The Latest from Iran (10 November): Uncertainty and Propaganda

NEW Iran: The Mousavi Interview with Jamaran (9 November)
NEW Latest Iran Video: Khaje Nasir University Hunger Strike (10 November)
NEW Iran: The Neda Agha Soltan Scholarship at Oxford University
Iran: An Eyewitness on 13 Aban “Protest An Inseparable Part of People’s Lives”
Iran’s Nuclear Programme: Washington’s Unhelpful Misperceptions
Latest Iran Video: More from 13 Aban & from Today (8-9 November)
The Latest from Iran (9 November): Assessing the Government

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

1920 GMT: We have posted, in a separate entry, the English translation of Mir Hossein Mousavi's interview with the Jamaran website.

1845 GMT: Mohammad Saleh Jokar, a senior official in the Student Basij organization, has announced that 6,000 Basij units will be created in elementary schools, seeking to promote Basij and revolutionary ideals among pupils from a young age. Jokar added that about 4.5 million students at elementary and high schools and 320,000 teachers are members of the Basij force.

1830 GMT: Rooz Online has published an English-language version of Ferehsteh Ghazi's interview with Grand Ayatollah Montazeri. The cleric asserts,

The confessions that have been extracted in prison have absolutely no religious or legal value and cannot be the basis for the death or prison punishments that have been issued. Those who are responsible and their accomplices for such confessions, are religiously and legally guilty and criminal.

Whenever the execution of a religious punishment leads to negative consequences on religion or society, the judge can and must stop the execution. (see also "Ayatollah Montazeri’s Interview on Eve of 13 Aban")

1820 GMT: Labour Activists Jailed. We reported in late October on the threats to detain leaders of the Syndicate of Workers of Haft Tapeh Sugar Cane Company after protests. Four of them --- Fereydoun Nikoufard, Jalil Ahmadi, Ghorban Alipour and Mohammad Haydari --- have now begun prison terms.

1800 GMT: Publish and Be Damned. Tehran's Prosecutor General Abbas Jafari Doulatabadi has warned that he will pursue sites that “publish baseless news”. The statement follows Monday's declaration by Esmail Ahmadi Moghaddam, Iran's commander of security forces, "There is need for greater supervision over the internet....Every time we have entered this scene, the media and individuals who show off as intellectuals attack and we step back.”

1330 GMT: A relatively quiet period, as we try to track down an English translation of the Mousavi statement on Monday to the Khomeini-owned Jamaran website, but as an EA correspondent notes: "This was a master stroke by the Khomeini family, as it places Mousavi under its own tutelage and wards off attempts to arrest him."

Meanwhile, we have video of today's hunger strike at Khaje Nasir University.

1130 GMT: US Tells Ahmadinejad, "We've Got You Covered". US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton may have just given the clearest message that Washington will work with the Iranian President, whatever obstacles he faces, to get an uranium enrichment deal.

Speaking to the US Public Broadcasting Service, Clinton said, "Look, we don't have to trust or love each other to understand that it is in our interest to try to stabilize the world." Then, noting the post-election crisis, she extended a helping hand to Ahmadinejad: "We understand the internal political dynamics, and we've been, I think, patient in helping [Iran] to see that we're serious."

0850 GMT: More on "Neda's Scholarship". The Iranian Embassy in Britain has fiercely criticised the award of a graduate scholarship in the name of Neda Agha Soltan by Queen's College, Oxford University (see separate entry).

Writing to Oxford's chancellor, the embassy expressed surprise at "a politically-motivated move", which involves the university "n a criminal case which is still under investigation by the Iranian police".

The embassy adds that Neda's death was "far from the scene of protests [which] erupted after the June presidential election". Indeed, the Iranian officials hint unsubtly, her slaying was part of a "complicated and planned" scenario.

So, the embassy concludes, "The involvement of the university in Iran's internal affairs, particularly in the country's post-election events of which the British media played a leading role, would lead to the loss of the university's scientific prestige and academic goal. This has nothing to do with the university's position and goals and will not help Iran and Britain improve their relations."

0835 GMT: More Than Meets the Eye on the Nukes? President Obama has told Reuters, ""Although so far we have not seen the kind of positive response we want from Iran, we are as well positioned as we've ever been to align the international community behind that agenda."

On the surface, that is an unexciting, hold-the-line statement. Yet it appears prominently in Iranian state media via Press TV, and it follows the clear signal from the US, via its ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency (see yesterday's updates), that Iran has time to negotiate the Vienna uranium enrichment deal.

So are there talks behind talks for a US-Iran agreement? And, if so, by whom with whom?

0735 GMT: EA readers have followed up our news about the petition to commute the death sentence of  Ehsan Fattahian, arrested in July 2008 and scheduled for execution tomorrow for "war against God". They point us to his open letter, "I Never Feared Death".

0730 GMT: EA readers point us to a video of a heated debate at a Tehran university between Mostafa Kavakebian, a reformist member of Parliament, and his counterpart Hojatoleslam Hamid Rasaee, about the rule of law in post-election Iran.

0725 GMT: We've posted a separate entry on the announcement of Queen's College, Oxford University, of a graduate scholarship in Philosophy in the memory of Neda Agha Soltan.

0630 GMT: A relative lull in the post-election crisis yesterday. The Government is still caught up in the detailed debate over its economic plans and the two-front confrontation --- at home and abroad --- over its response to the Vienna uranium enrichment deal. President Ahmadinejad is abroad, the Supreme Leader is silent for the moment, and surprisingly little has been heard from the military and security forces.

But only a "relative" lull. After each major gathering since June, there have been quiet phases, and yesterday was far from quiet. Mir Hossein Mousavi followed Mohammad Khatami into the post-13 Aban pages (and, again, note that the interview is being featured by the Khomeini family, which should be treated as an ally of the opposition) with his declaration for unity and warning that the Government could not hide behind the claim of an immutable Constitution, given that it was not living up to that document. Demonstrations are occurring each day somewhere on an Iranian university campus, and word-of-mouth is spreading the message that the mass gathering for 16 Azar (7 December) is less than a month away. And all of this is happening despite much, possibly the majority, of the Green leadership in prison or abroad.

This morning the news from the regime is of more uncertainty and mis-information. Kazem Jalili of Parliament's National Security Commission is pushing the anti-deal line that enrichment must be done inside Iran, using uranium purchased abroad, rather than in a country like Russia. Fars is claiming a private hospital refused to treat injured security forces, only treating a "certain group of people and turn[ing] away all bearded individuals who had a Basiji appearance".

And Khalil Hayat Moghaddam, a member of Parliament's judicial commission, has taken the propaganda that Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi have split (recall the false interview with Karroubi's son) to new depths:

These two have forgotten that they made a name for themselves under the banner of the Revolution, Leadership and martyrs...,as the tears of the mothers of the martyrs and the blood of the martyrs are what protect the establishment and the Leadership [from harm]. Mousavi and Karroubi's story brings to mind the tale of those people who were fighting over imaginary spoils of war; they have forgotten that they will not be able to inflict harm on the establishment and the Revolution. The harsh stance adopted by Hassan Karroubi against Mir Mousavi Mousavi clearly shows that disagreements are increasing between the supporters of the two political figures, and it will come to spelling each other's end. (English summary at Tehran Bureau)

Iran's Nuclear Programme: Washington's Unhelpful Misperceptions

The Latest from Iran (9 November): Assessing the Government

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

In The New York Times this morning, David Sanger publishes an article, "Iran Is Said to Ignore Effort to Salvage a Nuclear Deal", which gives half the story on the current tangled state of the negotiations over uranium enrichment.

Half the story because Sanger's story is effectively a US Government press release. Here is the narrative of unnamed officials:

The Obama Administration...has told Iran’s leaders in back-channel messages that it is willing to allow the country to send its stockpile of enriched uranium to any of several nations, including Turkey, for temporary safekeeping....But the overtures, made through the International Atomic Energy Agency over the past two weeks, have all been ignored....Instead....the Iranians have revived an old counterproposal: that international arms inspectors take custody of much of Iran’s fuel, but keep it on Kish, a Persian Gulf resort island that is part of Iran....

That proposal had been rejected because leaving the nuclear material on Iranian territory would allow for the possibility that the Iranians could evict the international inspectors at any moment. That happened in North Korea in 2003, and within months the country had converted its fuel into the material for several nuclear weapons.

This version of events intersects not only with developments around El Baradei's latest proposal --- Turkey takes Iran's reprocessed uranium from Russia and reshapes it into metal plates --- but also the reports that Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov was in Tehran pushing a deal. The article is also notable for revealing the Kish proposal, which had not surfaced before.

The downside of the article, however, is that it misses the other half of the narrative. Yesterday Tehran's officials put out a counter-proposal for reprocessing outside Iran, in a two-stage delivery to Russia. Each shipment of uranium would be 400 kilogrammes; the total of 800 kilogrammes is about half of Iran's stock. That proposal, which could be a response to Ryabkov's intervention, may just be a case of the Iranian Government spinning out the discussions, but it is a far cry from an outright rejection.

Indeed, it is troubling that Sanger's article is riddled with distorting exaggerations. His claim that US officials "had now all but lost hope that Iran would follow through with an agreement reached in Geneva on Oct. 1 to send its fuel out of the country temporarily" overstates the situation --- Tehran's officials did not accept a plan but agreed to further technical talks in Vienna. Thus his follow-up, "Iranian officials told the energy agency on Oct. 29 that they could not agree to the deal that their own negotiators had reached", is an unhelpful simplification.

That would not be a major problem if this was just loose reporting. The worry is that this is also the perception of US officials:

“If you listen to what the Iranians have said publicly and privately over the past week,” one senior administration official said Sunday, “it’s evident that they simply cannot bring themselves to do the deal.”

Even the most casual of EA readers would have picked up by now that there is not a single Iranian view on the negotiations. Instead, there is a heated debate within the regime on how to conduct the talks with the US. The Washington narrative in Sanger's article misses this, ignoring for example that President Ahmadinejad is pressing for a continuation of discussions despite hostility from within the Iranian Parliament and possibly from the Supreme Leader's office.

If true, this misperception carries the consequence that it may be the Obama Administration rather than Tehran which breaks off the talks. This does not mean that it is giving up a likely agreement --- again, Ahmadinejad's primary objective may be to stay at the table rather than signing a deal --- but it will lead to Iran blaming Washington for the collapse (and there will be supporters for this view, such as Erdogan in Turkey) and undercut the possibility of China and Russia supporting the harsh sanctions that the US Congress will demand.

Yet even this is secondary to the wider significance of the Administration's fuzzy view. Simply put, if the statements in Sanger's piece are accurate, Obama officials have a poor understanding of the internal dynamics in Iran after 12 June, with little comprehension of the fault-lines within the Establishment. In the end, they fail to understand that the nuclear issue is, first and foremost, a pawn in a much bigger chess match inside Iran.

Latest from Iran (2 November): 36 Hours to Go

NEW Latest Iran Video: Protest & Hunger Strike at Sharif University
NEW Iran: A Response to an American Who Asks, “What if the Green Movement Isn’t ‘Ours’?
NEW Iran Nuclear Talks: Tehran's Middle Way?
Video: Sharif and Khaje Nasir Universities Protests (1 November)
Video Flashback: Ahmadinejad v. The Giant Flying Bug
Iran: More 13 Aban Videos
Latest from Iran (1 November): Is This the Opposition’s Moment?

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

2125 GMT: More University Protests. In addition to today's demonstration and hunger strike at Sharif University (video in separate entry), about 400 students at Islamic Azad University of Roodehen, near Tehran, chanted “Ya Hossein, Mir Hossein", “We support the brave Karroubi” , “Death to Dictator”, “Courageous student, join us at the November 4th rally” and “Viva Karoubi, Viva Mousavi” (English summary). There is also video of a rally at the University of Kashan, south of Tehran.

1930 GMT: Mir Hossein Mousavi and his wife, Zahra Rahnavard, have visited the family of detainee Feizollah Arabsorkhe and claimed "investigators have been challenged by their daily conversations and dialogues with the children of the Revolution”.

Feizollah Arabsorkhi is a leading member of the reformist Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution and has been in prison since June.

Mr. Mousavi insisted that political activists and youth in the post-election protests are not “sabotaging or destroying”: “If the media were free and people were allowed to have their say, we would not have fallen to this state.”

1915 GMT: Back from a break to find a couple of stories on a relatively quiet day, as various forces prepare for 13 Aban.

Journalist Fariba Pajooh has ended her hunger strike, begun on 26 October, because of serious health problems. Pajooh was arrested on 22 August and has been detained in Tehran’s Evin Prison.

Iranian authorities have barred Emaddedin Baghi from leaving the country to collect the Martin Ennals Award for Human Rights Defenders. Baghi is a prominent opponent of the death penalty in Iran and founder of the Society for the Defense of Prisoners’ Rights.

1525 GMT: The Facebook site associated with Mir Hossein Mousavi has published an English translation of the account of Mehdi Karroubi's meeting this weekend with the student organisation Daftar-Tahkim-Vahdat. Beyond his claim that votes were allocated in advance of the Presidential election on 12 June, Karroubi's speech was a rallying call:

In this circumstance it is necessary that activists maintain their network and use the opportunities for meetings and gatherings, and don’t let people to be pushed to corners. Activists should announce their ideas, and in our ideas and methods we should emphasise those that are based on the national and religious identity of our beloved Iran like the anniversary of the victory of the Revolution, the celebration of Ghorban [one of the Islamic celebrations after Haj], and Ashora [the day Imam Hossein, the third Imam of Shia Islam, was martyred]. Today my advice to you is to maintain forces and ideas and to retain our just position.

1335 GMT: Iran's press supervisory body has banned publication of the leading business daily, Sarmayeh, for "repeated violations of the press law." Sarmayeh's editor Saeed Laylaz has been detained since June.

1325 GMT: More than four months after his detention, the file on former Vice President Mohammad Ali Abtahi's case has been sent to the Revolutionary Court. This raises the prospect of formal charges, possibly this week.

1320 GMT: It's Official --- Karroubi Marches. Mehdi Karroubi's Tagheer website has just confirmed that the cleric will be at Hafte-Tir (7 Tir) Square in Tehran, at 10:30 a.m. local time, for 13 Aban ceremonies. This supersedes previous claims that Karroubi would join students at Amir Kabir University.

1125 GMT: Video Specials. We've just gotten the footage from today's demonstration and hunger strike at Sharif University and have posted two clips. And an EA reader has pointed us to one of the finest speeches on modern Iran and the Green movement, delivered by a 7-year-old student, that we have had the privilege of hearing.

1100 GMT: I've just posted one of the most difficult articles that I have attempted since 12 June. It's a response to an opinion piece in today's Washington Post that dismisses the Green movement as "Iran's Unlovable Opposition".

0920 GMT: We've posted, courtesy of Iran Review, an analysis by Iranian foreign policy analyst Keyhan Bazargar of a possible "middle way" by Tehran to resolve talks on uranium enrichment.

0810 GMT: Meanwhile, The Internal Battle. Here is how complex the fight inside the Iranian establishment over talks with the "West" has become: the Islamic Republic News Agency is featuring an interview with a "State Department nuclear consultant", who emphasises the guarantees that the International Atomic Energy Agency will put in any agreement on Iran's nuclear programme.

That to me is a pretty clear indication that the Ahmadinejad Government, for internal reasons, wants to spin out discussions. But, given the now open hostility of high-profile members of Parliament and both Ali and Sadegh Larijani, how much support does the President have?

And what does the Supreme Leader think of all this?

0755 GMT: That Latest Iran Move on Uranium Enrichment (see 0700 GMT). Foreign Minister Mottaki's statement, made during a conference in Malaysia, was that Tehran had submitted its response to the International Atomic Energy Agency on Saturday. This was for a technical commission to review the Vienna proposal of the "5+1" powers (US, UK, France, Russia, China, Germany), which was for 80 percent of Iran's uranium stock to be enriched in Russia.

Interpretation? Go no further than Enduring America last Friday:

Given Ahmadinejad’s position, the political advantages of spinning out the talks are there to be grasped. If there are alterations in the plan to reduce the amount shipped below 80 percent and to send it out in stages rather than in one delivery, these will be concession to Iran’s and the President’s strength. If the “West” walks away from the table, this will be an indication of their continuing deceptions and mistakes — despite their apparent request for forgiveness from Tehran — and Iran will be in the right as it maintains nuclear sovereignty.

0700 GMT: 48 hours to go before the demonstrations of 13 Aban (4 November), and what we sense is growing excitement inside and outside Iran is making its way into international news coverage. The New York Times rather staidly notes, "Opposition in Iran Urges Continuing Challenge", while The Observer of London announces, "Iran Students Plan Return to Street Protests".

The coverage, following Reuters' initial lead, is still troublesome with its distortion of the impending rally. The New York Times, perhaps unwittingly, links Green opposition to hostility to the US: "The occasion is the 30th anniversary of the takeover of the United States Embassy in Tehran by hard-line students on Nov. 4, 1979. The day is marked every year with anti-American rallies." And both newspapers are bizarrely cautious about the open challenge of Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mohammad Khatami, and Mehdi Karroubi in recent days: "Mousavi appeared to back the protests yesterday....Although the opposition leaders...did not openly call for street protests, their remarks were widely seen as a call to arms on a day of considerable symbolic importance."

And "Western" journalists will still be distracted by even the slightest of remarks on the nuclear issue. This morning, for example, all have jumped on the comments of Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki that Iran has requested a technical commission to review the "third-party enrichment" proposal from the Vienna talks. (America's ABC News and even Fox News, which have not printed a word about 13 Aban, have seized on Mottaki's statement as a top story.)

Still, I cannot recall the "Western" media anticipating the last big marches on Qods Day (18 September), and it is interesting to note that The New York Times writes in retrospect, "Hundreds of thousands of protesters took to the streets." With the possibility that 13 Aban will bring out even bigger marches, news organisations --- print and broadcast --- will be on alert Wednesday. Their coverage does not reply or supersede the rallies, of course, but it may support the Green movement in a way not seen since early in the post-election crisis.

It is two days to 13 Aban (4 November).

Iran Nuclear Talks: Tehran's Middle Way?

Latest from Iran (2 November): The World Takes Notice?

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

Writing for Iranian Diplomacy, foreign policy analyst Keyhan Barzegar suggests a "middle way" in the enrichment negotiations, in which Iran can send some of its uranium to a third country --- thus meeting "Western" concerns --- but retain some of its stock.

Barzegar's view is very much that of a pragmatic diplomat, and I'm not sure it takes account of the political considerations both in Western countries and within Iran. (It is interesting to see his representation of Parliamentary objections to the Vienna deal as a reflection of public anxiety rather than as part of a power struggle within the establishment.) The bottom line of the analysis, however, deserves attention: for Barzegar, Iran's response to the enrichment proposal is not a manipulation or evasion but a genuine reflection of its technical as well as political concerns.


Translated by Iran Review:

Explaining about a draft agreement on nuclear fuel for the Tehran research reactor, the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Manouchehr Mottaki has noted, “The two sides decided to go through the draft. It has been done in Vienna and Iran will soon declare its viewpoint.” At the same time, some officials have already voiced their opposition to the recent nuclear agreement.

The main point evident in all those opposite remarks is lack of trust. Iran still distrusts the West and maintains that Western countries are trying to deprive it of its right to enrich uranium in the long run. Therefore, Tehran maintains that it should take a multilateral strategic approach to this issue.

In fact, they say, it is part of a US strategy to take all enriched uranium away from Iran and then raise expectations from Tehran in the next phase. It seems that their main concern is those expectations, which may finally bring the enrichment process, which has been a fixed policy of Iran, to a complete halt. This would cost dearly for those politicians who had insisted on enrichment in Iran, especially President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Therefore, if the negotiations fail to reach a clear result, it could be quite disconcerting.

The opposition heard in the Majlis (Parliament) is in line with the general anxiety in Iran and the idea that negotiations with the United States are not beneficial to Iran because the United States will use its power to inflict losses on Iran in a step by step manner. Therefore, they are totally suspicious about the role of the United States in its power game with Iran and maintain that Iran would be the weaker side of the game.

In the time of Bush, the game followed totally clear rules. He tried to force other countries through bullying and unilateralism to give in to US policies and this built international consensus against him. Obama, however, has adopted a new strategy according to which he is planning to engage in direct talks with Iran. This does not mean that Washington sympathizes with Iran or pursues special relations with Tehran, but it means that the Americans have found out that negotiations constitute the sole means of convincing Iran to give up its nuclear program and this is done through a step-by-step strategy. Iranian politicians, who are wary of the US role in international interactions, regularly oppose negotiations.

The opposition, however, does not signify total negation of the necessity of negotiations, but it should be considered a warning to negotiators that they must be careful not to give concessions to the opposite side. At the same time, the role of the Majlis in nuclear issue and foreign policy decisions indicates that key problems are solved through consensual solutions. This is very important with regard to the nuclear case because it will balance various power levers. At the same time, it shows the foreign side that the nuclear issue is of national importance to Iranians.

Forecasting Iran’s answer

Although it is difficult under the current circumstances to predict Iran’s response to the agreement, but all signs point to a middle way, which if chosen carefully, could be positive and in line with Iran’s national interests. In fact, if Iran kept part of the enriched uranium in the country and sent the rest to another country, it would pave the way for the continuation of cooperation. Iran should manage its nuclear case. I am not agreed to the recent opposition to the latest nuclear agreement because in any game, both sides try to benefit. If Iran believes in a win-win game, it should take a step and manage the situation. In fact, the trust building measures asked by Western countries should be started in Tehran. On the other hand, Iran is distrustful toward the West and expects Western countries to do something.

Therefore, a middle way can lead to a deal and that deal, under the current circumstances, would be to the benefit of Iran and its national interests. In any case, negotiations between Iran and the United States have reached a critical point and the nuclear case is the sole issue enjoying necessary potential to goad on those negotiations because it gives Iran a bargaining chip which forces the United States to accept to talk to Tehran.

Therefore, Iran should be careful not to sell that bargaining chip, that is, independent nuclear fuel cycle, for a low price. Both sides are taking steps to reach the agreed point. Iran is on the path to positive negotiations and is trying to take a positive step to pave the way for a deal. In the meantime, however, a middle way would be the best option to protect Iran’s national interests.