Afghanistan: Hamid Karzai Joining the Taliban? The Story Behind the Headline (Mull)

EA correspondent Josh Mull is the Afghanistan Blogging Fellow for The Seminaland Brave New Foundation. He also writes for Rethink Afghanistan:

The war in Afghanistan is disintegrating before our very eyes. Our counterinsurgency strategy is broken, and the Pentagon knows it. The so-called "emergency" funding requested months ago by the Obama administration now seems destined to die a slow, bureaucratic death in congress due to overwhelming pressure by citizens. Our allies in NATO have either reached their peak of military involvement, as with the UK, or have already begun to dismantle their troop presence, as with Canada and so many others. Other countries in the region are already vying for power after the US leaves, even as the Pentagon insists its July 2011 withdrawal date will only be the "beginning of a process."

But what about Afghanistan itself? What about President Hamid Karzai, our ally and head of the "Host Nation" government? The theory put forward by the pundit class is usually some variation of the "bloodbath" theme. Our allies in Kabul like Karzai will  be overrun and annihilated by the Taliban.

Afghanistan’s New Propaganda Scam: Poor Afghans, They’re Rich! (Mull)

This appears to be more media myth-making, however, as we see from Karzai's political manoeuvring. Not only is he threatening to join the Taliban. He may have already done just that.

Karzai has begun negotiating with the Taliban and even received formal terms of a peace treaty from Taliban-aligned Gulbuddin Hekmatyar,  but this does not necessarily mean that Karzai has allied with them. Negotiations are merely the first step in any peace process, no matter the circumstances.

Instead we have to look deeper inside this peace process to see the real endgame Karzai is working toward, that of a nominal, Pashtun-nationalist government in Kabul overlaying a Taliban-dominated countryside. Together they function not only as a crime family capable of exploiting Afghanistan's resources (minerals, opium, timber, etc.) but also as a highly effective proxy for Pakistan's interminable battle against Indian influence.

What is this Pashtun-nationalist government? While Karzai was formerly part of the Northern Alliance, he is also a Pashtun, as is the vast majority of the Taliban movement. The Taliban are quite adept at playing up this identity:

The Taliban are more than an expression of Pashtun nationalism, of course. They represent a reactionary movement that idealizes the simplicity and extreme conservatism of 7th century Islam. By burnishing this ideology, the Taliban is able, absurdly, to attract support beyond its Pashtun base.

The ethnic component, though, is a formidable one. It all but guaranteed a certain degree of success by the Taliban in all of “Pashtunistan,” in Pakistan as well as in Afghanistan. Yet all the while, the ethnic map imposes constraints, if not limits, on how far the Taliban can expand.

They were able to seize power in most of Afghanistan before 2001, although the “Northern Alliance” — made up primarily of ethnic Tajiks – managed to hold out until Americans arrived and smashed the regime in Kabul. Since then, the Taliban have had a harder time operating outside “Pashtunistan.”

Not any more. They're now able to expand beyond "Pashtunistan". Thomas Ruttig reports that the Taliban are beginning to move far into Northern Afghanistan, in areas traditionally quite hostile to their oppressive rule. The ethnic Hazara in this region were part of the Northern Alliance, which fought the Taliban during the 1990's until the Americans came in 2001. The Taliban have a history of anti-Shi'a Muslim violence there, but this could be changing, as Ruttig notes [emphasis mine]:

Most Hazaras had been hostile to the Taleban’s advance into their region in the 1990s after the movement that considered Shia as non-Muslim had committed some mass murders against the minority group, for example in Mazar-e Sharif, Yakaolang (Bamian province) and at the Robatak Pass (Samangan). The Taleban conquered Bamian, the largest town in Hazarajat, late in their campaign that brought them control over more than 90 per cent of Afghanistan’s territory in that period. It was supported by an agreement with one faction of the main Hazara party Hezb-e Wahdat, led by Ustad Muhammad Akbari (now an MP in Kabul), a rival of the leader of Wahdat’s main wing Abdul Karim Khalili (now a Vice President). Under this deal, Akbari’s fighters guaranteed that Bamian remained calm and accepted a presence of Kandahari Taleban in the town.

In the meantime, the Taleban have – at least officially – moderated their position vis-à-vis the Shia community. Mulla Omar has declared repeatedly that the movement would not tolerate any ‘sectarian’ bias. This can be interpreted as an attempt to woo the Hazara population that feels neglected by the central government in Kabul.

In addition to supporting the Taliban presence in Hazara areas, Akbari was also a supporter of Karzai's rape law, claiming it actually protected women's rights. While the Hazara have historically fought the Taliban, Akbari has shown time and again he is willing to compromise with whoever is in power. When the Northern Alliance was winning, Akbari supported them. Until the Taliban came, when he supported them. And now it's Karzai's Pashtun coalition with the Taliban, so Akbari is willing to take oppressive Shi'a laws in exchange for expansion of Taliban control.

In a separate interview, Ruttig explains further the dynamic between the Taliban and former enemies in the Northern Alliance [emphasis mine]:

The Karzai government already has shown that it is more sensitive about what conservative sectors in the clergy -- the so-called jihadi leaders -- demand than what civil society is concerned about - remember the "Shia Personnel Law.[...]

[Former head of National Directorate of Security, Amrullah Saleh's] resignation might have to do with all this. Politically, he belongs to the current which emerged from the former mujahedin Northern Alliance (NA). This current -- represented by Karzai's 2009 main rival at the elections, Dr. Abdullah -- sees Karzai's reconciliation approach with skepticism. It technically boycotted the peace jirga. (It did not use that word, though.) On one hand, this skepticism reflects concerns broader political and social circles share, like the organized women. On the other hand, the NA had not been known for a tendency toward power sharing and fears losing further influence if the Taliban joined a future government. Finally, if Thursday's Guardian is right, Saleh also saw Karzai moving closer to Pakistan. The relations between the NA and Pakistan have "traditionally" been strained.

Karzai seems to be marginalizing, if not outright rejecting from the political process, members of the Northern Alliance, usually in favor of those willing to side with the Taliban. He isn't so much joining the Taliban in the sense of being subservient to Mullah Omar's Quetta Shura, but rather in the sense of forming a power-sharing government. The Taliban will still control large amounts of Afghanistan, and we even see them moving back into areas they haven't held since the war with the NA during the 90's. And they may be willing to negotiate as "brothers" with Karzai.

Why would the Taliban share power with Karzai? More Ruttig [emphasis mine]:

We should not believe our anti-terrorism psy-ops and understand that the Taliban are a political movement with political aims. Such a movement will compromise when serious talks are held. Some Taliban know that they cannot rule Afghanistan on their own. We heard this discussion amongst Taliban in 2008 and 2009, but the surge closed their ranks again.

The Taliban will maintain Karzai's government in Kabul to  so they can effectively rule Afghanistan. After all, Mullah Omar is unlikely to have much success as President. Instead, the militants will need Karzai for stuff like this [emphasis mine]:

Afghan President Hamid Karzai said on Friday he was concerned about a looming battle over his country's untapped mineral resources and that Afghanistan's major donors should be prioritised in exploiting them. [...]

"I hope we will be able to manage it properly both in terms of rivalry from the international bidders in Afghanistan and also within Afghanistan, we should be able to manage the returns of those mineral extractions properly for Afghanistan," he said in a seminar hosted by the Japan Institute of International Affairs.

Karzai has enough credibility to deal with foreign investors (though maybe not American investors), allowing them to exploit Afghanistan's resources as well as to manage the funds properly "within Afghanistan", which of course means pay-off for the Taliban who legitimise Karzai's presidency. Afghanistan will be ruled by oligarchs, a mafia family controlling the country's resources. Karzai is not simply joining the Taliban, they are forming a coalition government, albeit a criminal and oppressive one.

But what about that other piece of Afghanistan's post-war tyranny, that of being a puppet for Pakistan's war against India? For the same reasons as the Taliban, Pakistan's military dictatorship also appreciates the benefits of a Taliban-Karzai coalition government:

"Morally, Afghanistan should give access as a priority to those countries that have helped Afghanistan massively in the past few years," he said, adding that Japan, the second biggest donor to Afghanistan in terms of money pledged, would be a welcome investment partner.

In addition to providing a training ground for terrorism against India, Afghanistan is also useful for undermining India's economy and trade partners. Japan is indeed the second largest donor of aid to Afghanistan, but the largest in the region is... New Delhi:

India has offered $750 million in aid to Kabul (Reuters) since 2001, making it the largest regional donor to Afghanistan. Besides helping to rebuild Afghan roads, airlines, and power plants, and providing support to the health and education sectors, New Delhi also seeks to spread its own brand of democracy in Kabul. Not only will future Afghan parliaments sit in a building that India helped construct, but Afghan civil servants, diplomats, and police officials will have received training from their Indian counterparts.

India's contribution has been large, but when weighed against other international donors, like Japan's billions, they fall much farther down the list of "prioritised" trading partners. Not only does Japan push India down the line, which is really not that serious considering India has mines of its own, but it also affects India's bottom line in other ways [emphasis mine]:

Traditionally, Japan has been the second largest destination of Indian exports (major exports include gems, marine products, iron ore, and cotton yarn). India is also a major importer of goods from Japan, and its importance has been growing in recent years (major imports include machinery, plant-related products, transport equipment, and electronic machinery).

Japan will need to import less from India thanks to its opportunity in Afghanistan. Obviously that's good for Pakistan, as it forces India into some uncomfortable economic positions, only one tiny example of how Afghanistan can be used against Indian interests. The Karzai-Taliban government would be compliant with Pakistan across the board, with the Taliban providing foot soldiers for Pakistan's "strategic depth" against India, and Hamid Karzai would be able to counter Indian influence in Kabul, whether that means obscure complications like new trade competition with Indian ore exporters or overtly downplaying India's role in post-war Afghanistan.

That is what will become of Afghanistan when then US withdrawal is over: a Taliban-Karzai coalition government, and a client state for Pakistan.

It's worth noting, however, that this is not a rationale for more war in Afghanistan. This maneuvering is happening now, in the middle of a massive US escalation. Our military involvement does nothing but exacerbate these effects on Afghanistan. Our violent war against the Taliban legitimizes them as freedom fighters. Our support of the crooked Karzai regime gives him credibility to run a sovereign state, as well as assuming all of the economic responsibilities that entails. And our support for Pakistan's military dictatorship, at the expense of their democratically elected civilian government, enables the Pakistani national security strategy of perpetual war against India, whether through terrorism, trade, or conventional means.

If the US has any interest in seeing a different outcome for Afghanistan, troops, special forces, or any kind of war are simply not an option. Rather Afghanistan's post-war tyranny can be undermined through other ways, such as developing Afghanistan (everything from roads to education to a free press) to the point where extremist ideologies, as well as the endemic corruption and oppression, like those of Karzai and the Taliban, will no longer be tolerated or sustainable. The US can also push for free and fair elections in Afghanistan, allowing a credible test of legitimacy for Afghanistan's government, to allow for more ethical international trade activities. And the US can engage directly with the civilian government of Pakistan, allowing peaceful Pakistani citizens to set and implement their own foreign policy, rather than have it controlled by the unaccountable warmongers under the head of the military, General Kiyani.

As domestic pressure finally chokes off support for the war in Washington, it's helpful to keep a close eye on these machinations by Karzai and the Taliban. Supporters of the war in the US will make claims about an impending bloodbath, but clearly Karzai's regime will survive our absence. War supporters will also claim that these problems which were created by our war can only be fixed by...more war. It's simply not true.

Post-war Afghanistan will be a miserable place indeed, but just as in 2009, 2007, 2001, and 1979, more war in Afghanistan and Pakistan is not the answer. The US occupation which feeds Afghanistan's misery must be brought to an end, and only then can we set about the process of developing the country, eradicating extremism, and making peace for the region as a whole.

Iran Request: Nonsense about "Twitter Revolution". Please Stop.

UPDATE 1825 GMT: Jared Keller has modified his final paragraph so it now reads, "The Green Revolution in Iran was muzzled, sadly, although the movement continues to put pressure on the Iranian regime a year after its initial protests. The Twitter Revolution, however, is far from over." He has also engaged in a productive dialogue over the original piece, noting his main intention was to establish the role of Twitter in events, correcting misconceptions, and adding, "I regret using 'totally stifled' as a rhetorical flourish [about the Green Movement]; I don't intend to make the same mistake in the future.

It's been wearying to read the recent mis-interpretation of social media and its place in the post-election conflict in Iran.

There is, however, a step beyond today, as Jared Keller of The Atlantic tries to set the record straight --- for which he should be thanked --- only to walk face-first into an even worse two-dimensional error. My response:

I am grateful that Jared Keller corrects the superficial notion --- sometimes put out in misunderstanding, sometimes to grab a cheap headline --- that Twitter is the movement for change in Iran.

Twitter is a tool --- a very powerful tool --- to keep information moving in and out of Iran even at the height of represssion by the regime.

It's ironic, then, that Mr Keller seems not to have used Twitter to lead him to the information of what is happening day-by-day in Iran, more than a year after the 2009 election. Had he done so, he would not have made the assertion --- as superficial as the notion of the "Twitter Revolution" and as ill-informed --- that "the Green Revolution in Iran was muzzled, sadly, its political organs now defunct and its development totally stifled".

The movement for civil rights is still much alive, with thousands defying arrest and intimidation to show up on streets in cities across Iran last Saturday and with political pressure building against the Government on a daily basis, both from the opposition and from "battles within the establishment".

The Latest from Iran (18 June): Hardliners Criticise Ahmadinejad

1510 GMT: Twitter and Civil Rights. We have posted a response to the latest attempt to set straight the relationship between social media and the post-election political situation in Iran.

1430 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Journalist Ebrahim Rashidi, who disappeared on Monday, has reportedly called his family from Ardebil's intelligence detention centre.

NEW Iran Request: Nonsense about “Twitter Revolution”. Please Stop.
NEW Iran Analysis: How Europe Can Help (Mamedov)
NEW Iran Document: The Tajzadeh Criticism and The Reformist Way Forward (Sahimi)
Iran Snapshot: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Master of Irony
Iran Overview: Striking Poses from Sanctions to Cyber-War to “Terrorism”
Latest from Iran (17 June): Clearing Away the Smoke

Journalist Hassan Etemadi has been given a two-year sentence, and journalist Shahin Zeynali has been handed a term of two years and 91 days.

The former mayor of Ghasr-e Shirin, Ghodrat Mohammadi, has been detained and transferred to a centre in Kermanshah. No reason for his arrest has been given.

1330 GMT: Through the Looking Glass on the Hijab. Reviewing today's Tehran Friday Prayer by Ayatollah Jannati, the head of the Guardian Council, I think we are now caught up in a contortion of politics. Iran has suddenly become a place where defenders of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad praise him for "a relatively liberal government approach" and turn their fire upon the "hardliners", rather than the opposition.

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_tZ2a0_3sNw&feature=youtu.be[/youtube]

For the headline from Jannati's speech today, in contrast to his previous appearances, is not the threat of heavy punishment upon the opposition but his criticism of Ahmadinejad for raising the "cumbersome" issue of the "morality police" and their efforts to enforce "good behaviour" such as the wearing of the hijab.

Linking those who acted or dressed inappropriately to "drug traffickers" and "terrorists", Jannati said that women who defied the rules on proper clothing were "worse than poison". No one (he means you, Mahmoud) had "the right to tie the hands" of those enforcing the law.

1005 GMT: Ahmadinejad's Hijab Problem. It seems the President has got himself in a political tangle over his complaint about "morality police" cracking down on supposed social transgressions, including "bad hijab".

The Governor of Tehran, Morteza Tamaddon, has insisted that Ahmadinejad's directives are the basis for his officials' actions.

High-profile member of Parlaiment Ali Motahari has declared that the President has been adversely influenced by his chief aide, Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai.

Ayatollah Alamalhoda, Mashhad's Friday Prayer leader, has asserted, "Unfortunately Ahmadinejad does not give the right attention to implementing religious rules."

Member of Parliament Mohammad Taghi Rahbar says he is ready to discuss the issue with Ahamadinejad on television.

0950 GMT: Today's Khabar Kick on the Government's Shins. Khabar Online, linked to Ali Larijani, has suggested that Vice President Mohammad Reza Mirtajoddini might have to resign because he wants to complete a Ph.D. dissertation.

The website, as reported by Peyke Iran, also points to 11 "suspicious" comments by the President in the last 76 days.

0945 GMT: Take Your Resolution and Stick It. Iran's National Security Council has issued a strongly-worded denunciation of the UN Security Council sanctions resolution on Tehran's nuclear programme:

Contrary to all expectations, the resolution has focused on Iran's nuclear program, without so much as a word about the Israeli regime's criminal activities and its attack on the Freedom Flotilla convoy carrying humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip only 10 days ago.

Also, the resolution brazenly ignores the 11 proposals put forward by Iran during Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, which have been welcomed by world countries.

The council takes issue with the adoption of the resolution, particularly since it came despite constructive cooperation and the release of a new report by the International Atomic Energy Agency confirming the non-diversion of Iran's nuclear material for the 22nd consecutive time....

"This clearly shows that Washington's commitment to Israeli security will never allow UN Security Council to fulfill its obligations with regards to securing the safety and the rights of different nations....

The Islamic Republic of Iran will respond fittingly to any attempt to violate the legal and legitimate rights of the Iranian nation," the statement added.

0845 GMT: We have posted an analysis by Eldar Mamedov, "Iran: How Europe Can Help".

0840 GMT: Economy Watch. Ayatollah Mousavi Ardebili has complained that people are still not informed about the Government's subsidy reduction plan.

0805 GMT: A Boast (and an Admission?). Tehran police chief Esmail Ahmadi Moghaddam, trying to wash away criticism of last year's attack on Tehran University's dormitories, has said, "We were prepared for the elections one week in advance." The dorm incidents were predictable because Communists and neo-Marxists following Mehdi Karroubi had come onto the streets.

Not sure if Ahmadi-Moghaddam realises this, but his statement gives indirect support to allegations of a manipulated election --- the security forces were preparing for violence because they knew in advance that there might be anger over an "adjusted" vote. (More on this on Saturday....)

Meanwhile, member of Parliament Elyas Naderan has kept up his pressure on the Government, saying that the Majlis never completed a full report --- despite its promises --- on the dormitory attacks: "Only parts of it exist and are in our minds."

0800 GMT: The Attack on the Clerics. Some more pressure on the regime: Ayatollah Abdolnabi Namazi, the Friday Prayer leader of Kashan, has said, "If attacks on marja in Qom become normal, the future is not predictable."  Hojatolelsam Mehdi Tabatabai asserts, "God will not forgive those who insulted the 14 Khordad [4 June] ceremony."

0645 GMT: The Attack on the Clerics --- An Apology? Hmm, wondering if this might be an important signal....

In a wide-ranging interview on Parleman News, Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani makes the statement that "whoever does not respect the marja (senior clerics)... shows his worthlessness". Larijani asserts that the marja "are the pillars of nezam", the Iranian system, and "the Supreme Leader up to the chiefs of Iran's forces see them as such".

An EA correspondent gets to the point with the question, "Is this an indirect apology from Ayatollah Khamenei?"

0640 GMT: The Economic Squeeze. Reuters publishes a summary of foreign companies who have pulled back from operations inside Iran and those who continue to do business.

0550 GMT: A Victory in Britain. It is reported that actress and lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender rights activist Kiana Firouz has been granted "leave to remain"' in the UK, removing the threat of deportation to Iran.

Firouz had been refused asylum on two previous occasions, prompting a campaign to prevent her return to Tehran.

0535 GMT: The Attack on the Clerics. It is reported that the website of the late Grand Ayatollah Montazeri has been filtered.

Kalemeh publishes a letter from Ahmad Montazeri, the son of the Grand Ayatollah, to senior clerics in Qom. Montazeri describes Sunday's attack on the Grand Ayatollah's home and offices and asks for a denunciation of the assault.

0515 GMT: Today's white noise starts out of Washington rather than Tehran, as the Obama Administration --- trying to hold back the tide of Congressional action on Iran --- plays up rhetorically to the legislators.

Speaking at a hearing on Thursday, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates gave the rationale for the adjusted approach of the White House to US missile defence:

One of the elements of the intelligence that contributed to the decision on the phased adaptive array (approach) was the realization that if Iran were actually to launch a missile attack on Europe, it wouldn't be just one or two missiles, or a handful.

"It would more likely be a salvo kind of attack, where you would be dealing potentially with scores or even hundreds of missiles.

An editorial aside:I wonder if and when the Administration will ever realise that this appeasement --- not of Iran but of Congress --- will never free up its approach towards Tehran but will limit and even undermine any hope of crafting a thoughtful policy towards the Iranian situation.

Meanwhile, getting back to significant developments, we catch up with this week's potentially important analysis by reformist Mostafa Tajzadeh. A Deputy Interior Minister in the Khatami Government and post-election detainee, Tajzadeh has published a lengthy consideration of today's Iran through a review of the past, apologising for the reformists' role in the detention and execution of political prisoners in the 1980s.

We've posted extracts from the Tajzadeh analysis, accompanied by interpretation for Muhammad Sahimi of Tehran Bureau.

Gaza Latest: Varied Reactions to Israel's "Eased" Blockade

Contrasting messages over Gaza: In an interview with the BBC, Syrian President Bashar Assad said that the attack of Israel's "pyromaniac government" on the Gaza aid flotilla increased the chances of war in the Middle East. However, the Quartet of the US, European Union, the UN, and Russia have welcomed Israel's decision to ease the blockade on the Gaza Strip on Thursday.

"The Secretary-General[Ban-Ki-Moon] is encouraged that the Israeli Government is reviewing its policy towards Gaza, and he hopes that today's decision by the Israeli security cabinet is a real step towards meeting needs in Gaza," said Martin Nesirky, the UN spokesman.

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Quartet Representative Tony Blair added: "I welcome the Government of Israel’s decision to liberalize the policy on Gaza."

However, Hamas and the Palestinian Authority were critical of Israel's decision. Hamas spokesman Sami Abu Zuhri said that Israel's decision to allow more goods into the Gaza Strip was designed to "beautify" the blockade and mislead public opinion. He added:

The Palestinians are not asking for additional goods to be allowed into the Gaza Strip. Rather, they are demanding the complete lifting of the blockade and the reopening of all the border crossings, as well as freedom of movement for all people.

Chief Palestinian negotiator Dr. Saeb Erakat wrote to his e-mail list that ‘‘the Israeli security cabinet vote to ease its land blockade of the Gaza Strip is not sufficient’’ and continued:

With this decision, Israel attempts to make it appear that it has eased its four-year blockade and its even longer-standing access and movement restrictions imposed on the population of Gaza. In reality, the siege of the Gaza Strip, illegally imposed on Palestinians continues unabated.

The facts are that a siege against 1.5 million people in the Gaza Strip continues. Either Israel lifts the siege completely or it continues to violate international law and basic morality.

Israel has used a so-called “white” list of only 114 items allowed into the Gaza Strip. Palestinian basic needs requires at least 8,000 basic items that continue to be prohibited. These include essential materials for rebuilding and for waste-water treatment for the most basic living standards.

He added, “During the first three months of 2007 36,000 trucks entered the Gaza Strip compared to 3,600 trucks that have been permitted to enter during the first three months of 2010. Today, 90% of the Gaza Strip’s civilian population relies on the World Food Organization and the United Nations Relief Works Agency.’’

US envoy George Mitchell held separate meetings with Israel Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak Thursday as part of his fourth round of indirect talks between Israel and the Palestinians. He told both leaders not to let day-to-day problems divert talks.

Diplomatic circles from Israel stated that the Palestinian leader, Mahmoud Abbas, would have been forced to withdraw, following the flotilla crisis, if there had been direct negotiations. They also stated that Palestinian officials would be placed at border crossings into Gaza so Hamas would not be given credit for the easing of the blockade.

Iran Analysis: How Europe Can Help (Mamedov)

Eldar Mamedov, an international-relations analyst based in Brussels, writes for European Voice:

If the past is any guide, the UN Security Council's decision to impose new sanctions on Iran is unlikely to radically alter Iran's behaviour and its pursuit of its nuclear programme. Instead, the EU and US should shift their Iran policy toward increasing the prospects for political change in the country.

The emergence of the Green Movement a year ago as a broad-based opposition to what was perceived as an electoral coup in favour of the hard-line president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, provides an opportunity for such a change.

The Latest from Iran (18 June): Threats & Apologies

The movement, informally led by former presidential candidates Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, has proved itself to be resilient in the face of the ferocious repression by the regime during the last year. For example, to the shock of the establishment, Mousavi strongly and publicly condemned the execution in May of five Kurdish dissidents. This shows that he is reaching out to the broadest possible segments of the Iranian society, including the aggrieved ethnic minorities and populations outside the big cities of Teheran, Isfahan and Tabriz.

A few weeks ago, Mousavi blasted Ahmadinejad's erratic economic policies. These policies have led to an unemployment rate of 50% among the educated youth and inflation of over 20%. Both Mousavi and Karroubi called for demonstrations to mark the anniversary of the presidential elections on 12 June.

Even if the regime finally succeeds in crushing the Green Movement, the opposition in Iran will not disappear. Iran's young, well-educated and well-connected society has seen its desire for political and social freedoms and economic prosperity stifled for far too long. The government's fresh offensive to re-impose ultra-conservative social mores, including the restrictive dress code for women, and a massive purge from the universities of professors deemed too "liberal" or "secular", are further alienating the youth. There are deepening cracks within the system itself, with a growing number of conservatives realising that it is untenable in its current shape. Remarkably, the opposition to the regime also has religious legitimisation, since one of its fiercest critics was the late and very popular Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri.

All this makes the option of supporting the Iranian opposition not only morally right, but also politically feasible. The EU can do it in several ways.

First and foremost, it should put human rights at the core of its strategy towards Iran. Individuals and organisations implicated in human rights violations should be subjected to the EU travel ban and freezing of assets. Non-governmental organisations such as Iran Human Rights Documentation Centre have compiled a list of officials directly involved in murders, torture and rape of the protesters. Contrary to widespread belief, the regime does care about such revelations, since some of the accused, particularly members of the Revolutionary Guard, have business interests in Europe and travel to Europe for, for instance, medical treatment. The revelations of the atrocities also fly in the face of the Islamic Republic‘s attempts to promote itself internationally as a unique example of a ‘modern religious democracy'. Sanctions against the perpetrators would send a clear message that there is a cost attached to the repression. It may save lives.

The EU should increase its efforts to protect Iranian dissidents, by, for instance, granting asylum in Europe. Thousands of them are currently waiting in Turkey for their applications to the EU countries to be processed. Meanwhile, they are being harassed and intimidated by Iranian agents. The EU must put pressure on Turkey to rein in the Iranian agents and more EU countries should follow the example of Germany, which already offered asylum to some of the dissidents. This will help the Green movement find a foothold abroad and establish a connection between its leadership and the EU governments.

Second, the EU must do its utmost to facilitate the opposition's access to the internet and other electronic communications in the face of government interference. It should protest loudly any jamming of broadcasts from Europe, such as Iran's attempts to block the BBC's Persian TV, and it should find ways to retaliate. The export of surveillance technology by European companies to Iran, whose government could use it to violate freedom of expression, should be stopped.

Third, the EU can help the disparate groups that have coalesced into the Green movement to resolve their ideological differences and decide what comes next. The religious democrats, including Moussavi and Karroubi, want to work within the system and reform existing laws. By contrast, liberals and social democrats insist that the current constitution and political structure are unreformable and should be replaced by a secular republic. The EU can provide a platform for debate among these groups to work out a common strategy and evolve into an alternative political force capable of ruling Iran. Foundations under European political parties can be instrumental in this effort.

While the nuclear issue will remain on the agenda for the foreseeable future, the EU should see the big picture. For the first time in three decades there is an opportunity for popular-led political change in Iran. It will take time, but it is an opportunity not to be missed.