The Latest from Iran (18 October): Today's Bombings

NEW Iran Newsflash: National Unity Plan Submitted to Supreme Leader
NEW Video: Blame on Sunni Group Jundallah, US For Bombing
NEW Iran: Khamenei, Bahari, Hajjarian, and the "Semi-Normal"
NEW Iran: The Great Supreme Leader Health Mystery
Iran: The Supreme Leader Lives — The Picture (17 October)
The Latest from Iran (17 October): Back to Semi-Normal

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2000 GMT: The official death toll from today's bombing is now 42.

1950 GMT: Coincidence or Sabotage? A passenger train travelling from Tehran to Kerman derailed today, and a tea factory in Golestan burned to the ground.

1925 GMT: Mehr News is reporting that the explosion near the Oil Ministry in Tehran was from a faulty air tank.

Islamic Republic News Agency, repeating the air tank story, is reporting one person killed and 17 injured.

1910 GMT: Switching the Foreign "Enemy" from the US to Pakistan. This morning, when the Revolutionary Guard was claiming Washington was behind the bombings, we wrote, "Watch carefully to see if the Ahmadinejad Government maintains this line, which could derail 'engagement'."

There's a big clue tonight that Ahmadinejad has chosen engagement over the blame-US line. Fars News reports that the Iranian Cabinet has demanded that Pakistan bring forward those who carried out the bombings, a positioning reinforced by the summoning of the Pakistani Ambassador to the Foreign Ministry. There is no mention of the US anywhere in the Fars story.

1900 GMT: There are reports of an explosion near the Oil Ministry in Tehran.

1830 GMT: The Death Toll Rises.... The afternoon number of 31 dead from this morning's bombing will rise, though it is uncertain how much. Fars News reports that 35 victims have already been identified.

1625 GMT: National Unity Plan. It's alive, and it apparently has been submitted to the Supreme Leader (who is apparently also alive) for consideration. We've posted a separate entry on the newsflash.

1535 GMT: Iran's Nuclear Programme: This is Not Good. If the following report from Press TV is accurate, Iran's nuclear negotiators --- on the eve of the Vienna technical talks --- just laughed in the face of the "West": "A team of Iranian experts heads for the Austrian capital to discuss the terms of a deal to buy highly-enriched uranium without exchanging any of Tehran's low-enriched uranium."

The deal discussed quietly since June between Iran and other countries, including the US, is precisely for Tehran to transfer 80 percent of its low-enriched uranium to third countries for enrichment. Simply adding highly-enriched supplies to Iran's existing low-enriched stock has no appeal for Washington, which sees third-party enrichment as a way to ensure that Tehran stays below the 20 percent enrichment maximum for "civilian" uses of uranium.


1530 GMT: Another Suspended Sentence. A day after the five-year suspended sentence for Saeed Hajjarian, the same judgement has been handed down on Shahab Tabatabai, Head of Campaign 88 for young supporters of Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mohammad Khatami.

1430 GMT: Now Back to Politics. Mir Hossein Mousavi, writing on his website Kalameh (English summary on Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty) after a meeting with relatives of detained former Deputy Foreign Minister Mohsen Aminzadeh, says he will persist in efforts for reform in spite of the Government's attempts to suppress post-election protests:

Our people are not rioters. Reform will continue as long as people's demands are not met. Keeping these people in jail is meaningless. They should be released as soon as possible.

1340 GMT: On the international front, Fars News reports that Iran's delegation to the technical talks in Vienna tomorrow will include Ali Asghar Soltanieh, the Iranian ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Hamid Reza Asghari, deputy head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organisation, and Mehdi Khaniki, another IAEO chief executive. However, Ali Akhbar Salehi, the head of the IAEO is not going.

1330 GMT: Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani has also taken the line that Washington carries responsibility for today's bombings, "We consider this recent terrorist act to be the result of the U.S. actions and this is a sign of their enmity."

To repeat: US and Iranian officials are due to meet tomorrow in the next step of engagement, technical talks on Iran's uranium enrichment programme.

1240 GMT: The Islamic Republic News Agency is featuring a message from President Ahmadinejad, offering his condolences to the families of those killed this morning and expressing confidence that there would be a swift response to the "criminal action".

1230 GMT: EA's Mr Smith checks in with detail on Jundallah and the bombing: "We would normally dismiss the Iranian allegations of foreign interference as the usual anti-West yarn from Tehran, but the claims against [Jundallah leader Abdolmalek] Rigi warrant extra attention. He is an extremely shadowy figure who appears to be well-protected, to the extent that his own brother has been caught and sentenced to death [Hamid Rigi was reprieved at the last minute although 13 other Jundullah members were executed] by the Iranian authorities but he himself is still at large.

"He has appeared several times on Voice of America Persian, under the label "Leader of the 'Popular Resistance Movement of Iran', which is something VOA made up --- it's not quite the Persian translation of Jundullah. Exactly how the VOA got hold of him for a live interview, via satellite phone, is quite unexplained, as is the prominence and deference accorded to him. This interview caused a serious backlash in the Iranian blogosphere and seriously discredited VOA Persian."

1215 GMT: Press TV's reporting is not only emphasising Jundallah's responsibility for the bombings but playing up a US connection. In a video we've posted in a separate entry, Press TV claims --- from an interview with the captured brother of Junduallah's leader, Abdolmalek Rigi --- that the group "has been in constant contact with the US Embassy in Islamabad [Pakistan] and this has been certified by different groups and sources [of Press TV]".

1200 GMT: The latest from Iranian state media puts the death toll from this morning's larger bombing at 29, including six senior Revolutionary Guard commanders, with 28 injured. The Sunni rebel group Jundallah is reported to have claimed responsibility for the attack. The Revolutionary Guard continue to allege that the US is involved, while state television has also blamed Britain.

0945 GMT: We've moved our initial morning analysis, considering the politics of the Supreme Leader's health, the release on bail of journalist Maziar Bahari, the suspended sentence for Saeed Hajjarian, and more arrests, to a separate analysis.

0920 GMT: Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting has identified the site of the larger of the two bombings as the gates of a conference hall, where the Revolutionary Guard meeting with tribal elders was to take place, in the city of Sarbaz in Sistan-Baluchestan.

0845 GMT: Press TV adds an interesting detail on the bombing, pointing to coordinated attacks: "At around the same time, another group of IRGC commanders were caught in an explosion as their convoy came under attack at a road junction" in the town of Pishin in Sistan-Baluchestan.

0840 GMT: No new details on the suicide boming, but Revolutionary Guard officials have issued a communique saying "foreign elements" linked to the US were responsible.

Watch carefully to see if the Ahmadinejad Government maintains this line, which could derail "engagement". US and Iranian delegations are due to meet tomorrow in the "5+1" technical talks on Iran's uranium enrichment.

0725 GMT: Iranian state media is reporting that "several" senior commanders have been killed by a suicide bombing in Zahedan, the capital of Sistan-Baluchestan Province in southeastern Iran, which left 60 dead and injured.

Those killed include General Noor Ali Shooshtari, the deputy commander of the IRGC ground forces, and Rajab Ali Mohammadzadeh, the IRGC's commander in Sistan-Baluchestan.

The IRGC commanders had gathered to meet tribal elders, purportedly for Shia-Sunni reconciliation. (English summary avaiable via Associated Press)

Iran: A Beginner's Guide to the Economy, Past and Present

The Latest from Iran (16 October): Rumours and Drama, Khamenei and Karroubi
Latest Iran Video: Selling Ahmadinejad’s Economic Plan (13 October)

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EA's newest correspondent, Mohammad Khiabani, introduces us to the economics preceding and accompanying the post-election situation:

The subsidy system that exists in Iran --- one that benefits both individuals and industry by lowering costs of basic daily goods but is highly inefficient and unfair in the distribution of those benefits ---- was never meant to be permanent. It was an expansion of a earlier set of food and energy subsidies that began under the Pahlavi dynasty, as part of the old regime's economic and social policy.

During the 1980s war with Iraq and the US embargo, when Mir Housain Mousavi was Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic (and not too ideologically different from the Revolutionary Guard in his political positions), the subsidy system expanded into a general distribution network that kept consumption in Iran at decent levels. This involved government-run food centers throughout the country, price controls, nationalization of foreign trade, multiple currency exchange rates, and a rationed goods program. Just as in the Battle of London during WWII, when the average Londoner's nutrition levels went up even while the city was being bombed by the Luftwaffe, the effect of this network in Iran was to equalize the consumption of goods. This helped raise the lower classes' living standards even while Iran's wealth declined from the Pahlavi days of its oil-fueled economic "miracle".

However, since the late 1980s, the Iranian regime has slowly dismantled this system. First it opened up to foreign trade, then it aligned its currency rates, then it allowed foreign investment in small parcels, and it finally attempted to tackle the biggest problem of readjusting the prices of basic goods so that they adjust according to market fluctuations. This is a noble goal, because the richest Iranians get the most benefit from the subsidies of food, energy, and gasoline, simply because they consume more of everything. The Islamic Republic has also, in conjunction with slow economic liberalization, expanded the social safety net for its population over the last 20 years, with a combination of decentralized primary health centers in rural and urban areas, large social insurance funds that operate under the category of "non-governmental" organizations, and initiatives to give everyone at least some form of pension and health insurance.

This long process, seen up close, looks like chaos. But if you step back, it has an odd logic to it, and it has contributed to comparatively good standards of living in Iran versus other middle-income countries, as measured by life expectancy, literacy (including amongst females in a region where rates are historically low), and low infant mortality. If you read Thursday's Wall Street Journal article on China's unraveled health care system, which used to be one of the best in the Third World, Iran does not look that bad.

What does this mean? Yes, social policy in Iran is imbued with politics, just as in any large state (look no further than the daily grind on Capitol Hill in Washington). Factions exist, with constituencies, and they jockey for power and recognition of successful policies.

It is all too forgotten now that privatization, subsidy reform, foreign investment, and welfare expansion were all part of the Khatami administration's economic plans between 1997 and 2005. And in a very Clintonesque move, Ahmadinejad has borrowed some of the best ideas of his predecessor and claimed them as his own. It seems now that the current (and very tendentious) alignment of factions in the Majles has fostered the political will to actually pass a restructuring of subsidies, while those conditions did not exist in the second Khatami term.

Daily politics in Iran has lineages deeply embedded in its past. Even the Revolutionary Guard's intervention in the economy stems from the after-effects of the 1980s war, when President Rafsanjani utilized Guard manpower and engineering expertise for the reconstruction of the country. This also had the added benefit of keeping hundreds of thousands of Iranian veterans employed, with a few of them getting quite rich in the process.

It is difficult to predict how well the government will pull off a restructuring of the subsidy system. While a much smaller implementation of gasoline rationing two years ago resulted in a few instances of gas stations being attacked, today the measure is seen as a success and discussed as a microcosm for the reforms. Plans to utilize the social security system of Iran to distribute cash and aid to the lower 50% of Iranians to offset incoming higher prices may actually expand and strengthen the social safety net. This may also inadvertently decrease the power of religious foundations such as the Imam Khomeini Relief Committee, widely criticized as a non-transparent charity organization, but currently very influential in poor Iranians' lives.

Any look through the microscope at Iranian politics must not be blinkered. Instead, it should be accompanied with a longer-term perspective on Iran's economy and society, one that allows us to talk about Iran with the same kind of language and terminology we use to talk about Turkey, Mexico, China, and any large middle-income country.

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2010 GMT: Our Daily Contribution to the Khamenei Death Rumour Mill. The Supreme Leader's Facebook site has the following message from Wednesday, "Today Noon; Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Supreme Leader of Iran attended a rite in respect of Imam Sadeq(A.S)".

If true, this would disprove Tuesday's Peiknet story, the original source of the current health rumors, that the Supreme Leader had been confined to his house by doctors.

1620 GMT: A Dutch Member of Parliament, Harry van Bommel, has urged Foreign Minister Maxime Verhagen to take further action against the imminent execution of Iranians sentenced in post-election cases:

Protest at the European level is not enough. The Netherlands should also use its own channels. There is an escalation of political oppression in Iran and we should react to that by using heavier diplomatic means....To prevent the eradication of any kind of opposition in Iran, the Netherlands must act now.

Human rights is one of Verhagen's policy priorities, and he can be contacted in English or Dutch via Twitter.

1545 GMT: Mehdi Karroubi has responded --- big-time --- to Government attempts to arrest him over his allegations of abuses of detainees. We've got the details in a separate entry.

1405 GMT: Fereshteh Ghazi has posted an interview with  the lawyer of Arash Pour-Rahmani, who was sentenced to death for subversive activity last week. Her headline is a blunt description: "Close to Death but Clueless".

1400 GMT: Iranian authorities continue to prevent filmmaker Jafar Panahi, who was briefly detained on 30 July, from leaving the country.

1110 GMT: President Ahmadinejad has used the setpiece of a meeting with an Egyptian writer and scholar to declare that further US sanctions on Iran are unlikely: “In a status where countries are seeking free trade, talk of embargoes is meaningless. At any rate, they have already imposed sanctions against our country, but achieved nothing. The world is a big place and all states are not controlled by a certain bullying regime."

Of course, this could be read as defiance but another reading is that Ahmadinejad is signalling that productive engagement is alive and well.

0900 GMT: Yesterday we noticed the latest message from Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, delivered after his class at Qom's seminary, challenging the Revolutionary Guard. An EA correspondent adds details of the statement:

As Ayatollah Khomeini has said, the Army, Revolutionary Forces, and Basij militia must not interfere with the political affairs as it would be very dangerous for the country. These forces should use their power against the enemy not the people and friends.

Statements that protecting the Islamic republic is obligatory only apply if the Islamic system is loyal to its values and slogans.

The values and the slogans of the Islamic Republic are "Independence, Freedom, and the Islamic Republic". Independence means not to be obedient to a superpower. Freedom is having the freedom of speech and the belief that the opponents will not be put behind bars. Republic means a system based on people's votes and finally Islamic means that the system should be based upon the Islamic values.

0815 GMT: Amidst the rumours about the Supreme Leader's health, there will be some terrible "analysis" today, but the blogger Allahpundit takes an early lead in the competition. It's not so much that he/she declares "Irresponsible Rumor of the Day" and then treats it as true for his/her thought. It's more that the speculation is awful:

Before the summer uprising, the odds-on choice to succeed [the Supreme Leader] was Rafsanjani....One possibility is [now] the Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, Ahmadinejad’s own personal “spiritual advisor”....Another possibility is that the [Revolutionary] Guard will simply finish the process started this summer and stage a full-blown military coup, installing Ahmadinejad or Jafari as dictator and taking things from there....The third possibility is the likeliest — namely, finding a puppet from among the clerical ranks who can be sold to the west as a 'pragmatist' or 'reformist' while letting the Guard control things behind the scenes.

0625 GMT: Amidst continuing chatter --- all unconfirmed --- about the declining state of the Supreme Leader's health, including claims that the Tehran Bazaar is talking about Ayatollah Khamenei's passing, this line stands out: "Obviously, every rumor about Khamenei’s death to date has been false."

0615 GMT: Meanwhile, in the "West", there has been a notable switch from the nuclear issue to "human rights" to challenge the Obama Administration's engagement with the Ahmadinejad Government. This morning's Washington Post editorial endorses the latest speech by Iranian lawyer and Nobel Prize laureate Shirin Ebadi: "Mr. Obama has extended the hand of friendship to a man who has blood on his hands. He can at least avoid shaking the hand of friendship with him." Tehran Bureau, increasingly prominent as a site for the views of the Iranian diaspora, features Setareh Sabety's comment, "I do not want my President, who made me cry with his words of justice and freedom, who made me think that the impossible was possible, to shake the hands of the murderer of my children."

0600 GMT: More "Information"? Could be coincidence but Javan Online, the newspaper associated with the Revolutionary Guard, has followed its story on Hashemi Rafsanjani with a purported statement from Ayatollah Mahdavi Kani on the post-election protests. Mahdavi-Kani was named as co-author with Rafsanjani of the draft National Unity Plan, published by Fars News in late September, the incident that prompted Rafsanjani's denunciation on Tuesday of "false news".

Meanwhile, Javan's lead story is another purported analysis of US-supported regime change.

0500 GMT: A rather strange day on Wednesday.

We watched for signs of political movement from Mehdi Karroubi and Hashemi Rafsanjani; what we saw was the extent of the Government's attempts to break their challenge.

The headline story of the Government's threats to prosecute Karroubi and Mir Hossein Mousavi was supplemented by accounts of the restrictions on the movements of both men. With constant surveillance and pressure by Government forces, they are confined to houses for long periods and, in the case of Mousavi, reportedly corresponding by written messages inside the home.

As for Rafsanjani, who is free to move and who holds key positions inside the establishment, he faces the Government distortion of his words and views. It also should not be forgotten that the regime maintains the threat of prosecution of his family members if the former President should move too far out of line.

A reader writes passionately, "Rafsanjani has no power any more and he lost it all trying to resolve his personal agenda." That's a fair challenge, especially given Rafsanjani's cautious and perhaps over-complex approach to politics, but I think it minimises the extent of the Government's fightback against a dangerous foe, especially after his mid-July Friday Prayers.

I also think that, as the Government is doing, one has to keep all the leaders in the picture. Individually, Karroubi, Mousavi, and Rafsanjani (as well as others like former President Khatami and senior clerics) can only have limited effect in the campaign for "reform" of the Ahmadinejad Government and Iranian system. It is only when there is both the movement of Rafsanjani inside the establishment and the challenge brought by Karroubi-Mousavi from outside --- again, a convergence we saw in mid-July --- that President Ahmadinejad and his allies are on the defensive.

Logically, then, the Government's approach is divide and rule. If Rafsanjani can be threatened and distorted into a strategy of gradual --- very gradual --- steps and Mousavi can be bottled up, then Karroubi's persistent statements are mere annoyances.

So is that it, then? Not quite. The paradox is that the umbrella political term in Iran right now is "National Unity Plan". Indeed, the Javan "information" that Rafsanjani supported Ahmadinejad's 2nd-term Government was put out in the context of a political meeting on that Plan.

We still don't know the details of the current draft Plan, from amongst the confusing reports of recent weeks, but any "National Unity Plan" which does not take some account of the opposition of past months will be seen as far from unifying.

And, yes, even that could be successful --- can Mousavi, Karroubi, Khatami, and the dissident clerics summon up the strength for another confrontation? --- were it not for another looming presence. The Green movement has been quieted and limited by time and Government restrictions, but it has not been vanquished. And 4 November, the day of the next major demonstration, is now less than three weeks away.

The Government restrictions have lengthened the political game --- we now see patterns in months, rather than weeks or days --- but it has not won it. No amount of surveillance, disinformation, or threat of prosecution can cover up that reality.

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2025 GMT: Grand Ayatollah Montazeri has issued a thinly-veiled challenge to the Revolutionary Guard through another statement. Focusing on the abuses of the armed forces, he declares, "Some think that because they have guns they should exercise the power of their guns and use it everywhere. In any society that wants to be obedient, its armed forces should not be cruel but rather be compassionate and merciful."

2000 GMT: Remember how we started this morning with a letter from Hashemi Rafsanjani, criticising and warning about "false news" to discredit him? Well, consider this from Javan Online, a publication closely linked with the Revolutionary Guard, as reported by Tabnak:

"Since the inauguration of the 10th administration, I believe in its legitimacy. Presently Mr. [Mahmoud] Ahmadinejad attends the Expediency Council meetings as president, with invitations signed by myself," Rafsanjani said in a meeting with Iranian political figures in favor of the national unity plan.

It's not surprising that Javan would put this story, whether or not it is accurate. What is surprising is that, in light of Rafsanjani's warning that the only reliable news about him would come either from his website or the offices of the Expediency Council, an important website like Tehran Bureau would reprint Javan's claim without reflection.

1850 GMT: Amidst a quiet domestic news day, we've picked up on the international story missed by most of the media, "Iran-US-Russia Deal on Enrichment, The Sequel".

1500 GMT: The Facebook page associated with Mir Hossein Mousavi has responded to the Government threats to take Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi to court with the reminder, "In case of the arrest of any of the Green movement’s leaders, we will take to the streets from 'Revolution' to 'Freedom' Square. The network [will use] media mobilization (SMS, email, flyer, wall notices, posters, Internet) for raising widespread awareness until the emergence of the Green army . (English summary via Iran News Digest)

1250 GMT: Amidst a lull in political developments, and as part of our increasing attention to the economic context, we've posted a two-part video from Press TV examining (and ultimately selling) President Ahmadinejad's economic proposals.

0805 GMT: We've posted what I think may be one of the most revealing analyses from within Iran, written by Dr Mahmoud Reza Golshanpazhooh, on the country's international position, "Tehran’s Growing Confidence Against the Israeli Threat".

0655 GMT: According to Peykeiran, a fifth death sentence over post-election conflict and "subversion" has been handed out to a "Davoud Mir Ardebili". The report claims that Ardebili is not a monarchist, the allegation made against three other condemned men, but merely called a radio station to report union protests.

0650 GMT: Today's Puffing of the Chest. Brigadier General Hussein Salami, the deputy commander of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps says,"Unlike the wrong conception of the enemies, Iran is strong and invincible."

No further comment or meat-related jokes necessary.

0640 GMT: Watching the Economy. Press TV's website has a must-read story betraying nervousness over both Iran's economic situation and the politics around the headline measure, Ahmadinjead's proposed subsidy reform.

The story begins with apparent good news, with a fall in the annual inflation rate from 20.2 percent to 18.5 percent. However, the headline also notes, "Jobless Rate Soars", rising to 11.3 percent from 10.2 percent over the summer.

And here's the stinger of the piece: "Economists fear that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's subsidy reform plan, which aims to gradually cut energy and food subsidies, will hike up inflation. The Iranian parliament has approved the outline of the bill, but lawmakers are still at odds over the details of the plan."

Our initial reading of the push for subsidy cuts, with the impulse being the worsening budget situation of the Iran Government, was too narrow. There are good structural reasons to reform the system, though I am uncertain how much these factor into Ahmadinejad's calculations. Far more significant --- and provocative --- is the President's political scheme, taking some of the money saved from the cuts and distributing it to Iran's poorest people.

0620 GMT: Our starting point today will be a close eye on the next steps of two key figures, Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mehdi Karroubi.

Rafsanjani surfaced yesterday to publish a letter via Iranian Labor News Agency, denying "false news" of a letter that he and Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Mahdavi-Kani supposedly sent to Mir Hossein Mousavi on 28 September. We think this is a reference to the claimed "National Unity Plan", "revealed" by Fars News that day. At this point, however, Rafsanjani's step is a defensive move, fending off pressure from the Government and media who oppose him, rather than a major political step. We have an analysis and English translation of the letter in a separate entry.

The situation around Mehdi Karroubi is more dramatic. The Government threat to prosecute him, issued yesterday by two high-level officials, is a clear response --- showing nervousness as well as supposed strength --- to the resurgence of Karroubi's public statements, especially his Saturday meeting with Mir Hossein Mousavi.

So, to be blunt, we're wondering, "Does Karroubi back down?", and we're thinking, "No." His response to the Government's ham-fisted warning, which following similar threats over the last two months --- may not come today, but I would look for a clear signal from the cleric by the weekend.

Meanwhile, a brief article in Peiknet has stoked the fire of rumours about the poor state of the Supreme Leader's health. The website claims that three doctors were summoned urgently to Ayatollah Khamenei's house and, after examining him, insisted that he cancel all public and Government meetings and stay at home, with only his family seeing him. To our knowledge, no other source has corroborated the Peiknet assertion.

Rumors that the Supreme Leader has cancer, specifically prostate cancer, have persisted for years --- our readers have discussed these in comments. For now, we'll keep watch, especially to see if Khamenei stays out of public view.

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1915 GMT: The Internet is buzzing over the story that Narges Kalhor, the daughter of President Ahmadinejad's advisor for cultural and media affairs, has applied for asylum in Germany. Kalhor made the application after showing her film The Rake at the International Human Rights Film Festival in Nuremberg. The movie condemns the use of torture in Iranian prisons and the totalitarianism of Iran's authorities.

The filmmaker Hana Makhmalbaf has conducted a video interview with Kalhor.

1810 GMT: Everyone's piling in to mention the Iranian Government's threat to prosecute Mehdi Karroubi for "lies" about the abuse of detainees. Iran's Prosecutor General Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejeie has added to the earlier warnings from his Tehran counterpart, Abbas Jafari Doulatabadi: "They [Clerical Court] have been tasked with hearing cases raised against the clergy and [you can] be sure that they will deal with this issue."

1700 GMT: We've posted a set of videos from today's protests by students at Tehran Azad University.

1625 GMT: Yes, A Rafsanjani Signal. EA's Mr Smith checks in to tell us that the interview with Hossein Mar'ashi of the Kargozaran party is even more significant than we thought (1000 GMT):

Mar'ashi is a close relative of Rafsanjani and served as his point man in the Khatami administration (1997-2005). The full text of the interview was published on the youth wing website of Kargozaran, and they explained that the interview had been previously published in censored form by the Etemaad daily due to "heavy pressures". One can surmise that it was Rafsanjani that gave the green light to the publication of the full text to send the message that he is aware of what's going on in the country.

The most significant snippet of the interview is the part in which Mar'ashi states that the regime wishes to have Hashemi "fall on his knees" and they want to make a "Jannati out of him", alluding to the puppet-like stance of the head of the Guardian Council [Ayatollah Jannati] vis-a-vis Ahmadinejad and the Supreme Leader. He also claimed that "senior leaders" of the IRGC want to arrest the reformist leaders.

1615 GMT: Fereshteh Ghazi has posted another set of information about the latest condition of detainees.

1600 GMT: Back from an afternoon of teaching with some most interesting inside information. An EA source with excellent links inside Iran tells us of President Ahmadinejad's trip to Shiraz yesterday.

The vast majority of students who turned out protested against the visit, in which Ahmadinejad reportedly arrived late and left early.

At the same time, Ayatollah Dastgheib, a vocal critic of the Government, gave an important speech to a small audience. The speech has not yet been published but, according to the source's information, Dastgheib went even further in his questioning of the legitimacy of Ahmadinejad's authority and also challenged the position of the Supreme Leader.

1145 GMT: No Worries About Corruption/Mismanagement Allegations? Really? This is the current lead story on the Islamic Republic News Agency website: "Not even one rial [Iranian currency] of oil revenue has been lost. The Ahmadinejad Government is a clean government." The claim comes from a "parliamentary deputy" on the Supreme Audit Court.

1100 GMT: Turning Up the Pressure. Here's the regime response to Mehdi Karroubi's recent renewal of his claims -- expressed through the letter sent by his son to the head of Iranian state broadcasting and his Saturday meeting with Mir Hossein Mousavi --- on abuses of detainees and, more broadly, flaws and injustices in the system. Tehran's Prosecutor-General, Abbas Jafari Dolatabadi, has said that a special clerical court is leading an enquiry into whether Karroubi broke the law when he accused security forces of rape and other abuses. (English-language summary available via the Los Angeles Times)

This is not yet a prosecution, more of a "final final warning". EA readers will recall last month when Ali Larijani was despatched, probably by the Supreme Leader, to tell Karroubi to maintain a low-profile silence and when the Government raided Karroubi's offices. Karroubi still joined the Qods Days marches, and his renewed statements have been matched by a restored Web presence.

So the ball is back in Karroubi's court but I fully expect him to play another shot. Game on.

1000 GMT: A Rafsanjani Signal? Hossein Mar'ashi, a high-level official in the Kargozaran party, has said: "Today I believe devoutly that this trueborn way which is presented by Mr. [Mir Hosssein] Mousavi as the "Green Path of Hope", implemented by the ...people in the framework of a movement. The power establishment cannot stand against it in the long-term neither structurally nor legally and has to accept the people's will sooner or later."

Kargozaran has been linked to Hashemi Rafsanjani since its formation in the 1990s, though it is a matter for discussion whether he is associated with this latest move. The Facebook site associated with Zahra Rahnavard, Mousavi's wife, is hopeful, calling the party "close to Rafsanjani".

0945 GMT: So What is This "Ground Resistance Force"? It's a genuine question, as we can't quite get our hands around the significance of this declaration by the head of Iran's armed forces, Major General Hassan Firouzabadi:

After two years of study we decided to change the IRGC [Islamic Revolution Guard Corps]’s structure, for the Basij to work in areas such as software work and the propagation of the Basiji culture in society, and to delegate the tasks, duties and mobilization of Basij units to a new called the IRGC Ground Resistance in order to increase expertise among the units.

The easy read is of a merger of the Basiji militia into the military organisation, but what does mean in terms of the control of those forces? Is this an effective IRGC expansion of authority, accompanying the possibility of its widening political influence? And, in the short term, what does this means for operations against the Green opposition and other demonstrators?

0615 GMT: Little breaking news out of Iran so far today. The New York Times runs instead a context article on "dozens of reporters, photographers and bloggers who have either fled Iran or are trying to flee in the aftermath of the disputed June presidential election", featuring interviews with two of the photographers, one who is still in the country. Mowj-e-Sabz looks forward to the 4 November demonstrations, "reminding the coup government that the issue of the elections is far from over".

Arguably, the most significant development on Monday was the Parliamentary passage of Government cuts in subsidies for energy and food. (Subscription required, but the full article can be accessed via Google Search using title and author.) Of course, the action risks public opposition, particularly as President Ahmadinejad has based his electoral appeal on helping the lower classes of Iran, but as the Minister of Economy told Parliament, "Under the current circumstances about a third of the country's income is directly or indirectly paid in subsidies," the cost of which has risen to $100 billion/year.

Is the Government on rocky economic ground that could cause political shifts? Far too soon to tell, of course, but a sign of nerves comes in Press TV's coverage. Ignoring the subsidy story this morning, its website prefers the reassurance of a natural gas deal between Switzerland and Iran.

EA readers have been paying attention to the economic aspects of the current crisis for several days, including a telling exchange last night, "Why people are taking it so much?" Iran specialists with whom I have been corresponding believe that the initial cuts in subsidies are manageable --- for example, households still get the full discount on purchases to fuel to a certian level, and then pay a "full price" which is amongst the cheapest in the world. However, there may be a cumulative effect. Add the Government measures to non-payment of wages in certain sectors and, in particular cases, strikes.

Despite the quiet, the situation is far from settled, and money and politics could be a combustible mix.