Truth and Reconciliation in/for Iran? A Roundtable Discussion

The Latest from Iran (11 August): Rafsanjani’s Decision

On July 31st, a politically diverse group of 31 academics, students, and anti-war protestors published an open letter in The Guardian of London, criticising what they viewed as the western media’s one-sided coverage of the post-election developments in Iran.   Foremost amongst the fallacies they perceived was the portrayal of the election results as “the start of a ‘velvet’ revolution against the Islamic Republic". At the same time, the letter alleged that the US State Department has used the crisis to “justify its continuation of Bush-era policies of financing anti-Iranian government organisations". Not only was this an act of political opportunism on the part of advocates of regime change, this interference and propaganda campaign aided the Iranian Government’s crackdown on the opposition and slowed the pace of democratic progress.

The authors contend that is only without foreign threats and interference that “the Iranian people [can] reach their aspirations of freedom and establish their unity in a framework of independence and national sovereignty.” For the reformist and Green Movement to affect real change in Iran, there must be a reversal of the West’s opposition to Tehran’s nuclear program and an “end [to] all their illegitimate economic, political and military pressures aimed at the internal destabilization of Iran".

Beyond this critique of Western policy towards Iran, the authors issued suggestions for finding a “reasonable solution for the conflict”. They demanded of the Government an end to attacks upon activists and the immediate release of political detainees. The letter also calls for a spirit of national conciliation facilitated by the establishment of an “independent truth and national reconciliation commission with representation from all candidates, such that it can gain the trust of the people of Iran". Addressing the leaders of the reformists and the Green movement, the authors suggest that “in order to prevent exploitation of the current crisis by western propaganda and opportunist groups, they unambiguously oppose all sanctions and condemn regime change. operations and any foreign support for the anti-Islamic Republic opposition".

The publication of this letter provoked a spirited debate within academic circles, so Enduring America invited interested parties to participate in a roundtable discussion. The exchanges touched upon all the issues raised in the letter but also spread to a wider debate on how the academic and media approach critical analysis of Iran. Participants included: Siavush Randjbar-Daemi, a Doctoral Candidate in Contemporary Iranian History at Royal Holloway, University of London. Holding dual Iranian citizenship, he has reported extensively on Iranian affairs for national Italian newspapers; Dr Farideh Farhi, a leading US-based scholar of Iran and co-author of the letter; Chris Emery, a British-based Doctoral Candidate who has written on Iranian affairs for The Guardian and contributes regularly to Enduring America; and Nathan Coombs, a Doctoral Candidate in London who specialises in revolutionary politics and is co-editor of the Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies.

SIAVUSH RANDJBAR-DAEMI: The authors introduce themselves as “anti-war activists” and proudly highlight their recent efforts against the “the pervasive deception created by western and Israeli-influenced media”. The group further attempts to remember that it does not wish to see a particular faction in Iran advance its goals, rather they wish to see the country’s “national rights” to be respected and be borne to fruition.

Like many Iranians across the globe, this group has been taken aback from the aftermath of the heady June 12 elections. They state that they wish to “help develop realistic solutions for the benefit of all our compatriots of whatever political persuasion” and particularly propose the creation of a South African-styled “Truth and Reconciliation Commission” to solve the current divergence internal to the regime and express hope that the large number of political activists and civil society practitioners currently imprisoned and facing trial will be freed soon.

What makes the “Open Letter” unappealing for informed readers are the frequent generalisations contained in some of its salient points. Particularly of concern is the lampooning of the Western media. While it is certainly true that segments of the European or American press have been incorrect if not entirely libellous in their respective Iranian coverage in past years - as unconfirmed scoops on the supposed military capabilities of the Iranian nuclear programme or the fake Yellow star story published by Canadian National Post in 2006 suggest - the concept that Western media as a whole has acted in unison to portray a constant skewed, biased and negative image of Iran is questionable. Even more alarming are sweeping judgements such as “The western media, by their one-sided coverage of the post-election developments, portrayed the street demonstrations protesting the election results as the start of a "velvet" revolution against the Islamic Republic”.

At the heart of this particular issue lies a more tangible definition of the “Western media”. The tendency to identify the latter with a few well known villains of the piece, such as BBC, CNN, Fox or Al Jazeera runs into serious trouble if one were to be present in media events in Tehran in the week preceding and following June 12. Nothing less than hundreds of reporters were accredited by the Iranian Culture Ministry for the elections, and most of whom catered for audiences that went in to the hundreds of thousands, if not millions. Coordination across several time-zones, languages as well as experience in direct reporting from Iran that went from journalists on their first assignment in Tehran to experienced hands who pointed out to sign-posts left unchanged since 1979 to produce any sort of “one-sided coverage” was well-nigh impossible. Rather than preach the ills of an inherently diverse group of reporters, the authors could have spent more time detailing the specific parts of the western media that engaged in deception and wrong-doing.

The analysis of the internal situation offered by the open letter also raises some questions. The bulk of the current political-legal quandary faced by the reformists internal to the Islamic Republic is essentially blamed upon the “provocative and confrontational policies” of George Bush, which, according to the authors, “played a key role in the defeat of Iranian reformists in the parliamentary elections of 2003 [sic] and the presidential election of 2005”. Whereas there are no grounds to dispute the erroneous and inhumane traits of Bush’s Middle East policy, the attribution of the conservative victories in 2004 - when the Guardian Council, a distinctively hawkish body, disqualified thousands of would-be reformist candidates from the Majlis race - and 2005, when the reformists and pragmatists such as Hashemi Rafsanjani paid the price of an extremely lacklustre political performance in preceding years, to foreign political meddling is a conjecture that would most likely baffle even the more staunch reformists in Tehran. While it is certainly true that the perception of increased outside intervention made life difficult for Khatami’s camp, one is left wondering why the latter successfully convinced the Supreme Leader to accept to a series of major overtures to the West in that same time frame, such as the wide-ranging settlement proposal sent to Washington soon after the Iraq war in 2003 ,which included a radical overhaul of Iran’s entire regional foreign policy, or the Tehran Nuclear Agreement between the EU3 and Iran in late 2003.  One is therefore left to ponder whether the reformists have been the target of their own undoing on the national political scene, going as they did from total control of Parliament and the presidency in 2000 to the almost total exclusion from institutional participation of present.

The analysis provided within the open letter as to the cause of present disturbances raises some questions. Most peculiar is the attribution of the decision by millions of Iranians to flood the streets of Tehran within hours of the election results to “various irregularities [...] including the suspension of reformist newspapers and mobile telephone SMS service on election day”. It would have been perhaps ideal at this stage to recall the main slogan of the protesting masses: “Where is my vote?” Iranians did not take to the streets to reclaim the distribution of reformists’ dailies or request the resumption of the ability to send text messages. Rather, they felt that an undeniable right of any modern society, and most particularly their own, that has spent the best part of the past century inconclusively engaging in a long-drawn state-building exercise, the chance to choose an official candidate of its liking, had been abruptly taken away from them. Far from being an irregularity whose classification can be cloaked under the term “various”, this request stands at the heart of the unparalleled tension between the different wings of the political elite of the Islamic Republic. Its omission from the discourse of the “open letter” is therefore surprising and of concern.

The open letter ends on a number of valid points, including the invocation to allow Iranians to be masters of their own destiny and the invitation, to Western governments, to avoid a repeat of the 1953 coup or any other sort of interference. However, in their role of informed and esteemed academics, the signatories should perhaps adopt a less generalising approach and one more inclined to grasp the complexity of the dynamics of the Islamic Republic’s relationship with the West and its domestic politics, whose insularity to winds of change occasionally blown from abroad appears to be remarkably resistant three decades after the Revolution that sought to end Western interference in Iran once and for all.

CHRIS EMERY: Although I found myself agreeing with large segments of this letter, I found its overall message confusing. This letter seems to have three aims: to criticise Western policy in Iran, to condemn Western media coverage of the current crisis, and to make suggestions to resolve the impasse. The first two assertions require a more detailed interrogation than is possible here and thus fall flat. The third aim requires MUCH more detailed elaboration, especially regarding the composition, remit, time frame and powers of the "national reconciliation commission". Without this, the purpose of this letter is as unclear as its intended audience. It reads more like a collection of academics trying to get something off their chests than a serious roadmap for solving the impasse.

Though I agree with many of the letter’s critiques of Western policy, several analyses are less persuasive. Firstly, the authors contend that the only thing standing between President Khatami's successful reformist agenda (1997-2005) and rehabilitation of Iran's relations with the West was Bush. This is simply false; Khatami had already faced a hard-line backlash in 1999 following the student riots and there is little to suggest the Supreme Leader was as equally committed to normalised relations. Even Khatami’s overtures were carefully pitched as a dialogue between faiths and peoples rather substantive talks between two governments. I think it is also disingenuous to suggest that Iran’s cooperation with the US in toppling the Taliban was a personal gesture by Khatami aimed more at rapprochement with the US than as an action clearly in Iran's security interests.

Whilst recognising the counter-productive nature of Western policies, I disagree that the final success of democracy and reform in Iran is dependent on the actions of the West. This, in my view, absolves the Iranian authorities of their primary responsibility for their actions.

FARIDEH FARHI: Siavush's criticism is certainly well-taken and there is no doubt that not all Western reporting has been as the statement describes, although much has. But I don't see how Chris' point about the understanding of  Khatami's gestures can be construed from the statement. The point is simply that Bush's policies helped to undermine the reform movement (I believe the sentence says it played "a key role" and not "the" key role). Is this a wrong point? As to the West’s responsibility, show me a state that has not moved in the direction of securitization and away from democratic practices when under foreign threat.

Are there objections to our suggestions? Are they problematic or wrong suggestions? I will be delighted if this statement begins a conversation in this regard even if all the suggested ideas are rejected and replaced

NATHAN COOMBS: The authors’ focus on the Western media’s portrayal of the post-election insurrection follows two recognizable trends that we have witnessed since the elections in Iran.

First is the reformists' rhetorically convenient emphasis on the opinion of the unreconstructed (and-ill informed) anti-imperialist Left in the West, for whom Ahmedinijad is seen as the representative of the poor and a bulwark against American ambitions in the region. Need it be said, this is a distorted and caricatured portrayal; based as it is on a marginal strand of the Left’s take on the situation, never mind the Western media as a whole.

All the Western media, barring some exceptions that stand out precisely for their rarity, were firmly behind the uprising; not just in the sense of uncritical cheerleading for [Presidential candidate] Mir Hossein Mousavi, but in portraying the events as a broadly class-composed popular uprising. This impression was established through the reliance on English-speaking Tehranese ‘informants’ and Iranian scholars based in the West such as Professor Ali Ansari. It was not a critically examined proposition, whatever the truth of the matter.

As such the claim that the Western media portrayed the uprising as a “velvet revolution” by anti-Islamic Republic forces (implying that it was doing so for the benefit of foreign regime-change advocates) does not hold water at all. If anything, there was a clear recognition by the likes of the BBC that what was unfolding was an intra-establishment power play, to which Western commentators predominantly came down firmly on the side of Mousavi, to the exclusion of more radical currents.

Second, the overall framing of the letter is firmly nationalist. In its thorough conflation of anti-Islamic Republic forces with pernicious foreign influence, the letter amounts to essentially a whitewash of the realities of the Islamic Republic and an elaborate piece of apologism. The sub-text is status quoist. From the opening paragraphs to the last, the woes of the IRI [Islamic Republic of Iran] are firmly lumped at the feet of imperialist forces and the policies of the specific government of Ahmadinejad, rather than the Islamic system itself. In its call for a premature truth and reconciliation commission, the authors’ seek to co-opt the spirit of the uprising to refine and buttress the Islamic Republic.

This is justified in terms of seeking to bring in the interests of the bourgeoisie more firmly within the apparatus and juridical norms of the state. As the letter puts it, “These social and political pressures, along with government mismanagement caused by the removal of competent technocrats, have negatively impacted the public interest and put enormous pressure on the middle class, the educated class, journalists and artists. These people must be allowed a more open and free environment in order to fulfil their instrumental roles in service of the country.” And in the spirit of national unity, under the justification of representing the interests of the middle class, the authors applaud the fact that: “extremist elements who used the opportunity to create chaos and engaged in the destruction of public property were condemned by Mousavi". Finally, in a total denunciation of any authentic revolutionary anti-IRI ambitions: “We call on the political forces of both sides to move toward building such a constructive climate and toward creation of an economic, political, and cultural agenda that can respond to all social needs.”

One can only hope that the siren call of this letter is not heeded, and that the workers, students, and radicalized of Iran can build some sort of organization to surpass the inhibiting reformism of Mousavi and his nationalist supporters of the IRI. The Western media has little, if anything, to do with it.

EMERY: Farideh, I do not deny the damage Bush's policies have wrought. However, I think this letter overemphasized Khatami's ability to reconfigure Iran's relations with the West. Certainly, Bush's policies didn't help, but in many ways the instruments of the state were more arbitrary and 'rogue' in the 1990s.

As you say, the main point is that we talk about these issues. Given the enormously broad spectrum of political beliefs and perspectives amongst the authors of this letter, I do wonder how this can be coherently achieved.

FARHI: Chris, if you are reading the statement as though it is trying to discount the overall responsibility of Iran's leaders for political, economic and judicial failures, then that is a shortcoming that was not the intent of the statement. At least in one paragraph tries to deal clearly with those failings (and note that there is a reason the first recommendations address the domestic situation and forces).

At the same time, the intent was also not to shy away from discussing the context of the past two decades of containment and regime change policies on the part of the US and the impact of those policies on distorting Iran's body politic, making many already paranoid officials even more paranoid. Does this mean that the US is the cause for the mess Iran is in today? Of course not. Ultimately culpability lies with those who have other choices but choose to stunt their people's citizenship.

Did Iran have many rogue elements in the 90's? Yes, but Iran was also gradually moving in a direction that could be considered positive even during the Rafsanjani presidency (1989-1997). I have no difficulty acknowledging that the trend was deemed dangerous by hardliners and hence their resistance and reaction. But I don't see any useful purpose in not placing that resistance and reaction in the context of external pressures and threats that by the way were not limited to the Bush Administration.

FARHI: Are the hard-line forces wrong in using these props to justify their authoritarian policies? Of course they are, and they should be condemned as the statement does. But I do not see any useful purpose in toning down the discussion of the instruments they were given, which they have recklessly used and should be held responsible for, since they had the option of not using them.

Frankly, I do not see any reason for anyone interested in the expansion of civil liberties and equal treatment of citizens as well as a somewhat independent foreign policy (yes I am a shameless and hopeless liberal) to shy away from attempting a balanced view, even if that attempts ends up being flawed as you suggest.

EMERY: These are very compelling clarifications. However, I feel the fact that such detailed elaboration is required reinforces my point. The above debate is enormously complex and, I think, treated in much less measured terms in the letter. Likewise, the issue of how the West has covered the current crisis requires examples, comparisons, and historical and political context.

As Siavush pointed out, there has been some fantastic reporting of current events by some outstanding journalists, if of course there have also been some awful, politically motivated, and historically ignorant pieces. It strikes me as a) unfair to tar the former with the latter b) slightly naive to issue a call for the latter to end. It won't, anymore than the ridiculous reporting by the Iranian media.

So I am still unsure what the overall focus and intended audience of the letter was. It seems to be doing quite a lot, often with a slightly complacent reliance on an anti-imperialist framework. Your fundamental point is that the West should butt out and give the reformists space. I think this is essentially what the US Government has done. Obama was resolute in his insistence that this could not become a US-Iranian issue. He has not vocally supported the Green Movement and has not even alleged fraud in the elections.

You say that Obama has kept 'many of his predecessors' policies'. I think Bush would have claimed the Green Movement for himself, immediately condemned the elections as a sham, and would have used all of this as a platform to ramp up his confrontational policies.

If we are emphasising the need for external forces to moderate their policies to allow the political space for domestic change, why are there no suggestions for the Iranian Government to moderate its rhetoric and policies vis- a-vis the West, particularly in the Middle East?

I agree that there probably is a link between external threats and democratisation. I would disagree, however, with the implications of the statement, “Only under these conditions, without any foreign threats, can the Iranian people reach their aspirations of freedom.” Many non-democracies strengthen or uphold this state with or without facing external threats (Saudi Arabia, Burma, Guinea, China). In fact, the Central Asian region is littered with such states. The fact remains that the IRI's attitude to political and human rights has ebbed and flowed, but has never really shown a structural capability to tolerate dissent. Structural and bureaucratic obstacles are MUCH more significant than the external strategic environment.

FARHI: Chris, as to your point about the US government butting out, the statement did point out the difference between Obama's and Bush's approaches and noted the trend was positive, but it also pointed out that the general framework of US policy regarding Iran's nuclear program has remained the same, at least so far. Obama has continued to be interested in a sticks-and-carrots approach, so has his Secretary of State who has talked about "crippling sanctions" if Iran doesn't abandon its pursuit of a weapons program (The US Senate just passed legislation to that effect as well). To be sure, the linguistic shift to a "weapons program" and away from "enrichment suspension" is an important shift, but so far I have not seen any concrete manifestation of what that shift will mean in terms of policy. Suspension as a pre-condition has been removed, but that demand as an outcome has not necessarily been abandoned).

As to the equivalence you imply we should have endeavored to pursue regarding both the US and Iran's immoderate foreign policies, it just doesn't make sense in terms of the purpose of the statement written by people who identify themselves anti-war. Such people are worried about a US attack on Iranian territory, about which there has been not only a whole lot of loose talk but actual threats and policies

Finally, the IRI has been criminal and rigid more often than not but what has distinguished it from many other countries in the region and also other post-revolutionary societies is the level of conflicts and disagreements within it among various groups contesting for power. There is a reason the search for one revolutionary party was abandoned in Iran in the 1980s, and there is a reason you have such heated and violent confrontation about the direction of the country at this point. These conflicts are structural in so far as they represent different interests and ideas. The writers of the statements, despite their ideological diversity, believe that the contending forces --- and there are more than two --- need to find democratic and non-violent rules to live with each other, rather than attempt to purge the other from Iran's body politic.

From my point of view, there is nothing utopian or ideal about the Islamic Republic, but representing the conflict in Iran as many in the West --- or inside Iran --- have done as being between the "people" and the Islamic State, as though the people of Iran are one unit collectively engaged in an endeavor to transform a hated state, is both incorrect and I believe dangerous. It is part and parcel of the hope that a simple wishing away of the Islamic Republic or the street mobilization we have seen will do the trick.

The statement, by the way, is also written in Persian, and its intent for multiple addressees, I think, is clear in the five suggestions.

COOMBS: Farideh, let me take just two of your responses:

"There is a reason the search for one revolutionary party was abandoned in Iran in the 1980s and there is a reason you have such heated and violent confrontation about the direction of the country at this point.”

Could this also not have something to do with the fact that Mousavi, then Prime Minister, presided in 1988 over one of the most brutal mass executions of political opposition in the 20th century? The search for a revolutionary party to overthrow the IRI was not abandoned as much as extinguished.

Ultimately, what you write here, that people basically need to learn to live together, is a confirmation of my reading of the letter: the denunciation (in the contemporary lingo of democracy and pluralism) of the need for the overthrow of the IRI, and advocacy of the recuperation of the bravery of some of the protestors into a status-quoist regime realignment in favour of the reformists.

"There is nothing utopian or ideal about the Islamic Republic, but representing the conflict in Iran as many in the West --- or inside Iran --- have done as being between the "people" and the Islamic State, as though the people of Iran are one unit collectively engaged in an endeavor to transform a hated state is both incorrect and I believe dangerous."

I would of course reject any crass resource to the populist language of "the people". Likewise, I would also reject the naive belief (unfortunately promoted by many of the reformists supporters and sympathizers) that you can do away with the state through a "simple wish" or just "street mobilization". Here we at least can find some agreement. No, to bring down a system is a monumental affair. The idea that the IRI will just crumble when faced by street protest and intra-regime dissent is a laughable fallacy of our post-1989 world; informed by the entirely unhelpful analogy of the fall of Communism in the Eastern bloc. What is needed is genuine organization and the rebuilding of revolutionary organizations that can play the long game.

Politics, and more so revolution, needs to be constituted through a long ideological struggle. What the reformists and young liberals on the streets have as now failed to do (at least to my knowledge) is start to build these principled organizations, autonomous from the regime.

Iran: President Ahmadinejad's Battle in Parliament

The Latest on Iran (10 August): Threats and Concessions

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

Yesterday we reported the story from Press TV's website that President Ahmadinejad was going to the Majlis to "consult" over his choices for the Cabinet. Well, here' s the real reason for the consultation, courtesy of Etemad Melli Etemad:

After a "highly unsatisfactory meeting" with Ahmadinejad, Speaker of the Parliament Ali Larijani sent a letter "with threatening overtones" to the office of the President; significantly the letter was cosigned by 200 of the 490 members of Parlaiment. Ahmadinejad immediately retreated and invited  the MPs of the "principlist" bloc, the largest in the Majlis, to refute Larijani's contention that Ahmadinejad and his advisors are "a bunch of egotists".

Meanwhile, Ahmadinejad supporters suddenly showed up in the corridors of Parliament, trying to convince MPs that Larijani's motive is to get a high-profile Government role and smoothing ruffled feathers by claiming that a misunderstanding has occurred and Ahmadinejad wants to consult them.

There were heated scenes in the Parliamentary chamber, with principlist MPs critical of Ahmadinejad in arguments with the President's supporters over the claim, "Ahmadinejad has already up his mind with regards to the cabinet, and he just wants the MPs to rubber stamp his choices."

Etemade Melli concludes,"The tenuous connection between Parliament and Pasteur Street [the President's office] is becoming more strained by the hour: the Ahmadinejad faction feels free to use any kind of [abusive] rhetoric against Larijani, while Larijani's supporters overtly threaten to withdraw their support from ministers suggested by Ahmadinenad that are not to their liking. This demonstrates that the current frostiness between Parliament and Pasteur street may erupt into a full-fledged war."

Transcript II: National Security Advisor Jones on North Korea and Pakistan (9 August)

Video and Transcript I: National Security Advisor Jones on North Korea, Pakistan, Iran (9 August)
Transcripts III: National Security Advisor Jones on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and North Korea (9 August)

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

CHRIS WALLACE: General, welcome to “FOX News Sunday.”

JONES: Thank you, Chris. Good to be here.

WALLACE: Is Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of the Taliban inside Pakistan, dead?

JONES: Well, we think so. The Pakistani government has believed -- believes that he is, and all evidence that we have suggests that. But there are reports from the Mehsud organization that he’s not. But we think -- we think that it looks like he is.

WALLACE: Let me ask you to clear up another matter. There were reports yesterday of a gun fight between two leading contenders to replace Mehsud and that one where both of them had been killed in a gun fight.

But this morning, one of those two people who was allegedly dead reportedly called Reuters news service to say that he’s alive and well and there was no fight. What do you know about that?

JONES: Well, we’ve heard -- we’ve heard stories about that. We can’t -- I can’t confirm it. But it certainly is -- appears to be that there was some dissension in the ranks. That’s not a bad thing for us.

And it goes to show that I think the strategy that we’re engaged with with Pakistan is actually having some effect. And that’s good.

WALLACE: Well, I was going to ask you, assuming that Mehsud is dead, what does it say about the president’s war on terror?

JONES: Well, I think in terms of Pakistan, it means that the Pakistani government and the army is -- and our relationships with the army are having good effect, and I think that we’re moving in the right direction.

Mehsud is -- was a very bad individual, a real thug, responsible for a lot of violence, a lot of innocent people losing their lives. And I think that if there’s dissension in the ranks and that if, in fact, he is, as we think, dead, this is a positive indication that in Pakistan things are turning for the better.

WALLACE: Well, let me ask you about that. Regardless of who’s in charge, there’s still up to 20,000 Taliban fighters inside Pakistan. Is this a key moment for the Pakistanis to go after them? And are we pressing the Pakistani government and military to do just that?

JONES: Well, for the last several months, Chris, we’ve had a very, very good engagement with the Pakistani government. The Pakistani army has acquitted itself quite well in the Swat region, showing sensitivity for refugees as well.

We have a growing relationship in terms of intelligence sharing, and I think the relationships between the two -- the two countries are on the -- certainly very positive right now -- and also the relationships with Afghanistan.

Don’t forget this is a theater-wide engagement. This is an important moment. I won’t say it’s a tipping point, but it certainly shows that we’re having some success.

When you can take out a leader like Mehsud, you do show -- you do have some dissension in the ranks, and it reduces their capability to organize, regardless of how many they have.

This is a strong message. Pakistan deserves to be -- to be credited for its role. And we hope that we continue the pressure and we don’t -- we don’t let up.

WALLACE: Afghanistan -- you say it’s a theater-wide issue. Afghanistan is scheduled to hold national elections on August 20th. With the Taliban active in about half of that country, will that election go off? And what are the chances of serious disruptions?

JONES: Well, all indications right now are that the elections are going to go off, that they’re going to be fair. They’re going to be secure in most parts, secured by lot of Afghan forces, with international forces forming the outer ring of security. We are paying a lot of attention to that.

It looks like they’re having a good debate going into the elections. And so the signs are positive now. We’re quite sure that there will be -- there will be some efforts out there to disrupt them, but we hope to keep that to a minimum.

WALLACE: The new U.S. commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, reportedly wants more U.S. troops sent to Afghanistan.

But according to the Washington Post, you told our top brass in late June that the president was done sending additional troops. And I want to get to the quote. “If there were new requests for force now, the president would quite likely have a Whiskey Tango Foxtrot moment.”

Everyone in the room caught the phonetic reference to W-T-F, which in the military and elsewhere means “what the expletive.”

JONES: Right.

WALLACE: General, did you say that?

JONES: I did say that, but in the context of the overall strategy. We -- this is not, Chris, simply about the number of troops.

This -- I have been involved in Afghanistan for the better part of six years of my life, initially as a NATO commander. And in my two years of retirement, we conducted a major study about Afghanistan. And now I’m back into it.

What is not lacking in Afghanistan is a comprehensive strategy. We have published the strategy that not only is agreed to here by everyone in the nation’s capital, but also by lot of our international allies.

Essentially, there are three prongs to the strategy. There’s a security prong. That is -- that is about troops. But economic recovery and cohesion with the security strategy is important. And better governance and rule of law, from Kabul all the way down to the local townships is extremely important.

So my point in saying what I said was that it is not simply about troops. Now...

WALLACE: But are you ruling out more troops for Afghanistan?

JONES: As you know, as you mentioned, General McChrystal is doing a comprehensive assessment, which is what any military commander does when they take over a significant job.

And the secretary of defense has heard his preliminary report, has asked some questions. It will come up through the chain of command, and then we’ll see what...

WALLACE: But if he asks for more troops, you’re not ruling it out?

JONES: Not ruling it out at all.

WALLACE: OK. There have been a flurry of recent reports, including a comment over the last couple of days from the new British army chief of staff, that to secure Afghanistan will take at least -- at least -- another decade.

First of all, do you agree with that? And secondly, is the president prepared for that kind of long-term commitment?

JONES: Well, I know Sir David Richards quite well. He was the commander of ISAF when I was his senior commander at NATO.

And I think that what we have in place right now is a comprehensive strategy. We have yet to go past the first milestone of evaluating it.

But I think the strategy that the president has agreed to and announced that all allies have agreed to, that emphasizes the three prongs that I just mentioned -- our -- and also, it also emphasizes more role for an increased capacity in the Afghan army and also the Afghan police.

If we do that, I think we will -- we’ll see indications very quickly that we’re turning in the right direction. And I think that the Afghans will be able to control their own destiny much quicker.

WALLACE: Do you want to give us a time line for that?

JONES: I don’t want to give -- I don’t want to predict a time line, just like we couldn’t predict a time line in Iraq. But you get to that tipping point. If you -- if the pieces are all organized correctly, you get to that tipping point a lot quicker, and then it becomes irreversible.

WALLACE: President Obama has made it part of his policy to try to reach out to Iran. Are we still prepared to negotiate with President Ahmadinejad after what seemed to be widespread reports that he stole the election?

JONES: In the context of the international P Five -- what we call the P Five-Plus One negotiations, we have -- we have extended an open invitation to Iran to join the talks, which we would -- we strongly hope they do.

They have not responded to that invitation. That’s been on the table since April. We hope that they do. The...

WALLACE: The fact -- let me just ask -- you say we hope they do. The fact that we -- that...

JONES: We hope that they respond.

WALLACE: But the fact that Ahmadinejad may have stolen the election makes no difference?

JONES: Well, the fact of the election really makes a difference to the people of Iran. They are the ones that have to decide on the legitimacy of it.

We have to deal with this -- the -- whatever the central authority is. If it turns out to be the same individuals, then that’s who we have to deal with.

But the issues on the table are so important, in terms of nuclear weapons -- I might say North Korea as well -- that when they respond, if they respond, we’ll have to deal with them. That’s just the fact of life. WALLACE: A report this morning that the Revolutionary Guard in Iran wants the political candidate, presidential candidate who lost, to go on trial for unrest after the elections. How would we regard that?

JONES: With regard to Iran, there’s obviously some internal difficulties in that country. We have basically taken the stance that since we can’t, obviously, affect it one way or another, nor should we, that we will deal with the Iran as this thing shakes out.

But it is obvious that there’s some internal difficulties. We’ll just watch and see what happens.

WALLACE: General, what have you learned from President Clinton’s trip to North Korea this week to bring back those two journalists? Did Kim Jong-il or any of the other top officials in their meetings indicate they want a new relationship with the U.S.?

JONES: Well, as you know, Chris, this was a private mission and one that the -- I think the -- we’re all grateful to the former president for taking it on. Certainly the families -- the joyful reunion was something we all celebrate.

And by the way, we would like to see the same kind of reunion in South Korea with the detainee that the North Koreans have, and also with the Japanese abductees that are still in North Korean prisons.

But the former president and the leader had about a 3.5-hour discussion. Reportedly, they discussed the importance of denuclearization in terms of weapon systems of the North Korean Peninsula -- of the Korean Peninsula, and -- in addition to, you know, talking about other things that the former president may have wished to discuss.

WALLACE: But did -- in that meeting -- as you say, it was over three hours. Did the North Koreans indicate they want a new relationship with the U.S.? And did they specifically ask for direct talks rather than going back to the six-party talks?

JONES: North Koreans have indicated that they would like a new relation -- a better relation with the United States. They’ve always advocated for bilateral engagement. We have put on the table in the context of the talks we would be happy to do that if, in fact, they would rejoin the talks. So we think the...

WALLACE: We would have -- be willing to have bilateral talks in the context of the six-party...

JONES: Within the context of the -- of the six-party talks.

WALLACE: What did we learn about Kim’s health and his hold on power from the Clinton trip?

JONES: Well, we’re still very much debriefing the party that went with President Clinton. But preliminary reports appeared that the -- that Kim Jong-il is in full control of his organization, his government. The conversations were respectful and cordial in tone.

WALLACE: But he’s still in charge?

JONES: And he certainly is -- he certainly appears to still be the one who’s in charge.

WALLACE: Can you assure the American people that all that the North Koreans got from this trip in exchange for the two American journalists -- that all they got from this trip was the photo-op, that there were no secret concessions from the United States?

JONES: I can do that with absolutely a straight face. There was no official message sent via the former president, and there were no promises, other than to make sure that the two young girls were reunited with their families.

WALLACE: A couple of final questions. Will the president meet his deadline for closing the prison at Guantanamo Bay by next January?

JONES: Well, we have every intention of doing so, and there’s a lot of work going on every single day to make sure that we find the right solution. And I’m confident that we’ll be able to meet that deadline.

WALLACE: Finally, let’s talk a little bit about Jim Jones, because I think it’s fair to say that you have been lower profile than some of your predecessors as national security adviser, particularly Henry Kissinger and some of the others.

But you’re not seen in public all the time hovering right next to the president. You’re not seen as the gatekeeper who controls all the foreign policy types who get in to see the president. Do you have a different view of your job?

JONES: I do. I think this is also a different century. And I think the national security adviser runs an organization that deals from everything starting with climate change and energy all the way to cybersecurity, including the normal threats that we associate with the job.

So it’s very complex. We have economic issues that we’re concerned about. And so I think...

WALLACE: But particularly in terms of your role.

JONES: I think -- I think, first of all, there’s no problem with me seeing the president on any matter that he wants to discuss or I want to discuss. That is -- that is not a problem.

I believe that there’s a -- there’s a new way of doing business, to tee up the issues that are very complex and span a huge, huge array of subjects that each day the president has to deal with.

And I think that getting the right people in to see the president at the right time to brief him on a daily basis on these issues is the right thing to do. It’s just...

WALLACE: And you’re not threatened that...

JONES: I don’t -- I don’t -- at the principal’s level, with Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates, we talk every day. We talk with Susan Rice up at the -- up at the U.N. We have a very collaborative team. There’s no dissension. There’s no -- there’s nothing but trust and confidence. And that’s the enjoyable part of the job.

So I don’t -- I want to make sure that the president gets the best advice he can. If I need to put my particular spin on it, I have -- I have no problem doing that.

I just -- I just think that I serve the president better by presiding over an organization that tees up the issues in the right way. We have a good process, I think, to make sure that the president gets the advice that he needs, that -- we vet it. We tear it apart. We fight over it if we need to.

But when we come to see the president, we have a -- we have a -- he gets -- he gets the pros and the cons. And if I -- as the national security adviser, if I need to say something either privately or with my colleagues, I do so. I don’t have any problem with that.

WALLACE: General Jones, we want to thank you so much for coming in today. Please come back, sir.

JONES: I appreciate it. Thank you, Chris.

WALLACE: Pleasure.

JONES: Thank you.

Iran: The Battle for the Ministry of Intelligence Continues

The Latest from Iran (7 August): The Opposition Bounces Back

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

Last week we posted an exclusive analysis on the battle to control the Ministry of Intelligence and its wider political significance: "The irony is that any notion of an outside 'velvet revolution” has been overtaken by an inside bureaucratic war. How far this war spreads could define the next phase of the post-election challenge to the Iranian system.

 Iason Athanasiadis has an intriguing follow-up in Thursday's Washington Times, "Power struggle hits Iran intelligence agency". Inevitably, a lot of the piece is rumour and speculation but the hard facts are worthy of consideration.

The theories behind President Ahamdinejad's sacking of the Minister of Intelligence, Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejeie, such as "failure to press for convictions on espionage charges of former nuclear negotiator Hossein Mousavian and two Iranian-Americans, scholar Haleh Esfandiari and journalist Roxana Saberi" are peripheral (the immediate reason for Ejeie's firing could just as easily have been thew Cabinet bust-up over the appointment of the First Vice President, Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai). Instead, the significant signal of the power struggle is here:
[blockquote]
Mr. Ejei was present on Monday when Ayatollah Khamenei presided at a ceremony confirming Mr. Ahmadinejad's second term: "Ejei came for the supreme leader, not for Ahmadinejad, because he derives his credibility from [the leader]."
[/blockquote]Just as important are the sources of the rumours for Ejeie's dismissal, as well as the firing of two Vice Ministers and more than 20 other officials: pro-Ahmadinejad activists quoted in the "conservative" Baztab and the "reformist" Mizan News. And there is the President's own reference to the "failings" justifying his changes at the Ministry:

Two weeks before the riots started, the Foreign Ministry reported that it was very suspicious that a significant number of people were traveling to Iran from Britain. But the intelligence ministry did not pursue this matter. The ministry also did not act as it was expected in the recent unrests, and there were blatant cases of negligence. 

Is the President now running the Ministry via its interim head, Majid Alavi, taking supervision away from the Supreme Leader?  Is he, as the 20+ dismissed officials have warned in a letter to the Ministry, erasing security files relating to his allies, including the former
First Vice President Rahim-Mashai? And are there manoeuvres behind these manoeuvres in which the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps is ensuring that it is the power behind this regime?

None of this is any clearer now than when the crisis broke more than two weeks ago. What has been established is that this is a system which is battling forces within as much as it is the opposition outside.

Iran: The Principlists Search for Compromise

The Latest from Iran (6 August): Getting Past Ahmadinejad

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis



Enduring America's correspondent, Mani, has reported the facinating interjection of Ali Motahari, a key member of the Principalist bloc within Iranian Parliament, the Majlis, on the allegations levied against Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani. According to Motahari, these allegations were a major factor in Rafsanjani's non-attendance at the inauguration ceremonies for President Ahmadinejad.

According to the website of Iranian politician Ali Motahari, the MP from Tehran has stated that avoiding factional prejudices is the most effective way to arrive at an understanding and cooperation between the executive  branch and Parliament. Motahari commented about the absence of reformist  MP s from inauguration ceremonies, "It is possible that these individuals have issues with how the elections were held and the events after the election, and they have not been satisfied, investigating the faults of each sides and exposing and punishing the culprits will lead to better understanding [between the factions]......I believe that the broadcasting of confessions in which  Messrs Rafsanjani, Khatami and Mousavi have been accused of plotting a velvet revolution has at least been a major cause preventing Mr Rafsanjani from participating in the inauguration ceremonies."

After stating his belief that Mr. Rafsanjani had intended to participate in the ceremonies, Motahari continued, "In my opinion, there are individuals amongst the security elite that do not want unity to exist among high ranking officials....I believe that both those that have incited the public to riot and those who have trampled the rights of the people during the confrontations with the protesters must be punished." Motahari concluded, "The recent actions of the high commission  of national security  in punishing  guilty security  officials is  a  starting point for  exiting the crisis and  attaining calm."

Motahari's comments follow his call for an investigation into the deaths of detainees whilst in custody:

If the confessions of those detained recently are to be aired, the infractions of the law by interrogators, which in some cases have led to the deaths of some detainees, must also be investigated, along with the reasons leading to the situation being made public.