Afghanistan: All Politics is Local --- Al-Qa'eda and the War (Mull)

EA correspondent Josh Mull is the Afghanistan Blogging Fellow for The Seminal and Brave New Foundation. He also writes Rethink Afghanistan:

In our latest video from Rethink Afghanistan, we closed by asking, "Afghanistan got your attention now?" The answer is apparently a resounding YES.

Afghanistan-Pakistan Complexities: Insurgents, Reconciliation, and “Al Qa’eda” (Rodriguez/King)

As the US President's "emergency" war supplemental funding finally hobbles onto the floor for a vote in Congress, months after it was requested, it is facing furious opposition up to the last moment.  Republican and "Blue Dog" Democratic legislators are already being publicly exposed as hypocrites on fiscal responsibility, and that cry will only get louder if the spending is approved.

President Obama himself has faced a stinging rebuke from Congress for his comments about lawmakers' "obsession" with the war, and the Out of Afghanistan Caucus continues to chip away at what little appetite for war remains in congress.

Robert Naiman writes,, "While press reports suggest that when the dust settles, the Pentagon will have the war money, it's likely that a record number of Representatives will go on the record in opposition to open-ended war and occupation."

That's a big deal for those members of Congress, but we have to remember where this challenge is coming from. These may be progressive warriors and heroes of the peace movement, but they're also still craven politicians who spend every second of their free time begging folks (either you or a lobbyist, depending on who takes the initiative) to support them so they can remain in office.

And this is Democratic President Obama's war in Afghanistan, so the massive, highly-coordinated anti-war push in congress can't be pinned on the machinations of the Democratic party. There is no chance in hell the President's partisan apparatchiks would be managing this kind of opposition to the White House, which means this is entirely the work of grassroots citizens' movements. Even though we're talking about a massive war thousands of miles away in Afghanistan and Pakistan, "all politics is local," and it is average citizens who are making a difference.

Put bluntly, Americans are pissed off about the war, and Congress has absolutely no choice but to act upon that anger. But rest assured, supporters of the war are not going to quietly wind down their endless battle because of a little Congressional pushback. And if the past is any indication, when popular anger with the war reaches these prominent levels, war-makers will play the strongest, most sacred card they have: Al-Qa'eda.

The warnings are only effective if you buy into the official spin surrounding the Global War on Terror (GWOT), with the US engaged in war across the entire globe with a terrorist army called Al-Qa'eda. It brings to mind the disturbing vision of the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington. Almost for that reason alone, the warning of both President Bush and President Obama resonate powerfully with most Americans.

However, if you strip away the official spin, a reasonable and realistic understanding of the threat that Al-Qa'eda poses reveals that even this basic justification for the war in Afghanistan is just another hollow excuse for a useless and catastrophically expensive foreign occupation.

Right away, let's get rid of a little conventional wisdom. The commonly accepted defense against the Al-Qa'eda argument is that these terrorists are stupid. They can't build a working car bomb, they can't blow up their own pants on a plane, or they just wind up blowing up themselves.They're inept, and therefore less of a threat. That's a little too close to tempting fate if you ask me. It's practically daring the terrorists to do something. Bring it on, dummies!

But there are also many, many innocent dead people, mostly Muslims, who would likely love to quibble with the characterization of terrorists as incompetent, that is if they hadn't already been murdered by Al-Qa'eda. A bomb in Peshawar does the same thing a bomb in New York City does: it kills people. The fact that the US has lucked out on the last few attacks is no reason to dismiss the violence of which Al-Qa'eda is still quite capable.

My choice of language there, the "violence Al-Qa'eda is capable of", is itself laced with some unhelpful conventional wisdom. I am implying that Al-Qa'eda is a coherent organization, a rational actor engaging in policy. But that's not really true.

The key to understanding the true nature of Al-Qa'eda is right there in the name. Al-Qa'eda means "the base", but that's not base as in a military base. It is base as in database. It is a list of information, in this case, a global Rolodex of members of like-minded groups and individuals willing to engage in Jihad. It's a Craigslist for terrorism. Each "member" of Al-Qa'eda, whether that's the old guard like Zawahiri in Pakistan or newcomers like Shabaab in Somalia, signs on to a franchise, carrying with it certain responsibilities, and thus they become a member of Al-Qa'eda.

For example, there was an Islamic insurgent group operating in Algeria known as the GSPC. After the 9/11 attacks, the United States dramatically increased its counter-terrorism relationship with the Algerian government. This new support changed the tide of the civil war, and the GSPC was brought to its knees. Facing defeat, the GSPC signed on to Al-Qa'eda, and overnight the old insurgent group, GSPC, disappeared with the exception of a few marginalized fringe groups. Al-Qa'eda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) was born.

Algerian recruits went to training camps in Pakistan, Yemen, Iraq, etc. Some waged jihad in those countries (becoming what the US military's "foreign fighters"), while others returned with knowledge, applying their new training to fresh campaigns of commando raids and IEDs against their home government.

With the Al-Qa'eda franchise came other perks, of course, including connection to international organized crime networks (narcotics, weapons, and human trafficking) as well as the nourishing supply of hard currency from regional oil sheiks that only the Al-Qa'eda brand can deliver. But at no point is there any sort of rigid, hierarchical structure to the organization of Al-Qa'eda. It is not as if the leaders of AQIM take orders from Osama bin Laden, or that they all get together over a map and plan out the global Caliphate. It's membership in a club --- social networking for Jihadists.

What this means is that there technically is no such thing as "defeating Al-Qa'eda." Quite simply, there is nothing there to defeat. Andrew Exum writes:

In general, we Americans --- especially some of our friends on the American Right --- tend to overestimate the importance of what we do in comparison to what local actors do. (Iraq and Afghanistan, seriously, should have taught us better.) That doesn't mean we fold up our tents and head home: we just have to be realistic about what we can hope to achieve through the application of U.S. power, military force especially.

Another way of saying that: "All politics is local". In Algeria, there isn't really an Al-Qa'eda there for us to fight, there is the same religious insurgency, a local phenomenon, that was there before the franchise and will be there after the franchise. The "foreign fighters", whether that's Algerians in Pakistan or Pakistanis in Algeria, are products of their local conditions. To stop AQIM, you have to resolve the issues in Algeria. To stop Al-Qa'eda in Pakistan, you have to resolve the issues in Pakistan.

How do we do that? So far the United States has used the military, but as we see in Algeria, and indeed everywhere else, that only drives the local actors, the insurgent groups, extremists, criminals, etc. even closer to a relationship with Al-Qa'eda. It makes the local problem a global problem, exacerbating it beyond control.

The Al-Qa'eda franchise that the US is primarily concerned with is in Pakistan (almost none remain in Afghanistan). Just as expected, the military efforts there have solidified the relationship between Al-Qa'eda and the local actors, in this case the groups comprising the Taliban. As a consequence of assassinating the older, more pragmatic leadership in Afghanistan and Pakistan, many Taliban groups are led by younger, inexperienced commanders who are far more susceptible to the radicalism of Al-Qa'eda. The war has gone on so long now that many of the foreign fighters have stayed and intermarried into local communities, embedding their ideology firmly into the status quo.

So not only is the Taliban now closer to Al-Qa'eda, they become more indistinguishable with every new drone strike and special forces raid. To reduce the terrorist threat, the US has to do something besides use the military.

To stop the Taliban, they have to be approached as the local actors they are. For instance, Afghan President Hamid Karzai has supposedly opened negotiations with the Haqqani network, which is part of the "Pakistan Taliban", as opposed to the "Afghan Taliban" led by Mullah Omar's Quetta Shura. The Haqqani network is very much a radical Islamic militant group, but they are also an asset of the Pakistani military in their "strategic depth" against India (that is, they kill Indians). Their existence relies on support from the military, so when the Pakistani Army demanded they sever their ties with Al-Qa'eda, they did so.

At Foreign Policy's AfPak Channel, we see this [emphasis mine]:

Moreover, the relationship is reportedly strained because of the Haqqanis' ties to the Pakistani state -- an enemy of al-Qaeda. Pakistani authorities have conducted a number of raids on Haqqani compounds that house al-Qaeda men and supplies, but Haqqani fighters are often left untouched.[...]

Former and current Haqqani Network commanders say that their movement is closer to the Quetta Shura's nationalist rhetoric than al-Qaeda's vision of global jihad, but some members of the group espouse al-Qaeda-like language. The Haqqanis have avoided the anti-Pakistan rhetoric common to al-Qaeda and the TTP. In June 2006, Jalaluddin Haqqani's office released a letter arguing that attacking Pakistan "is not our policy. Those who agree with us are our friends and those who do not agree and [continue to wage] an undeclared war against Pakistan are neither our friends nor shall we allow them in our ranks." Sirajuddin Haqqani has gone further, explaining in an interview that he opposed "any attempt by Muslims to launch attacks in non-Muslim countries." In May 2009, he argued to two French journalists: "It is a mistake to think that al-Qaeda and the Taliban are pursuing the same aim. Al-Qaeda is trying to spread its influence throughout the world. This does not interest us. The Taliban's aim is to liberate Afghanistan from foreign troops."

But the Pakistani military's role doesn't stop the bleeding over of Al-Qa'eda's global ideology, particularly into the younger members of the organization. The Haqqani networks and its affiliates still supply foreign fighters and suicide bombers sympathetic to Al-Qa'eda operations, even if this isn't the express policy of the top leadership.

To reduce the extremism in Pakistan, the US has several options, none guaranteed to work, but also none nearly as damaging and horrific as its current policy of war. The Pakistani military's relationship with the Taliban must be destroyed, which requires a complete end to their national security strategy of "strategic depth," the use of terrorism and insurgencies against India. While the US cannot directly force the military to do this, they can engage exclusively with Pakistan's democratically-elected civilian government. This would empower the government, which has no desire for war with India, to rein in the Army and intelligence services and end their support of terrorism.

This would also allow the Pakistani state to fully extend its authority into Taliban territory, rather than simply cutting a deal with the militants. If Pakistani citizens in the farthest reaches of the tribal areas had the same rule of law (which is itself in dire need of reform) as Pakistanis in suburban Karachi, the environment that produces Al-Qa'eda sympathizers would be dramatically reduced. The US can influence this with development aid, encouragement of a proper education system, and assistance in sustainable energy projects.

Most importantly, the US can end its war in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Our policy provides the perfect narrative for Al-Qa'eda, as Londonstani writes:

Pakistani 1: "Western countries are trying to destroy Islam. They fear us more than the Chinese. We are the only people who have a system that challenges theirs. They know their system has failed, so they are trying to destroy us before everyone becomes Muslim. They have always hated us. They want to keep us poor. Our rulers have been bought by them. Our rulers sold us for big houses in London and New York. Now Western soldiers and contractors roam around our country looking for ways to steal from us and control us. We are paying the price. If we don't fight, they will rob us and leave us to die in the gutter."

Pakistani 2: "Peace is a good thing. You are a Muslim, right? We are all about peace. We love it. Fighting is not the answer. Peace is the answer. Just take it easy, be good and everything will sort itself out."

Presenting your ideas as part of a bigger picture is much more persuasive than just chucking them randomly out there. The ideology of Islamist extremism has a very effective big-picture story. On the other side, the narrative is a bit...well,... lacking.

We can't make them believe we're not violent, oppressive invaders, because we are violent, oppressive invaders. They're going to come up with loony "conspiracy theories" like the US supports the Taliban, because we support the Army and intelligence services which supports the Taliban. It's just that simple.

Having a reasonable, civilian-only foreign policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan is what will reduce the threat of Al-Qa'eda, not an expensive and bloody occupation. War feeds Al-Qa'eda, and it feeds the Taliban. The local issues must be addressed, primarily by local actors, and it must be done with transparency and legitimacy. The US should not support military despots in Islamabad or mafia chieftains in Kabul. The US should not be occupying Afghanistan or conducting air strikes and raids in Pakistan, nor should it allow the proliferation of private mercenary groups in these groups, which feed into the idea of the US as lawless invaders.

Obviously you can't completely eliminate the threat of terrorism. Terrorism is a crime, like robbery or murder. Reducing the number of individuals willing to engage in this crime can be done through policy choices, but there is clearly still a role for law enforcement agencies to play.

However, there is a difference between terrorism being a natural occurrence, and our overseas wars blatantly churning out new terrorist recruits. While terrorism will still exist, its scope and degree can be dramatically slashed simply by ending the US wars in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and lest we forget, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, and everywhere else we're engaging in violent, military conflict with Al-Qa'eda affiliates (both real and imagined).

An end to the war is already in sight, not because of any powerful interference, but because local citizens pushed their representatives to block the president's escalation. Similarly, when the supporters of the intervention make their frightening warnings about Al-Qa'eda, the answer again is not war, but local solutions led by the citizens themselves, not the US. A change in US foreign policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, with a focus on development and rule of law instead of war, is what is required.

But before we can see that change, the war itself has to end. Just don't let them scare you with Al-Qa'eda.

Iran Analysis: Assessing Europe's Sanctions & Tehran's Oil (Noel)

Writing on Race for Iran, Pierre Noël offers an interesting analysis of European sanctions and Iran's oil and gas position, both regarding exports and imports. In the end, its significance is not as much economic --- Noël does not, for me, get to the heart of the tensions over whether Iran can satisfy its domestic demand, given the gap in imports and production left by the withdrawal of foreign companies, as well as cope with the restrictions on its exports --- as political: "Any issue that allows EU [European Union] member states to present a united front and make Europe exist on the world stage looks like a gift from heaven":

Iran is a country with very large reserves of natural gas, a lot of it relatively low-cost to produce.  With the right investment, Iran could become a gas exporter of global significance in about a decade.  Europe is one of the largest gas markets in the world.  Its combination of liberalized electricity markets and ambitious environmental policies has the effect of favoring gas as a fuel for power generation, at least in the mid-term.  Russia’s position in the European gas market raises concerns about market power and the politicization of gas supplies from Russia.  The EU supports new gas pipeline projects from Central Asia and the Middle East through Turkey to diversify Europe’s sources of natural gas; the availability of Iranian gas could be essential to the success of this diversification strategy.  Russia, on the other hand, should want to prevent or delay the emergence of Iran as a large gas exporter.

However, there are a number of uncertainties, which, taken together, raise serious questions about the practical validity of these interlinked propositions.  First, at the moment we do not know to what extent the latest EU sanctions will add to the difficulties already experienced by the Iranian oil and gas industry to source technology and finance.  These is a log of oil and gas activity going on in Iran, but large-scale gas export projects combining complex financing and cutting-edge engineering are not part of this activity.  This is certainly the case for LNG [liquified natural gas] projects, an area where the relevant technology is still largely controlled by Western companies; it is unclear to what extent big pipeline export projects could be carried on.

Second—and more fundamentally—it is far from certain that becoming a large gas exporter is a strategic priority for Iran, or even a clearly defined objective.  Iran’s potential to become a large gas exporter has been recognized for decades, but that potential has never materialized.  Iran imports roughly 5 billion cubic meters of gas per year (bcm/y) from Turkmenistan and exports roughly the same amount to Turkey.  The Islamic Republic’s small export contract with Turkey is notoriously unstable and has led to numerous rows over price and delivery.  European majors such as Total and Shell have had a terrible experience negotiating with Iran over LNG projects (and, during the 1990s, over oil projects as well).  When the European companies pulled back from new projects in Iran three years ago, ostensibly because of sanctions, the companies were not in a position to make final investment decisions on these projects for commercial reasons.

Becoming a large gas exporter would require a strategic decision by Iran, based on a wide political consensus—such as the one underpinning the Iranian nuclear program—to open the sector for real to foreign investors.  There is deep opposition to such a move in the Iranian political culture and the culture of its oil and gas bureaucracy, rooted in the memories of the U.S.-sponsored coup of 1953 following the nationalization of British oil concessions by the nationalist Mossadegh government.  If becoming a large gas exporter was a strategic objective for Iran, then the Iranian government would appear hopelessly incompetent at pursuing it.  Bu tgeology is not destiny; Iran may not want to be the next Qatar.

Furthermore, Iran is itself a large and fast-growing gas market, now 30% larger than the largest European markets, the UK and Germany.  Iran needs to continue developing some of its reserves simply to supply its domestic market; that is what Iran’s gas-related exploration and production activity has been about for some time and—I would suggest—that is what Iran’s gas-related exploration and production activity will continue to be mainly about.  The existing sanctions have been effective at killing proposed LNG export projects—but these projects might not have gone ahead anyway, in the absence of sanctions, for commercial reasons.  There is no indication that the sanctions have had any impact on the growth of gas production in Iran.  I do not know to what extent the Iranian industry’s exploration and production effort relies on European technology and services that would be made unavailable by new EU sanctions, and would not be replaceable by technology and services from Asian or South American companies.

This does not mean that Iran has no strategic energy policy.  In the context of the standoff with the “international community” over its nuclear program, Iran is obviously trying to use the attractiveness of its energy resources and geographical position to its political benefit.  The growing interest of Chinese oil and gas companies in Iran has been widely documented—but it has not led to any new gas export project.  Turkey’s ambition to increase its access to Turkmen gas via Iran has already been discussed on www.TheRaceForIran.com (see here andhere).  Given how strategic Turkmen gas (and the trans-Caspian pipeline) is to Europe’s Nabucco concept, Iran has an option to provide Turkey with both access to gas and leverage on Europe.  The Iran-Pakistan pipeline project, for which the Pakistani government has just reaffirmed its support, is another example where Iran uses its energy assets strategically to raise the cost of the U.S.-EU Iran policy.

The final point is about Europe’s plans for a large pipeline across Turkey that would bring gas from Central Asia and the Middle East to the EU, especially south-east and central Europe....

Read rest of article....

China This Week: Trade Pact But No US Arms Sales to Taiwan, Manoeuvres on North Korea, Google Accepts Chinese Law

China-Taiwan Trade Pact: Beijing and Taipei signed anEconomic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) on Tuesday, seeking to boost economic ties and ease political tensions that have haunted cross-Straits ties for most of the past six decades.

The deal, focusing on easier access to markets, will remove tariffs within two years on 539 Taiwan export items worth $13.84 billion and 267 mainland export items to Taiwan valued at $2.86 billion. Taiwan firms will be granted access to 11 service sectors on the mainland, including banking, accounting, insurance, and hospitals. Follow-up consultations will try to remove the obstacles for economic and trade activities.

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The pact will also boost bilateral trade already totaling about $110 billion a year, made up of some $80 billion in goods flowing to the mainland and $30 billion to Taiwan.
Analysts from the Peterson Institute for International Economics project that the deal could help Taiwan increase its GDP by up to 5.3 % by 2020, compared to 0.8% without the ECFA.

US arms sales to Taiwan on hold: According to the US-based Defense News, Rupert Hammond-Chambers, president of the US-Taiwan Business Council, has said arms sales are on hold until at least spring 2011.

While there is no confirmation of the report by official US sources, the Pentagon-backed Defense News has at times released US military decisions in advance.

Earlier this month, China called off a planned visit by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates after Beijing told the Pentagon the timing was "inconvenient". despite an earlier invitation for Gates to visit. This was an apparent snub over a $6.4-billion arms package unveiled in January for Taiwan, including helicopters, Patriot missiles, and mine-hunting ships.

China rebuffs US criticism over North Korea: China has rejected opposition to its stance over the Korean peninsula, saying it would never "pour oil on the fire" at a time when calm and restraint were needed.

Chinese media reports said President Obama had criticised China's "willful blindness" to the actions of North Korea the sinking of a South Korean warship.

"China borders on the Korean Peninsula, and we have our own feeling on the issue, different from that of the countries tens of thousands miles away. We have more direct and intense concerns", said Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang.

Qin said that for long-term development and stability, there must be abolition of nuclear weapons: "We are willing to make joint efforts with parties concerned to realize the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula through pushing forward the six-party talks".

Google Abides by Chinese Law to Renew License: Guxiang Information Technology Co. Ltd, the operator of Google.cn, has pledged to "abide by the Chinese law" in a letter of application to China's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology to renew its permit to run websites in China.

The application was made "almost at the same time" that Google's chief legal officer David Drummond wrote a blog post saying Google is committed "not to self-censor", according to the official.

Guxiang said it will "ensure the company will provide no law-breaking contents as stated in the 57th statement in China's regulations concerning telecommunications”.

The Latest from Iran (1 July): Establishing the Pattern

2025 GMT: Today's All-is-Well Alert: Deputy Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance Behrouz Alishiri has said that new UN sanctions have proven futile, as transactions in Iran's investment market have risen 10 percent since the passage of the UN resolution.

Alishiri added that, according to the reports of the International Monetary Fund, foreign investment in Iran rose from $900 million in 2007 to $3 billion in 2009.

NEW Iran Interview: Ahmad Batebi “The Green Movement Goes Underground”
Iran Eyewitness: “Life Continues for People…With the Hope of Change” (Fatemeh)
Iran Special: The Significance of the “Universities Crisis” (Verde)
The Latest from Iran (30 June): Assessing “Crisis”

1925 GMT: Oil Squeeze. Lloyd’s of London, the insurance market, is recognising US sanctions by restricting cover for any ships carrying petroleum to Iran.

1815 GMT: Where's Mahmoud? Well, this weekend, the President will visit Nigeria.

It could be that Ahmadinejad fancies a change of scenery. Perhaps he got one of those special e-mails offering him a lot of money if he helped get the funds of a late President/General/businessman out of the country. Or maybe there is some connection with Nigeria taking over the presidency of the United Nations Security Council.

1805 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Activists report that Narges Mohammadi , the vice-chair of Shirin Ebadi's Center for the Defenders of Human Rights, has been released on $50,000 bail.

1800 GMT: Speaking of Universities and Threats. BBC Persian reports that some applicants for Iran's universities have received a threatening text message warning that, if they participated in post-election protests last year, they will be ineligible for acceptance regardless of their performance on entrance examinations.

The head of the government agency that administers the examinations has harshly criticised the sending of the messages. Iran Unfiltered concludes that this is an example of "hardline" elements of the regime acting without the consent and probably the prior knowledge of officials.

1750 GMT: The Universities Crisis. The dispute between Parliament and President over Islamic Azad University, analysed by EA's Mr Verde yesterday, has finally hit the non-Iranian mainstream press. The Guardian of London offers a summary, framing the battle as "a bitter political battle for control between President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his most powerful rival, Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani".

1740 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Labour activists claim that the Iranian government has informed the International Labour Organization that Mansour Osanloo, a leader of Tehran's bus union, is due for release.

The Interational Transport Workers Federation and the International Trade Union Confederation have welcomed the news but also insisted that 52 other innocent trade unionists should be freed.

1605 GMT: Cyber-Shelter. Reporters Without Borders has launched the world’s first “Anti-Censorship Shelter” for use by foreign journalists, bloggers, and activists.

The organization said at a gathering in Paris, "At a time when online filtering and surveillance is becoming more and more widespread, we are making an active commitment to an Internet that is unrestricted and accessible to all by providing the victims of censorship with the means of protecting their online information.”

The initiative, pursued with the communications security firm XeroBank, offers free high-speed anonymity services, including encrypted email and web access, to those who use the Shelter Connection through a Virtual Private Network routes traffic across XeroBank's gigabit backbone network. As it passes from country to country, mixed with tens of thousands of other users, it creates a virtually untraceable high-speed anonymity network.

The network will be available not only to users of the Shelter in Paris but also to their contacts anywhere in the world and to all those identified by Reporters Without Borders. They will be able to connect with the XeroBank service through access codes and secured, ready-to-use USB flash drives.

1545 GMT: Larijani "Mans Up". Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani continues to put forth the even-tougher-than-the-President line on international matters.

Speaking at the end of an Islamic Inter-Parliamentary summit in Damascus, Larijani said the Americans' ulterior motive in imposing new sanctions lay not in Tehran but in the West Bank and Gaza: "We are told that Iran's approach toward Palestine is important for them [the US], and they think they can change our will by pressuring us."

Larijani added, "Considering the Zionist regime's plots, countries in the Islamic world should stand beside each other."

1400 GMT: Rewriting the Past for the Present. The head of the Basiji militia, Mohammad Reza Naqdi has announced a new Basij Cyber Army. To introduce this advance in Iranian warfare, Naqdi declared that the Soviet Union was toppled by Iranian martyrs, and those fighters also ensured Zionists are surrounded by Hamas and Hezbollah today.

1220 GMT: Refugee Watch. OMID Advocates have published an extensive, vital study, "Report on the Situation of Iranian Refugees in Turkey".

1125 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Pedram Rafati, a student activist at Amir Kabir University, has been sentenced to two years in prison and fined. Reports claim that the presiding judge, Abolghassam Salavati, threatened Rafati with a longer term if he appeals.

Labour activist Khosro Boukani has been given a two-year sentence.

0945 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Hossein Marashi, former Vice President and relative and ally of Hashemi Rafsanjani, has returned to jail after a temporary release during his one-year sentence.

Professors and students have demanded the release of Ehsan Abdoh Tabrizi, a Ph.D. candidate at Durham University in Britain. Tabrizi was detained on Ashura during a visit to his relatives.

0935 GMT: Economy Watch. Sadegh Mahsouli, the Minister of Welfare and Social Security, has announced that the  subsidy reduction plan will be implemented in six provinces --- Isfahan, Sout Khorasan, Kermanshah, West Azerbaijan, Bushehr, and Golestan --- from July.

Minister of Housing Ali Nikzad has expressed his concern about a "housing bazaar gone mad", resulting in extremely high rents.

Six million families will receive a basket of goods for Ramadan, with a reduction of 20 percent in price.

0930 GMT: The Battle Within. Fatemeh Bodaghi, the President's deputy for judicial affairs, notes that complaints against member of Parliament Elyas Naderan, a vocal critic of the Government, and (even more politically interesting) Tehran Mayor Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf are still in court and asks Iran's judiciary why they have not been handled.

0920 GMT: Spinning the Nuclear Talks. What is highlighted in Khabar Online's coverage of the statement by the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov: his call for renewed discussions between Russia, the US, France, and Iran.

What's missing: Lavrov's pre-condition that Iran suspend the attempt to enrich uranium to 20 percent.

0915 GMT: A Challenge to Moscow. Iran's Minister of Defense, Ahmad Vahidi, has demanded Russian delivery of S-300 missiles to Tehran. The shipment has been held up for months amidst the international manoeuvres over sanctions and Iran's nuclear programme.

0910 GMT: The Fall-Out from the Attack on Khomeini. Another message from a cleric for Seyed Hassan Khomeini, who was shouted down by regime supporters when he tried to speak at the 4 June for his late grandfather....

That is far from unusual. What is distinctive this time is that the backing comes from a member of the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution, seen as a bulwark of the regime. Hojatoleslam Dr. Ahmad Ahmadi wrote to Hassan Khomeini, "I was stunned when I heard of this ugly uproar."

0755 GMT: The Voices of Women. Zahra Rahnavard has asserted that joining international conventions is the best way to prevent domestic oppression.

Female followers of the late Grand Ayatollah Montazeri have asked Grand Ayatollah Sistani, the leading Shi'a cleric in Iraq, to insist on a reopening of Montazeri's offices, recently sealed by Iranian authorities.

0750 GMT: Irony, Sarcasm, or a Message for Ahmadinejad? Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani offered this nugget to the press in a meeting with Bahrain's Foreign Minister on Tuesday, "The strategic policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran on Iraq is the formation of a national unity government with the presence of all political, religious and ethnic groups."

Now, Mr Larijani, is your tongue in your cheek or are you really pushing the idea of "national unity" not only for Iraq but for its neighbours? (And if it is the latter, does Fars News understand what you are doing?)

0745 GMT: Websites for Human Rights. An EA reader brings to our attention CrowdVoice: Tracking Voices of Protest, which included a section with news on "Prisoners of Conscience in Iran".

0735 GMT: Ahmadinejad's Token Sanctions. Iranian state media say that President Ahmadinejad has announced a boycott of Western companies and goods in retaliation against sanctions by the US and UN. Included are Coca-Cola, IBM, Intel, and Nestle.

Hmm.... Not quite sure why Ahmadinejad is presenting this as "new". I certainly couldn't get hold of an evil Coke when I was in Tehran --- instead, I got hooked on the politically correct (and quite tasty) Parsi Cola.
0725 GMT: More on Depression in Tehran. Yesterday we noted the headline, via Iranian Labor News Agency, on a study of the emotional state of Tehran residents: 30% depressed.

Rooz Online offers much more on the study, by Tehran's Aria Strategic Studies Center, and on press coverage. The "30%" refers to severe depression; another 28% claim to suffer from mild depression. The report says concerns about marriage, housing, employment, and income are among those that have caused anxiety and unease among Tehran residents.

The official unemployment is now 14%, with higher rates amongst youth and university graduates.

0710 GMT: Cyber-Development. The International Committee for Human Rights in Iran has launched a podcast. This week's topic: "Will more political prisoners face execution soon?”

0620 GMT: Nuclear Front. Another signal that talks on Iran's uranium enrichment may resume: Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki has said Tehran will respond to a Russian proposal to meet with the Vienna Group (US, Russia, and France) after consulting with Brazil and Turkey.  He suggested that the discussions be held in Tehran.

Mottaki offered no comment, however, on the US-Russia-France pre-condition that Iran halt efforts to produce 20% enriched uranium.

0610 GMT: We have posted a feature, "The Green Movement Goes Underground", the third part of Persian2English's interview with activist Ahmad Batebi.

0450 GMT: Wednesday was another day in what seems to be the pattern of Iranian politics, now 12 1/2 months after the disputed Presidential election. Opposition activity was relatively muted, at least on the public front, while the Government tried to deal (or sometimes evaded) a series of conflicts within the establishment.

A follow-up to one of those possible emerging conflicts: Rooz Online have now published an English version of Mohammad Reza Yazdanpanah's lengthy article claiming that pro-Ahmadinejad members of Parliament are turning on the Motalefeh Party, a key group in Iranian politics since 1979, with the Islamic Azad University argument as a catalyst.

Afghanistan-Pakistan Complexities: Insurgents, Reconciliation, and "Al Qa'eda" (Rodriguez/King)

An interesting article, at many levels, from Alex Rodriguez and Laura King of the Los Angeles Times. It' s interesting not only for the information but the complexities which the reporters are trying to navigate: the links between Pakistani and Afghan groups, the links within Afghanistan, the clear efforts by officials and analysts to "spin" the story properly, and the never-absent spectre of "Al Qa'eda":

Prospects for an effort by Pakistan to broker a reconciliation between the government of neighboring Afghanistan and a violent wing of the Afghan Taliban depend on overcoming a major obstacle: severing long-standing relations between the militant group and Al Qaeda.

Afghanistan: A Winnable War? (Kagan & Kagan)

U.S. officials acknowledge that Pakistan has begun trying to seed a rapprochement between Afghan President Hamid Karzai and the Haqqani network, a branch of the Afghan Taliban that uses Pakistan to launch attacks on U.S., NATO and Afghan forces.

Driving Pakistan's effort is a desire to increase its influence over the government in Kabul and diminish any future role its archrival to the east, India, may have there once the U.S. begins pulling troops out, a withdrawal scheduled to start next summer.

The U.S. hopes that a combination of military pressure and inducements will entice some rank-and-file Taliban fighters to come over to the government side, but it has been cautious about Karzai's plans to reach out to Taliban commanders. It is likely to resist any deal Pakistan brokers in which the Haqqani network does not break ties with Al Qaeda, which date to the end of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan two decades ago.

In the meantime, the U.S. has targeted the organization's hideouts in the Pakistani tribal region of North Waziristan with drone strikes. Military officials also say they have taken the initiative against Haqqani fighters on the ground in eastern Afghanistan.

Experts say both Pakistan and Afghanistan realize that breaking the Haqqani network's ties with Al Qaeda is a prerequisite to any deal. They question whether it would ever happen.

Amir Rana, one of Pakistan's leading analysts on militant groups, said it's not possible for many militant groups, including the Haqqani network, to completely separate from Al Qaeda.

"What the Haqqani network and the other Taliban groups can offer is a guarantee that they will influence Al Qaeda to not attack U.S. or NATO forces, and a guarantee that their soil would not be used in a terrorist attack against the West," he said. "This is the maximum concession that the Taliban can offer."

Numbering in the thousands of fighters, the Haqqani network has a strong relationship with Pakistan's military and intelligence community that stretches 30 years, back to the time when Pashtun warlord Jalaluddin Haqqani organized mujahedin fighters against Soviet troops in the 1980s. Haqqani has now delegated authority over his network of fighters to his son, Sirajuddin.

The group moves freely between Afghanistan's eastern provinces and its headquarters in North Waziristan, where it has been left untouched by Pakistan's military. Experts believe the Haqqani network continues to provide Al Qaeda leaders and commanders sanctuary there.

U.S. leaders have frequently urged Pakistan to launch an offensive against Haqqani hideouts, recently backing those entreaties with evidence that the network was behind major attacks in Kabul and at Bagram air base, the U.S. facility north of the capital. The government in Islamabad, meanwhile, has brushed aside those demands, arguing that its forces are overstretched by extensive military operations against Taliban strongholds in surrounding tribal areas.

Analysts and former Pakistani military commanders, however, say the real reason that Islamabad has avoided military action against the Haqqani network is that it sees the group and other Afghan Taliban elements as a useful hedge against India's rapidly growing interests in Afghanistan.

Haqqani leaders have yet to signal whether they are interested in starting talks with Karzai's government.

In a report issued Monday, Jeffrey Dressler of the Institute for the Study of War, a Washington research organization, said the Haqqani group's ties to Al Qaeda were much closer than those of many other Taliban groups, and he expressed doubt that they could be broken.

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