Iran Document: Latest Karroubi Interview "The Shah Didn't Behave Like This"

An interview in Italy's Corriere della Sera with Mehdi Karroubi,first published in Italian in 22 February:

How is your son now?

Physically, my son Ali is feeling better. In the first days, his condition was terrible. Now we are worried about his mental state. The damage Ali suffered is a small example of all that is happening to the children of this nation. But the regime is already paying for this.

What happened on February 11?

The repression was violent, no doubt. There was an unprecedented conflict with the population. This time, the regime didn’t want to allow any gathering of protesters and it used all its strength; it gathered its forces from all the different governmental organs. They arrested our friends and family members, and they threatened the others. But their mobilization and organization didn’t stop us.


I knew how it would end, but I went to demonstrate anyway. I will go again if there will be other demonstrations, even if the outcome is worse than the last one. The newspapers wrote that the people prevented the conspirators (e.g., Karroubi and Mir Hossein Mousavi) from entering the square. I would like to ask those newspapers, which are controlled by the regime and the government: do you think that ordinary people use tear gas? Do you think ordinary people use metal bars and knives? The masters need to know that these days will pass but their sign will remain.

The events of these months have often been compared to the Revolution of 1979. You compared the violence of the repression to that of the Shah’s time, but you said that his army had shown more restraint. Do you see other similarities between our times and those?

The Shah’s regime was corrupt at its core, but he didn’t behave like this with the people. What do the armed forces have to do with the election’s results? Why did they treat the people like this on the 22nd of Bahman (11 February)? During the reign of the Shah there were rules; they did not take the people arrested to the mosque to beat them to death even before they appeared in front of the judiciary. These people make arrests without a warrant, beat them and keep them in detention. Not to mention the rest (such as the alleged rape of detainees).

Under what conditions would you be ready to find a compromise with Ahmadinejad and recognise him as the legitimate president of Iran? Do you consider yourself to be a leader of this Green Movement?

I don’t consider myself the leader of the popular Green Movement. I consider myself a member of this movement and of the reformist movement. My actions aim to a return to the will and the ideals of the people, that is to say to the people’s sovereignty. I don’t have a personal conflict, nor a reason to reach an agreement or make peace with Ahmadinejad. We consider Ahmadinejad’s government an established government that has to answer for its actions, but not a lawful or legitimate government. I am nobody: it’s not up to me to find an agreement or a compromise. It is the people who have to decide whether or not they want a compromise with the government. It is the people who are in conflict with the government, and who do not accept its management of the country. The people don’t agree with the strategy that puts us in conflict with the world taken on by Ahmadinejad, and we are a part of this same people.

You said that chanting slogans against the Supreme Leader and for a secular state is wrong. What slogans should people chant?

The things should be kept separate. We are not trying to make the regime fall. On the other hand, the Constitution is not a divine revelation and therefore is not unchangeable. But, at the moment, not even this Constitution is applied in this country.

Before the election could you imagine that the Iranian people would go so far in asking for their rights and that their anger would grow so much?

I did not imagine or foresee that the Iranian regime would go as far as rigging the popular vote as it did. On the other hand, the regime has adopted an obstinate and non conciliatory attitude with the people, which is the cause of the current problems. In the first days, the people said, “Where is my vote?” The people are still the same. So what happened that lead them to adopt the current slogans? The people want healthy elections and to see their votes counted.

As a student of Khomeini, I read that you were extraordinarily absorbed by him. Is he still a model for your actions?

I loved the Imam and I still love him. Yes, he is a model and an example for me. He was a devout cleric, he had insight and far-sightedness. My love for him increased after his death because of what happened. The Imam lead the country in its most difficult time: the first decade after the Islamic Revolution. The country was at war, prominent figures and other important politicians were killed in attacks and in the war. In that situation, perhaps some special and sometimes excessive measures were taken. I don’t say that he was a perfect model. But actions and decisions have to be evaluated taking the times into account.

What is the worst thing that has been done in the name of the revolution? What were the most joyful moments of the revolution? Why do you still believe in the Islamic Republic?

The Islamic Republic consists of two concepts: republicanism and Islam. The worst thing is the damage done to both those concepts and principles. I’m not saying that nothing is left anymore, but the damage done is very serious, both to Islam and to the concept of “republicanism” which means “the opinion and the vote of the people”.

The Imam said that the final decision is up to the people. He always considered the public opinion and never allowed, even under the worse conditions, ambiguity and lack of clarity during the elections. What was damaged were the promises that we made to the people. The issue is not to make the regime fall, but to reform it.

I still believe in the Islamic Republic, but not in this kind of Islamic Republic! The Islamic Republic that we promised the people had the support and the vote of 98% of the population: it was the Islamic Republic of free elections and not of rigged elections. I believe in modern Islam, an Islam full of kindness and affection, not a violent or fanatic Islam.

Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi pledged to reduce the business with Tehran and to support new international sanctions. Do you think these measures would help the opposition in any way? What effects do you think UN sanctions will have on the government and on the people?

When I was the speaker of the Iranian parliament, the relationship between our parliaments was excellent. My official visit to Italy at that time, and the visit of two presidents of the Italian House to Iran are a sign of the good political relationship between the two countries. Even the letter sent by the presidents of the Italian House and Senate to the chiefs of the Iranian regime regarding the consequences of my (possible) arrest is a demonstration of the good relationship we had at that time. For this, I am grateful to the presidents and to the members of the Italian parliament. But I am absolutely against sanctions; they increase the economic pressure that the people already suffer because of the wrong policies of the government.

Middle East Inside Line: Hamas Division, Ahmadinejad with Syria & Hezbollah, Mitchell to Resign?

Hamas Divides over Shalit Case?: Haaretz says that negotiations over the captured Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit have divided Hamas, with the resignation of Mahmoud A-Zahar, a senior member of the negotiating team. Despite the efforts of German negotiator Gerhard Konrad, Israeli leaders have said that they will not release some senior Palestinian leaders as demanded by Hamas. A-Zahar's argued with Hamas political leader Khaled Meshaal over the handling of talks and then left his post.

Hamas' "Israel Spy" Speaks: Mosab Hassan Yousef, the son of Hamas founder Sheikh Hassan Yousef who worked for Israel's Shin Bet security service, converted to Christianity, and moved to California, said by phone: "I wish I were in Gaza now. I would put on an army uniform and join Israel's special forces in order to liberate Gilad Shalit. If I were there, I could help. We wasted so many years with investigations and arrests to capture the very terrorists that they now want to release in return for Shalit. That must not be done."



Ahmadinejad with Assad and Nasrallah: Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, and Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah met in Damascus late Thursda. According to Al-Manar, Ahmadinejad met with Palestinian officials from at least 10 political movements during his visit. During that meeting, the Iranian president and the Palestinians expressed their desire for cooperation against Israeli "threats, aggressions," and moves regarding Islamic holy sites in Israel.

Mitchell to Resign?: Hadith a-Nass, a Nazareth-based daily Arab source, reported that special US Mideast envoy George Mitchell has requested to resign. The report claims that Mitchell is disillusioned over the bias of the State Department towards Israel and his failure to advance the resumption of peace negotiations. However, it is said that the White House has turned down Mitchell's request.

Palestine Moves if No Talks with Israel: Palestinian Authority chief negotiator Saeb Erekat, in an article, "The Political Situation in Light of Developments with the U.S. Administration and Israeli Government and Hamas's Continued Coup d'etat", threatens three steps unless negotiations with Israel are resumed.

One is an end to security cooperation with Israel, including the disbanding of the Palestinian security forces which have been trained by the US officials. The second is the nullification of the Oslo Accords and even the dissolution of the Palestinian Authority. The third? Abandoning pursuit of a two-state solution with Israel, and instead working toward a binational state that would exist on all the lands of historic Palestine.

Israel Expanding Settlements?: Haaretz has learned that Israel has plans to build another 600 homes in East Jerusalem.

Iran: Mousavi, The Regime, & "The Prerequisites of Escalation"

From The Newest Deal:

In his 17th statement, Mir-Hossein Mousavi made five specific points that he deemed necessary to start the political (and national) reconciliation process. The proposal lead to a noticeable uptick in the weeks leading up to 22 Bahman in talk of the need for national "unity" and also garnered much attention from Iranian intellectuals and dissidents. Ultimately, the regime's more radical elements reemerged and silenced the chatter before the security apparatus prevented a strong opposition showing on the revolution's 31st anniversary. But Mousavi's "five points," as they have come to be called, still carry much weight. Generally, they are:

1. Government accountability for post-election violations


2. Legislation of new election laws that would safeguard reform-minded candidates from regime's current vetting process


3. Release of all political prisoners


4. Freedom of the press and political-neutrality on state-run IRIB television


5. Freedom to assemble, as guaranteed by the Islamic Republic's constitution

Were these five conditions to be met, the Green movement would arguably have the breathing space it needs to mobilize and begin the long process of transforming Iranian society. For if anything became apparent in the weeks leading up to and after the June election, it was that Iran has undergone an awakening. It has simply been the repression that the above five grievances capture that has prevented the social movement's aspirations from coming to fruition.


Therefore, perhaps an alternative frame can be adopted to view Mousavi's five points. As a recent Tehran Bureau profile wonderfully captured, the reluctant leader of Iran's opposition has matured into a rather shrewd, cautious, and patient figure. While circumstances prevent him from voicing such a sentiment in public, the leader of the Green movement likely recognizes that the regime has reached a point of no return. The tyranny, the executions, the outright fascism -- all of it is, to quote his Mousavi from an interview on the eve of 22 Bahman, an outgrowth of the "revolution's failures" and the "roots of tyranny and dictatorship" that persist in society from the reign of the Shah. These are damning (and yet still very measured) words from one of the Islamic Republic's own founding fathers.

Thus, seeing the regime in this light gives Mousavi's five points new significance. The demands would no longer be five steps the regime must take in order to rescue the country from its current crisis, but rather, five blatant and particularly egregious shortcomings that the regime will inevitably be unwilling to address, and that will thus escalate the conflict between the Greens and the regime. For in the wake of the June coup d'etat, if one thing has become clear it is that those currently in control will never meet any such conditions, even if moderate voices within their camp plead otherwise. Political calculus has been replaced by megalomania, with the possibility of reconciliation falling victim.

And so if these five points are instead five tests that the regime must fail before confrontation with the regime escalates to the next phase, the news emerging this week from the Expediency Council and Assembly of Experts -- both bodies chaired by Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani -- is indeed very telling. First, the Council began considering aproposal being pushed by Rafsanjani and Mohsen Rezaei that would take away the Guardian Council's vetting role and instead give it to a new "National Election Committee" of sorts, which would conveniently be under Rafsanjani's supervision in the Expediency Council. (Ironically, the proposal to revise the country's election laws was made to Supreme Leader two years ago, after which he ordered for a new plan to be drawn up).

Make no mistake: this would essentially be a first step in meeting the second condition laid of Mousavi's 17th statement. Were the change to the vetting process be enacted, the Guardian Council would no longer be able to disqualify candidates from running for president or parliament, as it did when it disqualified all but four candidates from running in the 2009 presidential election.

The chances of the plan coming to fruition, however, appear slim. With the regime still reeling from the aftermath of the June elections and still off-balance going forward, it would have no reason to suddenly invite more political opposition in Majlis through freer elections in 2012. Hossein Shariatmadari, editor of the ultra-conservative Kayhandaily and someone who is regarded as being close to Khamenei, has already come out on the attack, stating that any propsoal to create such an electoral commission would be "against the Islamic Republic's constitution."

No sooner than the proposal was being discussed, more divisive conservative rhetoric emerged from the other body Rafsanjani chairs, the Assembly of Experts. In a statement reported by Fars News, the Assembly allegedly declared that the regime's patience with the opposition "ended in December after sedition leaders missed numerous chances to repent and return into the gown of the revolution." (Enduring America notes, however, that the statement is missing on the Assembly of Experts' official website and that several prominent members were absent from the Assembly's two-day meeting). Khamenei, for his part, has reiterated the statement's pronouncement in his own statement, saying that those who still do not accept the June presidential election result "would be disqualified from participating in the Islamic system."

The obstacles in revising the regime's election laws aside, the other four points from Mousavi's 17th statement have gone unheeded as well. Saeed Mortazavi, though implicated by Majlis [Iran's Parliament] in the Kahrizak torture-murders, remains a free man. Rather than having political prisoners freed, the country recently saw the greatest wave of arrests sweep dissidents since late June and early July. Meanwhile, state-controlled media remains entirely propagandized while any questions regarding citizens' right to freely assemble were surly answered by the enormous security presence deployed on 22 Bahman.

Not even appearing to consider the proposals, the regime seems bent on acting counter to each of Mousavi's five points. Despite the intentions of some del-soozan, (or "heartbroken" moderate conservatives), any promise for political reconciliation also appears dead. Rather, the crisis seems destined to continue indefinitely, and with neither side refusing to back down, Mousavi's five grievances may come to be prerequisites for the regime to unconditionally reject before the opposition begins to decide on how to take the uprising to the next level.

Latest Iran Video: The Rigi "Confession" (25 February)

Jundullah leader Abdolmalek Rigi makes his "confession" on Iranian state television:

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7jPxQMBJ3uk&feature=player_embedded[/youtube]

Iran Analysis: Khamenei's Not-So-Big Push

No doubt this morning about the big news out of Iran. On Thursday, the Supreme Leader tried to lock down the security of his position once and for all, declaring that opposition leaders “have lost their credibility by denying the results of the elections. They did not surrender to the law and committed a great sin....[They] have stepped down from the rescue ship and have lost their credibility to remain within the framework of the Islamic establishment.”

Iran Follow-Up: Interpreting the Assembly of Experts “The Certainty of the Uncertain”
Iran Analysis: The Assembly of Experts Mystery

So that's an unambiguous warning to Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi to shut up, for example, giving up on Karroubi's latest call for a referendum on the Guardian Council and for the regime's permission for mass protest. But Khamenei has made such statements before: he did so just after the June election, before the Qods Day marches in September, and before the Ashura demonstrations in December.


What is distinctive this time is that the Supreme Leader issued his declaration in a meeting with the Assembly of Experts, which had just finished its two-day meeting. The regime blueprint was for the Assembly to add its 86-member weight to a resolution of the crisis; the problem is that, for reasons which will take some time to establish, it did not so. The "statement" published on Fars News condemning the "sedition" of the opposition (was it a draft? a "leak" from a few pro-Khamenei or pro-Ahmadinejad members of the Assembly?) was never officially confirmed.

So, in the absence of that resolution, here was the Supreme Leader's message. It was not the authorisation of the arrest of Mousavi and Karroubi (although, if either make a high-profile declaration with further demands and the prospect of a rally, this may change). Despite the insistence that the June election was settled, it was not support of President Ahmadinejad.

It was, to use the language of American football, "Protect Your Quarterback". Me.

Personal security, for the moment, equates to the security of the system of velayat-e-faqih (clerical supremacy). And, for the moment, that is accepted by all high-profile political figures. For all his ambiguities, Rafsanjani has done somersaults to be unambiguous on this point. Mousavi has never made a direct attack on Khamenei's position. And Karroubi, despite his "Mr Khamenei" statement last month, has ensured that his demands are narrowly focused on certain institutions --- the Iranian judiciary, the Guardian Council, the Presidency --- and not on velayat-e-faqih.

So, Supreme Leader/Quarterback, you're OK. And that is about all that can be settled....for the moment.