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Wednesday
Jun162010

Iran Analysis: The Supreme Leader and the Attacks on the Clerics (Verde)

Mr Verde writes for EA:

Two events and a possible connection....

On 4 June, hecklers forced Seyed Hassan Khomeini to abandon his speech at his grandfather’s memorial service.

This week the homes and offices two Grand Ayatollahs, Sane'i and the late Montazeri, were surrounded by a crowd who chanted rude insults against Hassan Khomeini and his family and attacked the buildings for several hours. Heavy damage was caused and the gravestone of Montazeri was removed.

These events took place inside Khomeini’s mausoleum, in the presence of Ayatollah Khamenei, and in Qom, the spiritual capital of the Islamic Republic.

Now the connection. Given that the Islamic Republic will stop at nothing when trying to prevent a display of opposition, no matter what the occasion. So were these two events not just tolerated but organised by the regime? One rumour, accepted by Ahmad Montazeri, son of the late Grand Ayatollah, is that the Supreme Leader secretly visited Qom in the late hours of the night before the latest attacks.

For many months now Khamenei has been criticising regime insiders as “khavas-e bibasirat”, imperceptive confidants. He has not only been intolerant of dissent, but has also demanded their vocal approval of his decisions and actions. So, to speculate, the 4 June humiliation of Khomeini was a warning to all religious figures that Khamenei will stop at nothing when it comes to confronting them. "Look at what I do to Khomeini’s beloved grandson; imagine what I’ll do to you."

If so, the step seems not only to only failed but also to have provided the “imperceptive confidants” the opportunity to demonstrate their imperceptions. Almost all religious figures --- reformist, conservative, non-political --- expressed their outrage over the treatement of Seyed Hassan Khomeini; many took the opportunity to praise Khomeini’s personal and/or religious credentials. With the exception of Rafsanjani who said that Khamenei was upset about the heckling, no one bothered to mention the Supreme Leader.

The only major religious personalities who have not yet condemned the 4 June events are Khamenei (who in a speech to MPs a couple of days later seems to have approved of the humiliation of Khomeini), Nouri-Hamedani (who repeats the government line) and Mesbah-Yazdi (who at times advocates what appears to be a Shia version of Taliban). Even Agha Tehrani, the radical Tehran MP who is a student of Mesbah Yazdi and is very close to Ahmadinejad, is reported to have visited Hassan Khomeini to express his sadness at the events.

But then, a visit by Mehdi Karroubi to Qom is used as an excuse to attack the homes and offices of two of the highest-ranking clerics in Iran. This could be part of the original plan, or it could be a response to the clerics' support of Khomeini: shut up or risk being attacked.

[To understand the magnitude of the attacks, imagine if the US troops in Iraq were to attack the home and office of Grand Ayatollah Sistani in Najaf and hurl insults at him and his family. All hell would break loose.)

Photos of the aftermath of the attacks showed that photographs of Khoemini and copies of the Quran were thrown on the floor by the attackers. Remember how forcefully the regime condemned the supposed disrespect to Khomeini’s photos back in December? None of that now.

Whatever the intention behind the attacks, one thing is clear: Khamenei has given up on trying to gain the respect and support of the clergy. Just as with the general population over the past year, he has decided that the only way to confront the clerics is by force.

But if the Supreme Leader has escalated the confrontation, these events are opening up an opportunity for the reformists to attack the regime further. Mir Hossein Mousavi’s statement on Sunday compared the attacks to the actions of the Shah’s regime in the 1960s.

Last year the regime ran a questionable election, then --- instead of responding to public queries --- it killed, arrested, tortured, and raped peaceful demonstrations and jailed officials of the Khatami period. This year the regime is humiliating Khomeini’s family and attacking the homes of grand ayatollahs.

In June 2009 the Islamic Republic washed its hands of its republicanism, and in June 2010 it is throwing away any pretence at being Islamic. The Supreme Leader is prepared to go it alone, with a few lower-ranking seminary students used as regime thugs and a few politicians paying him lip service.

All this occurs alongside a political front with non-policies, confusion and sudden u-turns. A few examples:
- In his recent TV interview Ahamdinejad claimed that crackdowns on people’s clothing have nothing to do with his Government. This has led to many on the conservative side to criticise him and one cleric to claim that Ahamadinejad says one thing in public and does something else privately. Meanwhile, the former Culture Minister says that plans to crack down on women’s hejab were put into action by the Ahmadinejad government a few years ago.

- Regime officials travel the world doing all they can to prevent another Security Council resolution against Iran's nuclear programme, but when that resolution is passed, Ahmadinejad dismisses it as a used handkerchief that should be discarded.

- Regime officials threaten that, in response to the resolution, the Islamic Republic will leave the Non-Proliferation Treaty and downgrade ties with China and Russia. But not long after this, it is announced that the regime is not considering a departure from the treaty, and Foreign Minister Mottaki tells the Parliament that Russia and China’s positive votes for further sanctions wer out of compassion for Iran.

- One military commander says that Iran will escort ships to Gaza. This is denied by another military commander a few days later

- Then 70 members of Parliament sign up to go to Gaza.

After one year of unprecedented repression and brutality, the regime has not been able to crush protests: every time there is a significant occasion, Tehran and other cities are turned into military camps to prevent protests. There is no cohesion in government policy. On the international front: Lebanon, home to the regime’s beloved Hezbollah, does not offer direct support to the Islamic Republic in the UN vote, choosing instead to abstain, and Bosnia, a country which the Islamic Republic was so vocal in supporting in the 1990s, votes Yes.

And now Khamenei is further alienating the religious establishment.

Next?
Tuesday
Jun152010

The Latest from Iran (15 June): Another Anniversary

1850 GMT: Claimed video of today's gathering at Behesht-e-Zahra cemetery, apparently at the grave of Sohrab Arabi:

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gikWMCaTbzE[/youtube]

NEW Iran’s Green Communications: Beyond Twitter to “Small Media” (Enayat)
NEW Iran Analysis: Missing the Important Story?
Iran: The Attack on Montazeri, Sane’i, Karroubi
Iran Analysis: The Regime’s Next Push Against “Nothing Special”
The Latest from Iran (14 June): The 2nd Year Is Underway….


1730 GMT: The Cemetery Protest. Reports coming in that at least eight people, six of them women, have been arrested in Beheshte-Zahra. One woman was detained as she talk to the mother of the slain protester Sohrab Arabi.

1725 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. HRANA reports that Sadra Aghassi and Naem Ahmadi of Tabriz University's Islamic Student Association were arrested on 14 June, 2010.

Allameh Tabatabei University student Koroush Jannati was arrested on 12 June by intelligence agents after reporting to the university’s security office.

1715 GMT: The Mousavi Charter. The Los Angeles Times has an interesting reading of today's declaration by Mir Hossein Mousavi of objectives and strategies for the Green Movement.

The website notes that most of Mousavi's statement points to reform within the Iranian system with statements such as....
The Green Movement reaffirms its commitment to human, moral, religious and Iranian principles and values and feels obliged to refine and reform the behaviors of the Islamic Republic of Iran....The Green Movement is in continuation of Iranian people's efforts to attain freedom and social justice and national sovereignty...These objectives had already been pursued in the Constitutional Revolution, Oil Nationalization Movement [of 1951] and the [1979] Islamic Revolution.”

However, the Times notes one passage in the PDF version of the statement, but omitted from the version on Mousavi's website Kalemeh, that points to a separation of state and religion: "Maintaining the independence of religious and clerical bodies from the regime is the only option to preserve the exalted status of religion in the Iranian society and it will be one of the main principles hitting high on the agenda of the Green Movement.

1703 GMT: Today's Demonstrations. Dissected News reports from a source (see comments below) that about 200 family members of "Detainees of 12 June" gathered in front of Evin Prison, demanding the freedom of their relatives. The gathering lasted until dark.

Activists are reporting, and opposition websites are carrying the story, that about 300 people have gathered in Behesht-e-Zahra cemetery to pay their respects to those slain in post-election clashes, including Sohrab Arabi and Ramin Ramezani. Two people who were taping the ceremony have reportedly been arrested, and security presence is high.

1700 GMT: Khordaad 88 have posted an English translation of Mir Hossein Mousavi's Monday statement, which hailed the Iranian people's fortitude over 22 Khordaad (12 June) and condemned the weekend attacks on clerics.

We are still awaiting a full translation of Mousavi's declaration today of a "charter" for the Green Movement.

1650 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Labour activist Behnam Ebrahimzadeh was arrested during Saturday's demonstrations. It is claimed that Ebrahimzadeh, beaten during his detention, suffered two broken ribs and multiple injuries.

1645 GMT: Propaganda of Day. This line, set out by Minister of Intelligence Heydar Moslehi, may be just a bit too blatant to work.

Moslehi said Tuesday that several people linked to the "terrorist" People's Mujahedin of Iran had been arrested over plans to carry out bombings on 22 Khordaad (12 June), the anniversary of the election: “Two terrorist teams of hypocrites were identified and their key members were arrested” The alleged plan was to “carry out bombings in several Tehran squares" (i.e., the squares where the regime put out security forces on Saturday to deter gatherings).

Britain, France, and Sweden were the foreigners accused of “backing” the PMOI (Britain, of course, as the "Little Satan", France for its recent anti-Iran rhetoric, but why Sweden?). And one of the suspects had been arrested “in a student dormitory” (i.e., a student dormitory like the one that security forces attacked last 14-15 June, killing several people).

1625 GMT: Attack by the Clerics. Rooz Online in English has an overview, covering many of the events we have noted in the updates, of the criticism by clerics of the treatment of Seyed Hassan Khomeini at the 4 June ceremony for his grandfather.

1315 GMT: Mousavi's Charter. The first English-language report on Mir Hossein Mousavi's charter for the Green Movement, posted this morning (see 0940 GMT), comes from Agence France Presse. The article leads with Mousavi's call for "a fair trial of those who committed the election fraud, tortured and killed protesters" and mentions his demand for an "end to the involvement of police and military forces in politics, the independence of the judiciary, and prosecution of those in plainclothes".

1240 GMT: Concluding and Pronouncing. Yet another sweeping assessment of the Green Movement, this time from Karim Sadjadpour.

Most of Sadjadpour's piece consists of recommendations such as "Go Beyond Street Protests", for example, with strikes, "Organize Abroad", and "Reach Out to 'Ali The Plumber'" --- and he does conclude with hope, "The path to democracy is both delicate and daunting, and not guaranteed. A pessimist might argue, however, that a far more daunting task will be for the Islamic Republic to indefinitely sustain a politically repressive, socially restrictive, economically floundering theocracy in the 21st century."

Still, it's the opening of the piece, issued as truth even before Saturday had concluded, that sets the tone and catches the eye: "The anniversary of Iranʼs tainted presidential elections came and went without much sign of life from the opposition Green Movement. Aside from scattered protests, activists were understandably cowed by governmental intimidation and heeded the advice of opposition elders to preserve their powder for future battles."

1115 GMT: Beyond Facebook. Amidst the current discussion on new and social media and the Green Movement, an interesting contribution by Mohammad Sadeghi, the organiser of the Mir Hossein Mousavi and Zahra Rahnavard Supporters' Networks on Facebook: "The Green Movement is crafting a new and nonviolent political discourse that holds tremendous repercussions for a region in which the vast majority of civil actors are anything but peaceful. This movement is the culmination of more than 100 years of struggle by the Iranian people to secure their basic rights and liberties. Let's use this opportunity to remind ordinary Iranians of the amazing and very real victories they have already won, and not lecture them about their inefficacy and inefficiency, which is wholly imagined and miscalculated."

0940 GMT: A Charter for the Greens. It was promised, and now it's published: Kalemeh has posted Mir Hossein Mousavi's statement of objectives and strategies for the Green Movement.

Inconveniently, I have to go to an academic meeting, so I'll hand over to readers for perusal and comment.
0935 GMT: Beyond Green Tweets. We've published an analysis by Mahmood Enayat, "Iran's Green Communications: Beyond Twitter to 'Small Media'".

0930 GMT: Remembering. Rah-e-Sabz publishes names and details of 29 people killed on 25 Khordaad (15 June) last year.

0855 GMT: The Battle Within. Khabar Online --- have we mentioned that it is the website linked to Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani? --- assesses that President Ahmadinejad's televised interview on the anniversary of his "victory" will upset "even the hardliners".

There's a bit of evidence for that assertion from Kayhan, which analyses that some people have "given wrong advice" to Ahmadinejad, "incompatible with his Islamic revolutionary thoughts". Looks like the President's criticism of "morality police" for pressuring people over "bad hijab" and other transgressions is not going down that well....

On another front, Hamid Reza Fouladgar, who oversees privatisation matters in Parliament, has commented about the dispute over implementation of Majlis laws by Ahmadinejad: "After 1 week of discussions, we were met with his silence, hopefully a good sign/"

0845 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. The father of student activist Mohammad Reza Jalaiepour, of the Third Way Movement, has described his son's re-arrest: those carrying out the raid "told us Ahmadinejad will stay for a third term".

0840 GMT: The Attacks on the Clerics. Writing in Rah-e-Sabz, analyst Mohammad Javad Akbarein claims that there is a circle of regime politicians and clerics, including Hojatoleslam Ruhollah Hosseinian, formier Minister of Intelligence Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejeie, Mohammad Golpayegani, and Hamid Rasaie, who have been organising attacks against "opposition" marja (senior clerics) and their followers for years.

0835 GMT: Where's Mahmoud? President Ahmadinejad is returning to Tehran after a visit to Assalouyeh in the Persian Gulf province of Bushehr to sign contracts to expand Phases 13, 14, 23, 22, 19 and 24 of the South Pars oil and gas fields.

The story behind Ahmadinejad's trip is that the contracts have been rewritten after the withdrawal of foreign companies, including Royal Dutch Shell and Spain's Repsol, from development. The work was re-allocated to Iranian firms, including some allegedly connected with the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps.

0830 GMT: We've corrected an oversight by posting President Obama's official statement, emphasising human rights, on the anniversary of Iran's election.

0620 GMT: As Iran marks another anniversary --- this one of last year's mass protest against the outcome of the Presidential election --- we post an analysis considering latest developments and media coverage, "Missing the Important Story?"

Meanwhile....

Getting Around the Energy Squeeze?

Iranian state media is giving big play to the signature of a $7.5 billion "peace pipeline" deal between Iran and Pakistan for delivery of natural gas to Islamabad by 2014.

Which is fair enough, but still does not quite cope with the issue of if Tehran can maintain both its exports and imports of energy supplies over the next four years.

Shutting Down the News...And Literature

We have an update on Iran's filtering of news sites. Meanwhile, Rah-e-Sabz reports that there is widespread filtering of Persian literary blogs and the philosophical magazine Rokhdaad.

Rumour of Day

Tahavole Sabz claims that the word is being sent out to Iran's parents: come out and greet President Ahmadinejad or your kids won't be enrolled in school.
Tuesday
Jun152010

Afghanistan's New Propaganda Scam: Poor Afghans, They're Rich! (Mull)

Josh Mull is the Afghanistan Blogging Fellow for The Seminal and Brave New Foundation. He also writes at Rethink Afghanistan:

By now everyone has just about lost their damn minds about this New York Times article detailing Afghanistan's "discovery" of vast amounts of mineral wealth. Yes, it's way crazy old information (like 1970s old). Yes, it's Soviet Pentagon propaganda. As regular readers know, the International Security Assistance Force's counter-insurgency strategy is a flaming wreck, and you can guess what they're going to do about that, including with propaganda and misinformation.

Afghanistan Special: New Report on Pakistan’s Intelligence Links with Insurgents (Waldman)


But if your reaction has been typical, that of only sneering derision and snide condescension (guilty!), you've missed the point. Part of understanding propaganda is knowing its intended audience. We do this automatically when, say, Iranian President Ahmadinejad blames evil CIA spies for whatever it is that's bothering him that day: unemployment, tummy ache, whatever. We understand right away that this is not about us, about Americans. Rather, it's aimed at a domestic Iranian audience with very real fears about foreign interference. Only in the case of Afghanistan's minerals, we're personalizing it, assuming it's aimed at us. It's not for you, though. This propaganda has a very specific audience, and so far it's working perfectly.

Steve Hynd picks up on the scheme [emphasis mine]:
However, guaranteed U.S. access to "strategic reserves" of "strategic minerals", where possession is nine tenths of the game and the resources are just as valuable still in the ground as mined and processed for market, is a heady brew to mostly-hawkish senior policymakers and Very Serious think-tankers, especially if the end of the sentence goes 'and China doesn't get them". Risen's stenography isn't aimed at us, but at them and will be used to add some geopolitical weight to the arguements McChrystal and others are already beginning to make as to why they should be allowed to break their promise to Obama and the U.S. should stay in Afghanistan a few years longer.

This story is aimed at the elites who make the wars. The Pentagon has handed the hawks in Washington a powerful factoid to be used and re-used endlessly in pursuit of their war.

How do we know this? Well, there are some very obvious clues. The article is loaded with crunchy, fact-y bits that appear substantive, but in reality have nothing to do with what's actually at stake. Does it matter that they have rare-earth minerals and lithium for laptops and so on? No, it doesn't matter if they struck the mother lode of chocolate ice cream. As Blake Hounsel writes, they don't even have concrete, much less a sophisticated, multi-billion dollar mining industry capable of extracting, processing, and marketing these minerals to international companies. They want it to look like a lot of information ("Wow, lookit all the minerals!") but not actually answer any real questions ("Wait, can they even get it?").

Think-tankers love this kind of crap. They'd like nothing better than to somehow fit counter-insurgency and iPads (like most in the media, they're commercial shills for both) into the same article. If you like your Macbook and your Prius and that application that makes your telephone fart, well, you'd better support our batshit crazy idea of invading and bombing Afghan into a peaceful democracy. Otherwise the Chinese will steal all of that copper, and they don't give us anything (except everything).

But it's better than that. You also have gems like this:
In 2004, American geologists, sent to Afghanistan as part of a broader reconstruction effort, stumbled across an intriguing series of old charts and data at the library of the Afghan Geological Survey in Kabul that hinted at major mineral deposits in the country. They soon learned that the data had been collected by Soviet mining experts during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s, but cast aside when the Soviets withdrew in 1989.

During the chaos of the 1990s, when Afghanistan was mired in civil war and later ruled by the Taliban, a small group of Afghan geologists protected the charts by taking them home, and returned them to the Geological Survey’s library only after the American invasion and the ouster of the Taliban in 2001.

Neato, it's just like Tom Clancy! Soviet resource wars, hidden documents - it's all so exciting. And it even contains the secret weapon that bleeds the heart of every think-tanker and foreign policy wonk everywhere: the courageous, pro-American snitch. God bless you for "protecting" information that everybody already knew, "small group of Afghan geologists." And thank you, thank you, for keeping it a secret during your darkest eras and revealing it only when the American invaders arrived. I can only assume all Afghans are just as grateful for your selfish attempt at stifling development as we are!

We love to imagine the brown people we're obliterating with missiles secretly know of our righteousness, deep down on the inside. Oh, that smart local, he secretly knows we're the good guys! If you've ever read Richard Clarke's epic, high fantasy novel Scorpion's Gate, you already know this character. In it, a Saudi oil prince secretly falls in love with American democracy and carries out a coup, pretty much turning Saudi Arabia into Switzerland overnight. Of course, this is about as believable as some old, white Tea Partier in Oklahoma secretly reading the Hadith and the collected works of Sayyid Qutb in his basement, but whatever, foreign policy hawks never get tired of fetishing their own pet locals. Those Afghans know the truth, we're the good guys!

Now that we're clear who this propaganda about Afghanistan's minerals is aimed at, is it working? See for yourself:
in emerging and underdeveloped states, weak legal systems and official corruption create incentives for powerful people to exploit those resources, rather than allow mineral wealth to fuel national renewal. Think Congo or Sierra Leone. It’s easy to tick off the ways in which what political scientists call the “Resource Curse” applies to Afghanistan: a tenuous legal structure; warlordism; war; foreign interventionism; corruption throughout the political system; an uneasy and unstable relationship between provincial and national authorities; and an uneasy and unstable relationship in provinces and districts with instruments of local governance as well as national governance.

Yay, the "Resource Curse." It's one of those well-intentioned western excuses, dripping with irony and ignorance, used to insult other countries and hopefully justify a reason to bomb them. The sales pitch goes something like this: "Why, hold up there Ira---, er, Afghanistan. Looks like you got a case of the failed state. Yessir, on account of the resource curse, that is. Luckily, we can sell you the cure! Y'see, it's called counter-insurgency..."

But there's a couple problems with this. Right away, it's not a "curse". A curse implies that it's somehow mystical, a supernatural affliction. Turning into Dracula is a curse. Discovering vast mineral wealth is not a curse.

It's not a magical mystery why Afghanistan, or any other country, suffers from this so-called curse. Ackerman was quite clear: "tenuous legal structure; warlordism; war; foreign interventionism; corruption". Well gee whiz, how do you suppose that stuff happened? Foreign intervention? War? Are we so stupid that we don't realize what we're saying? War is a deliberate policy we choose, we fund, and we carry out. It's not "oops, I guess Afghanistan is cursed." We did that.

But this obliviousness is also where we see the exact impact of the mineral propaganda. This isn't "pro-war" propaganda so much as it is feeding excuses for why the war is failing. A failing war simply implies more war as icing on the cake. Remember, you can never blame the COIN strategy, it is sacred. But you can blame everything else, including Afghanistan itself. Andrew Exum spells it out for us:
But counterinsurgency strategies rest on the assumption that you can eventually weaken anti-government forces and reduce levels of violence to the point where a political process can take place in more peaceful circumstances. We now have one trillion fresh reasons why this assumption might not be valid for Afghanistan. I am not yet sure what this means for either U.S. and allied interests or the current strategy. I more or less agree with today's editorial in the New York Times that our current strategy "still seems like the best chance to stabilize Afghanistan and get American troops home". But as the editorial noted, the news last week from Afghanistan was terrible. And I'm not sure this week's news is any better.

Got that? COIN isn't the problem, no, that's our "best chance." The problem is how crappy Afghanistan is, and now they have "one trillion fresh reasons" to fight about something. Damn those ingrate Afghans, always wanting an equitable stake in their country's resources. We're just trying to move in with guns and bombs and dominate their wealth for our narrow corporate interests, you'd think they'd be nicer about it. If only their crooked government that we support wasn't so corrupt and incompetent, like President Obama and his friends from Goldman Sachs.

See, Afghanistan is war torn, so that's why our war isn't working. Clearly the solution is more war. Voila! Resource Curse!

As we see, this isn't some every day propaganda trying pitifully to sell a trillion dollar debt-war to a nation of unemployed. This is a very specific talking point explicitly targeting the foreign policy community, all as a part of the Pentagon's blame game. It makes the Pentagon appear desperate, sure, but this isn't a joke, some embarassing gaffe by the PR department.

This is very real and very effective military propaganda. Blame everything, blame the Afghans, blame their lithium, just please don't blame the war.
Tuesday
Jun152010

Kyrgyzstan: At Least 124 Dead, Up to 100,000 Flee (Harding/AP)

Earlier this year we covered the uprising in Kyrgyzstan and the replacement of the Bakiyev Government with a new administration. Unfortunately, that is far from the end of the story, as clashes in the southern part of the country, near the Uzbekistan border, have taken dozens of lives and displaced tens of thousands.

Luke Harding and Associated Press reported for The Guardian of London late Monday:

Kyrgyzstan was tonight in the grip of a humanitarian crisis after more than 100,000 minority Uzbeks, fleeing Kyrgyz mobs in the south of the country, gathered on the Uzbekistan border.

Uzbek community leaders said hundreds of Uzbeks had been slaughtered in five days of mob attacks, which began last Thursday in the city of Osh then spread rapidly to the nearby town of Jalal-Abad and other surrounding areas.

The official toll was put at 124 killed and more than 1,600 injured. But according to Associated Press at least 200 Uzbeks had already been buried. The Red Cross said its delegates saw about 100 bodies being buried in just one cemetery.

Much of Osh, the country's second biggest city, was still burning, witnesses said today, with Uzbek areas razed to the ground, and homes, shops and supermarkets destroyed. Gunfire was reported in the Cheremushi district. Residents trying to flee the city were taken by helicopter to the airport.

The road to the city passes an Uzbek village, where residents, defending their homes from Kyrgyz mobs, were opening fire on vehicles. The situation in Jalal-Abad, which erupted in violence on Saturday remained tense, despite apparent negotiations between local Uzbek and Kyrgyz leaders.

Uzbek homes in the town's Sputnik district were in flames, Kyrgyzstan's AKIpress news agency reported. It said gangs of Kyrgyz youths were roaming from house to house looking for ethnic Uzbeks. Several had written on their arms: "If we see an Uzbek we will shoot him." Witnesses said one gang seized the editor of the local Uzbek newspaper. There were also numerous kidnappings.

Jallahitdin Jililatdinov, head of the Uzbek National Centre, told AP that at least 100,000 Uzbeks fleeing the attacks were desperately trying to cross into Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan's government tonight confirmed that 45,000 had made it across the border.

Hundreds of Uzbek refugees were also stuck in a no-man's land at a border crossing near Jalal-Abad.

Russia, the UN and the US have begun a humanitarian relief operation, while Uzbekistan has started setting up camps for refugees. Several planes with WHO medical supplies arrived today at Osh airport. Witnesses said that most of those who fled were woman, children and elderly people. Uzbekistan said many had gunshot wounds.

"Tent camps will be put up in the border between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan for many ethnic Uzbeks who have left their homes following riots in Osh," said Kyrgyzstan's ombudsman, Tursunbek Atun. He conceded that no temporary facilities had been built, and that some refugees were sleeping in the open at the Dostuk crossing, a few miles from Osh and its Uzbek suburbs.

Kyrgyzstan's interim government, which took over after the president, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, was overthrown in April, has so far been powerless to stop the violence. Uzbeks have supported the new government while many in the south have backed the ousted Bakiyev. What began last month as a counter-revolution by disgruntled Bakiyev supporters quickly turned into ethnic cleansing.

The violence now threatens the stability of the whole central Asian region, with a full-blown conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan a possibility. More immediately, if the interim government fails to reassert control over the south, Kyrgyzstan could split in half, or cease to exist as an independent state, experts suggest.

Over the weekend Russia turned down a plea by Kyrgyzstan's interim leader, Roza Otunbayeva, to dispatch peace-keeping troops to Osh.

Today the Kremlin said it did not rule out a possible intervention. The statement followed a meeting in Moscow of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, a Russian-dominated Nato-style security bloc made up of former Soviet republics.

Read rest of article....
Tuesday
Jun152010

Iran's Green Communications: Beyond Twitter to "Small Media" (Enayat)

Regular readers know how disconcerted I have been by shallow commentary dismissing the role of new communications --- often framed superficially as a dismissal of "Twitter Revolution" --- in information and dialogue during Iran's post-election conflict.

So it is refreshing to see an analysis which tries to get beyond the simplicities to assess not only what has happened but what might happen with this information, dialogue, and activism, despite the increasing efforts of the Iranian regime to shut down communication. I would take up some of the points put forward in this article --- I think it underestimates what channels have been opened and what links have been maintained through "not-so-small media" and networks via and beyond the Internet --- but I think it opens up a productive discussion.

Mahmood Enayat writes for Index on Censorship:

The 12th of June was the anniversary of the disputed Iranian presidential election. The ensuing events of last summer challenged assumptions about the political impact of the media, especially the internet, on Iranian society.

Prior to the protests a lot was said about the importance of the internet as a “free space”, where opposition discourse was thriving, especially in the context of its limited manifestation in the offline world. The Persian blogosphere was hailed as one of the most vibrant non-English speaking communities where youth, women, homosexuals, and religious and ethnic minorities were expressing and to some extent mobilising themselves. Occasionally, the internet also played a “fourth estate” role — that is, the ability to create an independent institution making the authorities accountable for their actions. There were a number of secretly recorded amateur videos documenting the wrongdoing of some Iranian officials — the subsequent wide coverage of those videos made it very hard for the Iranian officials to deny the incidents.

These two political functions of the internet — a “free space” and a “fourth estate”, also played important roles in the aftermath of the election. The internet became the backbone of the green movement, as severe restrictions were imposed on the movement’s offline activities. Citizens used their mobile phones and became the eyes and ears of the international media whose correspondents had been expelled from Iran. The videos documented the participation of Iranians in street protests and the brutality of force used against them by the authorities, resulting in the widespread practice of adding the postfix “revolution” to social media platforms like Twitter and YouTube.

However, the Green Movement was not simply allowed to use the internet for its own end. The Iranian authorities tried to stop the “Twitter revolution” by waging an active war against internet freedom. The authorities went beyond simple internet content filtering by tampering with internet connections and mobile phone services, by jamming satellite broadcasting, and by hacking and attacking opposition websites. They also monitored online dissenters and used the information obtained to intimidate and arrest them. They threatened service providers in Iran to remove ‘offensive’ posts or blogs and more significantly, they tried to fill the information void created by these measures with misinformation.

There has been a sense of disappointment amongst the supporters of the Twitter revolution. We should try to make sense of its shortcomings.

Social and conventional media need each other

It became clear that social media (staffed by citizen journalists) and conventional media needed each other to function. Given the government’s severe restrictions on access to the internet and its infiltration of the social media’s platforms with fake content, its audience was limited. Citizen journalists relied on conventional media to take the best of their content and reach a larger audience, while the latter needed the former to continue their news cycles in the absence of correspondents on the ground.

Twitter and Facebook: Bridging rather than mobilising

Facebook and Twitter were more influential in mobilising diaspora Iranians showing solidarity rather than mobilising street protests inside Iran. Owing to their knowledge of context and language, diaspora Iranians were also able to connect the outside (mainly the media) to the inside. Both the platforms were filtered before the election and remained inaccessible in Iran during the protests.

Do not underestimate the basics

In the days after the disputed election, the Iranian authorities shut down many of the news websites set up by supporters of [Mir Hossein] Mousavi and [Mehdi] Karroubi and other opposition groups by arresting the technical teams involved in their maintenance, initiating intense Denial of Service (DOS) attacks and hacking. The opposition clearly took having access to secure hosting and capable technical support for granted and did not expect these incidents to occur. Its lack of preparation meant that many of them struggled to get back online and to remain online in the following months.

Knowing how to operate safely online is important

There have also been a number of reports that activists were presented with copies of emails exchanged with other activists during their interrogation and were arrested for their online activities. Many of them were also asked to provide the credentials of their Facebook accounts and were questioned extensively on their relationships with friends on their list. The Iranian authorities used this fear for further power projection by claiming that the Iranian Police has access to all the emails and SMS messages exchanged in Iran and can monitor them. All of these tactics have created fear and self-censorship among the ordinary internet users and activists in Iran, a fear that is perpetuated by a lack of knowledge of the very basics of information security.

There will be more limitations on the internet

The Iranian authorities used to consider the development of the internet in Iran as an enabler for economic development. During the Rafsanjani and Khatami presidencies, the government invested heavily in expanding the internet infrastructure, resulting in a high growth rate of internet users. However, this has now changed and Ahmadinejad’s government has allocated $500 million in this year’s annual budget (2010-11) to “counter the soft war”. This effectively means imposing more restrictions on opposition movement’s use of the internet. The fifth economic plan devised by his government does not have any indicators for increasing the internet penetration rate in Iran, contrary to the past two economic development plans. This indicates that the Iranian government is not interested in increasing the number of internet users in Iran, at least not for the next five years.

The internet's reach is limited

Internet users in Iran are predominantly middle and upper middle class and internet access remains limited among the less affluent sections of Iranian society. Mousavi has stated numerous times that the Green Movement should try to reach out to the working class and bring it on board.

But the internet is the only available media option

The internet is the only media space that is available to the Green Movement as other forms of media are heavily controlled by the government and it is not possible to launch a newspaper, radio or TV station inside Iran. Satellite broadcasting of political TV stations based outside Iran will be subjected to heavy jamming. The short wave radio broadcasted from outside is also losing its audience significantly, as highlighted in a recent audience survey by the BBC World Service.

The Green Movement should think “small media”

The Green Movement and its supporters inside and outside Iran need to go beyond the common perception and prescribed use of the internet (like YouTube, Twitter and Facebook) and come up with new and innovative solutions. Mousavi himself has encouraged the Green Movement to embrace “small media”, which relies on offline social networks for further distribution of information. He is reminding the Green Movement of the lessons learned from the 1979 and Constitutional Revolutions, as both used small media to mobilise support and achieve their aims.  Small media has four main characteristics:

- It is distributed and is therefore not prone to blockage
- It produces sharable information products
- It relies on highly resourced and networked individuals to reproduce sharable information products
- It uses the social networks of highly resourced individuals to distributed sharable products to less resourceful individuals

Leaflets and cassette tapes were widely used in 1979 revolutions. These days the digital equivalents of them will be CDs, DVDs, memory sticks, email, Bluetooth on mobile phones, peer to peer file sharing etc. The green movement only has the internet but it has to change its approach towards it by going beyond its widely prescribed uses. It is time to replace the Twitter revolution with small media discourse.