Iran Election Guide

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Monday
Feb152010

Middle East Inside Line: US, Russia, & Israel on Iran; Lieberman v. Palestinian Authority; US Congressman "Break Gaza Blockade"

US-Israel Defense Meeting on Iran: The US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, said in Israel on Sunday, "Iran must not acquire nuclear capability". He added: "It [a regional confrontation following a strike on Iran] will be a big, big, big problem for all of us, and I worry a great deal about the unintended consequences of a strike... We haven't taken off any option from the table."

Meanwhile, Haaretz says that U.S. Vice President Joe Biden will be arriving in Israel within weeks on an official visit.

Middle East Analysis: The Iran-Russia-Israel Triangle


Moscow's Snub to Israel on Iran Missiles: An hour before Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's plane took off on Sunday, Russian officials said that Moscow sees no reason to delay the sale of the S-300, a powerful air-defense system, to Iran. Vladimir Nazarov, deputy secretary of Russia's Security Council secretary, told Interfax news agency in an interview:


There is a signed contract [for the S-300 missiles] which we must follow through on, but deliveries have not started yet. This deal is not restricted by any international sanctions, because we are talking about deliveries of an exclusively defensive weapon.

On the other hand, according to Haaretz, Russian intelligence officials leaked comments expressing their displeasure with plans by an Israeli firm to close a major arms deal with Georgia.

Lieberman Accuses Palestinian Authority: Israel's Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman told Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee on Monday that "much of the global effort to de-legitimize Israel is supported and sponsored by the Palestinian Authority". He added that the bid to smear Israel in the international community was "partially sponsored by funds Israel is transferring to the Palestinians".

US Congressman "Break Gaza Blockade"US: On Sunday, Rep. Brian Baird, a Democrat from Washington state, spoke to a group of Gaza students regarding the situation in Gaza and said that the United States should break Israel's blockade of Gaza and deliver badly needed supplies by sea. He resembled such an operation to the situation in the post-Second World War and said: "We ought to bring roll-on, roll-off ships and roll them right to the beach and bring the relief supplies in, in our version of the Berlin airlift."
Monday
Feb152010

Latest Iran Video: US Analysis (Gary Sick) v. Overreaction (Stephens, Haass)

Although this interview on CNN is a few days old, I think Gary Sick's evaluation of the political situation in Iran --- from the Green Movement to the state of the regime to the nuclear talks --- is amongst the best to come out of the US. I am struck in particular by his assessment that short-term "success" for the regime (repression of protest) conflicts with long-term "success" (legitimacy).

Later this morning, I came across the opposite on the analytic spectrum. Richard Haass, head of the Council on Foreign Relations, gets so tangled up, amidst his recent call for "regime change" and the snap perception that the Green Movement "failed" last week, that he declares, "Preventive strikes. The earlier we do them, the better." That plays into the hands of Bret Stephens of The Wall Street Journal, a long-term advocate of an aerial attack: "I think the question that is raised by the failure of the so-called Green Movement to come out in force is whether the movement has actually crested. It gained strength after the election. I think it had its high point in December."

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qcr16MpZRQ4[/youtube]

The Latest from Iran (15 February): Withstanding Abuse


Part 1 of 2

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ofMJx_L1YDU[/youtube]


Part 2 of 2

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vWNOp7YtCJc[/youtube]
Monday
Feb152010

Afghanistan: Is It A Battle If No One Shows Up?

It has been eerie to watch the first few days of Operation Moshtarak, the US-Afghanistan-ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) military offensive against the Taliban in Helmand Province. It is not just the observation of the battle from thousands of miles away; it is that this encounter has been scripted.

The offensive was signalled weeks ago in declaration from US military and political headquarters, reporters were suitably embedded, and the ritual proclamations were issued. BBC radio even turned over several minutes of prime-time programming to the speech, in full, of a British commander to his troops on the eve of battle. (Ever since William Shakespeare put words in the mouth of Henry V at Agincourt in 1415 --- "We few, we happy few, we band of brothers" --- this has been required in presentation of English/British wars.) Yet all the scripting could not set down the final-act resolution of this question:

What if you threw a war and no one showed up?

The Afghanistan Occupation: 700 Military Bases (and Counting)


This morning an Afghan official is declaring that 12 Taliban were killed on Sunday. That makes it a score draw with number of dead civilians, as 12 perished in an American rocket strike. In total, about 40 Taliban are reported dead since the start of the offensive. That's 40 bad guys in what was supposed to be a showdown battle for the Taliban "stronghold" of Marja and in what The Washington Post, voicing the words of a US Lieutenant-Colonel, is calling "last-ditch efforts" by the enemy.



The official line of victory was offered by a British general, "The operation went without a hitch. We've caught the insurgents on the hoof, and they're completely dislocated." Now, the narrative goes, US-British-ISAF forces will bring in 2000 Afghanistan police to restore order in Marja.

Hmm.....

An alternative interpretation would be that the Taliban chose not to fight in the "stronghold". Indeed, if you go with the concept of "asymmetrical warfare", that would be the expected move. Faced with the overwhelming firepower of the US and ISAF, most of the insurgents would disperse and resume the battle --- explosive devices, guerrilla attacks, moves against the Afghan Army and police --- when the US-ISAF threat had dissipated.

One of the misleading analogies in the US-UK press this week has been that Marja 2010 is not Fallujah 2004, the Iraqi town that was the arena for two major battles between US troops and Iraqi insurgents. The script reads that, unlike Fallujah, there has been little confrontation, little bloodshed, and relatively little damage. That "victory" story misses an important point. In both the Fallujah battles, most of the top insurgents had left the town in advance of the US attack. Those who stayed behind effectively provided violent cover for a tactical retreat.

So here's the twist in the script. The US-led forces probably did not want a fight. That is why the offensive was signalled so long in advance. Speaking a few minutes ago on the BBC's top radio programme, Air Chief Marshal Jock Stirrup, the head of Britain's Defence Forces, declared, "We are not battling the Taliban. We are protecting the local population."

And that takes this play beyond any immediate staging. The issue moves to whether Marja and other Afghan towns can be held, and that in turn brings up all the questions beyond US artillery: the strength of the Afghan police force, the significance of development, the legitimacy and competence of local government, the policies of Kabul. (Those who would like a sobering lesson in what may be involved can check out the story of the northern Helmand town of Musa Qala, which has bounced back and forth between Taliban and British control since 2006.)

No doubt we will hear, over and over, in forthcoming days about "the battle for hearts and minds". (Let me correct that: I just saw the article, "Troops Fight for Hearts and Minds in Afghan Assault", published by Agence France Presse and being pushed by the ISAF public-relations staff via Twitter.)

Already, however, The New York Times has shifted its headline from Rah-Rah-Victory to "Errant U.S. Rocket Strike Kills Civilians in Afghanistan". And the BBC shifted from glorification to tough questions this morning, challenging Stirrup over the dead civilians and "victory". His response? "We will know in about 12 months" whether success had been achieved.

Operation Moshtarak ("Together") was a showpiece. If you want a battle, look for it not in the biff-bam-boom of this telegraphed offensive, but in the less dramatic but more important contests to come.
Monday
Feb152010

Iran: The IHRDC Report on Violence and Suppression of Dissent

Yesterday, three days after a Human Rights Watch report on the same topic (see separate entry), the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center released its initial findings, "Violent Aftermath: The 2009 Election and Suppression of Dissent in Iran":

INTRODUCTION

On June 13, 2009, the day after the tenth presidential election in the Islamic Republic of Iran, demonstrations erupted in cities across the country. Demonstrators protested what they viewed as widespread fraud—calls of “Where is my vote?” predominated. The Guardian Council had permitted only four men to campaign: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the incumbent; Mohsen Rezaei, a former head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Sepah), considered a conservative; Mir-Hossein Mousavi, a former prime minister of Iran during the war with Iraq, considered a reformist; and Mehdi Karroubi, a former speaker of the Majlis, also a reformist.

Iran: Human Rights Watch Report on Post-Election Abuses (11 February)
The Latest from Iran (15 February): Withstanding Abuse


Mousavi had declared himself the winner late on Election Day. The government immediately announced that Ahmadinejad had won by 62 percent of the vote. The regime also responded by cutting off electronic communication avenues within Iran and with the outside world. As the week progressed, cell phone and internet services were regularly shut down and slowed. On June 16, the authorities announced that foreign journalists were forbidden from reporting from the streets, and that their visas would not be renewed. Hundreds of domestic journalists and members of the press were arrested and intimidated.



Despite these efforts, demonstrations continued throughout the country on an almost daily basis through the month of June. On at least one occasion, the crowd numbered in the millions. In response, the government confirmed that Ahmadinejad had won and unleashed the Sepah (commanded by Mohammad-Ali Jafari) and the Basij (headed by Hossein Taeb) upon the crowds. As the crowds became larger and persisted in exercising their rights to peaceful assembly, the security forces became increasingly violent.

Demonstrators were attacked, beaten and shot in the streets. Many demonstrators were killed in the street. Thousands were arbitrarily arrested—the Judiciary reported that 4,000 people were arrested in the initial weeks. Daily demonstrations finally slowed after a particularly harsh crackdown on June 20 during which at least thirty people were killed.

However, throughout the summer and continuing into the winter, demonstrators flooded the streets on remembrance days, and the security forces continued to brutally suppress all expressions of dissent. Objection to alleged fraudulent elections gradually developed into broader expressions of dissatisfaction with the government. Over the course of a few months, the protests became less focused on the election and more on the general repressive nature of the regime. On December 27, Ashura, reportedly hundreds of demonstrators were arrested.

The Iranian regime also arrested people who were not demonstrating but whom the government charged with fomenting a “velvet revolution.” The exact number of arrests remains unknown, but circumstantial evidence indicates that hundreds were arrested and detained merely for exercising their rights of association. The arrests captured broad segments of civil society, including leaders and members of political opposition and minority groups, members of the political establishment, lawyers, students, and academics. The arrests continued through the winter.

Many arrestees were threatened but released after a few days. However, many others faced torture, rape and sometimes death while in custody. Detainees were, and continue to be, subject to solitary confinement, lengthy interrogations, beatings, rape and other forms of torture. Many were not permitted contact with their families or lawyers, and many were coerced into providing public confessions. Some demonstrators were sent to the Kahrizak detention facility, where they were treated so brutally that the government ordered its closure and transferred detainees to Evin and other prisons. Three Kahrizak detainees died, due to lack of medical care, on the way to or shortly after arrival at Evin Prison. The families of many murdered demonstrators and detainees were denied permission to hold proper burial rites for their loved ones.

On August 1, a series of mass show trials began in Tehran. The first two were broadcast on Iranian television and showed hundreds of disheveled detainees dressed in pajama-like prison garb, looking dazed and confused. Although a list of defendants has never been made public, many were recognizable by the public including former vice-president Mohammad-Ali Abtahi and Dr. Mohsen Mirdamadi, the secretary general of the Islamic Iran Participation Front. The mass show trials bore little resemblance to criminal trials, under Iranian or international law. At each, the prosecution read a political document accusing the detainees and others outside of Iran, including foreign governments, of fomenting a “velvet revolution.” The readings were followed by confessions by select defendants.

Since August, detainees have also appeared on television confessing to crimes involving national security, belonging to terrorist organizations and conspiring with foreign powers. On October 5, the government began announcing sentences. The first four were death sentences handed down to men who had been arrested before the elections. As of December 31, at least a hundred sentences of lengthy prison terms, flogging, or banishment have been announced. However, the identities of many of those detained and tried remain unknown.

This preliminary report that documents and analyzes the Iranian government’s brutal suppression of dissent following the June 12 election. To meet publication deadlines, it ends its coverage on December 31, 2009. However, the Islamic Republic’s suppression efforts continue to escalate, and Iran Human Rights Documentation Center (IHRDC) fully expects that in the coming weeks, months and years, further details will come to light.

This report begins with a brief description of the presidential election, which is followed by a catalogue of the regime’s brutal suppression of the demonstrations. The regime’s refusal to issue demonstration permits to opposition groups, its use of excessive force to suppress the demonstrations, and its murder of demonstrators violated the rights of the demonstrators to freedom of assembly, protection against the use of excessive force by law enforcement, and their right to life under Iranian and international law. The killing of demonstrators was simply murder.

The third section covers the arbitrary arrests of demonstrators and the brutal treatment they suffered while  imprisoned in violation of Iranian and international law. Demonstrators were imprisoned without charge, and once imprisoned, were not afforded fundamental due process, including contact with their lawyers and families. Detainees were mistreated, denied medical care, beaten, raped, tortured, and killed. The regime’s failure to inform families of the whereabouts of their loved ones also constituted forced disappearances in violation of international law.

This is followed by a section describing the arrest and imprisonment of large swaths of Iran’s political and civil society. The arrests, interrogations and torture of the non-demonstrators violated Iranian and international law for the same reasons these acts violated the rights of the demonstrators. Political detainees were held for extended periods of time, often in solitary confinement, with minimal access to family or their chosen counsel. Those who were assigned legal counsel were allowed little contact with their chosen lawyers. If it is found that the torture, killings or forced disappearances were widespread, systematic, and with the knowledge of the perpetrators, each also constitutes a crime against humanity.

The last section of this report describes the five mass show trials and the sentencing of both demonstrators and activists. The parading of detainees in mass show trials, and subsequent sentencing of election-related arrestees violated Iranian and international law, both of which require observance of basic due process, including presumption of innocence, and the right to an attorney of one’s choice, and prohibit reliance on forced confessions in criminal proceedings.

The responsibility for this brutal wave of suppression begins at the top of the Iranian regime with the Supreme Leader and flows down through Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the heads of the law enforcement organizations, including the Sepah [Islamic Revolution Guards Corps], the Basij and the police (NAJA), the heads of the Judiciary, and continues down through the ranks to the Basij on motorcycles running demonstrators down on the street, sadistic prison guards and other judicial employees. The perpetrators and their superiors are responsible under Iranian and international law.

Much of the material presented in this report is from thirty-two interviews conducted by IHRDC with activists, experts and victims of the government’s suppression. Most have chosen to remain anonymous for security reasons. Given the Iranian government’s concerted efforts to hide and distort the record, this report also analyzes and compares witness testimony with reports in the official Iranian press and the international press.

Read rest of report....
Monday
Feb152010

Iran: Human Rights Watch Report on Post-Election Abuses (11 February)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The nearly nine months since Iran's presidential election sparked widespread popular demonstrations against alleged vote-rigging have been among the most tumultuous in the history of the Islamic Republic, which marks the 31st anniversary of the revolution that paved the way for its establishment on February 11, 2010. This has been a period of repeated serious human rights abuses that include extra-judicial killings, violations of the rights to freedom of assembly and expression, and the prohibition of torture, not to mention arbitrary arrest and detention and countless due process violations.

Iran: The IHRDC Report on Violence and Suppression of Dissent
The Latest from Iran (15 February): Withstanding Abuse


In the two months immediately following the June 12 election, the government carried out a major campaign of repression that included mass detentions of protestors, political reform figures, and rights activists, culminating in public trials in August. November and December saw renewed attacks on protestors as large demonstrations commemorated significant dates in the history of the Islamic revolution and the Shia Muslim religious calendar.


This report brings together testimonies and information reflecting the continuing human rights crisis since the election and its sharply disputed results. Over the course of 5 months, Human Rights Watch conducted interviews with over two dozen individuals, including ordinary protestors, journalists, political figure and their families, and human rights defenders. The report's findings indicate a widespread governmental crackdown across various sectors of Iranian society. Although the government has acknowledged some abuses and even named responsible individuals, no one has been prosecuted for committing major human rights violations.

On June 12, 2009, Iran's incumbent president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, stood for re-election against challengers Mehdi Karroubi, Mir Hossein Mousavi, and Mohsen Rezaii. Although the one-month campaign period produced some notable transparency, such as live televised presidential debates for the first time, the government mobilized its institutions and media resources to promote President Ahmadinejad and harass his opponents. The authorities closed reformist publications, blocked opposition websites, and disrupted SMS services prior to the election. Rival candidates' accusations of official favoritism and electoral meddling by the government came to a head on election day. After the announcement of preliminary results on election day, the three opposition candidates quickly charged that the authorities had rigged the voting in favor of President Ahmadinejad and later filed complaints with the Guardian Council. (The Guardian Council is an unelected body of six clerics and six jurists whose range of powers includes supervisory authority over presidential elections).

On June 13, following the government's announcement the previous afternoon that preliminary election results showed Ahmadinejad to be the winner, large numbers of protestors took to the streets. They gathered throughout Tehran and other major cities for the next several days. The demonstrations were overwhelmingly peaceful. However, police and security forces confronted protestors, including those who played no part in the occasional acts of vandalism that occurred, with batons, clubs, and in some cases live ammunition. State violence extended beyond demonstrations, with plainclothes andBasij paramilitary forces attacking student dormitories and staging nighttime raids in residential areas. Security forces arrested thousands of protestors in the course of these governmental crackdowns during the first week following the election.

In addition to massive detentions of ordinary protestors and peaceful activists, as early as the day after the election, authorities rounded up scores of well-known writers and political figures affiliated with the reform movement.  (The reform movement is a term dating to the 1997 election of President Mohammad Khatami, who planned to bring about greater social and political freedoms. Since that time, the term is often broadly applied to include political figures and activists who advocate for change within the framework of the current governmental system.)

The worst abuses against ordinary protestors have taken place at police stations and detention centers, most notoriously at the Kahrizak detention center outside of Tehran. At least three detainees have died due to injuries sustained in Kahrizak. In August, authorities dismissed the director of Kahrizak and said that three guards would be prosecuted for prisoner abuse. In January 2010, a parliamentary panel investigated the deaths and allegations of torture and named former Tehran Prosecutor-General Saeed Mortazavi as the person responsible. Although the panel dismissed allegations of sexual abuse, it found that widespread violations had taken place in the detention center. However, neither Mortazavi nor anyone else implicated in the abuse has yet been prosecuted.

Authorities also abused detainees in Evin, a large prison complex where Human Rights Watch has previously documented systematic abuses.  In Evin, authorities held prominent political figures and activists, who gave confessions that appeared to have been coerced incriminating themselves and others of vaguely-worded political offenses. In August, the government held the first mass trial for over 100 reformists, with defendants confessing to having colluded to promote a "velvet revolution." After the first day of the trial, state television showed two of the defendants, Mohammad Ali Abtahi and Mohammad Atrianfar, denying that their confessions were coerced and claiming to have "changed" their opinions since they were detained. Testimonies collected by Human Rights Watch indicate that authorities coerced the detainees into providing these confessions. Families of detainees told Human Rights Watch that their relatives were put under severe physical and psychological pressure to produce self-incriminating statements.

Despite widespread repression in the weeks following the election, peaceful demonstrations and expressions of opposition continued. Former candidates and their supporters, primarily depending on the internet, have spoken out against human rights violations and called on the government to hold abusers accountable. In response, the government harassed and intimidated activists, journalists, and human rights defenders, detaining many, subjecting some to trials that did not meet international fair trial standards, and convicting others solely for exercising their right to peaceful dissent.

During the fall and winter of 2009, government harassment of peaceful protestors in response to major demonstrations such as those held on November 4 (the anniversary of the takeover of the US embassy in 1979), December 7 (National Student Day), and in conjunction with the Shia religious holiday of Ashura on December 27 continued unabated. Attacks by security forces acting alongside the Basij injured many and killed at least 8. Authorities also arrested scores of additional activists and protestors, and threatened to try some on charges that carry the death penalty. As of February 10, the government had executed 2 persons who had in fact been detained prior to the elections on charges ofmoharebe (enmity with God). In January, the government sentenced 9 others to the death penalty on the same charges and put on trial 16 others on charges that carry the death penalty upon conviction.

Key Recommendations to the Government of Iran

  • Establish an independent and impartial fact-finding commission to identify those who ordered the crackdown on post-election protesters and those responsible for serious human rights violations.

  • Investigate promptly and impartially all allegations of torture or ill-treatment in detention.

  • Ensure that victims of torture or ill-treatment receive appropriate compensation from the government.

  • Release all detainees held for exercising their right to free expression, assembly, and association


Read rest of report....