The Latest from Iran (22 October): Unsteady as She Goes

NEW Really?! Israel & Iran in Direct Talks on Nuclear Weapons
Iran’s Nukes: Text of IAEA Head El Baradei Statement (21 October)
The Latest from Iran (21 October): Room for a Challenge?

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

2020 GMT: Rah-e-Sabz has named 18 of the people arrested this evening.

1915 GMT: Tonight's Arrests. A group had gathered at the house of Shahabbedin Tabatabei, a detained member of the Islamic Iran Participation Front to pray for his release. Security forces entered the home. They asked 4 everyone's cell phone and filmed them, handcuffed the men, and took away several people.

Among those detained were Tabatabei's wife, Mohammad-Reza Jalaiepour, who was detained earlier in the post-election crisis, Mehrak Mirabzadeh, Faezeh Abtahi, and Saeed Nourmohammadi. Mirabzadeh and Abtahi were later released.

1800 GMT: Iranian activists on Twitter are reporting that a number of high-ranking Islamic Iran Participant Front members have been arrested, and in some cases re-arrested after previous post-election detentions, this evening.

1655 GMT: The reformist Islamic Iran Participation Front of the Islamic Revolution has condemned the sentences against political activists. It has God’s promise that no Government or country can survive with such acts; as Prophet Mohammad said, “A state can survive with infidelity but not with tyranny and oppression."

The IIPF added that the coup forces have shown that their only use of religion is to justify despotic and authoritarian actions, issuing unjust sentences against some of the most loyal children of the revolution and the country. (English summary via Mousavi Facebook page)

1640 GMT: More than 2500 students at Sharif University have signed an open letter protesting disciplinary action against their classmates for political activity.

1630 GMT: Heads-Up Announcement. I just finished a 45-minute interview with Fintan Dunne of Sea of Green Radio on Afghanistan and Iran. The broadcast should be available this evening.

1530 GMT: Failure of Day. Earlier this week, we reported on a success for the Green Wave at the Iran Media Fair, when the "hard-line" Kayhan newspaper was forced to remove a guestbook and take down a flag after they were inscribed and decorated with pro-Mousavi slogans and green ribbons.

On the other side, a stand set up by the Ministry of Islamic Guidance to collect names for a complaint against Mousavi did not do very well. So poorly, in fact, that it was taken down.

1300 GMT: Fars Makes Up Clinton Quotes. I'm  not sure if this is another signal that Iran will sign the enrichment deal --- given the image of a US making concessions to a "peaceful" Tehran --- or really bad propaganda.

Fars News is currently leading with the story, "Clinton: Iran's nuclear program is peaceful", quoting her from an interview with The New York Times. Which would be fine, except it bears no resemblance to the truth. In the article in the Times, the summary of the Secretary of State's remarks --- actually made in a speech to the US Institute of Peace --- is "Iran and North Korea must take decisive action to curb their nuclear programs, and not just talk about doing so, if they expected to enjoy an easing of global pressures".

1240 GMT: Will Iran Sign the Uranium Enrichment Deal? Yes.

At least that's the clue offered by Ali Asghar Soltanieh, the Iranian Ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency, "The Vienna talks are a new chapter in cooperation between Iran and the other participating states….We will be waiting to see whether they will stay true to their words and promises. The International Atomic Energy Agency will be a witness to the other states' behaviors when it comes to technical cooperation on using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes."

So there's Tehran's spin: We are the ones in control of this process, putting "the West" to the test on the nuclear issue.

You won't see this in Western media yet --- they're distracted for the moment by the tangential comments of Deputy Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Reza Bahonar that the deal "is not acceptable to us". Bahonar has no role in the nuclear negotiations; his words only come into play if the Parliament decides to resist the Government's engagement with Washington.

1145 GMT: Not Going to Let It Go. The "US linked to Jundallah bombing" narrative lives on. Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani has repeated his claims from Sunday that this is an American connection to the attack in southeastern Iran that killed at least 41 people: "Unfortunately, a trace of the US crimes can be seen in the latest events in our country. Although [the US] has denied any involvement in the terrorist attack, it is not enough and not unacceptable to us. They should explain why such things are taking place."

I have to say I'm surprised, given the context of this week's talks in Vienna on Iran's uranium enrichment. Perhaps Larijani is maintaining political pressure on Washington. But is that a prelude to walking away from the draft agreement? Is it to maintain a tough public stance, even as Iran accepts the arrangement?

Even more curious, and complicating the questions above, is that Larijani is the only front-line politician to complement the Revolutionary Guard's criticism of Washington. So is the Speaker speaking for the Ahmadinejad Government or cutting an independent path?

0825 GMT: The Shark Surfaces. Fararu News reports that Hashemi Rafsanjani has spoken with scholars at the Qom seminary.

He emphasized the principles of Islam and the Islamic Revolution to deal with the country's "many fundamental problems". The Iranian system was sound but, unfortunately, certain operations had raised public and international concerns. It was important, therefore, that all institutions and individuals respected and upheld the Constitution. And, to support that, there must be "free and uncensored information of events and issues", without lies and distortions.

Nothing unusual or dramatic in those general statements. What may be more significant, as we watch Qom's evolving interest in a resolution to post-election disputes, is the timing of Rafsanjani's encounter.

0600 GMT: In contrast to events in Vienna, where Tehran and the "West" neared an agreement on uranium enrichment, a quieter Wednesday in Iran. There were reports of scattered demonstrations, but rumours of a confrontation between President Ahmadinejad and students at Tehran University never turned into reality.

The quest by pro-Ahmadinejad members of Parliament to put pressure on Mir Hossein Mousavi through a formal complaint appeared to run aground in confusion. For the moment, the Revolutionary Guard continues to be preoccupied with the aftermath of the Sistan-Baluchestan bombing.

On the opposition side, movement is still restricted by the Government's formal and informal measure, but a drip-feed of news continues as the calendar moves towards 13 Aban (4 November). Mehdi Karroubi, meeting the members of the Defenders of Human Rights and the National Peace Council, strongly criticised the measures trying to cut off his communications with the people, such as the shutdown of his newspaper and official website, the arrest of his close allies, and the closure of his office. He assured the audience that he was ready for any further regime moves, e.g. that would be taken against him. The Government's ignorance of the rights of the people made the situation worse, and the Green movement would continue until those rights are reinstated. (English summary available via Radio Zamaneh)

The report of a forthcoming meeting between senior clerics and members of Parliament over the proposed National Election Committee promises another front in the challenge to the President and possibly the Supreme Leader. And reformists took heart from the announcement that former President Mohammad Khatami had won the inaugural Global Dialogue Prize, given for cultural and intercultural research in global communication and cooperation.

One item from the prisons: Mostafa Tajzadeh, the former deputy Minister of Interior, told his wife during a visit that he was unaware of the process of his Detained since June, he remained defiant: " Let [the regime] say whatever they want in an unchallenged environment and in our absence; there is no doubt that there will be an opportunity for the people to hear our side of the story! "

Latest Iran Video: Larijani on The Bombings, Jundullah & The US (18 October)

Iran Discussion: The Bombings, Jundullah, and the US
Latest Iran Video: Inside Jundallah and Today’s Bombings (18 October)
The Latest from Iran (18 October): Today’s Bombings

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

Sunday afternoon, hours after the bombings in Sistan-Baluchestan, Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani commented on Press TV, linking the US to the attacks. As we've noted in a separate analysis, the Ahmadinejad Government subsequently backed away from this line:

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ewRGLiWcun8[/youtube]

Iran: So Who Controls the Islamic Republic?

The Latest from Iran (11 October): “Media Operations”

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

UPDATE 12 October 0845 GMT: EA's Mr Smith offers his reading of the Foreign Affairs analysis:

"I do not see what this adds to what we knew already. Besides making the silly mistake of identifying Mesbah Yazdi with Mohammad Yazdi, and stating that the former was head of Iran's judiciary (in reality his real influence and authority are, until proven otherwise, rather limited to "spiritual guidance" of Ahmadinejad), the rest are allegations that have been fed to him after having floated on the Web for months. The Taeb-Jalili-Khamenei trio was floated by Roger Cohen [of The New York Times] in one of his dispatches from Tehran.

The only tidbit that would be interesting, if verified, is the purge of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps and the removal of pro-Mousavi Guardsmen before the elections. That would make sense, and it would be interesting to have real statistics on that.
--
Earlier this week Foreign Affairs published an article by Jerry Guo on "the rise of a new power elite" of "the Revolutionary Guard and its allies" in Iran. The article raised points which have been discussed by Enduring America readers for several weeks, considering politics, the military situation, and the battle for control of key sections of Iran's economy. In addition to Guo's attention to the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps, notice his inclusion of Saeed Jalili, the secretary of Iran's National Security Council, and the Supreme Leader's son, Mojtaba Khamenei, amongst the "coalition of power".

Letter from Tehran: Iran's New Hard-Liners

The headquarters of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) are in a European-style palace, replete with Greek columns and a grand staircase, in the eastern suburbs of Tehran. From here, the IRGC orchestrated the crackdown that followed Iran's disputed presidential vote in June, beating protestors on the street and torturing those behind bars. More ominously, the IGRC and other extreme hard-liners have sidelined fellow conservatives in the Iranian government, carving out their own power base in a regime that is becoming increasingly insular, reactionary, and violent.

So far, much of the analysis of the emerging Iranian power struggle has focused on the clash between the country's conservatives and reformers, pitting President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his patron, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, against Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, two thwarted presidential candidates, and Mohammad Khatami, a former president. (Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a former president and seasoned kingmaker has eased toward the reformists in the election's aftermath.)

The real struggle, however, is the conflict among the hard-liners themselves, many of whom operate behind the headlines in unseen corners of the state machinery. Although Iran's opposition movement has witnessed an unprecedented surge in public support, the election and its aftermath mark a radicalization of the system not seen since the early days of the Islamic revolution.

In the reformist era of Khatami, and to some extent during Ahmadinejad's first term, the country's conservative theocrats and technocrats -- such as Ali Larijani, the speaker of the parliament, and Gholam-Hussein Mohseni-Ejei, the ousted intelligence minister who criticized the state's use of forced confessions -- held much of the power over the executive and legislative branches. Although they were entrenched status quo forces, these pragmatists believed in the dual nature of the Islamic Republic's statehood -- a country with religious and political legitimacy.

But now such figures are losing their influence to a new breed of second-generation revolutionaries from Iran's security apparatus known as "the New Right." They are joined in the emerging power structure by ultraconservative clerics and organizations such as the Alliance of Builders of Islamic Iran. These neo-fundamentalists call for the "re-Islamization" of the theocracy, but their true agenda is to block further reform to the political system in terms of reconciling with both domestic opponents and the West.

This coalition includes Hassan Taeb, the commander of the Basij, the paramilitary branch of the IRGC; Saeed Jalili, the secretary of Iran's National Security Council and the country's chief nuclear negotiator; and Mojtaba Khamenei, the supreme leader's second son, a man so feared that his name is not often uttered in public.

Hard-line figures such as the younger Khamenei and the IRGC leadership are granted religious legitimacy through the support of the most radical mullahs in the theocratic establishment: Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, the head of the Guardian Council, the committee that certified the election tallies, and Ayatollah Mohammad Mesbah Yazdi, a former head of the judiciary and Ahmadinejad's spiritual adviser. Yazdi is affiliated with an underground messianic sect called the Hojjatieh Society, which hopes to quicken the coming of the apocalypse. Democratic reforms, the Majlis (parliament), and elections are mere annoyances under this radical Islamic worldview.

It is not surprising, then, that Yazdi issued a fatwa shortly before June 12 that gave authorities tacit approval to fudge the vote. Indeed, the clerics seem to have gotten the intended result: after the election, a number of employees at Iran's Interior Ministry released an open letter stating that "the election supervisors, who had become happy and energetic for having obtained the religious fatwa to use any trick for changing the votes, began immediately to develop plans for it."

Yazdi's influence on Ahmadinejad became pronounced in the early days of the president's first term, when Ahmadinejad declared that the return of the apocalyptic 12th imam would come within two years. Now, his second term will likely be marked by even more radical behavior: in a meeting with Yazdi in June to discuss his domestic agenda, Ahmadinejad promised to Islamize the country's educational and cultural systems, declaring that Iranians had not yet witnessed "true Islam." Then, in August, amid calls to purge reformist professors, a presidential panel began investigating university humanities curricula deemed to be "un-Islamic." Several progressive students told me that they have been barred from returning to campus this semester, including a top law student at Tehran University. "I was going to continue the protests with my law degree in a more effective manner," he said. "But now I am just a simple pedestrian."

But ideology remains secondary in the struggle to maintain and consolidate control within the fractured regime. It is becoming increasingly clear that Ahmadinejad and his associated faction of neo-fundamentalists no longer aim to take on the mantle of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's revolutionary ideals. As Khamenei's representative to the IRGC put it, "Some people are sticking to Imam Khomeini's ideas ... [but] the situation has changed." Accordingly, religion and revolutionary ideology have become convenient means to an end, but not the end themselves. Purges of un-Islamic faculty and students are meant to target the organizers of mass protests; the arrests and subsequent trials of political opponents, meanwhile, act to shield the financial interests of the IRGC and its hard-line partners.

Read rest of article...

The Latest from Iran (8 October): Will There Be a Fight?

NEW Green Tweets: Mapping Iran's Movement via Twitter
NEW Iran: A Telephone Poll on Politics You Can Absolutely Trust (Trust Us)
UPDATED Iran: Rafsanjani Makes A Public Move with “Friendship Principles”
UPDATED Iran: How a Non-Story about a Non-Jew Became Media Non-Sense
The Latest from Iran (7 October): Drama in Parliament?

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

1900 GMT: It appears that the State Department's withdrawal of funding from four Iran-centred human rights organisations including the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, which we noted yesterday, may get some media attention. Alex Massie of the British magazine The Spectator has written about the "shabby, and actually terrible" Government treatment of the groups, raising the concern of Andrew Sullivan of The Atlantic magazine.

1845 GMT: A University student newspaper has been closed by Government order after it implicitly accepted that the Holocaust had occurred.

1545 GMT: We're here, but it is a really slow news day, compounded by breakdowns in communication. Twitter seems to be out of action. Press TV's website is still leading with yesterday's story of the Supreme Leader's speech, and CNN has nothing beyond the disappearance of the Iranian nuclear scientist Shahram Amiri (see 1025 GMT).

1050 GMT: Fereshteh Ghazi ("Iranbaan") has posted another set of updates on the conditions of detainees.

1025 GMT: Kidnappings and Talks. Both in Iranian and non-Iranian media, headlines are devoted to Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki's allegation, "We have found documents that prove US interference in the disappearance of the Iranian pilgrim Shahram Amiri in Saudi Arabia."

The claim elevates an already murky story into the current power politics around Iran's nuclear program. Amiri is one of four Iranians who have "disappeared", whether through defection or kidnapping, since 2007. All four have been connected with Iran's military or nuclear programme. (Note that Press TV coyly refers to Amiri, beyond the "pilgrim" status, as "a researcher".) There have been allegations that the disappearances may be connected with an Israeli covert effort to cripple Iran's nuclear efforts.

Mottaki's statement, however, is connected more with an attempt to get leverage in the post-Geneva negotiations. The article uses comments by University of Tehran academic Seyed Mohammad Marandi to put further pressure on the US, "As long as the United States continues to behave in an unacceptable manner, I think it will be very difficult for Iranians to be convinced that true negotiations can lead to a fruitful conclusion." Marandi also applies that pressure to Iran's regional manoeuvres: "What is even more disturbing is the fact that the Saudi regime has effectively discredited itself and...will be seen by those who know what has gone on in the region as being confined to American demands and effectively abiding by American wishes."

0955 GMT: A Bit of Fun. Thanks to Persian Umpire, we have posted the ultimate telephone poll of Iranians on politics and President Ahmadinejad.

0915 GMT: The Death Sentence is Noticed. Reuters, citing the Green movement website Mowj-e-Sabz, has written about the death penalty imposed on Mohammad Reza Ali Zamani (see 0620 GMT).

0910 GMT: Parleman News offers an overview of yesterday's events in the Iranian Parliament. The focus is on Ali Larijani's success (and thus President Ahmadinejad's defeat) in winning re-election as head of the Principlist majority party, but there is also a bit of light-hearted banter between journalists and MPs over the question, "Where is my vote?"

0635 GMT: Following up our story of the morning (0600 GMT): Ayande News has an interview with Saeed Mortazavi (pictured), most of which is on the events surrounding Kahrizak Prison. Mortazavi minimises his role in the detentions and abuses, claiming that deaths occurred because of "prior injuries" rather than incidents at Kahrizak.

0620 GMT: Beyond the politics, a curious silence this morning on our last report of yesterday, the first death sentence passed on a post-election demonstrator, Mohammad Reza Ali Zamani. Possibly because the news has not been reported inside Iran, I cannot find a sign that the opposition has picked up on the development. If the death penalty is carried out, it could offer the symbolism of a martyr --- as with Neda Agha Soltan or Soltan Arabi --- for high-profile protest.

0600 GMT: The open challenge in Parliament to President Ahmadinejad, or at least to some high-profile officials, did not materialise yesterday, despite the existence of a report into post-election abuses which could be the foundation for that confrontation.

The document remained classified, and no one --- not even the reformist press --- broke out to make claims beyond the identification of two likely culprits, Iran Deputy Prosecutor General Saeed Mortazavi and Tehran police chief Ahmad Reza Radan.

That does not mean that the challenge has evaporated. To the contrary, there are enough signals from conservative/principlist members of Parliament to indicate anger with a Government which both oversaw and covered up the abuses. The symbolic catalyst for this is "Kahrizak", the prison where detainees were beaten, on occasion to death. One of those detainees was Mohsen Rohulamini, the son of a prominent academic and adviser to conservative Presidential candidate Mohsen Rezaei, and it is his case that appears to have propelled the movement that someone has to answer for "crimes".

The question, as we noted yesterday, is how far that anger has translated into talks "across parties" not only to press the President on the report but to turn this into a wider attack on his authority.

We know that Hashemi Rafsanjani met principlist clerics on Tuesday. What we don't know is how much contact he has had with conservative/principlist politicians and officials within the Government. And we do not know what role the "Green movement", or rather its leaders, have in any discussions. It could be that the relative silence of Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi in recent days is because they are now in talks which need time to produce action, or it could be that they are on the outside but waiting to see what occurs.

Throughout the crisis, EA readers have reminded me that Iranian politics is rarely measured in days or even weeks but in far longer periods. That timeframe seems to fit here.

The Latest from Iran (7 October): Drama in Parliament?

UPDATED Iran: Rafsanjani Makes A Public Move with "Friendship Principles"
UPDATED Iran: How a Non-Story about a Non-Jew Became Media Non-Sense
Video: 4 Clips from Tehran Azad University Protests (6 October)
The Latest from Iran (6 October): Loud Noises, Quiet Manoeuvres

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis2

2130 GMT: A very depressing end to the day. The Committee on Human Rights Reporters has announced that Mohammad Reza Ali Zamani, a member of the The Association of Monarchists, is
to be executed by hanging for taking part in the demonstrations following the June elections. Zamani, who had no access to independent legal representation, was transferred on Monday from Section 29 of Evin Prison to Branch 15 of the Revolutionary Courts and his sentence was handed down by Judge Salavati.

To our knowledge, this is the first death sentence for a partipicant in post-election protest.

(http://chrr.us/spip.php?article6138)

1800 GMT: Disturbing article in Payvand that 10 of the 21 members of the "press court jury" have been replaced in elections. Out go Fatemeh Karoubi, wife of Etemade Melli party head Mehdi Karoubi, Masih Mohajeri, editor-in-chief of Jomhouri Eslami newspaper, and cleric Mohsen Doagu, all of whom have been critical of the Ahmadinejad administration. The news accompanies the closure of three more newspapers since Sunday.

1715 GMT: Report that 12 members of the Iran Teachers Union who were arrested on Tuesday (the day after World Teachers Day) have been released from detention.

1530 GMT: Let's Keep It Global, OK? Sure looks like Mahmoud Ahmadinejad wants to talk about matters other than domestic trifles. He appeared on Iran state television after a Cabinet meeting to confirm Tehran's willingness to consider "third-party enrichment" of its uranium, adding:

I think these negotiations were a step forward and I hope we proceed with the same trend so we will have constructive cooperation to resolve all outstanding global issues....In these negotiations we witnessed better behaviour than in the past from some countries and we noticed that the logic of respect and justice is being established gradually. These talks are good basis for continuation of the negotiations.

1319 GMT: Prompted by readers, we're investigating the story that the Obama Administration has cut funding to four Iran-centred human rights organisations. The only article so far, in Boston.com, considers the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center. The three other groups are not identified.

1315 GMT: Fereshteh Ghazi ("Iranbaan") has updated on the condition of a number of detainees, including the two of 18 students who were not released after University protests last week.

1105 GMT: And Now A Distraction. Press TV summarises the Supreme Leader's public address in the northern city of Chalous:

The enemy started to throw mud and spread rumors in order to undermine and downplay this big political victory....The enemy caused unrest in a part of the country. We see that it is worried about the 85 percent participation of the Iranian nation in the presidential election....Iran's foes are angry with progress and development of the nation.

And so on and so on....

0915 GMT: OK, So We Did Talk. Aladdin Boroujerdi, the Head of Parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, has messed up the Government's "Maybe We Did, Maybe We Didn't" strategy by confirming that Iranian and American delegates did have bilateral discussions at the Geneva meeting on Iran's nuclear programme. Saeed Jalili, the lead Iranian negotiator, had denied that any 1-on-1 conversation took place.

0820 GMT: One source for the claim that Saeed Mortazavi is on the firing line for the Parliamentary report on post-election abuses (see 0740 GMT) is member of Parliament Ali Reza Zakani, who claims that documents will soon be produced for judicial authorities establishing Mortazavi's guilt.

0810 GMT: Ayatollah Dastgheib has written another letter criticising the handling of the post-election crisis, alleging that "military men" are the cause of "vices" in Iran.

0755 GMT: Is This A Confession of Fraud or An Attack on Larijani? In an interview, conservative member of Parliament Javad Karimi Ghadousi claims that Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani wants a National Unity Government so that he can replace Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as President. Ghadousi criticises Larijani for investigations of post election events, such as the raids on Tehran University dormitories and the abuses at Kahrizak Prison, "in defiance" of the Supreme Leader's statement that these were "side issues".

This, however, is the headline assertion: Larijani called Mir Hossein Mousavi on the night of the Presidential election to congratulate him on victory, and Deputy Speaker Mohammad Reza Bahonar wrote a letter to Ayatollah Khamenei that the regime has to accept and prepare for Mousavi as President.

0745 GMT: Back in Action (with a Great Headline). It looks like Mehdi Karroubi's Web presence has returned, with the repackaging of Tagheer on a different URL. It criticises proposed First Vice President Rahimi (see yesterday and 0530 GMT) with one of the best lines in the post-election crisis: "Fake Correspondence of Fake Minister in Fraudulent Government".

0740 GMT: News is coming out of the Iranian Parliament that while parts of the report on post-election abuses are classified, it does criticise --- as rumoured --- former Tehran Prosecutor General (now Iran Deputy Prosecutor General) Saeed Mortazavi and Tehran police chief Ahmad Reza Radan.

0550 GMT: Nothing to See Here. Not a word on Press TV's website about the internal political dynamics. Instead it goes for Iran in the World, with "the [Supreme] Leader...has said Iran's military advances are no a threat to any nation but instead are helping them progress 'without dependence' on the US."

Nothing in Fars News' headlines either; however, the Islamic Republic News Agency does feature a critique of "the archaeology of Hashemi Rafsanjani's National Unity Plan". The analyst, Mohammad Sajjad Nosrati, begins with an invocation of "the discourse of [French philosopher/sociologist] Michel Foucault" (somehow I can't see the same approach being applied to Barack Obama's health care plan in the US) before asserting that the Plan was put forth a few months before the Presidential election.

0530 GMT: After days of fencing and manoeuvring for position, we may see some interesting developments inside and around the Majlis today, as a Parliamentary committee is scheduled to present its report on post-election abuses.

Tensions between the President and conservative/principlist groups have been re-emerging, with hints that condemnation of episodes such as the crimes in Kahrizak Prison may have to name some names, pressing the Ahmadinejad Government to take the reprimand and offer up a scapegoat. That has been accompanied by a renewal of discontent over the President's choice of allies and cronies, with whispers becoming public grumbles about selections such as the First Vice President Mohammad Reza Rahimi. And one should not overlook that the headline, "Supreme Leader Reshuffles Top Positions" at the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps and Basiji headquarters, sits on top of a continuing battle between the President and others to control the Ministry of Intelligence.

Still, the key word in the opening sentence above is "may". The Parliamentary report has already been delayed, and conservative/principlist critics may decide once again to put aside their differences with Ahmadinejad. For what we have yet to see in this crisis is a conservative/principlist decision to set aside their basic opposition to "reformists", allying with them at least temporarily to force changes from Ahmadinejad and the security forces.

And that in turn takes us to the heart of the confusion and tension over the "National Unity Plans", whether that is one Plan, two rival Plans, or even more. With a lot of attention on Hashemi Rafsanjani, the question has not been answered: is there any plan which has finally brought agreement between conservative/principlist groups and reformists to work together in a committee to bring signficant changes?