Iran After Qods Day: What Next for the Green Movement (The Sequel)?

Iran: The Lessons of Qods Day (Parts 1 and 2)
The Latest from Iran: Challenge Renewed (19 September)

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

Yesterday Mr Smith set out the questions for the Green Movement on Qods Day. Just over 24 hours later, this is his re-assessment of the prospects for the opposition, which intersects with Scott Lucas' appraisal of the long-term political challenges:

The Green Wave succeeded in its main objective yesterday. Ever since the start of Ramadan, the reformist opposition to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, led by Mehdi Karroubi, was striving to make Qods Day the focal point for anti-government demonstrations. The target was to "stand up and be counted", and to prove that the Green Wave rank and file have not been cowed into silence by the litany of violence unleashed against it by pro-government security forces.

The Quds Day events have set a precedent for the Green Wave. From now on, every public holiday, or event that includes a large public gathering, can now be exploited by the opposition as an opportunity. The demonstrators can fan out in the streets and highlight the government's main weakness, its behaviour like an administration that claims to have received 24 million votes in the "most free and fair elections ever". If nothing else, the reformists have and will succeed in causing serious embarrassment for the authorities, as the decision to air a football game in black-and-white and with muffled sound, hiding any reformist supporters in the stands - highlights.

The reformist leadership however, has failed to produce a structured, middle- to long-term strategy. Of its three main leaders, Mir-Hossein Mousavi, Mohammad Khatami and Mehdi Karroubi, it is Karroubi who has been most active and vocal lately, producing several hard-hitting communiques detailing allegations of rape and rebuking indirect notices by the Supreme Leader to back down over his claims. Possibly out of concern for the well-being of their close associates that have yet to be jailed, Mousavi and Khatami have retreated from adopting the same tactic. Mousavi continues to profess allegiance to the institutional configuration of the regime and the Constitution, and somewhat romantically links the current crisis to a distorted view, by the current incumbents, of the prerogatives assigned to institutions such as the Guardian Council, the Presidency
and , indirectly, the Supreme Leadership, without questioning, at least so far, the validity of the institutional configuration described within the current constitution. This could well prove to be a conceptual Achilles Heel for Mousavi.

The situation on the ground in Iran hence appears to be that of a nervous stalemate. The government is entrenched and appears unwilling to concede any sort of concession to the opposition. The latter is defiant, has the remarkable capacity to send thousands of its supporters out in the streets and coordinate them effectively via the Internet (web-designed slogans were sung with amazing coordination across the cities of Iran yesterday). However, the Green Wave is not yet willing to embark on a new level of challenge, one that would presumably see Karroubi, Mousavi, and Khatami upping the ante by, amongst other things, sending open letters straight to the Supreme Leader.

Also unresolved is the fate of the dozens of journalists, top reformist officials, and civil society activists who have been regularly arrested in the past three months. The regime is therefore likely to keep up the pressure and continue to retaliate against the opposition leaders by harassing their immediate associates. Meanwhile, Mousavi, Khatami and Karroubi will have to go back to the drawing board to ponder othe next stage of their strategies. The imminent end of Ramadan might be auspicious in this regard: Mousavi has promised that the official launch of his new political initiative, the "Green Wave of Hope", will immediately follow Sunday's Eid al-Fitr.

Iran: The Five Lessons of Qods Day

Iran After Qods Day: What Next for the Green Movement (The Sequel)?
The Latest from Iran: Challenge Renewed (19 September)
The Latest from Iran (18 September): Qods Day

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

1. THE VICTORY OF THE GREEN WAVE...

Let's start with the basic but important observation. After all the attempts of the regime has tried to crush dissent in the last three-plus months --- the speeches, the threats, the shutdown of communications, the arrests, the raids, the trials --- the protestors came out yesterday. They came out not in scattered groups of hundreds across the capital, not in the "few thousand" of initial estimates on Friday, not in the "several thousand" of our judgement after President Ahmadinejad's speech, not in the "10,000" to which we cautiously moved, but in "tens of thousands".

How many? That is now a statistical game with no resolution. What matters is that, for all the regime's attempts to force a recognition of its legitimacy, it has still not succeeded. By 1000 GMT, even as Ahmad Khatami was delivering the Friday Prayers, the President had been eclipsed by the story of "No Gaza, No Lebanon, My Life for Iran". Despite the regime's portrayal of "Israel/Palestine" as the meaning of the day (a plot which many in the "traditional" media shamefully, if unwittingly, abetted --- see below), despite all the smokescreens and the restrictions, the images and videos came out. Al Jazeera's footage told the story that its reporter could not --- streets were filled not just with pro-Government supporters but with those who wanted to make Qods Day a renewed marker of their anger and their hopes. That footage was already being complemented and even surpassed by the videos that made it out of the regime's grasp. And the stories also came through: via phone calls, via the e-mails that could not be blocked, via blogs, via the curiosity-now-fixture called Twitter.

By 1000 GMT, no one noticed the Friday Prayers being led by Ahmad Khatami. The Ahmadinejad speech was down the list. The demonstrations had become Qods Day.

And that victory was obtained despite, not because of, some conditions that had been thought essential. Mir Hossein Mousavi played at best a marginal and belated role, whether this was because his genuine participation in the rallies had been limited and then twisted by the Government or because he was simply unable to make his presence felt. And former President Rafsanjani --- the chants rang out, "Hashemi, where are you?" --- was nowhere. The opposition's Web outlets were filtered, taken down, curbed.

And still the marchers turned out.

2. ...SETS A NEW TEST FOR ITS LEADERSHIP

This, however, is not a final victory. It's not even a triumph in the sense of making the Government alter its path. That awaits the political manoeuvres and power plays that will once more come to the fore.

Mehdi Karroubi passed his personal test yesterday. Three months, he was "just" a well-liked cleric and politician who --- by regime manipulation or by the limits of his political range --- had received less than two percent of the Presidential vote. Now he is the symbolic figure for many in the Green Wave. He has carried the fight in his letters, statements, and his encounters with Government officials. And today, by virtue of a well-organised office and communciations network, a focus on the injustices and abuses of the regime, and a personal charisma and persistence, he is at the head of the opposition as the next challenges are faced.

Mohammad Khatami is now in an important supporting role. His place yesterday was limited but quite visible, when the news and eventually pictures of his encounter with security forces, forcing him to withdraw from the rally, emerged. Now he returns to discussions with the reformist clerics and political parties who seek to link up with other factions to press their case against the President and, to an extent, the Supreme Leader.

And Mir Hossein Mousavi? The episode of the pictures --- "Was he at the rallies? And, if so, with whom?" --- has deeper roots in both the initial hope for his leadership of the Green movement and the later doubts as his public visibility was replaced by a series of statements. On reflection, I think this is more because of Government success than Mousavi's failure: this is one case where the threats and the sabotage of communications has drawn the net tighter and tighter around a leader. However, the return to basics brings this recognition: on 30 July, Mousavi was turned away from the "40th Day" memorial when Karroubi pressed on, and yesterday, when Karroubi (and Khatami) were able to show persistence and defiance, Mousavi could not.

Yet, as I write, I recognise that this attention to "leaders" might be contributing to the regime effort to limit the movement and its achievements. For, while the MKK trio are significant, opposition to the Government and the system has come in the last month from a wider range of political and clerical voices. In particular, the message out of Qom is that a majority of the Grand Ayatollahs and Ayatollahs want significant change to preserve the Islamic Republic. The paradox is that, as their role has been increasingly constricted by a move by President and his allies away from "Islamic" and "Republic" to "secular" and "authoritarian", space for their views is being opened up by the complementary presence of public opposition. That is why the Government has swung at them with a heavy hand by jailing their relatives, a step which I suspect may produce more problems than solutions for the regime.

3. AHMADINEJAD STUMBLES

We have underestimated the President throughout this crisis and we may do so again, but yesterday --- at least inside Iran --- was a powerful slap in the face to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

It was a slap felt in an episode just after the President's attempt to seize and define the political agenda with his introduction of Friday Prayers. As he spoke to IRIB Channel 2, the chant rose up behind him, "Ahmadi, Ahmadi, Resign, Resign!" All the weeks of promoting himself, standing up to the Supreme Leader, challenging Hashemi Rafsanjani, and smiting his reformist opponents, and a few voices (may they be protected) had whipped off the Emperor's clothes.

There is a powerful paradox here: Ahmadinejad's speech in itself was a politically shrewd one. He avoided any recognition of internal difficulties by playing the Israel/Palestine card (and throwing in Native Americans as well). For those at home, it represented, "I'm in charge here leading Iran, and Iran leads the world." For those abroad, it was, "C'mon. Take me on. Recognise me."

And the second part of that effort worked. Outlet after outlet in the "West" fell for the "Ahmadi Denies Holocaust" line. This was supplemented by the President's interview with NBC television (added to the Iranian declaration that 137 foreign media representatives had been granted permits to cover Qods Day), which has now become, "Ahmadi Won't Give Up His Nukes". It is a repeat of the political cycle of the last four days, only this time it is more for the President's preservation than Iran's grand geopolitical contests.

Where Ahmadinejad failed was at home. He failed not because of the speech but because it followed a stark, heavy-handed effort to wipe out dissent. And all it took was the first signs of the dissent to realise that his contest is not over. Legitimacy may await him in New York this week, but it is not guaranteed at home.

4. THE WANDERINGS OF THE SUPREME LEADER

This is a lesson of absence. I'm not sure that our updates yesterday ever mentioned Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

If this was just a case of Qods Day, would not be that significant. After all, it is Hashemi Rafsanjani who has had the lead role on this occasion over the last 25 years; there is no requirement for the Supreme Leader to come to the fore for the political symbolism of supporting Palestine.

This Qods Day, however, is in a wider political arena, one which the Supreme Leader jumped into hours after the Presidential polls closed. With that decision, he put his own authority on the line, and much of the story of the last three months has been whether he ensured or damaged that authority. So absence yesterday comes not in the midst of certitude of his Supreme Leadership but in the question of whether Khamenei is now scrambling for position vs. his own President.

Nice mirror image: if Mir Hossein Mousavi has to re-establish his political relevance in forthcoming days, so does the cleric who denied him the Presidency in that very political move on the night of 12 June.

5. AND NEXT? THE LONG(ER) MARCH

My colleague Mr Smith projected yesterday that the outcome of the Qods Day protests and manoeuvres would be a continued stalemate, both between forces within the system and between the regime and opposition.

I can see the merit of the assessment but I beg to differ re "stalemate" (Mr Smith uses the word again today, but I think his surprise at the large turnout may have bring a shift in his analysis). Stalemate indicates no movement, and yesterday was a rejection of deadlock, both in the slogans and the politics.

This does not mean, to repeat, "revolution" (even if that was the goal of the protesters, which it most certainly is not). Rather, it is a quest to find spaces and to open up new ones for negotiation. In practical terms, that is likely to return us immediately to the dance over arrests and detentions. But, in addition to the less visible and flammable but equally important dimensions of the economy and governance --- take note that foreign policy and the nuclear programme are not on that list --- those issues carry the wider question of Ahmadinejad's authority.

If this was a President and his allies inclined to compromise, I could see the way out. Stop mentioning the internal enemies, not only in yesterday's speech but in statements to come. Gradually release the detainees and stop the show trials. Do not crush but isolate Karroubi, Khatami, Mousavi, and the dissident clerics, hoping that with time fatigue and resignation will ensure no more large demonstrations.

This is probably the resolution sought by the Supreme Leader, notably in the meetings held by Ali Larijani with Mehdi Karroubi and with senior clerics. Already, however, the question has arisen whether there is any flexibility in the system: the smack-down of Karroubi's claims on detainee abuse by the Judiciary committee indicate either that bureaucracy is not prone to any meaningful talks or that the Presidency, rather than the Supreme Leader, has the upper hand in the system.

For this is not a President inclined to compromise. So he, and probably the Revolutionary Guard behind him, are likely to wield the heavy hand. There would seem to be limits to how far they can go --- dare they risk the arrest of the opposition leadership? --- but I am not sure, in a game of Political Chicken, whether they will let up on the accelerator and avoid a possibly catastrophic showdown with the opposition.

More importantly, and this is where the long(er) march comes, I am not sure whether Ahmadinejad yet realises that he may be aiding the opposition in the Iranian version of "What Does Not Kill You, Makes You Stronger". This President and his allies may have thought they would land a knock-out blow with their swinging of the last week, but when the bell finally rang last night, the opposition was still standing.

Welcome to a contest which just went beyond 15 rounds.

The Latest from Iran (18 September): Qods Day

NEW Qods Day Video Special: The Black-and-White Soccer Game
NEW Iran's Qods Day: The Participants Speak
Qods Day: The Discussion Continues
Iran Qods Day: Snap Analysis and Summary Translation of Ahmadinejad Speech
NEW Iran Video: Qods Day Protests (18 September)
UPDATED Iran: The Full NBC TV Interview with President Ahmadinejad
NEW Iran: What’s at Stake on Qods Day for Green Movement and Regime?
Iran: So, What Are the Green Movement’s Goals Tomorrow?


Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

2135 GMT: The Best Rumour of the Day (1745 GMT) is now Fun Fact of the Day. Iranian state television did show tonight's football match in black-and-white, and we've got the video.

2040 GMT: An Important Note to Close (For Now). I was going to hold this until morning, but as a reader has noted on the discussion thread, it is far too important a development to be treated lightly.

Advar reports what we have been observing since yesterday: there are worrying signs that the Internet is being strangled inside Iran, with slowing speeds. An EA correspondent adds reports from Iran that other services, such as Yahoo Messenger and Gmail, are unreachable and anti-filter mechanism are also almost completely down. He asks, "Could this be the start of the Government's [next] crackdown?"

2006 GMT: I'm Going to Tell You One More Time, New York Times (1155 GMT). Your headline writer has his priorities wrong: "Amid Large Protests, Iran Leader Calls Holocaust a Lie".

Here's your rewrite: "Despite President's Israel Diversion, Large Protests Challenge Government".

(I swear that I wrote this seven minutes before reading this from the National Iranian American  Council, "The NYT editors need some help today. Their coverage shouldn’t be entitled, 'Amid Large Protests, Iran Leader Calls Holocaust a Lie'. The real headline should be 'Thousands Protest at Rallies Despite Threats'.")

1950 GMT: A Good Mystery to End the Night: Why Did Ali Larijani Meet the Clerics?

Tehran Bureau, drawing from Tabnak, has part but only part of the story: "Majlis [Parliament] speaker Ali Larijani has secretly met with Grand Ayatollah Naser Makarem-Shirazi at his residence in Qom." The full story is that Larijani met not only Makarem-Shirazi but also Ayatollahs Nouri-Hamedani and Safi-Golpaygani to "discuss current important issues of the country".

So why has Larijani sat down with three clerics who have criticised the Government to varying degrees, including one (Safi-Golpaygani) who was castigated by the Supreme Leader for sending a letter criticising the Cabinet? Try this: just as Larijani, acting for Ayatollah Khamenei, called in Mehdi Karroubi at the start of this week to ask him to quiet down, now he is carrying the Supreme Leader's message that it would be best for all concerned if everyone stepped back from public criticism.

The problem for Larijani and Khamenei is that today's demonstrations are likely to embolden the senior clerics, making it more difficult to bring them in line.

1845 GMT: Two New Entries. Because of all the great discussion amongst the readers, we've started a new thread for debate.

And, thanks to an excellent EA source, we've got first-hand observations from participants in marches in five different locations across Tehran. The Best Rumour of the Day about the Football Match (1745 GMT)? It's true. The heckling of Ahmadinejad when he was talking with IRIB Channel 2 after his speech ("Ahmadi, Ahmadi, Resign, Resign!")? Also very true.

1745 GMT: Best Rumour of Day. "Only parts of today's soccer match were televised [by state media], in black and white without sound, hiding green effects and chants."

And it gets better: "State TV sports commentator says we only have one camera at the soccer match and it is not functioning."

1738 GMT: Picture. (Tens of) Thousand(s of) Words. How big were the rallies? Well, going through the visual evidence including this entry's photo, taken in Azadi Square, we will now say that "tens of thousands" were marching and demonstrating today.

1733 GMT: Another Arrest. Fatemeh Dardkeshan, daughter of the reformist activist (and student of Ayatollah Montazeri) Mahmoud Dardkeshan, has been detained.

1732 GMT: The Jostling of Khatami. This photo of the former President being bumped into retreat (reminiscent of Mehdi Karroubi being jostled at the 17 July Friday Prayers of Hashemi Rafsanjani) has emerged.



1730 GMT: Reports that SMS is being reconnected in Tehran.

1700 GMT: The buzz is still about whether or not Mir Hoseein Mousavi showed up today, with the claim of a second photograph and a new report from "a witness" claiming that "supporters rushed Mousavi into his car when the hard-liners approached". To be honest with you (and foreshadowing our Saturday analysis), however, the issue is not as much about the authenticity of the pictures as it is the legitimacy of Mousavi's leadership.

"Everyone" knows that Mehdi Karroubi made a stand by appearing at the rallies today. "Everyone" knows that Mohammad Khatami went to the rally and was jostled into retreat. But not everyone knows that Mousavi made a public stand. They are not certain if he participated and, if he did so, whether he was with the protestors or "pro-Government" crowds.

In other words, Mousavi has done a lot with written statements since July but writing in this case is cheap. What is at issue here is whether Mousavi (as he did early in the crisis) is a public face as well as an author for "The Green Path of Hope".

1530 GMT: Radio Farda says 800 protesters have gathered in front of Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting buildings in north Tehran.

1450 GMT: Internet is still buzzing with reports of clashes inside and outside Tehran. One that has received press support is of a crackdown by security forces in Isfahan.

1420 GMT: Josh Shahryar has written concisely and effectively about the issues surrounding the claimed picture of Mir Hossein Mousavi at today's rally (see 1335 GMT).

1415 GMT: More Cyber-Wars. Rah-e-Sabz reports that it, like other sites such as Mowj-e-Sabz, has been under attack. The site claims that much of the Internet in Iran was cut off or restricted in anticipation of today's rallies.

1400 GMT: A Journalist's Ponderings. Hard on the heels of her interview with President Ahmadinejad, NBC's Ann Curry offers this exclusive insight, "Ahmadinejad on Twitter: 'I don't have a problem with it. But it should not be used for wrong purposes.'"

So has this posted because Ms Curry is in agreement with her interviewee, considering Twitter to be a dangerous inconvenience to proper politics and journalism? Or could she, after the follies of NBC's excursion to Iran, be reflecting that the President sees Twitter as more of a threat --- opening avenues of information and analysis --- than the woman who just interviewed him?

1335 GMT: Mousavi Mystery. As Afshin has noted in comments below, there is a photograph which claims to be of Mir Hossein Mousavi at the Qods Day rally today. There is a great deal of confusion, as the photograph has been posted by the Facebook site run by supporters of Mousavi and by Mehr News, which claims it shows Mousavi supporting a pro-Government rally.

For now, we're treating the picture as suspect and a possible weapon in a war of information/disinformation, as there has been no other indication that Mousavi made it to the rally today.

1315 GMT: More Arrests of Clerics' Relatives? Mowj-e-Sabz reports, "In the protests today, Hamed, Naser and Hajar Montazeri - grandchildren of Ay Montazeri were arrested. Marzia Elahinia, Hamed Montazeri's wife, and Sara Azizi, Naser Montazeri's wife, were also arrested. Ayatollah Rabbani's daughter Loya Rabbani and her daughter Zahra Dostmohammadi and Mohammad Hossein Rabbani another of his grandchildren were also arrested."

Some confusion here as three of Montazeri's grandchildren were reported to have been arrested earlier this week and it is unclear if there are more grandchildren being arrested, the same grandchildren being detained again, or a mix of two reports. In any case, the regime's pressure on the senior clerics who are challeging it is now very apparent.

1250 GMT: And Yes, Virginia, There is a Khatami. Mohammad Khatami was at the Qods Day rally today, if only briefly. Parleman News posts a set of pictures, two of which we've reproduced. The first is Khatami's arrival; the second may be an indication of the security forces' response that forced Khatami to leave.



1155

1155 GMT: We've moved Mr Smith's outstanding near-live translation of the Ahmadinejad speech from our updates to a separate entry, together with his snap analysis of the President's language and strategy.

I've only seen the headlines on "mainstream" coverage of the speech, but I'll put down a marker. Any news service that frames this as "Ahmadinejad Revives Holocaust Myth" (oh, look, The New York Times has just fulfilled our prediction) or "Ahmadinejad Bashes Israel" is missing the big picture. The real story is that Ahmadinejad avoided comment on the challenge to him within Iran, so the Israel angle is simply a high-profile diversion (and one that I suspect will work with most "Western" journalists).

The second smokescreen, thanks to NBC's supposed masterpiece of coverage, will be incessant recycling of Ahmadinejad's comments on talks with the US over Iran's nuclear programme, ignoring what should have been today's focus on the Qods Day rallies.

1120 GMT: Cyber-Attacks. After Parleman News reported last night that it is being filtered by the Government, preventing access inside Iran, the Green movement's site Mowj-e-Sabz is now down.

1100 GMT: Yes, Virginia, There is a Mehdi. Confirmation that Mehdi Karroubi was at the Qods Day rally today comes in a video posted on the Facebook pages of Mir Hossein Mousavi. We're now posting it in our video section.

1045 GMT: Rah-e-Sabz posts an overview of protests, arrests, and clashes in "Bushehr, Rasht, Tabriz, Isfahan, Shiraz, Isfahan, Ahvaz, Mashhad...."

1030 GMT: How Big? As you can appreciate, we are erring on side of caution in making projections on size of rally. But, looking across video evidence (some of it posted in our separate entry), I would now go beyond "several thousand" protesting in Tehran. Does the question go beyond, "Ten Thousand?" to "How many tens of thousands?"

1015 GMT: Oh, Yeah, The Friday Prayer. Apparently Ahmad Khatami said, "There are two basic reasons for our support for Palestine and Quds, first because Muslims are a single nation and second because we support the oppressed....The Zionists have tried to make this Quds Day a failure but they will not succeed". And so on.

1010 GMT: So "Where Is Mir Hossein Mousavi?" Here's the answer from the Islamic Republic News Agency: "Strong protests of people to Khatami, Mousavi and Karroubi's presence at Qods demonstration". The newspaper reports, "Mousavi showed up at Vali-Asr intersection at 12 noon with a few bodyguards, and was forced to retreat after confronted with people shouting "Death to Mousavi the hypocrite, Mousavi, Mousavi Shameless". It adds that Khatami and Karroubi were also forced away.

Al Jazeera is now reporting this although "it cannot verify".

0935 GMT: Catching Our Breath for Questions. The news that Mohammad Khatami was "attacked" and forced away from the rally seems solid (0809 GMT). But did Mehdi Karroubi appear and speak to the marchers (0633 GMT).

And where is Mir Hossein Mousavi?

0930 GMT: Mowj-e-Sabz is now reporting clashes and "violent situation" in Isfahan and clashes and arrests in Tabriz.

0915 GMT: Classic (and Accurate) Quote of Day. It's from Josh Shahryar, "Get yer cokes and pizzas folks. It's gonna be a long day."

0910 GMT:More on Rallies. Al Jazeera is already bumping the President aside for the marches, as their footage indicates there may be more than the "several thousand" we just projected. CNN's Reza Sayah on Twitter claims, "3-4 kilometre stretch between Vali Asr Square & Laleh Park packed with tens of thousands of opposition supporters".

0845 GMT: How Big Are the Rallies? Images on Al Jazeera television show masses of people on the move, and Agence France Presse is claiming "tens of thousands" from witnesses.

A source inside Iranian media has told EA that the internal broadcast feed is showing 3000-3500 demonstrators. Based on the reports, we now feel comfortable saying “several thousand” Green Wave supporters are marching, wearing green wristbands, with the largest confirmed rally at the Vali-e Asr intersection, near Tehran University on Enghelab Street.

(We think that the AFP report of "tens of thousands" may include not only Green Wave supporters but also onlookers and some Ahmadinejad supporters who are also present or are on way to Tehran University.)

0809 GMT: Parleman News claims confirmation of reports, which we have been followed, that former President Mohammad Khatami was "attacked" and forced to leave the Qods Day rally. The newspaper claims this was done at the behest of the son of the editor of Kayhan newspaper, Hossein Shariatmadari.

0745 GMT: President Ahmadinejad starting his speech introducing Friday Prayers. See our separate summary translation.

0740 GMT: Excuse of Day (So Far). Iranian state TV says, “Unfortunately we can't covered Qods Days rallies with helicopter because security forces have prevented us.”

0730 GMT: Reports coming in of preparation for Friday Prayers in Tehran. Government figures such as Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki in crowd, President Ahmadinejad arriving.

0715 GMT: EA correspondent confirms following Twitter claim, "Iranian State TV broadcasting the protests without sound and saying people are chanting for Palestine". He adds, "Footage is very sanitised."

0710 GMT: Counter-claim. Well-placed source in Iranian media tells EA correspondent that "few hundred" have gathered in Tehran squares. No mention of Karroubi or Khatami amongst protestors. Source says this is from "internal (and thus unseen) broadcast feeds", not what is actually being aired on State TV.

0705 GMT: Reported chanting of "Long Live Montazeri!! Viva Sane'i" (praising two Grand Ayatollahs who have criticised the Government) at Karim-Khan Bridge.

0700 GMT: Reports that tear gas has been used in 7 Tir Square to disperse crowds.

0633 GMT: And The Plan Rolls Out. Mehdi Karroubi is speaking in 7 Tir Square, shouting "Death to Oppression!". Mohammad Khatami is also reported to be present.

0630 GMT: Reports of clashes in Isfahan's Enghelab Square.

If the plan laid out by Mehdi Karroubi's office yesterday is being followed, he should be marching to and possibly arriving in 7 Tir Square now.

0615 GMT: An Important Caution. We are being very careful about reports of numbers and intensity of protests. While those passing information are well-intentioned, the claims are always prone to exaggeration or distortion as they are passed along.

That said, there are signs that these will be the largest gatherings since June. One report from a source in Tehran: "There's too many people [at 7 Tir Square]. The [security] forces are just watching in awe."

0610 GMT: Unconfirmed reports that marchers gathering in Qom.

CNN, after days ignoring Iran, has now decided this is a Very Important Story, previewing Ahmadinejad's speech with "Tense in Tehran" and "High Alert".

0555 GMT: Reports from numerous sources of chanting from protestors, including "God is Great", "Yah Hossein! Mir Hossein!", and "Death to the Dictator". Also people are gathering under Karim Khan Bridge chanting "No Gaza, No Lebanon --- My Life for Iran".

0535 GMT: Mowj-e-Sabz, the website of the Green movement, is filled with reports of Revolutionary Guard warnings. Thursday's statements are reported as "IRGC Preparing for Bloodbath", and then there is this claim: "According to an informed source, the security forces, based on prior plans, intend to arrest Mir-Hossein Moussavi and Mehdi Karroubi following the Quds Day Marches.""

0515 GMT: It is now 9:45 a.m. in Tehran. There are reported gatherings in Tehran at 7 Tir, Vanak, and Mirdamak Squares. Uniformed security forces are gathering in Enghelab Square near Tehran University. Claims also of gatherings in Tabriz, Isfahan, and Shiraz.

From ePersian Radio via Twitter source: "Big crowd [latest report of 1000+] in 7 Tir square, most are wearing green, lots of basijis/soldiers." Another source claims, from ePersian Radio, that Grand Ayatollahs Montazeri and Sane'i have said they will join the rally.

Iran: What's at Stake on Qods Day for Green Movement and Regime?

The Latest from Iran (18 September): Qods Day

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

Enduring America's Mr Smith prepares for today:

Qods Day is going to be a significant development in the post-June 12 election drama that has gripped Iran. It will probably be at least equivalent in significance to 17 July, when former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani delivered a strong sermon stressing the need to respect popular will within the confines of the Islamic Republic's elite.

The reformists are chasing a few important goals in tomorrow's demonstration. First and foremost, it gives an opportunity both for the leadership and the rank and file supporters of the Green Wave to "stand up and be counted". It will be the possible setting for a morale-boosting strong presence. Protestors will be back in the streets of central Tehran, following month of retreat from the waning but ever-lively cycle of martyr commemorations and street demonstrations that proceeded unabated from 13 June to the end of July. It will also be an opportunity to indicate that the most recent tool of repression set loose by the regime, the indiscriminate raping of opposition supporters that joined baton attacks and occasional murder as methods of coercion, did not succeed in dampening the morale of the reformist supporters.


Of the reformist leaders, Mousavi is the one that needs to capitalise most from marching alongside his supporters. The former Prime Minister has largely played second fiddle to the other defeated moderate candidate, Mehdi Karroubi, in the latter part of the three-month post-election saga. He has lost the lead in producing communiques challenging the regime, and he has not produced anything as ground-breaking and earth-shattering as Karroubi's series of strong accusations regarding rape that has cost the former Majlis speaker the ban of his long-running newspaper, Etemade Melli, but has won him tremendous popular support. Likewise, former president Mohammad Khatami has largely lurked in the shadows since initially coming out strongly and challenging the Supreme Leader in very thinly veiled terms for the Kahrizak Prison abuses. Both Mousavi and Khatami will therefore need to augment their stature as reformist leaders, as neither is yet ready to bow to Karroubi. Although the three are adamant opponents of Ahmadinejad, they are also vying at the same time for the leadership of the opposition.

The government forces have several paths to tread with utmost care. Ahmadinejad will be heading to New York within hours of the Friday Qods Day events, and he will most likely want to avoid arriving in the Big Apple to account for yet another high violence toll in what is going to be a long sparring match with the international media. Likewise, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei will want to minimise public violence in the first, major street demonstration to hit Iran during Ramadan for at least 30 years. It is therefore to be expected that the ordinary law enforcement forces will have the order to keep violence at a minimum. The same cannot be applied to the Basiji and other autonomous forces, who are probably going to unleash violence of their own accord. The traditional itinerary of the Qods Day march also poses serious logistical problems for the government, starting as it does in various parts of the city to converge in front of the University, where participants would usually go and attend Friday prayers.

The complex scenario above leads to think that Qods will effectively protract the stalemate between the various contenders in Iran's chess game. The government will not find solace in the fact that Iran's calendar is replete with other religious festivities and anniversaries that the reformist opposition can use at will to return to the streets. In the background, impenetrable as ever, stands Hashemi Rafsanjani, who inched closer to the opposition this week as he was thrusted out of the leadership of the first Qods prayer in almost a quarter century. The million-dollar question was, and remains, does he really have the power to break that stalemate and is he willing to do so?

Iran: The Supreme Leader and the Larijani-Karroubi Meeting

Iran’s Chess Match: Setting Up the Pieces for Friday
The Latest from Iran (16 September): Smoke Before Battle

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

Maryam at Keeping the Change has posted an article on Monday's meeting between Speaker of the Parliament Ali Larijani and Mehdi Karroubi, offering important detail on the discussion. Equally significant is her reading of the power politics behind the encounter:

"The combination of these contradictory tactics may indicate that Khamanei is carefully crafting a strategy for resolving the post-election conflict that applies these different forms of pressure where appropriate. At the same time, however, Khamanei's approach could indicate that the Supreme Leader has a thin, unguided non-strategy and is simply throwing all his resources at the Opposition, in a desperate attempt to end the political standoff -- on this analysis, Khamanei's alternative use of aggression and diplomacy is less an affirmative, calculated decision and more a reaction to the failure of one or the other approach."

Maryam's reading is a vital contrast to our analysis, developed this morning, that it is President Ahmadinejad and his allies that are in the lead with the Supreme Leader scrambling to regain his own position. At the same time, her pondering of "careful strategy" v. "non-strategy" could be applied not only to Ayatollah Khamenei but to the Government's measures in the run-up to Qods Day.

More Details on Karroubi's Meeting Monday with Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani

The website Rouydad adds additional detail to the earlier piece we posted from Karroubi's news outlet, Eteemade Melli. According to this newest report, during yesterday's meeting Karroubi informed Larijani of his concerns with the work of the three-man committee investing the prisoner rape and assault claims, as well as the actions of the state news agecy "Voice & Visage." At the end of the meeting Karroubi reportedly told Larijani of his hope that "unlike his brother [Sadegh Larijani], [Ali Larijani] will not sell his religion to the world." The report goes on to claim that Larijani asked Karroubi to "keep quiet" until the domestic situation improves, promising that his allegations would be properly investigated once calm had been restored. Karroubi replied, "I would prefer death to remaining quite in the face of these violations."

Interestingly, Rouydad's account of the meeting begins with a quotation from a source inside Parliament, stating that: "On the orders of the Supreme Leader, Larijani met with Karroubi. Mr. Larijani is the bearer of the Leader's message." With this in mind, Larijani's request for restraint from Karroubi and Karroubi's purported refusal to do so take on added signficance. As we observed in our earlier post on this meeting, it appears that the Refomists' hand is not as weak as some have suggested and that attempts at conciliation have not been wholly put aside by the Supreme Leader. If anything, this development, taken together with the events of the last week, may indicate that Khamanei is taking multiple approaches to the post-election conflict. On the one hand, he appears to be using some elements of his arsenal, such as the Revolutionary Guard, to strike a confrontational approach with the Reformists, while at the same time using other allies, such as the hardline pragmatic Ali Larijani, to pursue negotiations with Opposition leaders.

The combination of these contradictory tactics may indicate that Khamanei is carefully crafting a strategy for resolving the post-election conflict that applies these different forms of pressure where appropriate. At the same time, however, Khamanei's approach could indicate that the Supreme Leader has a thin, unguided non-strategy and is simply throwing all his resources at the Opposition, in a desperate attempt to end the political standoff -- on this analysis, Khamanei's alternative use of aggression and diplomacy is less an affirmative, calculated decision and more a reaction to the failure of one or the other approach. This reading is borne out by a pattern which appears to have developed post June 12, with periods of intense confrontation followed by spurts of appeasement and vice-versa (witness the fourth Tehran trials and accusations against Reformist leaders of collusion with foreign governments, followed by Khamanei's public statements denying the possibility of any such conspiracy) .

In all likelihood, it is the second analysis that may best capture Khamanei's mindset -- Khamanei is, after all, known to be less than an astute politician, with a tendency to favor uncompromising, agressive political strategies to diplomacy. He is, as such, disinclined to pursue appeasement unless his preferred confrontational approach has failed. In this vein, the recent events surrounding Karroubi are telling. After the raid on his offices, the closure of his newspaper, and the threats of arrest against him have all failed to silence Karroubi, Khamanei may have decided that conciliation should, at least in the short term, be explored. If Karroubi remains defiant, however, we should expect to see Khamanei return to his tried and true aggressive posture.

Other than providing potential insight into Khamanei's political strategy, Karroubi's meeting with Larijani should serve as a small reminder of the in-roads made by the Reformists over the last two months and of the Government's heretofore inability to decisively snuff out the Movement's leaders. There is little doubt that the current situation inside the country, as well as the Government's response, is unique in the history of the Islamic Republic. This is hardly the Iran of 1988, when thousands of political activists were summarily executed, expelled, and otherwise removed from the Iranian political scene. Of course, the circumstances were differen then: those killed and exiled during that period were hardly Establishment darlings, but rather were, by and large, members of dissident groups ideologically opposed to the Islamic Republic; moreover, their elimination was religiously sanctioned by a fatwa issued by Ayatollah Khomeini. Perhaps more tellingly, however, the recent events in Iran also bear little ressemblance to the atmosphere that reigned during the Presidency of Mohammad Khatami, when the Reformists remained cowed and unable to unite against the conservative forces that were working to disrupt Khatami's efforts at change.

Outside of the brutal crackdown against demonstrators, the Government has not yet resorted to large scale violence, such as mass executions or targeted assassinations of Movement leaders, to resolve the crisis. At the same time, the Reformists have managed to maintain some semblance of unity (with Khatami, Karroubi, and Mousavi almost appearing to alternate in the role of "Movement Leader"). Moreover, the Opposition has adapted its tactics in order to maintain pressure on the Government, focusing its message less directly on the election issue and more on the events and incidents that occurred in the aftermath of the dispute, such as the show trials and allegations of prisoner rape and abuse. While these may seem like modest accomplishments, the country's history of political repression and opposition to reform over the last 30 years make them the signposts of a society in transition.

As always, trying to predict where this conflict is headed is futile. What we can conclude, however, is that the Establishment has yet to achieve a decisive victory and that this failure, in and of itself, may tell us more about the future of Iran than any one arrest, office closure, or high-ranking political meeting ever will.