Iran: So Who Controls the Islamic Republic?

The Latest from Iran (11 October): “Media Operations”

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UPDATE 12 October 0845 GMT: EA's Mr Smith offers his reading of the Foreign Affairs analysis:

"I do not see what this adds to what we knew already. Besides making the silly mistake of identifying Mesbah Yazdi with Mohammad Yazdi, and stating that the former was head of Iran's judiciary (in reality his real influence and authority are, until proven otherwise, rather limited to "spiritual guidance" of Ahmadinejad), the rest are allegations that have been fed to him after having floated on the Web for months. The Taeb-Jalili-Khamenei trio was floated by Roger Cohen [of The New York Times] in one of his dispatches from Tehran.

The only tidbit that would be interesting, if verified, is the purge of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps and the removal of pro-Mousavi Guardsmen before the elections. That would make sense, and it would be interesting to have real statistics on that.
--
Earlier this week Foreign Affairs published an article by Jerry Guo on "the rise of a new power elite" of "the Revolutionary Guard and its allies" in Iran. The article raised points which have been discussed by Enduring America readers for several weeks, considering politics, the military situation, and the battle for control of key sections of Iran's economy. In addition to Guo's attention to the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps, notice his inclusion of Saeed Jalili, the secretary of Iran's National Security Council, and the Supreme Leader's son, Mojtaba Khamenei, amongst the "coalition of power".

Letter from Tehran: Iran's New Hard-Liners

The headquarters of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) are in a European-style palace, replete with Greek columns and a grand staircase, in the eastern suburbs of Tehran. From here, the IRGC orchestrated the crackdown that followed Iran's disputed presidential vote in June, beating protestors on the street and torturing those behind bars. More ominously, the IGRC and other extreme hard-liners have sidelined fellow conservatives in the Iranian government, carving out their own power base in a regime that is becoming increasingly insular, reactionary, and violent.

So far, much of the analysis of the emerging Iranian power struggle has focused on the clash between the country's conservatives and reformers, pitting President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his patron, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, against Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, two thwarted presidential candidates, and Mohammad Khatami, a former president. (Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a former president and seasoned kingmaker has eased toward the reformists in the election's aftermath.)

The real struggle, however, is the conflict among the hard-liners themselves, many of whom operate behind the headlines in unseen corners of the state machinery. Although Iran's opposition movement has witnessed an unprecedented surge in public support, the election and its aftermath mark a radicalization of the system not seen since the early days of the Islamic revolution.

In the reformist era of Khatami, and to some extent during Ahmadinejad's first term, the country's conservative theocrats and technocrats -- such as Ali Larijani, the speaker of the parliament, and Gholam-Hussein Mohseni-Ejei, the ousted intelligence minister who criticized the state's use of forced confessions -- held much of the power over the executive and legislative branches. Although they were entrenched status quo forces, these pragmatists believed in the dual nature of the Islamic Republic's statehood -- a country with religious and political legitimacy.

But now such figures are losing their influence to a new breed of second-generation revolutionaries from Iran's security apparatus known as "the New Right." They are joined in the emerging power structure by ultraconservative clerics and organizations such as the Alliance of Builders of Islamic Iran. These neo-fundamentalists call for the "re-Islamization" of the theocracy, but their true agenda is to block further reform to the political system in terms of reconciling with both domestic opponents and the West.

This coalition includes Hassan Taeb, the commander of the Basij, the paramilitary branch of the IRGC; Saeed Jalili, the secretary of Iran's National Security Council and the country's chief nuclear negotiator; and Mojtaba Khamenei, the supreme leader's second son, a man so feared that his name is not often uttered in public.

Hard-line figures such as the younger Khamenei and the IRGC leadership are granted religious legitimacy through the support of the most radical mullahs in the theocratic establishment: Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, the head of the Guardian Council, the committee that certified the election tallies, and Ayatollah Mohammad Mesbah Yazdi, a former head of the judiciary and Ahmadinejad's spiritual adviser. Yazdi is affiliated with an underground messianic sect called the Hojjatieh Society, which hopes to quicken the coming of the apocalypse. Democratic reforms, the Majlis (parliament), and elections are mere annoyances under this radical Islamic worldview.

It is not surprising, then, that Yazdi issued a fatwa shortly before June 12 that gave authorities tacit approval to fudge the vote. Indeed, the clerics seem to have gotten the intended result: after the election, a number of employees at Iran's Interior Ministry released an open letter stating that "the election supervisors, who had become happy and energetic for having obtained the religious fatwa to use any trick for changing the votes, began immediately to develop plans for it."

Yazdi's influence on Ahmadinejad became pronounced in the early days of the president's first term, when Ahmadinejad declared that the return of the apocalyptic 12th imam would come within two years. Now, his second term will likely be marked by even more radical behavior: in a meeting with Yazdi in June to discuss his domestic agenda, Ahmadinejad promised to Islamize the country's educational and cultural systems, declaring that Iranians had not yet witnessed "true Islam." Then, in August, amid calls to purge reformist professors, a presidential panel began investigating university humanities curricula deemed to be "un-Islamic." Several progressive students told me that they have been barred from returning to campus this semester, including a top law student at Tehran University. "I was going to continue the protests with my law degree in a more effective manner," he said. "But now I am just a simple pedestrian."

But ideology remains secondary in the struggle to maintain and consolidate control within the fractured regime. It is becoming increasingly clear that Ahmadinejad and his associated faction of neo-fundamentalists no longer aim to take on the mantle of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's revolutionary ideals. As Khamenei's representative to the IRGC put it, "Some people are sticking to Imam Khomeini's ideas ... [but] the situation has changed." Accordingly, religion and revolutionary ideology have become convenient means to an end, but not the end themselves. Purges of un-Islamic faculty and students are meant to target the organizers of mass protests; the arrests and subsequent trials of political opponents, meanwhile, act to shield the financial interests of the IRGC and its hard-line partners.

Read rest of article...

Iran: English Text of Mousavi-Karroubi Meeting (10 October)

Iran: So Who Controls the Islamic Republic?
The Latest from Iran (11 October): “Media Operations”

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Translated on the Facebook page associated with Mir Hossein Mousavi:

Yesterday (Oct 10, 2009) Mir Hossein Mousavi visited Mehdi Karroubi in his home to talk about the post-election events. In this meeting both presidential candidates by pointing out the efforts of the IRIB (the state-run TV and radio channels) to diminish the reform movement, emphasised on their legal rights and demanded to appear on TV/radio to defend themselves and reply to the false accusations made against them on the “national” stage.

At the beginning of this meeting Mehdi Karroubi said that the recent presidential election was a great opportunity, and the establishment could have used this opportunity to strengthen its position in the international community. Noting that the behaviour of the government after the election was far from the status and ideas of the system that was founded by Imam Khomeini, Karroubi strongly criticised the illegal arrests of Alireza Beheshti, Morteza Alviri and Ebrahim Amini (senior advisors to Mousavi and Karroubi) as well as the other political prisoners who have sacrificed a lot for the revolution and the country.

Karroubi, the Secretary General of the Etemade Melli party, called the treatment of the students and revolutionary figures by the government as “odd and strange” and by reminding the events that happened during Shah’s time when the military forces attacked the university, called these kinds of behaviours obscene and that after all these years there was no one who could defend such acts and that he considered these as signs for all the officials to be careful with their actions so that so that future generations would have a good memory of them.

Mehdi Karroubi pointed out the recent letter by the Tehran Governor’s office that prohibits the members of Tehran’s City Council from comforting and meeting with the family members of the victims of the recent events, calling this behaviour “very uncivilised”. Karroubi also  pointed out the recent remarks made by Mohseni-Ejei (the new Prosecutor General) in which he had said that the country was in a combat situation, Karroubi stated that these words were to create fear from the revolutionary courts (show trials) and asked why these kinds of statements are made: why one should pretend that the country is in the military mode and everyone should keep quiet and be silent? Noting that some of the military leaders such as the General Commander of the Revolutionary Guards are accusing the reformists of providing topics for the foreign media, Karroubi asked them who is truly providing topics for the foreign media. “Is it us or you? Do we make harsh statement or you? Who is behaving roughly, you or us?”

Karroubi also pointed out the Qods Day rallies. He stated that the position regarding Israel has not changed and that the Qods Day is a day to support the people of Palestine and condemn the violation of their rights by Israel, but he added:

We should be thankful to the many people who attended these rallies. Most of those who participated in these rallies in response to our invitation were chanting slogans about Iran and their country and were concerned about their fate. We cannot ask people to be ignorant about their country, and although the main propose for this day was Palestinian people, I ask the authorities to explain what has happened in the country that suddenly on Qods Day people are split in two groups and some express their concerns in the slogans they were chanting.

At the end of his remarks, Karroubi stressed that some are talking about the presidential elections as if nothing has happened and are telling people that there has been no fraud in the election. He asked, "Why are the Government telling people these lies as if people don’t know what has happened to them? If that is true then what are all these protests?"

Karroubi added that the authorities are claiming that Ahmadinejad had 300,000 votes in 10,000 ballot boxes, while Karroubi did not even have a single vote in those boxes....

This is despite the fact that some of the observers at the polling stations say that in a ballot box I had 100 votes but they counted only one for me. At least say something that people won’t laugh at you over it. If you are telling the truth then in response to tens of hours of denying the fraud on the “national” media and putting pressure on the innocent detainees to obtain false confessions from them, give us some airtime too so that we also present our evidence and reasons.

Mehdi Karroubi believes that the public opinion and their trust is the greatest resource of the system. Karroubi said:

The greatest resource of Imam [Khomeini] was the public trust and had said so himself several times. Therefore the trust in the system should not be destroyed and no one should move in that direction. Some of these gentlemen knowingly or unknowingly are moving in that direction and are constantly preparing material for the foreigners. Let’s make a right move to come out of this situation. Let’s announce the real statistics. IRIB, which has become a biased and destructive media with every day destroying its credibility more, should follow the right course and should try to win the trust of the people again.

Mir Hossein Mousavi, pointing out the events after the election, strongly criticised the behaviour of the government. He said that it is a bitter irony that the revolutionary figures who were active from the very beginning of the revolution are today in prisons: “I don’t know why these events are happening and why they are doing this to the religious and revolutionary figures.”

Mousavi believes that these actions are causing wounds to the people’s souls and spirits that will not be easily treatable in future. He pointed out the show trials for the reformists, staged with a lot of propaganda, and asked: “What did you gain from this show? Are you seeking to hold inquisition courts? Do you understand the downfalls of such actions in the society?”

Mousavi referred to the great number of revolutionary figures who have been pushed aside and said:

In the past four years, many wrong actions have taken place that have made the revolutionary figures either go to the sidelines or lose their enthusiasm for working. Have a look and see how many ministers, members of the Parliament, and revolutionary figures were eliminated. The sidelines of our revolution have now become greater and more important than its core. How many Presidents we have, how many ministers we have [who have been marginalised]. We have members of the Parliament, managers, leading intellectuals who have all been pushed to the sidelines. Why are all these talents eliminated?

Pointing out his warnings over the past year, Mousvi expressed sorrow over the abuse of the county’s financial resources by some of the power centers, such asthe questionable transfer of telecommunications to the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps and the methods of financing the $8 billion cost.

Mousavi then referred to the accusations [by the Government] of "velvet revolution" and said: “Unfortunately these days from every podium, there is a remark being made to destroy the revolutionary figures. The holy podium of the Friday Prayer is now specific to a party and the hardliners are using any means to eliminate everyone who has a different opinion from them.”

Mousavi, pointing out the history of Russia and the Communist period, said that in an era some people took power that tried to eliminate those who were active in that revolution by removing the images of them from books and pictures and by forging the history to deceive their people and the people of the world, but [eventually] their government was overthrown and historians wrote the real history. He emphasised:

The few should not think that the events of the beginning of the Revolution and the years after that are gone from people’s minds. Recently, one of the gentlemen who had a position in my cabinet and then resigned over some differences has made comments that make you wonder. It is three or four months that he is spreading lies at IRIB and his media against me, Mr. Karroubi, and people who have supported us and tried to destroy our characters. Don’t we have the right to defend ourselves on “national” TV too?

Recalling the meeting with Ayatollah Hashemi-Shahroudi (the former Head of the Judiciary), Mousavi said:

Mr. Shahroudi called me and asked if I could go to his office. I went there. Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani (the Head of the Assembly of Experts and the Expediency Council) was there too, but I was not originally informed about his presence. We talked about the events that happened after the election and then Mr. Shahroudi asked me what I would do. I said that we were clear and that they should give us time so that we could also defend ourselves in live broadcast from the national media in that environment of destruction. Prior to that Mr. Larijani had also asked me if I would go to the television and I said yes. In the meeting with Mr. Shahroudi, he suggested a legal gathering and I accepted. Right then he called the High Commission of National Security, they spoke and they agreed too. Then they told us to write a request. We prepared a request [for a gathering] signed by me and sent it. A few days later we received a note from the High Commission of National Security that they had rejected our request according to some article and it was also signed by some managers.

Mir Hossein Mousavi, criticising the extent of lying among some officials, added:

They are constantly giving false information to the public and think that people will believe them. How many times have the number of people killed after the election changed? Then they claim that the fraud in election is a lie. There are people who are determined to pretend that there was no fraud in the election. This was repeatedly propagated from the television.

Well, if you are certain of your action, why are you worried of our presence on television or why are you preventing the presence of our experts there? If you are truthful, then establish a roundtable with the presence from our experts so that both sides could put their views.

Mousavi, pointing out the restricted vironment that has been created, said: “Today the environment is in such a way that no one can criticise the administration. Anyone who says something [against the administration], even if he is one of their own people, is linked to the enemy, is said to be against Imam [Khomeini], and will have false accusations made up against him.”

Mousavi reiterated: “I asked them why you, who voided 700 ballot boxes during the sixth parliamentary election so that you could get one specific figure elected to the parliament, don’t open a hundred ballot boxes in a live television broadcast so that people can see how many ballot papers without a serial number are in there?”

At the end Mousavi expressed hope that the devotees of the system think and resolve the problems that have been created. In his opinion it is impossible to ignore the public’s awareness and to ask the students to be quiet, as they are sons and daughters of this people and demand an answer.

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1955 GMT: More on The Friday Prayer. State media's rather sanitised version of Ahmad Khatami's remarks is now being supplemented by other accounts summarising his attack on post-election protesters. He claimed that, on Qods Day, the foreign media focused on a "few thousand Republicans", who were enemies of Islam, rather than the millions of supporters of the Government and regime.

1655 GMT: A Friday Prayer Diversion. Ahmad Khatami's turn to give the address, and he (or at least the state media summarising him) continued the Ahmadinejad approach of looking overseas to avoid looking at home. He declared, "The meeting [at Geneva on Iran's nuclear programme] was a great victory for the Islamic Republic of Iran to such an extent that even the Western and Zionist media had to admit defeat."

1445 GMT: Flashback: The "Confession" That Means Death. We're posting the Press TV report from mid-August on Mohammad Reza Ali Zamani, the post-election protester sentenced to death earlier this week.

1230 GMT: Karroubi's Back. The reformist leader has written a sharp letter to the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, refuting claims made by President Ahmadinejad on US television and asking for time to present the evidence of detainee abuses. We've posted the English text.

And, on the day that the 2009 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded, we've revived our entry on the drive to name Karroubi as the 2010 recipient.

0915 GMT: Urgent Correction. Readers have let us know (and thanks to all of you!) that the date for the major protest is 4 November, not 3 November as we originally reported, and that the occasion is Iran's Heritage Day as well as the anniversary of the 1979 takeover of the US Embassy.

0825 GMT: A Quick Reply on 4 November Demonstrations. It took only a few minutes for readers to confirm the information on Iran's streets about the forthcoming protest (see 0745 GMT). The poster (on left) has the following caption:

Join, my dear. On 13 Aban [4 November] we will greet the anti-riot police and security forces with flowers. And sitting down on the streets in silence, we will turn night into day and day into night with our unity

Invitation by the Student Society, Office of Strengthening Unity (Daftar-e Tahkim-e Vahdat), University of Tehran, the People & Students’ Green Movement

0745 GMT: 25 Days and Counting? A reader notes our statement "no major gatherings scheduled" (0630 GMT) and replies, "Do you know about the demonstrations being planned by the Sea of Green for 13 Aban (November 3), anniversary of the taking of US hostages in 1979?" [N.B.: Other readers later corrected this --- the date is 4 November, Iran's Heritage day.]

I have noticed references to this but have been awaiting further information on whether intentions have turned into plans. Any assistance from readers most welcome.

0730 GMT: A University Correction? We linked yesterday (1845 GMT) to a Government document which ordered the closure of a University newspaper after it implied that the Holocaust had been a historical event. A sharp-eyed reader has noted that the date on the document is Iranian Year 1387 --- last year --- rather than 1388.

0645 GMT: Credit to Michael Slackman of The New York Times. Yesterday he published a full review not only of the Revolutionary Guard's involvement in a coalition bid for 51% of Iran's state telecommunications company but also background cases such as the Guard's takeover of the management of Imam Khomeini Airport, the current Parliamentary investigation of the telecom deal, and "concerns in Iran over what some call the rise of a pseudogovernment".

Although the story is weeks old, it hasn't been noticed much in the Western media, and the Revolutionary Guard's role in the Iranian economy is one of the most important long-term aspects of this political crisis. The only clanger in Slackman's piece is his necessity to put in an irrelevant comment from Flynt Leverett, a former US National Security Council official: “In a strategic sense, I don’t think Iran is in a fundamentally different place than it was before elections, not in the way it approaches negotiations or the way it looks at its foreign policy."

If Slackman really wanted to establish significant in that quote from Leverett, which belongs in a piece on US-Iranian relations, he would link it to the former NSC official's continuing attempt to establish the legitimacy of the Ahmadinejad Government. For it is that legitimacy that it is at the political heart of possibly illegitimate moves by the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps.

0630 GMT: On Monday it will be four months since votes for President were counted/misaltered/manipulated in Iran, and the anniversary is being welcomed with one of the quietest phases in the post-election conflict. With no major gatherings scheduled, and with politicans and some clerics focused more on private talks than public statements, this is wait-and-see.

The anticipated Parliamentary fireworks have not materialised, and President Ahmadinejad is trying to stay out of trouble by not mentioning alleged abuses, his Ministers' records, or the Iranian economy. One interesting on the last of these: Iran state TV reported yesterday that the quota of subsidised gasoline/petrol for each person will be cut by 45%. Some US-based specialists interpreted this as a reaction to anticipated tighter sanctions from Washington; the simpler explanation is that the Iranian Government needs to cut costs.

Now into the Iranian weekend. No chatter yet about Friday Prayers --- we'll have a look now to see who's leading them. Expect instead more murmurs about detentions and punishment; slowly the death penalty passed on protester Mohammad Reza Ali Zamani, and some activists are also raising cases such as the trial, with possible death sentences, of seven member of the Baha'i faith.

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We avoided the media flutter last month over a poll by World Public Opinion of Iranian attitudes, not because we objected to the purported findings --- the most provocative that "eight in 10 Iranians say they consider [Mahmoud Ahmadinejad] to be the country's legitimate president" --- but because WPO's rationalisation could persuade us that this was a poll carried out under "neutral" conditions. A telephone call from the United States, coming out of the blue, to a household in Iran, made amidst post-election conflict in which there is a presumption that phone conversations may be under surveillance....hmm, didn't strike us as being optimal for getting full-and-frank answers.

We were going to let a wobbly survey fall of its own accord. But then Persian Umpire came along and put everything in perspective for us:

I wanted to mention the report by worldpublicopinion.org when it was first published but didn’t get a chance. Since it was referred to by [Dr Seyed Mohammad] Marandi  – considered by many here to be on the academic front of the mouthpiece industry  – in a CNN discussion on Sunday, it might be a good time to revisit the topic. The report stirred up controversy here, causing us much vexation and digestive upset.

In all honesty, I don’t know anything about polls and statistics, I am even forgetting my basic math, but to accept the results of this poll is tantamount to believing that the post-election chaos, on the streets and in the corridors of politics, must have only been a figment of our imaginations.

I don’t want to hurt their feelings, so let’s give worldpublicopinion.org A+ for effort. As for publishing the results of the effort, maybe they should have considered the health hazards and slept on it. So, they left me with no choice but to correct parts of the poll and repeat it. Unlike the original survey, the refusal rate for this one was a little less than 52%, so you can take this as solid information.

How much confidence do you have in US President Barack Obama to do the right thing regarding world affairs?

I found the answer consistent with the WPO report: 16%. Then last night I asked myself the question and didn’t get a wink of sleep. I got on the internet to find out what “World Affairs” really meant.

Six hours later, I realized I wasn’t any wiser. After perusing the 38,700,000 results and getting familiar with terms such as “socioeconomic”, “geopolitical”, “interdependence”, “trade”, “foreign policy”, “global economy” and many more, I think I have to refine the question and call all those people again. In fact the question may need to be broken into two, because I spent another six hours thinking about “doing the right thing”, which led me to concepts like “ethics”, “political philosophy”, “interests”, “utilitarianism”, and “eye of the beholder”.
In light of this development, I decided to leave the foreign stuff until I can further specify what I am asking these people.

Considering everything that has occurred before, during and after the elections, do you consider Ahmadinejad to be the legitimate president of Iran?

Of the 50% who answered the question, 12.5% said they belonged to either the Basij or the Sepah [Revolutionary Guard], and 87.5% said “considering everything that has occurred before, during and especially after the elections” they are willing to consider Ahmadinejad as higher than President if he wanted them too....

Note: one respondent misunderstood “legitimate” as meaning “bastard”, for which he is in trouble as his phone was wiretapped.

In general, how satisfied are you with the process by which the authorities are elected in this country?

Now this question in the report were very interesting to me, but I though it required further probing. Here, I initially got the same numbers: a very large majority (81%) said they are satisfied with the general process, though only 40% said they were very satisfied. Sixteen percent say they are not satisfied. But when respondents were asked if they were very very satisfied, 20% said they were, and then only 10% said they were very very very satisfied.
My assistants are still on the phone with this question, incrementally adding a “very”....I will publish the results once the question is over.

In Iran how free do you think people are to express controversial political views, without fear of being harassed or punished?

To me this question should have been binary. Free or not free. Combining “how free” with “without fear” was just confusing. Let us look at the response with a 71% rating in the WPO report: “I am somewhat free to express, without fear.” Perhaps it is just me but I don’t understand what this phrase means. I can handle “I am free to express without fear”, or the opposite “I am not free to express without fear.” I can also process “I am somewhat free to express” and its opposite. Let me say it another way: I am either free of fear to say something, or not. I cannot be “somewhat” free of that fear.

Before going insane, I decided to rephrase the question:

Do you agree with Mr. Ahmadinejad that Iranians have “almost complete freedom”?

Lo and behold, 100% said “yes”.

Are you comfortable answering silly political questions over the phone in Iran?

I squeezed in this last but essential question to assess the reliability of my survey. 14% refused to answer because they were offended, 5% said they were comfortable, 50% said they were not comfortable and 31% responded with a single tut. I marked them as "freaked out and afraid even to say so".

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1940 GMT: Isn't It Ironic, Don't You Think? The Iranian Government has celebrated Teachers Day by arresting 12 teachers. (To clarify, in light of comments below, World Teachers Day is 5 October. Iran's Teachers Day is 2 May.)

1745 GMT: Rumours and Audits. Tomorrow could be a very interesting day in the Iranian Parliament. The hot whisper is that former Tehran Prosecutor General and now Iran Deputy Prosecutor General Saeed Mortazavi could be set up as the "fall guy" for abuses mentioned in a Parliamentary report.

More substantial --- at this point --- is another criticism of President Ahmadinejad, this time over Government expenditure. The National Audit Report to the Parliament claims mismanagement, embezzlement, and fraud and accuses the Government of 2005-2009 of harming the nation.

1725 GMT: The release of the editor-in-chief of Etemade Melli, Mohammad Ghoochani, has been delayed.

1635 GMT: Another Player on the Pitch. OK, the reformists are in play with their meeting with senior clerics (1555 GMT). Rafsanjani's gone public with his meeting with clerics (1608 GMT). And now Alireza Beheshti, Mir Hossein Mousavi's chief advisor, re-enters after his recent detention. He has written an open letter of scathing criticism of the Revolutionary Guard and its commander, Mohammad Ali Jafari.

1618 GMT: Larijani Win, Ahmadinejad Defeat? Mik Verbrugge adds vital information on Ali Larijani's re-election as head of the Principlist group in Parliament (1605 GMT). Despite days of reports that pro-Ahmadinejad MPs would try to unseat Larijani, their candidate received only seven votes.

1615 GMT: More Student Protests. Reports and videos are coming in of demonstrations at Shiraz/Sadra University and Azad University in Tehran.

1608 GMT: Another Rafsanjani Message? As some senior clerics meet reformist politicians (1555 GMT), others have met Hashemi Rafsanjani to express grave concern over the national crisis and ask Rafsanjani to take all steps towards resolution. Rafsanjani reportedly answered, "In order to exit this crisis, we need 2 identify the 'true culprits' of divisions and provocations and confront them decisively." He further explained that such culprits were those "who accuse, slander, float rumours, and those in the media who help them".

1605 GMT: Ali Larijani has been re-elected leader of the Principlist group in Parliament with 24 of 32 central committee votes.

1555 GMT: Now It Gets Interesting. Members of the Parliamentary reformist minority, the Imam Khomeini Line, will consult with marjas (senior clerics), including Ayatollah Ali Mohammad Dastgheib. The news comes 24 hours before a Parliamentary committee is due to report on its enquiry into alleged abuses of post-election detainees.

1545 GMT: No Sympathy Allowed. Back from academic seminars to find a rush of developments. Yet another sign that the ruling authorities are feeling some pressure. The Vice Governor of Tehran has ordered City Council members to refrain from meeting freed detainees and families.

1210 GMT: I Love You (Spell It with Tractors). Mowj-e-Sabz, the website of the Green movement, has a delightfully naughty article about the dubious background of Ahmadinejad's latest selection for First Vice President, Mohammad Reza Rahimi. There's little to support claims such as "allegations of stealing land from a University", but this allegation made up for lack of evidence with a sense of style:

He later assumed position as the governor of Kurdistan Province in the early 90s when Rafsanjani was in his second term as Iranian President. According to sources supporting the current coup government, during Rafsanjani’s visit to his province, Rahimi ordered farmers to place their tractors in a way that would read phrases in praise of Rafsanjani.

Meanwhile, three members of Parliament have filed a complaint, requesting investigation of claims that Rahimi forged his doctorate.

1155 GMT: Poke, Poke, Poke. You might think that the Ahmadinejad Government, having gotten agreement to a series of talks and averted the prospect of tougher sanctions, might want to take a quiet, steady line.

No chance. The latest jab of the stick comes from the head of Iran's nuclear programme, Ali Akhbar Salehi, who tells Kayhan that the second uranium enrichment plant at Fardoo will have the latest in high-technology centrifuges. In other words, the calmer narrative of Fardoo as a back-up to the main plant at Natanz will now be replaced, both by Tehran and by "Western" critics of engagement, with the portrayal of Fardoo as a front-line component in Iran's drive to nuclear energy (Iran version) or nuclear weapons ("Western" critics version).

1000 GMT: Former President Mohammad Khatami has visited the home of the recently-released reformist leader Saeed Hajjarian. No details of the discussion have been offered.

0945 GMT: Earlier we noted the closure of Farhange Ashti, a newspaper close to Hashemi Rafsanjani, and the pro-reformist Arman-e Ravabet-e Omoumi by the Press Supervisory Board (0715 GMT). It is now reported that a third newspaper, Tahlil Rooz, has been shut.

0830 GMT: News arrives of a new Web project to offer English translations of German media on the post-election crisis in Iran. Some interesting material is already on-line.

0745 GMT: We've posted a brief analysis and transcript of an interview of former Obama Administration official Ray Takeyh and University of Tehran academic Seyed Mohammad Marandi on CNN. It's a textbook example of how, as Washington pursues engagement, the Ahmadinejad Government will link the talks to international and internal legitimacy.

0715 GMT: A quiet Tuesday so far. The Ahmadinejad Government has been playing up its international profile, calling the Geneva talks on the nuclear programme a “national success” for “Iran's resistance” to foreign pressure and emphasising that the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohammad El Baradei “praised Iran's cooperation" in his Sunday press conference. (There was no reference to El Baradei's call for transparency from Tehran.) Ahmadinejad also proclaimed Iran's support for the Iraqi Government, framing it as an ally against unnamed opponents: "With fine qualities such as theirs, the Iraqi nation has a bright future ahead of it. It will undoubtedly stop its enemies in their tracks and take up its responsibilities with the understanding and foresight that it has."

Nothing further on the “National Unity Plan”. Nor has there been much from the Green movement or even from leading reformists since the weekend. So we are still stuck in trying to understand the politics behind a plan whose details are not known.

However, there was one very powerful signal on Monday of the internal battle between forces allied with Hashemi Rafsanjani and those who oppose his manoeuvres for “political reconciliation”. Farhange Ashti, a newspaper close to Rafsanjani, was closed on orders of the Press Supervisory Board. The pro-reformist Arman-e Ravabet-e Omoumi has also been shut.