Saturday
Jul032010
Iran Special: The Escalating Crisis Within (Verde)
Saturday, July 3, 2010 at 7:45 
Mr Verde writes for EA:Weeks into the Parliament v. President v. Rafsanjani crisis over control of Islamic Azad University, there is no resolution. There have been efforts to play down the immediate conflict, for example, with the denial of Yasr Rafsanjani, the son of Hashemi Rafsanjani, that the university's office manager was arrested (but not, the sharp-eyed will notice, a denial that a raid took place on the university's offices). Yasr Rafsanjani also said that Azad University has written to head of judiciary, Sadegh Larijani, for "clarification".
The meeting of the "proper" (i.e., Government-controlled) university board, appointed by Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, has been postponed because of "issues". No rescheduled date has been announced, so a takeover by the SCCR of the university seems to have been put off for now.
Yet while there is no immediate showdown, the significance of the dispute continues to spread within the regime. We have had the anti-Majlis demonstrations, with the slogans against members of Parliament, who are overwhelmingly "principalist", and against Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, who is from the key city of Qom. [Note: since Mr Verde wrote this, the news has come out of Ahmadinejad supporters disseminating anti-Larijani leaflets after Friday Prayers in Qom.
We had the clash between principalist MPs Kouchakzadeh and Motahari with jibes, insults, and physical confrontation. We had a principalist MP make a speech in the Parliament asking, "Why is it that when some people (meaning Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi) want to demonstrate, they have to get a permit which is denied, but when others (meaning the pro-government mob) demonstrate without a permit and insult the Majlis, they are taken around in buses and provided lunch, cakes, and drinks?
The Azad University arguments are also having effect on the dynamic between Ahmadinejad and the key party Motalefeh. As you reported, pro-Ahmadinejad MPs want to out the chairman of the Majlis education committee who is a member of Motalefeh (and incidentally is the brother-in-law of Azad University chancellor Jasbi). And now we have an interview with the chairman of Motalefeh, Mohammad-Nabi Habibi: he says that if events like 14 Khordad (the 4 June humiliation of Ayatollah Khomeini's grandson), the SCCR decision on Azad University, the President’s letter to Council of Guardians and the Prosecutor General's overruling of the decision of a court (the overturning of the injunction against the SCCR decision on Azad University) are repeated, it would harm the unity of even the followers of the Revolution.
So now we have more than an argument; we have a crisis, escalating over the last four week. Habibi had no intention of condemning the heckling of Seyed Hassan Khomeini at the 4 June ceremony for his grandfather, but the Azad University episode has forced the hand of this most principalist of Iranian parties, Motalefeh.
Right from the start, the 14 Khordad heckling of Khomeneni seemed like a stupid idea. Then details of the events emerged: Najjar, the Interior Minister, had told Ahmadinejad to extend his speech so that Khomeini could be squeezed out; the mob was organized; Khamenei had insisted that Khomeini spoke (which suggests the possibility that Khamenei was behind the incident and set Khomeini up, especially since he did not condemn the heckling). Then we had all religious figures of note backing Khomeini and condemning the events.
This has given Khomeini a strong mandate, something which Khamenei has not been able to obtain since last summer. He may be starting to use this mandate, recently criticising the economic situation and saying that the country’s problems cannot be managed with childish vindictiveness.
All this intra-principalist fighting brings another possibility: a space created for Hashemi Rafsanjani to snipe at Khamenei.
Rafsanjani is known for not speaking clearly. Usually what he says can be interpreted to mean opposite things. But recently, commemorating the 7 Tir bombing of 1981, he put out a statement which can only be read as taking direct aim at the Supreme Leader:
The sphere of our enemies is getting bigger, but our sphere of identifying enemies has become restricted.
Divisiveness is called honesty, insult is called candour, lies are called tact, slander is called boldness and slogans are called insight.
Why is Rafsanjani becoming bolder? Is it that he feels that he has too much to lose and should make a move now? Or does he feel that the other side is on the back foot?
Everyone knows that Rafsanjani does not like Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. In 2005 he claimed that Ahmadinejad’s election was fraudulent. Just before the 2009 election, Ahmadinejad accused Rafsanjani’s family of serious corruption and Rafsanjani in turn write a letter to Khamenei warning him of serious problems to come.
Yet even though the President may be trying to put on more pressure by trying to take Azad University from Rafsanjani, in my view, Khamenei is behind the move:
- Rafsanjani has not supported Khamenei, his President and his post-election decisions and actions. So now the Supreme Leader wants to yet again show that such lack of total support and disobedience will have serious consequences.
- Since well before the election, Khamenei has had to incresingly rely on sections of the top commanders of the Islamic Revoluton Guards Corps. Since the elections, he is losing legitimacy and respect elsewhere and therefore has to depend even more on the IRGC.
The methods of the military --- shooting people in the streets, running them over, jailing and torturing them --- may prove to be ineffective in the long term. But Khamenei has no choice, he is stuck with them and has to support them (no matter how stupid actions like 14 Khordad are) and appease them, by allowing them to take control of lucrative economic organizations,like the state-run telecoms company and the South Pars gas contracts.
Azad University is a rich and lucrative institution; there would be no surprise if IRGC cronies wanted to control it. So Khamenei has so far allowed SCCR to start the process of taking Azad University from Rafsanjani’s cronies and passing it to IRGC’s cronies.
- Rafsanjani has wide connections within the regime. These connections have in the past been used to overcome the regime's problems during crises. But this time a large part of the establishment is refusing to back the Supreme Leader. He is angry about this and may think he no longer needs Rafsanjani as a behind-the-scenes peacemaker.
Instead, Khamenei may be looking, or is being forced by the circumstances in which he finds himself , to eject large parts of the establishment, including the reformist and any conservatives/principalists who are not fully behind him). And he could feel that Rafsanjani’s connections and influence are hindering this cull.
A problem with these tactics: if you "cleanse" the large part of the establishment, you need to replace them with new dependable allies. And this has to take place within a distinctive and not necessarily helpful Iranian political environment:
- The Islamic Republic has not been able to install its ideology throughout Iranian society. People who have grown up under the rule of the regime do not understand and/or accept that ideology, for at times it appears not as having its own values, but as primarly being against the values of others.
- One of the main aims of the 1979 Revolution was to eradicate the corruption and cronyism of the past. If anything, this has become worse.
- From the early days of the Islamic Republic, more emphasis was placed on commitment to the regime than to expertise and knowledge. This has led to severe mismanagement at almost all levels.
- The structure of the regime does not support transparency and continuation of governance is based on competing (but closed) centers of interest. So you have the Majlis, the Council of Guardians, Expediency Council, Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution, and numerous other official and semi-official centers of power, with many having authority over the same areas. There is no proper oversight, no transparency.
This in itself leads to public mistrust of the regime. Also, Imagine if Khamenei were to resign or unable to carry on as the Leader. Then the Council of Experts would have to meet in emergency session to choose his successor. They could select anyone to succeed him (and judging by what happened outside of the Majles last week, a busload of thugs could become the determining factor). The SL has the most power --- the ultimate power --- in Iran, but there is no transparency in the way he is selected, nor are there any checks on his performance.
- The leaders of the regime have and still do promise justice for all, but their practices are creating injustices at all levels of life in Iran.
- The nature of the regime is exclusive, not inclusive. It has created a system that excludes many members of the general population from its circle for many different reasons: the way people dress, what they read, what they watch, their personal opinions, etc. The regime only accepts that part of the general population as its “citizens” who are unquestioning followers. If you ask a question, you may get the answer that you are corrupt, stupid, or an enemy agent. (Khamenei has demonstrated this well, with his complain about the “imperceptive confidants”.)
- The regime places the interests of a select few over the national interest. It may seem that the Islamic Republic values the leaders of Hamas and Lebanese Hesbollah and their interests more that the people of Iran and their concerns.
And thus the crisis --- beyond street protests, Azad University, and the regime’s nuclear projects --- of which these are only a few examples,
- When the reformist Mohammad Khatami was President, he said that talk of amending the constitution is treason (note: treason). Last year, in his statements after the elections, Mousavi said: the Constitution, not a word less, not a word more.
Mousavi is now saying that the people have the right to ask for the Constitution to be changed. He is saying that the constitution is not God’s word.
- Last year Mousavi was talking about the early days of the Revolution as the golden age. But now he is saying that not everything then was good. And the key reformist participant in the Revolution, Mostafa Tajzadeh, puts out a statement criticizing many of the actions of the regime in the 1980s.
- Alongside the sniping at Khamenei, we are beginning to see religious scholars questions the principle of velayat-e faqih (supreme clerical rule).
(the list is longer than this)
What we are witnessing are serious questions not just about the actions of the regime officials, but about the founding principles of the Islamic Republic and the actions of Islamic Republic since it was founded; not just from last year or five years ago when Ahmadinejad became president or 20 years ago when Khamenei became Supreme Leader. In his statement, Tajzadeh talks about returning to what Ayatollah Khomeini was putting forth during his exile in France, the promises made before the Revolution.
But regime officials and the groups divide further and carry on with their own fights, while the problems get worse. Neither Khamenei nor anyone else within the system appears to have any idea about fixing these problems. As individuals and as groups, they are best at fanning the flames.
We have a large part of the Iranian population which is very unhappy. The regime has not done anything to ease the unease of the post-election protestors; if anything, it has done a lot to upset even more people. The economy is getting worse, and the sanctions --- despite what Ahmadinejad may say --- will not make things easier.
A dangerous power vacuum is emerging, as Khamenei is not able to lead in many cases. Having to clear up the mess after something goes wrong, his authority is waning. The President does not appear to have the required competence, and regime reformists are excluded from any involvement. For some, the answer emerges that sections of the Revolutionary Guard may hope to grab power.
But none of these political scenarios offers an imminent answer. For the in-fighting and soul searching reveals a vacuum beyond the political vacuum of power, the emptiness may now be that of the principles of the Islamic Republic.
