General Kayani's "Silent Coup" in Pakistan: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly (Mull)

EA correspondent Josh Mull is the Afghanistan Blogging Fellow for The Seminal and Brave New Foundation. He also writes for Rethink Afghanistan:

Pakistan's General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the man over whom our leaders in Washington fawn and who sits atop the intensely destabilizing "Strategic Depth" networks in Afghanistan, has just been handed an extension of his term:

The Pakistani government on Thursday gave the country's top military official, army chief Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, another three years in his post, a move that analysts said would bolster Pakistan's anti-terrorism fight and cement its role in neighboring Afghanistan.

Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani announced the extension in a late-night televised address to the nation. "To ensure the success of these [counter-terrorism] operations, it is the need of the hour that the continuity of military leadership should be maintained," he said.

The impact on our war in Afghanistan is obvious.  Call it "strategic depth" or "cementing its role": it all adds up to influence on Afghan President Hamid Karzai's government, the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, Al-Qa'eda, and the future of all of these players in Afghanistan.

The crux of the development is that Kayani's extension is bad news for us, due to his cozy relationship with militants and terrorist organizations, as well as his undermining of the democratically-elected civilian government. But the details are important, especially as they could mean the difference between uncontrolled escalation and our planned military withdrawal from Afghanistan.

For the complete picture, a look at what a few experts (read: bloggers) are saying to determine the good, the bad, and the ugly ramifications that Kayani's extension has on the US war in Afghanistan.

For the good news, we have Shuja Nawaz writing for the New Atlanticist [emphasis mine]:

A major advantage that might accrue is that the certainty provided by the new term for the army chief will allow the civilian government to become confident in asserting itself in policy matters, knowing that the army chief will not overtly intervene in its affairs. This may help strengthen political institutions. At the same time, civilians must resist the temptation to turn to the army to lead the battle against militancy (a national endeavor not purely a military one) or to arbitrate differences on the political field.

These three years should also give Kayani time to assess the present Higher Defense Organization of Pakistan and perhaps come up with a more devolved structure for the army and a better system of command and control at the center. One possible scenario may include regional and centralized commands at four-star rank, appointed by the same authority who selects the service chiefs, and a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs with real powers to regulate all the services while acting as the main military advisor of the government. This approach has been taken by the United States and many other modern militaries, so it would hardly be unprecedented. Without having a stake in the chairman's position in 2013, Kayani may be able to provide a dispassionate plan for the government to decide, well in advance of the next round of promotions in 2013. Any proposal that he presents as a disinterested party will have credibility and will also help override the parochial concerns of the army relative to the other services in Pakistan.

It would be more than good news, it would be great news, if Kayani did work to minimize the role of the military in government, and created a civilian-military relationship similar to the US. But that only works if the first part of the statement is true: Kayani's interference in politics ceases, allowing the civilian government to become more confident.

That's where the bad news comes in. This is not a case of the Army backing away from its role in politics. it is, in fact, a craven arrangement with the ruling political party. Arif Rafiq writes at AfPak Channel [emphasis mine]:

Perceptions aside, three more years of Kayani could conceivably provide continuity to both Pakistan's military and political setup. In recent months, the consensus in Pakistan was that Kayani would receive a two-year extension. Gilani's choice of three years was a surprise. But not by mere coincidence, Gilani's government also has three years remaining in its tenure. And so it's certainly possible that there is a deal between Gilani's Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and Kayani, perhaps involving foreign guarantors, to let this ship sail for three more years (with Gilani wearing the captain's hat steering an imaginary wheel and Kayani actually in control). Indeed, Gilani alluded to a possible deal when he said today that Pakistan's four major "stakeholders" -- the president, prime minister, army chief, and Supreme Court chief justice -- are in a "secure position" till 2013. [...]

And so for Kayani, who has managed to become the darling of many of Pakistan's nationalists and Islamists, there is some risk involved in continuing for another three years as army chief. If he ties himself too close to the PPP, he -- and more importantly, the Pakistani Army -- could lose a critical support base and sink along with the current government, unless he maintains a political distance and continues to pursue a semi-nationalist security policy.

Gilani projects a false sense of confidence in the viability of Pakistan's current political-military setup. This is Pakistan. The Kayani extension provides a short-term ceasefire between the PPP and the army, but it will also likely produce re-alignments among its fractious power brokers. And another head-on clash between any two of them is not far from reality.

Cutting a deal with the ruling elites of the status quo to stay in power is not the same as Kayani becoming a "disinterested party" in the government. That's not a democratic government, it's a puppet. In that sense Kayani's extension could be considered another in Pakistan's long history of military coups, albeit a silent one. This will agitate the opposition parties, namely the PML-N, and the Islamist party would not be out of line to call for new, early elections, simply as a way of "re-checking" the legitimacy of the PPP-Kayani government.

But that's not the worst part for the US war in Afghanistan. Pakistan's internal politics are important to us, but it's Kayani's national security and foreign policy that have truly ugly implications for the US. B. Raman writes on his blog [emphasis mine]:

In the counter-insurgency operations against the TTP he has had partial successes in the Swat Valley, South Waziristan, Bajaur and Orakzai agencies. Under his leadership, the Army has been able to deny the TTP territorial control in these areas, but has not been able to destroy their capability for terrorist strikes and commando-style raids in tribal as well as non-tribal areas. While arresting some leaders of the Afghan Taliban, who were living in Karachi and other non-tribal areas, he has avoided action against the Afghan Taliban leadership operating from the tribal areas.

He has avoided any action against Al Qaeda elements which have taken sanctuary in the non-tribal areas. Under Musharraf, the Army and the ISI were much more active against Al Qaeda in the non-tribal areas than they have been under Kayani. The anger of Al Qaeda and its associates against Musharraf because of the action taken by the Army and the ISI was responsible for the virulent campaign of Al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri against Musharraf and the Army. They abused Musharraf as apostate, collaborator of the Hindus etc and thrice tried to kill him---once in Karachi and twice in Rawalpindi. Compared to that, there is hardly any Al Qaeda campaign against Kayani. There is a greater threat to Mr.Zardari from Al Qaeda than to Kayani. The Army and the ISI have managed to create an impression in the tribal areas that Mr.Zardari and not Gen.Kayani is responsible for the facilities extended to the US for its Drone (pilotless plane) strikes in the tribal areas. Since Gen.Kayani took over, while many Al Qaeda leaders have been killed in the tribal areas by the Drone strikes, there have been very few arrests of Al Qaeda elements in the non-tribal areas. Al Qaeda feels more secure in the non-tribal areas of Pakistan today than it was under Musharraf.

If you missed that, let me spell it out for you: Kayani's extension is good for Al-Qa'eda. Yes, that Al-Qa'eda. The terrorist guys.

Then there's all that other stuff about the Afghan Taliban - Mullah Omar's Quetta Shura in Balochistan, as well as the Haqqani network, who are responsible for the vast majority of terrorist and insurgent attacks on our US troops in Afghanistan.

How does the US feel about this? Nawaz:

The United States has studiously avoided taking a public position but conversations with U.S. diplomats and military officials over the past few months indicated their deep interest in the future of General Kayani and a noticeable desire to see him remain at the helm of affairs in Pakistan.

Rafiq:

Some of Pakistan's nationalist and Islamist commentators have also reacted with suspicion toward Kayani's extension, describing it as a result of Hillary Clinton's "lobbying"

Raman:

Kayani is thought of well both by the Pentagon and the PLA leadership

And a flashback to Sue Pleming's report on Kayani's visit to Washington:

Guests crowded around Kayani at the annual Pakistani National Day party at the embassy, posing for photos and jostling for the military leader’s ear.[...]

U.S. senators and Obama administration officials lined up to speak to the slim and dapper general, who Pakistani media say rules the roost back home but is also central to U.S. relations with Islamabad.

Damn, we really love this guy. What are we thinking? Whatever it is we like about him --- his style, his centred demeanour, his subtle hand in politics - General Kayani is still just another military dictator, another crook in a long line of corrupt, tyrannical, warmongering thugs. He is not our ally, not our friend, and his extension, now a full-fledged dictatorship complete with a compliant, ruling political party, is just plain bad news for the United States.

The US must immediately end all military aid to Pakistan, and should pursue sanctions against the ruling elites in the PPP until such time as their government can prove its legitimacy by way of free and fair democratic elections. Barring such extreme measures, the US must engage exclusively with Pakistan's civilian government, while working toward greater inclusion of opposition parties like the PML-N (who are presently too close to radical Saudi Arabia, and could stand to be moderated with more international influence).

More importantly, the US must end its war in Afghanistan. Not only is not in our interests to fight a civil war in Afghanistan, but it is even less in our interests to have our US troops used as pieces in Kayani's personal chessboard. Our troops fight and die for our national defense, not for Kayani's insane militarist objectives against India. Pakistan is catastrophically unstable, and US military leaders are moving to escalate our involvement. Further war in the region will prove to be disastrous for the US.

Reforming our relations with the Pakistani government can be slow and doesn't have to be as extreme as an immediate freeze. The PPP government can be allowed time and support to again free themselves of Kayani's control, such as when they tried to grab control of the ISI, Pakistan's terror-supporting spy agency, in 2008. But we cannot wait to end the war in Afghanistan.

The war puts Americans in danger, it is destroying our economy, and now with Kayani's empowerment, our objectives in Afghanistan become all the more hopeless and impossible. We have to bring our troops home, get them out of this civil war in Afghanistan and proxy war with Pakistan, and only then can we move on to accomplishing our objectives, be they counter-terrorism, development, or human rights.

We must end this war now, lest one more US soldier die so that General Kayani can "cement his role" in Afghanistan.

Iran Analysis: Re-Defining the Green Movement (Verde)

Recently Ataollah Mohajerani, the former Minister of Culture in the Khatami Government, provoked much discussion and some criticism when he tried to set out his view of the groups within the Green Movement.

This week, writing in Rah-e-Sabz, Mohajerani tried to clarify his assessment.

The former Minister, claiming that his speech at Imperial College London had been taken out of context, writes that he sees three types of Greens:

A) Revolutionary: People who are against the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Imam Khomeini, and Islam. They want to overthrow the Islamic Republic and have been of this opinion for 30 years.

B) Revolutionary-Reformist: people who want to change the Constitution and remove velayat-e faghih (ultimate clerical supremacy).

C) Reformist: people who want to implement parts of the Constitution which have not been implemented, bringing out its full potential and following up on the post-election protest of "Where is My Vote?".  Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi, Mohammad Khatami, and most of the political prisoners are in this category

Warning that the opposition "have all become like Keyhan", the hard-line newspaper, with its lies against the Greens, Mohajerani says that those in his first category are after the overthrow of the Islamic Republic; they  sympathize with and are comrades of the neocons, applauding American activists like John Bolton and Senator John McCain in Washington. This, according to Mohajerani, has been the style of overseas-based Iranian opposition for 30 years.

My observations

*It is a good sign that Mohajerani has tried to address the criticism of his views and of the “filtering” of the Green Movement.

*In the description of his first group "Revolutionaries", it sounds as if Mohajerani is saying that anyone who is against the revolution and Khoemini is also against Islam. Is he equating Khomeini and the 1979 Revolution with Islam? In that case, what is the difference between his view of the world and that of the current Supreme Leader, who equates himself with the Prophet?

*I am not sure where his descriptions of the Green Movement leave people like Neda Agha Soltan --- who, according to her mother, did not vote in the 2009 elections --- who were murdered during the street protests and have arguably become the potent symbol of both the Green Movement and the regime’s brutality.

*Mohajerani talks about the setting of conditions by some people for when they get to power (i.e., after the failure of the current regime leadership which, like many others, he takes to be inevitable). Setting such conditions is a bad thing to do, but it looks like Mohajerani is doing exactly the same thing. With his own description of the Green Movement, which is setting categories and conditions, where does this leave him?

*Mohajerani seems to say that everyone who is against the revolution and Khomeini is by definition a supporter of US neoconservatives. This appears to paint a  lot of not very similar people with the same brush.

[An aside: I think, (with his mention of “these people have been the same for 30 years” and his definition of the first “revolutionary” category of Greens, Mohajerani is mainly having a go at the supporters of the previous regime  of the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.]

*Most importantly in my view:

The three sections of the Green Movement that Mohajerani describes are actually a sign of the opposition's strength. This indicates that the movement includes a range of people from the Islamic Republic’s former (and maybe even current) high-ranking officials to those who have been against the Islamic Republic even before its creation. This view of the Green Movement is of a loose coalition of almost all political groups and ideas, with the exception of Ayatollah Khamenei and a few people around him).

My conclusion....

Mohajerani and many other reformists, a lot of whom are paying a very heavy price, should be commended for their stand against Khamenei and his gang. With that stand, they have helped and are still helping the Green Movement.

When he was Minister for Culture, Mohajerani tried to open up the cultural environment --- within regime limits, it has to be said --- and was eventually forced from office. After the elections last summer, he did a series of interviews with Persian language media, in which he managed to prove (importantly, within the context of the Islamic Republic) that Ayatollah Khamenei, by his actions, no longer met the conditions to remain in the post of Supreme Leader. This should not be forgotten when arguing about different interpretations about the Green Movement.

By the same token, Mohajerani and other former high-ranking regime officials need to look and see what has gone wrong in the regime, in which they served not long ago, for it to have become the disaster it is today. The outcome of such an investigation could be very useful for all Iranians and the future of Iran.

This does not mean that we should blindly follow anyone who makes pronouncements, an allegation which has been made by many of the current young generation of Iranians against our parents’ generation. While we should remember and be thankful for the stand that people like Mohajerani are taking against Khamenei, we need more critical dialogue within the Green Movement. As Zahra Rahnavard said in a recent interview, “Those who are not criticized become stagnant like a marsh”.

EA on the Road: A Trip to the Coast

We're having a bit of down-time this weekend, thanking the one who puts up with our devotion to EA (two years ago it was a wedding in Birmingham, today it's cockles by the seaside in Brighton), so service will be limited. Mike Dunn and Ali Yenidunya are minding the site, so do keep ideas and comments flowing.

We'll be back from Sunday evening with full service.

The Latest from Iran (24 July): Reviewing the Situation

2210 GMT: The Re-Appearing Fatwa? But for eyebrow-raising, this wins the prize....

Rah-e-Sabz claims that the Supreme Leader's "I am the Rule of the Prophet" fatwa, which appeared on Tuesday but then receded from Iranian state media, is now back --- unfortunately, the website doesn't link to the supposed location.

NEW Iran Analysis: Rafsanjani Bowing Out? (Abedin)
UPDATED Iran Media Follow-Up: War, War, War. Blah, Blah, Blah. No Facts. More War. Blah.
Iran Interview: Detained US Hiker’s Mother “I Wish I Could Hear Her Voice”
Iran Analysis: The Supreme Leader & the Disappearing Fatwa (Verde)
The Latest from Iran (23 July): Receding Authority

2200 GMT: Bazaar Developments. We close this evening with some eyebrow-raising news.

It looks like there has been an attempted reconcilation between the President and officials of the conservative Motalefeh Party, who have been a traditional power behind the Bazaar. On Thursday Ahmadinejad met Habibollah Asgharowladi, Asadollah Badamchian, and Mohammad Nabi Habibi.

Friction between the President and Motalefeh had been stoked by the dispute over control of Islamic Azad University, with members of the party criticised by Ahmadinejad supporters for their defence of Parliament's position.

Meanwhile, Rah-e-Sabz posts photos of a large fire in Kerman Bazaar. The cause is unclear.

2145 GMT: Today's All-is-Well Alert. Ali Vakili, the managing director of Pars Oil and Gas Company, says that investment in Iran's South Pars gas field has increased by 120 percent in the current Iranian year. Vakili said the rise was the result of the issuance of 3 billion Euros in foreign currency bonds and $3.014 billion in national participation bonds.

There was no reported comment from Vakili on how bonds could assure completion of projects when foreign companies were withdrawing from South Pars.

1830 GMT: The Interrupted Memorial. Footage of the memorial for poet Ahmad Shamlou, disrupted by security forces (see 1640 GMT), has been posted.

1810 GMT: Labour Front. Operators at the Kermanshah Telecommunication Company staged a protest in front of the Kermanshah Governor’s mansion on Thursday.

1750 GMT: Picture of Day. One of a set of photographs of former Deputy Speaker of Parliament Mohsen Armin after his release from detention on $200,000 bail:



1745 GMT: Video of Day. Footage has been posted of poet Shams Langroudi reciting his work at the memorial for Amir Javadifar, killed in post-election conflict last year.

1730 GMT: A Demotion for the Supreme Leader? Reporting on a meeting of the Supreme Leader with his office staff, Rah-e-Sabz refers to "Mr Khamenei".

1653 GMT: Refugees in Germany. The first of 50 post-election Iranian refugees have arrived in Germany after they were granted asylum. The refugees, most of whom are reported to be dissident journalists, had been in Turkey.

1645 GMT: Karroubi Goes After the Guardians. Mehdi Karroubi, in a letter to Guardian Council member Ayatollah Mohammad Momen, has criticised the  Council for "institutionalizing fraud" and offering a "double-standard interpretation" of the constitution.

Karrubi alleged that the Council has become an "instrument for securing and maintaining power for a particular political faction".

1640 GMT: Blocking the Poet's Memorial. Parleman News reports that security forces have forced the cancellation of a memorial at the grave of Ahmad Shamlou, one of Iran's great contemporary poets, on the 10th anniversary of his death.

1405 GMT: Talking Tough. For Revolutionary Guard Commander Mohammad Ali Jafari, all this Government in-fighting is irrelevant: leaders of the "uproar" will be dealt with in a timely fashion.

1400 GMT: More Larijani v. Ahmadinejad. The Speaker of Parliament is in fighting mood: he has accused the Government of violating the Constitution over subsidy cuts.

1330 GMT: Parliament v. President (and It's in State Media). Press TV and the Islamic Republic News Agency breaks their usual silence on the Parliament's growing conflict with Mahoud Ahmadinejad, highlighting the issue of $2 billion for the Tehran Metro.

Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani is quoted, "Executive bodies are obliged to enforce this law after its communication. They cannot refrain from enforcing it. According to the Constitution, the president must communicate any law within a specific period of time. If a legislation is not communicated in due time the Majlis speaker will communicate it."

The Government has refused to sanction the $2 billion, possibly because of a political battle with Tehran Mayor Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf. (Former Vice President Massoumeh Ebtekar has just made this point in Rah-e-Sabz.)

1245 GMT: Academic Corner. Peyke Iran claims 13 professors at Al-Zahra University have been dismissed and students have advised to study China and Russia.

1240 GMT: Offside. The sports daily Goal has been banned for three months.

1200 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Mohsen Armin has been freed on bail of about $200,000.

An appellate court has upheld the 9 1/2-year sentence imposed on human rights activist Bahareh. Hedayat. The 7-year term of Milad Asadi has also been upheld.

1105 GMT: Parliament v. President. Another MP, Mus al-Reza Servati, has declared that the Ahmadinejad budget lacks ministerial signatures and is therefore illegal.

1045 GMT: Culture Corner. The Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance has reiterated that censorship of books and films is necessary.

1005 GMT: We have posted a separate analysis, "Rafsanjani Bowing Out?"

1000 GMT: Economy Watch. Peyke Iran claims that up to 85% of workers now have temporary employment contracts.

0925 GMT: The Universities Conflict. Raha Tahimi, writing for the Institute of War and Peace Reporting, posts a useful overview of the dispute over control of Islamic Azad University and the "temporary ceasefire" between former President Hashemi Rafsanjani and President Ahmadinejad.

0915 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. On Wednesday Mehdi Karroubi visited Narges Mohammadi, the women's rights activist who was recently released from detention.

Mohammadi continues to suffer from poor health and the lack of treatment provided when she was in prison.

0735 GMT: Cyber-Watch. Ali Aghazadeh of Parliament's National Security Commission has reportedly declared that "countless new sites need more control" by the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps.

0730 GMT: Conspiracy Theory. It wasn't all cheer and sending a man into space in the President's speech on Friday (see 0649 GMT).

Ahmadinejad "revealed plans by the United States and Israel", announcing, "They [Washington] have decided to attack two of the regional Arab states, which are our allies, with the help of the Zionist regime to create fear of decision-making in Iran."

The President teased the audience by not revealing which two Arab states are under the gun. Instead, he turned to another concern, chastising Russian President Dmitry Medvedev over remarks on Tehran's nuclear programme. Ahmadinejad regretted that Medvedev had "become the mouthpiece for the plot by the enemies of Iran."

The President did say that he maintained hope for relations with Moscow.

0700 GMT: Road to Nowhere. Iranian Students News Agency claims that the Ministry of Transport owes billions of dollars to construction companies, with 500 road and rail projects unfinished. Parliament has asked the Minister of Transport not to accept plans for construction proposed after the President's recent tour of the provinces.

0655 GMT: The Supreme Leader's Back-Room Politics. Amidst the intrigues this week over Ayatollah Khamenei's "I am the Rule of the Prophet Fatwa", Rah-e-Sabz offers an analysis of the Supreme Leader's advisors, including chief of staff Asghar Hejazi, the mysterious "Mr Vahid", and Khamenei's son Mojtaba.

0649 GMT: Mahmoud Looks to the Stars. Speaking at the National Festival of Iranian Youth on Friday, President  Ahmadinejad said Iran plans to launch its first manned shuttle into space by 2019.

Ahmadinejad added that the project was scheduled for 2035 but that the launch date was reviewed in a Cabinet meeting this week. He did not offer the reason for the sudden 16-year advance in his Ministers' calculations.

0645 GMT: Energy Posture. Iranian 1st Vice President  Mohammad Reza Rahimi has said that Iran is considering the removal of the dollar and the euro from its oil trade transactions: "In our oil transactions, we will use any currency that is to our benefit.”

Reports indicate that Iran and China may start using the yuan, the Chinese currency, to settle their oil transactions. An Iranian official has also suggested the dirham, the currency of the United Arab Emirates, for business.

Following the latest UN and US  sanctions, Iran has been experiencing difficulties in carrying out its international trade deals in dollars and euros.

Iran Analysis: Rafsanjani Bowing Out? (Abedin)

Mahan Abedin writes for Le Monde Diplomatique: "As the Iranian revolution moves toward its fifth decade, there seems to be no more room for the man who excelled in the art of being everything to everyone."

Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Iran’s president from 1989-97, was at the top of the Iranian political establishment for three decades, his uncanny ability to manipulate politics to his own advantage undiminished. But over the past year, as Iran went through its most serious political crisis since the 1979 revolution, his empire has declined, and now his enemies have been emboldened to strike a fatal political blow. Rafsanjani has signalled his willingness to step aside from politics, thus avoiding public dismissal; the language has been carefully worded to minimise his loss of face.

Rafsanjani’s downfall was his inability to avoid a confrontation with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and supporters, after Ahmadinejad’s disputed victory in last year’s presidential election. The purge of Rafsanjani has less to do with a clash of personalities and factional interests; it signals a major re-alignment in Iranian politics, in which the role of factions is much diminished and the power of the state ascendant.

Rafsanjani has been among the most influential forces in Iranian politics, devoting his life to the revolution. Before the expulsion of the shah in 1979, he was a committed disciple of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and took extraordinary steps towards the fall of the monarchy. He even participated in political violence, notably the assassination of the former prime minister, Hassan Ali Mansour, in 1965.

After the revolution Rafsanjani was catapulted to the commanding heights of the Iranian government, serving as the speaker of the Majlis or National Assembly throughout the 1980s. This gave him a vantage point to survey the complex political faultlines of post-revolutionary Iran, with its many shifting factions.

Besides his Machiavellian instincts, Rafsanjani’s extraordinary political success came from his understanding of the Islamic Republic’s lively political scene and his ability to intervene successfully in major political disputes. By placing himself in the middle of warring political factions he was able to play mediator, taking the heat out of disputes --
all the while strengthening his own position and that of his family.

Read rest of article....