Iran Analysis: The Supreme Leader & the Disappearing Fatwa (Verde)

EA has caught up in a mystery for 36 hours, as Ayatollah Khamenei's dramatic fatwa --- "I am the Rule of the Prophet" --- started to disappear from Iranian state media.

Given the timing of the Supreme Leader's supposed declaration and the religious and political circumstances, what happened and what does it mean? Mr Verde, who put out the initial interpretation of the fatwa (strength or weakness?) on Wednesday, takes a look:

Khamenei’s own site, unlike the case of other fatwas such as the March pronouncement that the Fire Festival is evil, did not publish the “I am the Prophet” fatwa. Instead, in its newsfeed, it had a link to a page announcing the fatwa on another site.

Iran Special: Khamenei’s “I Am the Rule of the Prophet” Fatwa — Strength or Weakness? (Verde)

Issuing of the fatwa in that form was a disaster.

Before explaining, a basic point: most of the statements and claims that Khamenei makes in the fatwa are nothing new. Both the terminology and the substance have been used before by Islamic Republic officials. The only relatively new claim is that he is a successor of the Prophet Mohammad (although he alluded to this before when he was meeting Iranian officials and, to back up his demand that people should follow him, quoted a verse from the Qu'ran that asks Muslims to follow the Prophet). One of the titles that regime officials used to use to describe Ayatollahs Khomeini and Khamenei is “rahba-r moslemin-e jahan” (the leader of the Muslims of the world). Another is “nayebe barhagh-e emam-e zaman” (the rightful successor of the hidden Imam).

Sine all this has been said before, why is the current episode a disaster? Well....

*This time Khamenei, who is the Islamic Republic’s highest authority, is personally making these claims about his status. Up to now he and other regime officials would have had plausible deniability if questioned about these dubious claims, attributing them to low-level people and declaring this is not our official position. Now it is going to be very difficult to give a convincing answer, say to Saudi officials who might have a question or two about claims of being a rightful successor to the Prophet or leader of the Muslims of the world. Similar problems will arise if the Supreme Leader's circle is questioned Shia Muslim scholars and clerics like Iraq's Ayatollah Sistani.

*The fact that Khamenei is making this claim BEFORE any other independent senior clerics and Grand Ayatollahs have made such a declaration suggests that he is trying to grab for himself the position of successor to the Prophet, rather than following the consensus of Shia clerics. If any other Grand Ayatollahs now back up Khamenei’s claims, it will appear as if they were forced into it by the regime.

*Such a fatwa is the same as officially admitting the end of the rule of law and an end to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic.

Challenges to the regime claim that it is taking parts of the Constitution, such as Article 110 which covers the authority of the Supreme Leader, and expanding them to the point where other articles --- people’s right to determine their own destiny, independence of the judiciary, Parliament’s duty to pass legislation --- become useless. Khamenei’s interventions, as in the Islamic Azad University crisis or the corruption case of 1st Vice President Mohammad Reza Rahimi, render the rule of law ineffective.

Now Khamenei is saying that he has the right to do as he pleases, not ifs and no buts. He sees no necessity for the constitution and the laws of the land, as he --- the rightful successor to the Prophet and the Imams and the leader of the Muslims of the world --- can decide whenever he wants what should or should not be done. This will lead to charges that the country is being ruled in an arbitrary manner. It will also reduce any elections to the superfluous. If such a fatwa were to stand, then elected officials would become courtiers in Khamenei’s service, not the servants of the people.

*The timing could not have been worse. One of the aims of last week's bombing in southeastern Iran is to create tensions between the Shias and Sunnis there and across Iran. This fatwa only increases the Shia-Sunni tensions.

*This fatwa is a clear sign of the weakness of Khamenei on a personal and a political level. Personally, because he sees the need to elevate himself to the level of the Prophet. Politically, because he may be seeing that his orders are not being obeyed; so he has to use violence to force through his will and has to hide behind the Prophet to make himself look respectable.

Still, Khamenei and his advisors have long held the views that are expressed in the fatwa. Why release it in this dramatic form?

*Perhaps Khamenei is finding it increasing difficult to run the day-to-day affairs of the state, due to insubordination from all quarters, and wanted this fatwa to be the reason for people to follow orders and the threat in case they do not.

*Perhaps this was supposed to be a “private” statement --- like the rumoured fatwa from Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi ordering election manipulation last year --- and it was leaked. If it was leaked officially, then it is a serious miscalculation. If it was leaked unofficially, then Khamenei should be very worried about who would publicise such a sensitive statement.

*Perhaps it is to test the water before an official declaration.

*Perhaps Khamenei is preparing for a big push against the reformists and is trying to claim unquestionable legitimacy for himself.

*Perhaps the Supreme Leader is trying to counter criticism of killings and detentions by saying that this is what the Prophet would have done.

*Perhaps it is, rather in desperation, aimed at pushing back against criticism of Khamenei, only some of which may be in the public domain.

*Perhaps the infighting amongst the conservatives/principalists is to the point where it is worrying Khamenei. He is therefore trying to remind them that he is the top man and they should not forget that.

*Perhaps Khamenei is feeling that he is under pressure not from the reformists but from President Ahmadinejad, who is looking to bypass the Supreme Leader, the conservatives who are upset about the Government's rule, and the traditionalists who are seeing that Ahamdinejad is trying to sideline them.

Thanks to Khamenei’s handling of the post-election crisis, his other option is giving in to the reformists, something he had been desperately tying to avoid for over a decade now. So he is forced to make a very grand declaration in an attempt to defend himself.

*Perhaps this is personal vanity on the part of Khamenei.

I would watch for reactions from the reformists and senior clerics; however, my preliminary assessment is that the public appearance of the fatwa, however it came about, seems to have been big a mistake. I would not be surprised if it was expunged like the misguided declaration on the "sacrilege" of the Fire Festival.

Iran Analysis: Voices Raised --- Removing the Supreme Leader (Verde)

Mr Verde writes for EA:

In the last 24 hours, three statements have emerged:

Mohsen Kadivar, the cleric and scholar who is now based in the US, has written a lengthy letter, "Impeachment of the Leader", to Hashemi Rafsanjani, in his capacity as head of Assembly of Experts. The letter setting out the factual and legal case that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei should be removed from the post of Supreme Leader.

Kadivar accuses Khamenei of injustice, dictatorship, overthrow of the Islamic Republic and weakening Islam. He says that if the Assembly does not act on this, they will have proven that the Islamic Republic cannot be reformed via legal means. The letter, published in six parts in Rah-e-Sabz, provides substantial evidence in the form of statements by Rafsanjani, Guardian Council head Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, and Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi and the Constitution.

Seminary lecturer and author Ahmad Ghabel, recently released on bail from prison, has written that Khamenei has acted against national security on several occasions, propagated against the regime, and has often published lies with the aim of creating public anxiety. The Supreme Leader has insulted many of the opponents of the establishment’s policies and is acting to overthrow the Islamic Republic.

Ghabel also alleges that Khamenei’s statements are against Islamic teaching and that at times he talks nonsense. Ghabel notes that he is now accused by the courts of acting against national security; reworking this allegation, he says he is guilty of that act, since he voted for Khamenei in Presidential elections in the 1980s.

It is reported that journalist Isa Saharkhiz, detained for 13 months, refused to defend himself in court yesterday. Instead, he called for the removal and trial of Khamenei, since the Supreme Leader has strayed from the Constitution and is acting unjustly.

---

These are direct and bold challenges to Khamenei. They are not just criticisms of some decisions or actions but are calls for removal from office. They are not warnings that the removal might be necessary in the future, but presentations of the case that he should be removed now.

I would not expect any results from these in the near-future, except more pressure on Ghabel and Saharkhiz and more attacks on Kadivar. However, it is worth a close look to see if reformists in Iran are now raising the stakes.

Iran Follow-Up: The Story Beyond the Opposition, Enduring America, and US "Neoconservatives"

Yesterday I noted --- partly because I was annoyed, partly because I was amused --- that Enduring America had made an unexpected cameo appearance in a sweeping attack, published by the opposition website Rah-e-Sabz, on US "neo-conservatives" as "false friends" of the Green Movement.

Mr Verde follows up by analysing the significance of the story far beyond Rah-e-Sabz and the article:

Iran Through the Looking Glass: “Never Judge Enduring America by Its Cover”

First, the reference to EA in the article:

The website “Enduring America” (meaning “Sustainable America”), by using the logo of the Pentagon for its site, pretends to support the Green Movement. The website “Tehran Bureau” has been criticized by many of its readers because it claims that it supports the freedom movement in Iran while at the same time it has an Israeli analyst, who writes his comments from the viewpoint of Israel’s interests.

The author is using reference to EA as an ill-fitting “filler” to move from Huntington to Tehran Bureau. There is no reference to any content, just a mention of the site name, its translation into Persian, and a reference to the site logo. Beyond this, there is no substance to the “exposure” –-- as the author would like to see it –-- of EA as part of the great neocon conspiracy to ensure that Iran does not become democratic.

The author starts the article with a quote from Ataollah Mohajerani, a Minister in the Khatami Government. It mentions Moajerani’s article “Keyhan and the CIA” (29 Khordad/ 19 June), and his 28 June speech about the risks to the Green Movement and his support of them.

Mohajerani recently started categorising and filtering the Green Movement into his version of the Good, the Bad and the Ugly, which he called the “nationalists”, “non-nationalists”, and “anti-nationalist”. It looks like he is trying to act as a Guardian Council for the Movement.

Mohajerani has been criticised for this seemingly “disqualification” of some of the Green supporters. The main aim of the author in Rah-e Sabz seems to be support of  Mohajerani, trying to “illustrate” the neocon conspiracy and thus accuse some purported Green Movement supporters of being neocon stooges and anti-democracy in Iran.

The article also mentions the “nag ghazeh, na lobnan” (not Gaza, not Lebanon) slogan, referring to last September’s Qods Day chants by anti-regime protestors: “nag ghazeh, na lobnan – jaanam fadayeh iran” (“not Gaza, not Lebanon --- I give my life for Iran”). Referring to the regime’s support for Hezbollah and Hamas, the slogan declares forget Gaza and Lebanon and let’s fix Iran first.

A few weeks ago Mohsen Kadivar, who happens to be Mohajerani’s brother-in-law, said in an interview on Voice of America Persian that the protestors’ slogan on Qods Day was actually “ham ghazeh, ham lobnan –-- jaanam fadayeh iran” (“both Gaza and Lebanon –-- I give my life for Iran”). After he was criticized for saying this, given the video evidence, Kadivar  sent an email to VoA conceding that the “not, Gaza, not Lebanon” version of the slogan was shouted by people on that day but adding that he preferred the “both Gaza and Lebanon” version. Perhaps far from coincidentally, the author of the Rah-e Sabz article also has a go at Voice of America.

My main point? This article is another indication of the crisis with the Islamic Republic and different interpretations of its founding ideology:

On the regime side, there are management crises everywhere (power shortages, water shortages, Bazaar strikes, etc.) and Ahmadinejad getting into arguments with his supporters --- or should that be former supporters? --- about neckties. The Supreme Leader compares himself with the first Shia Imam and thinks he’s going to war in the 7th Century AD.

The reformists, faced with their own ideological shortcomings (which is inevitable, as they come from the same background as Ayatollah Khamenei and the rest of the regime), are finding them very difficult to resolve. So some of them (I must emphasise some of them, and not all of them) instead opt for disqualifying Green supporters and trying to change the meaning of slogans. Confronted over these tactics, they start lashing out at everyone and anyone. Welcome to “politics” Iranian style!

Mir Hossein Mousavi who is sitting in Iran and having to put up with the consequences of not giving in to Khameni/Ahmadinejad’s demands (consequences which include the assassination by “unknown persons” of Mousavi's nephew during the Ashura protests last December) says that the Green Movement does not have a leader and also that the Green Movement does not have a spokesperson overseas.

Maybe instead of attempting to speak on behalf of the movement, mimicking the Guardian Council by disqualifying some regime opponents, and distorting the declarations of people who risked their lives in the streets in Iran, Mr Mohajerani and his allies might contemplate their roles --- as senior regime officials not that long ago --- in the mess that the Islamic Republic has created in Iran today. Maybe, instead of making false accusations, based on half-baked arguments, they might think about what it is that they stand for?

The Latest from Iran (11 July): Feeling Hot, Hot, Hot

1940 GMT: The Bazaar Strikes. The "Babylon & Beyond" blog of the Los Angeles Times posts an update on the state of the bazaar protests over proposed increases in business taxes:

Authorities have...shut down the bazaar, declaring Sunday, ordinarily a bustling work day, an impromptu holiday because of the hot weather in an attempt to mask over the strike.

On Sunday, subways heading to the bazaar were relatively empty...."I am still continuing my strike," said Ali, a cloth merchant. "I may keep shut on Monday too."

NEW Iran Special: A Response to “The Plot Against Ahmadinejad” (Verde)
Iran Exclusive: The Plot to Remove Ahmadinejad, Act II
The Latest from Iran (10 July): The Plot Against the President

1930 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Mission" Free Iran publishes a letter which it has received from the mother and younger brother of detained activist Behnam Ebrahimzadeh, asking for the support of the international community to protest his imprisonment.

1855 GMT: Execution Watch. Radio Farda reports that the head of Iran's judiciary, Sadegh Larijani, has suspended --- for now --- the death sentence against Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani for adultery.

Ashtiani's case has attracted international attention because of the possibility that she might be stoned to death.

1625 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Activists are paying close attention to the case of 45-year-old Zahra Bahrami,  arrested and taken to Evin Prison during the Ashura protests of 27 December. Bahrami, an Iranian-Dutch dual national, has been charged with "mohareb" (war against God), and it is believed she will be tried soon.

RAHANA wrote in April that Bahrami had been held in solitary confinement and interrogated numerous times during her detention. Activists also claim she is being forced into a false confession.
Bahrami has not been allowed any prison visits, and the occasional phone calls she makes to her family are monitored and controlled by the interrogators.

1600 GMT: Coming to a Classroom Near You. Mohammed Boniadi, deputy director of the Tehran education department, says 1000 clerics will be sent into schools this fall to fight Western influence and domestic opposition, making students aware of "opposition plots and arrogance."

1545 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. HRANA profiles Parvin Javad Zandeh, a 22-year-old woman arrested on Ashura (27 December) who is serving an 8 1/2-year prison sentence.

The brother of Mahboumeh Karimi, an activist of the One Million Signatures campaign, says she is suffering from poor physical and psychological health.

1420 GMT: Graphic Rumour of Day. Human Rights Activists News Agency is reporting that a 26-year-old woman from Tabriz, Elnaz Babazadeh, was beaten, raped, and killed by three Basij militiamen who had detained her for inappropriate hijab.

HRANA has proven a reliable source of information in the past; however, we are treating this story as unconfirmed, given the seriousness of the allegations, and will be monitoring developments.

1405 GMT: More on the Karroubi Statement (see 0935 GMT). Green Voice of Freedom gives a fuller English summary of Mehdi Karroubi's comments today to families of political prisoners who visited his home.

Beyond his criticism of sanctions on Iran, linked to his claims of the mismanagement and abuses of the Ahmadinejad Government, Karroubi declared, “Unfortunately, today the establishment is neither a republic nor Islamic. And this is an alarm bell for those who care about the country, the establishment and this land. As always, we are seeking to revive the true definition of the Islamic Republic, which was approved by Imam [Khomeini] and the wise people of Iran in April 1979.”

In affirming the legitimacy of the Republic, Karroubi said, “The Constitution is not like a revelation, and at time it needs to change”. This political consideration of reform was impossible, however:

Despotism has brought us to the point where the country’s highest executive power has no regard for the Parliament and its laws....This, is disrespecting the Iranian people....We seek a republic that is based on the people’s vote and on engineering the people’s votes.

1140 GMT: Cartoon Politics --- From Paul the Octopus to Khamenei. Never say that Iran's cartoonists are out-of-touch with the latest cultural moments. Soon after posting our special World Cup item on Germany's psychic Paul the Octopus, who has chosen both Spain and Mir Hossein Mousavi, we notice this:



1000 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. The International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, from a source, claims that Mohammad Davari, the chief editor of Mehdi Karroubi's website Saham News, remains in Evin Prison’s Security Ward after several months. The source claimed that Davari has been under intense pressure to "confess" in a television interview.

0935 GMT: The Opposition and Sanctions. Mehdi Karroubi has followed up Mir Hossein Mousavi's linkage of regressive UN sanctions to the inept foreign policy of the Ahmadinejad Government and Iran's economic woes.

Karroubi said, "I believe that part of the Iranian rule as well as the Revolutionary Guards are in favour of sanctions as they make gigantic and astronomical profits from them."

The cleric then targeted President Ahmadinejad:

Imprudence in foreign policy and the lack of political sanity in the actions and political and diplomatic words of the man in charge of the government have imposed high costs on the country," the reformist cleric said in a direct attack on Ahmadinejad. We should not give an excuse through shallow words and bungling actions and allow others to easily impose sanctions against Iran.

0715 GMT: On a slow Sunday --- it's hot in Iran, after all --- we have posted a World Cup special, "The Ultimate Triumph of Paul the Octopus". There's a special treat at the end of the story for Iran-watchers.

0630 GMT: We begin this morning with an evaluation of Mr Verde of our exclusive report and analysis on Saturday, "The Plot Against Ahmadinejad, Part II".

Meanwhile on the hot front, the questions persist about the Government's holidays for Sunday and Monday because of "extreme heat". Reformist member of Parliament Dariush Ghanbari has suggested the weather cannot be the real reason for the sudden announcement, given the effect on business and services.

Broadcasting Resumed

A bit of relief for the head of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, Ezzatollah Zarghami, from both the Tehran heat and international pressure....

After Dutch counterparts withdrew their invitation for Zarghami and his colleagues to visit them, Zarghami was welcomed by Germany's broadcast directors, ARD chairman Peter Boudgoust and ZDF director-general Markus Schächter, in Mainz on Friday. IRIB made sure it filmed the occasion.

Iran Special: A Response to "The Plot Against Ahmadinejad" (Verde)

Mr Verde assesses EA's Saturday "exclusive" on the planning amongst leading Iranian conservatives/principlists to limit the President's authority or even remove him from office

I thank him and offer this quick addition. I fully agree that the plotters against Ahmadinejad are "trying to protect their own interests within the regime...[rather] than offering a real change of direction". The evidence from our sources may indicate that they no longer think their interests can be protected with the President in office.

But, as Mr Verde notes, their success depends on getting the Supreme Leader to accept this point of view (and possibly setting up defences against a response by the Revolutionary Guard). That success in turn needs more than the current base of planners: Hashemi Rafsanjani and senior clerics, in their view, have to be added. Until they see this as likely, the private manoeuvres of Larijani-Rezaei-Tavakoli will not become public beyond their speeches challenging the Government:

Iran Exclusive: The Plot to Remove Ahmadinejad, Act II

As the exclusive notes, under the present circumstances the possibility that Ahmadinejad is impeached by the Parliament is unlikely. They will need the signature of 1/3 of MPs to start the process and a 2/3 vote to actually impeach him.

We all saw what happened when the Majlis voted against the pro-Ahmadinejad Supreme Council for Cultural Revolution in the contest over Islamic Azad University, in which the Parliament backed down within 48 hours. In an impeachment process, we would probably witness more than a busload of thugs in front of Majlis.

Even if the president is impeached, the Supreme Leader will have the final say in dismissing him and Khamenei has invested too much on Ahmadinejad. And even if Ahmadinejad were to be dismissed, the First VP Mohammad Reza Rahimi would become an interim president. Because the planners have as many problems with Rahimi as they do with Ahmadinejad, they would have to get rid of him before moving on the President.

All this new talk of attacking and threatening Ahmadinejad by the Larijani-Rezaei axis is probably from a position of weakness rather than strength. They feel that, as a result of changes in the past few years and especially the last 12 months, Ahmadinejad and Co. are moving to limit their power and influence. With Khamenei’s intervention in the Azad University case, they have found some space to try to push back against Ahmadinejad ----the Kahrizak Prison abuse scandal and Rahimi’s corruption case are just convenient excuses. So this could be more a rear-guard action than a strategy for attack.

The events of the past year have resulted in a logjam within the Islamic Republic. The election fraud and the post-election actions by the regime have left the Republic’s reputation in pieces. Violence on behalf of the Islamic Republic against its own citizens is not new; what is new is that this time the violence has been directed at the entire population rather than targeted at specific groups, like the leftists, MKO [Mujahedin-e-Khalq], reformists, etc.

As the Supreme Leader, Khamenei has clearly said that he supports Ahmadinejad, and within the regime he has concentrated power in the hands of a small faction that is behind the President. If he were to move against Ahmadinejad now, there were be two consequences. Firstly, the people who are behind Ahmadinejad would rebel against the decision, further damaging the Supreme Leader's reputation and influence. Secondly, Khamenei would be admitting that his decision to back Ahmadinejad wholeheartedly was wrong. This would lead to more serious questions about his judgement and his ability to remain in charge. More of the Republic’s servants would doubt Khamenei as the Leader and the legitimacy of the regime and their roles with it.

Therefore, the whole existence of the Islamic Republic could be threatened if Khamenei were to try to sacrifice Ahmadinejad. This might have been possible last summer: Khamenei could have withdrawn his support of the President then and allowed him to fall. Khamenei would have been damaged too, but he could probably have gotten away with it. But since Khamenei, for whatever reason, decided to stand by Ahmadinejad, the only way he could now get rid of him is if the regime had managed to create stability in Iran. The current situation is far from that: we are witnessing new crises on a daily basis.

Some might say that Khamenei could get rid of Ahmadinejad and install someone like Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, Tehran Mayor Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf, or Secretary of Expediency Council Mohsen Rezaei. The problem is that this person would have to give in to at least some of the demands of the opposition and protestors. If that were to happen, the regime, which has been so inflexible, would suddenly have signalled to the population that ,with enough pressure, it would relent, no matter serious the issue. That could be the start of a new, and perhaps more determined, wave of opposition and protests.

Some might argue that the reformists can take over. They are too far from the centre of power at the present time. And it is increasingly looking like the reformists are facing ideological problems of their own. They seem to speak in paradoxes: both “return to the values Islamic Revolution” and “human rights”. They have not yet managed to explain how it would be possible to return to the values of the Revolution under Ayatollah Khomeini and install values like democracy, human rights, etc. The mess we are in at the present time is the result, not the abuse, of the values of the Revolution as interpreted by Khomeini. So a reformist takeover within the regime could lead to more public demands for change (and maybe even more protests) which could end up causing more damage to the Islamic Republic.

The regime in a precarious impasse with Ahmadinejad as a piece within the stalemate. If this piece is taken away in the present circumstances, it may lead to the whole structure collapsing

As far as the clerics are concerned, I think they are in a lose-lose situation. On the one hand, Ahmadinejad & Co. (with support from Khamenei) are moving to limit and weaken their power within the regime. On the other hand, the three decades of clerical rule in Iran have left them discredited. [Editor's Note: see an earlier analysis by Mr Verde, “The Escalating Crisis Within”).

Therefore any moves by Larijani-Tavakoli-Rezaei-etc against Ahamdinejad are probably more to do with them trying to protect their own interests within the regime, than a real change of direction. Otherwise, the regime could face more serious problems.