Pakistan: After Mehsud's Death, Are the Taliban Defeated?

The apparent assassination of the Pakistan Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud (pictured) in an American missile attack has raised questions over the future of the insurgency. This article from Arif Rafiq of The Pakistan Policy Blog is a compehensive look not only at the situation in Pakistan but across the border in Afghanistan:

Almost two weeks after the killing of Baitullah Mehsud, Pakistan continues to have an upper hand over the Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP). But Rawalpindi-Islamabad’s gains over the TTP are unconsolidated. The Pakistani Taliban network can rejuvenate itself. Pakistan needs to sustain its vigilance against the militants, while at the same time not drag itself into a full-fledged conflict in South Waziristan it is not ready for.

Pakistan has managed to:

* secure its major urban areas outside the Pashtun belt, and, to a large extent, Peshawar, from militant attacks. There has been no equivalent of the Manawan police academy or ISI office attacks in Lahore or the Pearl Continental attack in Peshawar.
* cleanse the Malakand division of militants (though not completely — see below) to the extent that much of the internally displaced population is returning home and willing to facilitate policing efforts to prevent a Taliban return.
* increase approval of the Pakistan Army in the Malakand division, despite the fact that it hasn’t followed a COINdinista Network Approved Strategy (CNAS).
* continue to penetrate terrorist cells and apprehend key facilitators, funders, and trained suicide bombers.
* push the militant leadership into the North-South Waziristan corridor.
* fracture the TTP leadership, or at least create the perception that it is in “disarray.”
* put the Mehsud network — and anti-state takfiri terrorists, in general — on the defensive, both physically and ideologically.
* maintain pressure on TTP remnants in Bajaur, Khyber, Mohmand, and Orakzai. Note that there hasn’t been an attack on a NATO convoy in Pakistan recently.
* transfer the Pashtun “hot potato” on to the United States.

This success is due to:

* the use of air power against militants in the Malakand division and the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) that, while causing significant civilian casualties, neither turned the local population against the central government nor strained the manpower of the Pakistani security services.
* a commitment to keep a large military presence in Swat for the next few years.
* a sustained counterpropaganda campaign utilizing the private media and religious scholars, particularly Barelvis.
* a clever psy-ops campaign against the TTP.
* a whole-hearted embrace of its fallen soldiers, with public funerals made accessible to the media.
* excellent investigative and police work done by the federal interior ministry down to the provincial police forces.
* the decision by the Obama administration to focus drone attacks against the Baitullah Mehsud network.

The TTP has failed to:

* prove that Baitullah Mehsud is alive. Hakimullah Mehsud, who appears to be living, promised a Baitullah video by last Monday, but it never appeared.
* demonstrate leadership continuity by appointing a successor to Baitullah.
* counter Pakistan Army claims that there was a clash between Hakimullah and Wali-ur-Rehman Mehsud by having the two agree on a Baitullah successor or, somehow, publicly prove they are on the same page.
* show that it remains a force to be reckoned with by pulling off a major attack in Islamabad, Peshawar, or urban Punjab.
* legitimize (or re-legitimize) its insurgency and campaign of terror in the eyes of the Pakistani public by linking it to Pakistan’s support for the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan.

Despite the Pakistan military’s gains against the TTP, the terrorist outfit’s senior leadership — aside from Baitullah — remains alive. Commanders such as Faqir Muhammad and Hakimullah Mehsud are around. But their continued existence does not preclude a disassembly of the TTP. Afterall, it is an umbrella organization. Disassembly would require the commanders to no longer share the same threat: the Pakistan military-intelligence establishment. And that would require an undesirable return to a messy policy of Rawalpindi sorting out the bad guys from the less bad guys (i.e. “good” vs. “bad” Taliban).

For the Pakistan Army, South Waziristan remains the belly of the beast. Its unforgiving land is the home of the Mehsud network as well as a host of Pakistani and foreign jihadi groups.

But, for many reasons, the Pakistan Army cannot afford a ground incursion into South Waziristan....

Read rest of article....

Video: Obama Speech on Afghanistan to Veterans of Foreign Wars (17 August)

Yesterday President Obama spoke to the Veterans of Foreign Wars in Phoenix, Arizona. The headline was "Obama Defends War in Afghanistan", as the President explained that the US intervention was a "war of necessity" (as opposed to the Bush Administration's "war of choice" in Iraq), two days before the Afghan Presidential vote. Obama, however, also spoke more widely about other theatres of US operations and about the relationship between military and non-military power.

PART 1 OF 3

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5GVYKpaSrT8[/youtube]

PART 2 OF 3

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_aao8m5RYvo&feature=related[/youtube]

PART 3 OF 3

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o3o3pKPxkEk[/youtube]

Iran Debate: Is Hashemi Rafsanjani A Spent Force?

Iran: Is Rafsanjani (or Ahmadinejad) A Spent Force? The Sequel
The Latest from Iran (18 August): Which Way for the Government?

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

Throughout yesterday, there was a fascinating (and, I think, important) debate between two of Enduring America's specialists on Iran, Mr. Smith and Mr. Jones, about the political fortunes of Hashemi Rafsanjani. The discussion not only considers whether the former President retains a significant influence over the future of the Islamic Republic but also looks at the positions of the Supreme Leader and President Ahmadinejad. Feedback from readers would be welcome, as I believe this may be one of the defining contexts for the outcome of this post-election crisis:

SMITH: I think that Rafsanjani has been giving up his "Godfather" role within the Green movement progressively. If you add up his non-reply to [Mehdi] Karroubi's letter [on abuse of detainees], his embarassing retreat from Friday prayers, and today [appearing with President Ahmadinejad], you get the impression of someone who is deeply distressed but does not feel secure enough to embark on a major confrontation with the state power. It is unnerving in the sense that, as the Mehr photos show [of the Rafsanjani-Ahmadinejad encounter], it is actually Rafsanjani that is adopting a body language geared towards subordination, and not the other way round. The gesture is the single most important "frame" to have come out of elite circles in Iran afte the shoulder kiss of Ahmadinejad to the Supreme Leader during his inauguration.

JONES: But then again, what did Rafsanjani have to gain from replying to Karroubi's letter? That's a hot potato that even [Mir Hossein] Mousavi is wary of handling. I do agree that Rafsanjani is deeply distressed (something his brother made clear), but I'm not sure his "Godfather" role was anything but a superficial and transitory collision of interests. Now Rafsanjani is unsure how his interests are best served and is thus "pausing". This also coincided with the emergence of the Majlis [Parliament]hmin challenging Ahmadinejad, a dynamic in which Rafsanjani was less involved.

I think when he does get around to speaking at Friday Prayers, we will have a much better understanding of his peace of mind and tactical re-appraisal.

SMITH: Rafsanjani's speech on July 17 was quite genuine, as was the distress he vented out through his brother on the Iranian Labor News Agency. But he has realised that Khamenei has gone for brute force and that it's better for himself and his family to back down. So my gut feeling is that there is more than transitory interests here, but he is by now emerging as a spent force. The one and last stand he could/might make is the next Assembly of Experts meeting, whenever that will take place; however, despite all this prodding from former MPs, Grand Ayatollahs, etc. that we have been seeing in the form of all these anonymous letters calling for Khamenei's head, I doubt we shall see Rafsanjani substantiating these.

A passing joke among myself and my Iranian contacts is that the Assembly of Experts communique dismissing Khamenei would not even reach the website of the Assembly before all those septuagenarians are carted away.

JONES: I agree that this pressure will have a lasting legacy. In effect, I think the parameters of Iranian political culture, memory and participation have been extended. In the short term, the regime equates compromise with weakness. In the longer term, such will be the fear of bringing millions of Iranians onto the streets that compromise will be equated with stability (perhaps even survival).

I can think of very few popular movements who have mobilised equivalent support and not gone on to extract or induce significant concessions or changes in the long term.

I guess the extent to which we see Rafsanjani as a spent force depends on our expectations of what he wanted to achieve and how realistic it was he could achieve it. The removal of Ahmadinejad? I don't think was achievable, and Rafsanjani eventually understood this. So, he settled for the effective neutering of Ahmadinejad's 2nd administration, which I think will happen. Khamenei was, in my view, equally never going to be removed. But Rafsanjani ultimately challenged him and is still standing- that's radical in itself. The question is, what has the last 2-3 months cost him? Has it cost Khamenei more or less?

SMITH: I would urge caution on Rafsanjani's capability of neutering Ahmadinejad's administration, but I agree that much has changed in the Iranian political landscape for good in the past two months, regardless of any future progress by the Green movement. However, I am sure that Khamenei has factored in some "cost" or "loss" when agreeing to go by with the hardliners, although I can't say whether he was really ready for this sort of reaction from the people.

As for Rafsanjani, well, he has paid a high price all along. He was lambasted by Ahmadinejad in the debates, has had people extremely close to him such as [Mohammad] Atrianfar, [Mohammad] Qoochani and others thrown into jail and paraded before TV long after his Friday prayer plea for their release, was forced to backtrack when he withdrew from the last Friday prayers [14 August], and today, according to one of the main columnists of Etemade Melli, he "bowed before Ahmadinejad like a servant does in front of his master". So, all in all, I have to stake my claim that he has not emerged in a very good posiition overall, although he has managed to cling on to some of his old powers and be somewhat "radical". But, as Iranian politics have thought us, its better to wait and see, starting from the Assembly of Experts meeting!

JONES: Do you think there was anything Rafsanjani could have done differently? This may be a curious case where none of the current "heavyweights" of the system have come off well, least of all Ahmadinejad (and Khamenei).

Raf's fortunes have ebbed and flowed: he was far more humilated by his loss to Ahmadinejad in 2005 than by the slurs in the 2009 debate. Fact remains, Rafsanjani is still more powerful than Ahmadinejad. The reason being that Ahmadinejad has never challenged the Supreme Leader and was effectively told to shut up and keep out of sight (something Khamenei could not do to Rafsanjani).

I don't think Rafsanjani expected those detained to be released; he wanted it on record that he had called for it. I also think that the mutterings about Rafsanjani are the continuation of old complaints, but the rumblings about Khamenei's suitability as Supreme Leader are something that have never ever come out before, even if they were felt privately by many). As you say, however, we will have to wait and see.

SMITH: I am still unsure of the real extent of Rafsanjani's power. On paper, he is as powerful as it gets, more so given that he survived an attempt to remove him from the leadership of the Assembly of Experts in February, meaning that he could technically count on a majority there.

As for his fortun, you should take the pre-electoral slurs and post-electoral moves as one big package. Not to forget the total sidelining of his concerns, as stated in the letter and three-hour meeting he had with Khamenei right before the elections. A close Rafsanjain associate boasted about the "positive signals" emerging from that meeting to several foreign diplomats, so you can appreciate the sort of "con" Khamenei played on his old associate.

The slurs against Rafsanjani were conducive, according to my own field work and those of others in Tehran before the elections, to a rise of votes for Ahmadinejad, while I will wait for the Assembly of Experts meeting to express my thoughts on his post electoral performance. However, in terms of real influence in state decision-making, I would say that Ahmadinejad is going quite strong. True, he is rebuked from all quarters, including the Supreme Leader, every now and then, but he has been remarkably successful in exerting his own viewpoints on the long-term evolution of many affairs of state, including the nuclear file, relations with the West, and the economy. He has driven the economy to shambles yet nobody has really managed to serious "punish" him for that, which is quite astonishing in its own right.

The Latest from Iran (17 August): Waiting for the Next Manoeuvre

NEW Video: Ayatollah Sane'i's Criticism (12 August)
NEW Video: When Hashemi Met Ahmadi (17 August)
Questions for the “Green Path of Hope” and for the Government
Iran: “Beloved and Popular” Mr Ahmadinejad Wants to See You in New York!

The Latest from Iran (16 August): New Challenge to Khamenei?

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis



2105 GMT: Jomhoori Eslami has published a statement from 120 physicians and faculty members. After condemning the harsh and savage treatment of protesters, they assert, "It is imperative that, when the credentials of individuals aspiring to high office is being reviewed, their mental health should also be reviewed by a knowledgeable committee that the people can trust".

2100 GMT: Amir Mohsen Mohammadi, student and human rights activist, has been released from detention on $150,000 bail. Mohammadi had been detained since 14 June.

1945 GMT: Our Top Tribute to Journalism. Earlier today (0930 GMT) we awarded the Gold Medal for Dumbest Western Image for #IranElection to Time magazine's "Will Iran's 'Kennedys' Challenge Ahmadinejad?"

Who, you may ask, was the previous winner? Reza Sayah of CNN for his profile of Zahra Rahnavard, Mir Hossein Mousavi's wife, "a woman some [i.e., Reza Sayah of CNN] are calling Iran's Michelle Obama".

1920 GMT: The sharp-eyed Josh Shahryar noted that, in its report on Sunday's third Tehran trial, Press TV's website referred to "Iran's disputed Presidential vote", the first time that the qualifier "disputed" had appeared in state media. So today's brief item on clashes outside the offices of Etemade Melli further raised an eyebrow: "All gatherings have been banned in a crackdown on mass protests that erupted after the disputed election of 12 June.

1840 GMT: 48 Hours to Go. Meanwhile, President Ahmadinejad is getting warning signals about those Cabinet choices. Alaeddin Boroujerdi, the Chairman of Parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, has said, “The Majlis [Parliament] expects the president to select ministers carefully.” Deputy Speaker Mohammad-Reza Bahonar gave Ahmadinejad a wrist-slap for Sunday's televised announcement of six proposed ministers, presented without any information to Parliament, “This time the president introduced some of the nominees directly through media which is unprecedented."

1830 GMT: As President Ahmadinejad prepares to propose his Cabinet, the Supreme Leader is moving his own pieces on the political chessboard. He has appointed Ayatollah Hashemi Shahroudi, who just stepped down as head of Iran's judiciary, to both the Expediency Council and the Guardian Council.

1715 GMT: The spokesman of Mehdi Karroubi's party Etemade Melli has told Saham News that judicial officials will meet tomorrow with the editor-in-chief of Etemade Melli newspaper to discuss outstanding issues. The spokesman stated that there is a high probability that, after the conclusion of this meeting, Etemade Melli will resume publication.

1650 GMT: Peykairan reports that 15 people were arrested, two women beaten, and a bus attacked in clashes in 7 Tir Square.

1605 GMT: Read This Signal. Press TV English highlights Hashemi Rafsanjani's speech at the inauguration of Mohammad Sadegh Larijani today:

"In case of delivering fair verdicts, the society will have a sense of security and no one will feel helpless in asserting his violated rights," said the head of the Assembly of Experts.

Hashemi-Rafsanjani warned that if the nation feels troubled by the judicial treatment of detainees "the society will descent into chaos."

That would have been hard enough for President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to hear (except, according to some reports, he walked out before the end of the speech). But how about this? Press TV, a state media outlet, headlines the account to pin the blame on the Government: "In Iran, Rafsanjani links 'Unjust' Verdicts to Chaos."

1500 GMT: Very reliable sources have confirmed to EA that the suspension of Etemade Melli "until further notice", reported by Iranian Students News Agency earlier today, is true. The communique from the Culture Ministry rescinds the publishing licence of Etemade Melli due to its "repeated publication" of "illegal" articles that have produced "many complaints".

1344 GMT: Associated Press, from Iranian state television, is reporting the following statement from Mohammad Sadegh Larijani at his inauguration ceremony as head of Iran's judiciary: "Nobody should dare ... to violate rights or security of citizens. I announce that I will not forgive anybody in this regard and violators will be put on trial."

1340 GMT: Reliable Twitter source says journalist Kaveh Mozaffari will be released from detention today. Mozaffari was arrested on 9 July, the day of the 18 Tir demonstrations.

1325 GMT: Mowj-e-Sabz claims that, despite the initial ban on its publication (later denied by Tehran's chief prosecutor, who said that it was just "printing problems"), Etemade Melli newspaper did appear today.

1320 GMT: Reuters reports, "Up to 60 opposition supporters chanted 'Death to the Dictator' Monday near the building of a reformist newspaper....Police at the scene in downtown Tehran prevented the demonstrators from gathering in front of the offices of the Etemad-e Melli newspaper of leading reformist Mehdi Karoubi, the witness said."

1310 GMT: Twitter filled with unconfirmed reports of clashes in front of offices of Etemade Melli, with Basiji militia allegedly attacking demonstrators. Other reports that protestors are moving towards 7 Tir Square.

1220 GMT: We have posted, in a separate entry, the video of the encounter between Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hashemi Rafsanjani at today's inauguration of Mohammad Sadegh Larijani as head of Iran's judiciary. An EA correspondent comments, "Have to say that Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad warmth is slightly unnerving."

1130 GMT: A Very Interesting Development. According to the Iranian Labour News Agency, Hashemi Rafsanjani is taking part in the inauguration ceremony for Sadegh Larijani. Other people attending are President Ahmadinejad, former Revolutionary Guard chief Rahim Safavi, Ali Akbar Nateq Nouri, Speaker of Palriament Ali Larijani, Prosecutor General Saeed Mortazavi, and Guardian Council spokesman Abbas Ali Khadkhodai.

One EA correspondent asks, "Is Rafsanjani breaking ranks? He surely looks like fish out of the water in this midst." Or is Rafsanjani trying to build up his political base by showing that, amidst the tensions and conflicts with the President, he can still work with other Establishment figures. Or, to put the issue narrowly, is Sadegh Larijani's appointment so important for Rafsanjani that his public support outweighs his association with those he might consider as political enemies?

1045 GMT: A very slow news morning, punctuated only by this Twitter chatter: "Sea of Green will gather 4pm TODAY (Mordad 26/August 17) Karimkhan St". Etemade Melli party website, connected with Mehdi Karroubi, continues to feature headline that gathering for today in front of Etemade Melli newspaper has been called off.

0930 GMT: Possibly the Dumbest Headline of This Crisis. Congratulations, Time magazine: "Will Iran's 'Kennedys' Challenge Ahmadinejad?" This attempt to give the Larijani brothers a "Western" makeover continues in the opening paragraph:

The brothers Larijani — often referred to as the Kennedys of Iran — are emerging as a powerful counterweight to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad from within the conservative camp. And unlike other Ahmadinejad rivals, the Larijanis are fully endorsed by Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatullah Ali Khamenei.

Several problems with that political "analysis" spring to mind. Even a passing look at our analyses over the last week of the manoeuvres within the Iranian establishment --- Parliament, the judiciary, the Ministry of Intelligence, the Supreme Leader, the President, the Revolutionary Guard, the clerics of Qom --- should offer a complex situation that goes beyond Larijanis in the Blue Corner, with the Supreme Leader as their towelman, and Mahmoud in the Red Corner.

For now, however, we ask readers, especially in Iran: do you know of any reference inside the country to the Larijanis as "the Kennedys"?

0715 GMT: Might as well begin today's updates with a chuckle. The chief prosecutor of Tehran, Saeed Mortazavi, has denied that last night's closure of the Etemade Melli newspaper, associated with Mehdi Karroubi (pictured), was because of a Government order: "Etemade Melli has not been shut down....[The paper] was not distributed on Monday following problems in its printing-office."

According to Mehdi Karroubi's son, Hossein, the paper was ordered to halt its presses after publishing a letter from Mehdi Karroubi responding to "insults" against him over his allegations of abuse of detainees.

0710 GMT:  A quiet start to the morning so we've posted an analysis which we hope will be both informative and provocative, "Question for the 'Green Path of Hope' and for the Government".

Latest Iran Video: Ayatollah Sane'i's Criticism (12 August)

The Latest from Iran (17 August): Waiting for the Next Manoeuvre
Video: When Hashemi Met Ahmadi (17 August)

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

There is Internet flutter today about a speech given by Ayatollah Sane'i to clerics on 12 August, a video of which has just emerged. Sane'i has been a sustained critic of the Government since the election, but this address goes further in its condemnation. It is in Farsi, of course, but Josh Shahryar offers a summary, which we've reprinted below the first of the five videos:

PART 1 of 5

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NrYPN0-Qk4c[/youtube]

SUMMARY: Sane' i had never been so shocked before in his life, as he has been because of what had happened in the events after the elections, especially detentions, deaths and torture – not even during the Islamic Revolution in Iran, when his friends were being tortured by the Imperial regime.

During his speech, he praises [Mir Hossein] Mousavi and other reformist leaders and asks the government as to why they are being oppressed. He declared that all these people who have been detained, tortured and are accused of violence are well-known men that he has known for many a year and none of them were planning to topple the regime, adding, that in terms of piety, Mousavi was the best or one of the best people in Iran.

He said that in Islam, no one had the right to torture someone so severely. He blasted the confessions and said that no confession was valid under any circumstances, if the confession had been obtained through torture. He said the name of Imam Khomeini was being tarnished by the atrocities committed – all in the name of the constitution.

He asked the government, to cease torture, stop persecution and immediately release all political prisoners.

PART 2 of 5

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nejb18GpoyI[/youtube]

PART 3 of 5

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WpWra0XundY&feature=related[/youtube]

PART 4 of 5

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yOVZ1i3b6Wo&feature=related[/youtube]

PART 5 of 5

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5pjeDzUa4BE&feature=related[/youtube]