britain, that could have put the Government's political strategy --- based on engagement despite Sunday's events --- into disarray.

Possibly Ahmadinejad and the Guard are pursuing a good cop/bad cop strategy. Even so, the eyes of the Iranian military seem to have been diverted from the internal political situation. And with the Government occupied with other matters, there has been a curious silence --- both with respect to the Green movement and with respect to the National Unity Plan --- since last week.

This does not mean that the Government's power to assert its authority has been diminished. To the contrary, yesterday's announcement that the Iranian-American scholar Kian Tajbakhsh would spend 12 to 15 years in jail (a sentence passed several days ago) was meant to show that the fist was still clenched against supposed opponents at home and abroad.

Still, the space for political manouevre --- the space the regime hoped to close down with its threats, surveillances, and disruptions of communication --- has reopened. We still await the responses and unfoldings around Mir Hossein Mousavi's Sunday statement. Meanwhile, a well-placed EA source gives us another, equally important dimension.

This source advises, "Watch Qom". His interpretation is that the Grand Ayatollahs and Ayatollahs --- Dastgheib, Bayat-Zanjani, Sane'i, Safi Golpaygani --- are pressing for reforms to meet the post-election challenge, and he adds that none of those clerics are fans of Ahmadinejad. Just as significant, they do not operate in a vacuum but interact with "secular" players in the political game. So the vehement attack of the "conservative" member of Parliament Ali Motahari on the legitimacy of the President is not just because of Motahari's personal animosity and his connection with the Larijani brothers; it is also because Motahari, the son of an Ayatollah, is working with and reaction to another wave, this one from the Qom seminary.

It is 14 days to 13 Aban (4 November).

Iran Newsflash: Lawyer Shadi Sadr Wins Dutch Human Rights Award

The Latest from Iran (21 October): Room for a Challenge?

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An EA reader kindly sends us breaking news from the Dutch Foreign Ministry:

The Iranian human rights lawyer Shadi Sadr has won the 2009 Human Rights Defenders Tulip for her courage in championing the human rights of her fellow citizens. Netherlands Foreign Minister Maxime Verhagen will present the award in The Hague on Monday 9 November.

Ms Sadr defends the rights of women in Iran, where she works as a lawyer, journalist and researcher. "Shadi Sadr is being awarded the Human Rights Defenders Tulip for her exceptional courage, perseverance and work in an environment of concern, where human rights are repeatedly violated," said Mr Verhagen.

In her work as a lawyer, Ms Sadr defends women and human rights activists. In 2004, she set up Raahi, an organisation that seeks to improve women’s rights. Raahi provides free legal assistance, particularly in family law cases, to women in positions of acute difficulty. In addition, Ms Sadr is campaigning to abolish the practice of stoning to death in Iran. To this end, she co-founded the campaign "Stop Stoning Forever".

As a journalist, Ms Sadr writes for magazines, newspapers and websites. She combines these activities by regularly contributing critical articles about legal cases she has handled and about the way in which women are treated. For many years, she has been addressing taboo subjects such as domestic violence and bringing them out into the open.

Ms Sadr’s peaceful efforts on behalf of others have incurred a backlash of incidents. She has received personal threats and her phone has been tapped. In 2005, the authorities banned her from leaving the country for a year. In March 2007 she was arrested and imprisoned. During the unrest surrounding the presidential elections in Iran on 12 June this year, she was forcibly arrested and jailed for 11 days.

The award consists of a bronze sculpture of the Human Rights Tulip and a personal prize of €10,000. The winner may also submit a proposal for a project to the value of €100,000. This will enable Ms Sadr to intensify her work as a human rights defender and extend her network within the Netherlands and the rest of Europe.

UPDATED Iran: The Great Supreme Leader Health Mystery

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UPDATE 21 October: And just in case you're still doubting, the Supreme Leader's website has posted an audio and photo album from yesterday's meeting with female scholars.


UPDATE 1645 GMT: Ayatollah Khamenei’s official website has posted a photograph and full report of the Supreme Leader’s meeting with thousands of female scholars and teachers. Khamenei declared that Islam show its “respect and dignity for women and women’s talents” in the family, society, and national and international activities. He repeated his criticism of Western academia, specifically the humanities, for its teaching and worldview in contrast to an Iranian approach based on Qu’ranic principles. (Cross-posted from Latest Iran Updates, 20 October)

UPDATE 20 October 1615 GMT: The Supreme Leader did meet the head of Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, Ezatullah Zarghami, at the end of last week. Previously we had reported that the meeting was scheduled but, amidst the rumours about Ayatollah Khamenei's health, had no confirmation that it took place. (Cross-posted from Latest Iran Updates, 20 October)

Well, it's the morning after the pictures that were supposed to end all speculation about the fitness and health of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The images of the Supreme Leader with President Ahmadinejad and the visiting President of Senegal, Abdoulaye Wade, are most ordinary for a ceremonial photographs, and their message is that, after an extraordinary five days of rumour, possibility, and anxiety, all is ordinary with Iran's leadership.

Inevitably, Internet users (including Enduring America's staff) pored over the pictures to find inconsistencies and flaws that might point to a regime cover-up. Did the event even occur?

Fars News offered a curiosity when it ran a photograph different from that released by the Supreme Leader's office, with Wade in a suit rather than traditional African dress. And, indeed, the picture was of a June 2006 meeting. Yet the explanation turns out to be very mundane: all photographs are taken by Khamenei's private photographer, who then edits them and places them on the official website subject to the approval of the Supreme Leader's office. It may be hours between the news of a meeting and the emergence of any pictures, so an editor at Fars pushed out an old photo while waiting for the newer one. Wade was indeed wearing traditional dress on his visit to Tehran, a fact confirmed by his pictures at the reception at Ahmadinejad's compound.

Then there was the Photoshop speculation. Enduring America readers noticed an object which appeared to be in the same place on the same table in front of Khamenei in the 2006 and 2009 meetings. The possible, again mundane explanation, is one of habit or bureaucratic routine. The object appears to be a case or recording device used regularly on such occasions.

Some Iran-watchers are persisting with the Photoshop theory, and other rumours persist. The claim that Wade was only in Tehran for a few hours (which does not rule out a visit to Khamenei, since the Supreme Leader's office is only two blocks from the Presidential compound). The photographs are from Wade's February 2008 meeting with the Supreme Leader (we haven't yet found any pictures of that encounter). Former President Hashemi Rafsanjani tried to see Khamenei but was turned away.

My aversion to these hypotheses is because they over-complicate and thus distract from a far more important situation. In the middle of the speculation yesterday, an EA correspondent commented concisely, "He's alive, whether he's well, that's another story for another day!"

With respect, it's a matter for this day. The Supreme Leader's appearance, for at least the time it took to take the photographs, does not rule out the original story, which was that he had been taken ill earlier this week, and three doctors had been summoned to his home. (It does knock out, I think, the expansion of this into Khamenei being in hospital in a coma.) If that story is true, with the addition that the Supreme Leader was told no public appearances and only visits with family and friends, then it is a significant twist in the post-election tale. Khamenei was being firmly instructed to remove himself from the public arena but his office found, given the flurry of speculation, that removal is not possible --- sooner rather than later, he had to resurface.

That's still a big if. The origins of this rumour still lie with a single website, run by the "left" Iranian diaspora, relying on a single unnamed source. What gave the story legs were other curious developments such as the suspension of publication of several pro-Government newspapers.

So the issue is not whether "the Supreme Leader is still not dead", but how "still not dead" he is. This remains a most demanding political situation, to say the least, and a Khamenei who is less than 100%, let alone one who is significantly restricted by a prolonged illness, means new calculations by others in the manoeuvres for power.

Iran: Taking Apart the Jundallah-US Narrative

LATEST Iran Bombings: Former Pakistan Intelligence Chief Blames US
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The Latest from Iran (21 October): Room for a Challenge?

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UPDATE 1945 GMT: Take this for what it's worth from former CIA operative Robert Baer: "I've been told that the Bush Administration at one point considered Jundallah as a piece in a covert-action campaign against Iran, but the idea was quickly dropped because Jundallah was judged uncontrollable and too close to al-Qaeda. There was no way to be certain that Jundallah would not throw the bombs we paid for back at us."
--
We followed up Sunday's bombing in southeastern Iran with a discussion between EA's Mr Smith and Chris Emery on the likely attackers, the Baluch insurgent group Jundallah. Meanwhile, the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps and Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani were claiming that Jundallah was supported by foreign intelligence services, including US operatives.

EA correspondent Josh Mull dissects the Jundallah-US narrative to put some questions not about the claim but about the significance of the bombing. --- WSL

My immediate question is why the blaming of Jundallah head Abdolmalek Rigi automatically makes Tehran's anti-Western rhetoric more credible. Who else could they have named that would NOT lend credibility to their anti-Western rhetoric? The Kurdish PKK? The Baluchistan Liberation Army? The Mujahedin-e-Khalq? The US is said to have supported all of them against the Tehran regime at one point or another, so what makes Jundallah an extra-credible outlet for US activities?

Let's presume Tehran is telling the truth and that that was a deliberate covert action by the United States using Jundallah assets in Islamabad:

1. What is the specific motivation of the United States to use this specific tactic, with these specific assets, against this specific target, at this specific time?

2. This would be a grievous act of aggression against a country with which the US claims to be in diplomatic discussions. It is an attack massacring dozens more than the globally-condemned Taliban attacks against Indian personnel in Afghanistan. How does this reconcile with the US strategy of engagement on the nuclear issue?

3. What are China and Russia's motivations to continue along the US path, knowing that the US will commit these atrocities without regard to diplomatic consequences?

4. The Obama administration has previously claimed to have ceased aggressive covert actions against the Iranian regime, so is this an outright lie? What would be the motivation and benefits of covert operations?

5. What is the cost-benefit of outrageous suicide tactics against a worthless and irrelevant target? If you're going to use a suicide bomber, why not hit a nuclear facility, or something else important to US national security interests?

6. Why would Pakistan allow Jundallah assets to operate in Islamabad, given their well-known ties to the Baluch insurgency, who would likely jump at the chance to strike this deep in Pakistani territory?

7. Why would the US run such an incredibly sensitive operation out of one of their most watched Embassies on the planet? India, China, Russia, Saudi Arabia: all are highly operationally capable in Islamabad, and any aggressive covert actions which would compromise their own national security interests vis-a-vis the US and Iran would raise a lot of red flags and alarms.

8. Why not use closer, more efficient assets, such as an enormous special forces apparatus in Afghanistan, or similar forces in Iraq, or even sea-borne assets from the Persian Gulf? We're talking communications here, so why is a crowded and compromised embassy better than an invisible submarine or clandestine outpost?

9. If Iran really could decrypt US covert satellite communications, why not such evidence to the United Nations and/or the International Criminal Court? It constitutes a smoking gun.

If any of those questions could be answered, we might be on to something in blaming the US for a suicide bombing against an Iranian army base. Failing that, perhaps a simpler explanation might hold up. It appears that Jundallah has pulled off a spectacular and vicious attack against the institution most involved in the systematic oppression of Sunni and Baloch Iranian citizens.

We can presume that Jundallah perceives, far more acutely than we do, weakness in the regime. It may seek to exacerbate that weakness by antagonizing the military, the institution which oppresses them but would also be used to maintain order against a restive reformist movement as well. It can be reasoned that Jundallah calculates a reformist regime would be slightly more open to their demands than a fanatical, military-supported regime.