Saturday
Sep192009
Iran: The Five Lessons of Qods Day
Saturday, September 19, 2009 at 7:54
Iran After Qods Day: What Next for the Green Movement (The Sequel)?
The Latest from Iran: Challenge Renewed (19 September)
The Latest from Iran (18 September): Qods Day
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Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis
1. THE VICTORY OF THE GREEN WAVE...
Let's start with the basic but important observation. After all the attempts of the regime has tried to crush dissent in the last three-plus months --- the speeches, the threats, the shutdown of communications, the arrests, the raids, the trials --- the protestors came out yesterday. They came out not in scattered groups of hundreds across the capital, not in the "few thousand" of initial estimates on Friday, not in the "several thousand" of our judgement after President Ahmadinejad's speech, not in the "10,000" to which we cautiously moved, but in "tens of thousands".
How many? That is now a statistical game with no resolution. What matters is that, for all the regime's attempts to force a recognition of its legitimacy, it has still not succeeded. By 1000 GMT, even as Ahmad Khatami was delivering the Friday Prayers, the President had been eclipsed by the story of "No Gaza, No Lebanon, My Life for Iran". Despite the regime's portrayal of "Israel/Palestine" as the meaning of the day (a plot which many in the "traditional" media shamefully, if unwittingly, abetted --- see below), despite all the smokescreens and the restrictions, the images and videos came out. Al Jazeera's footage told the story that its reporter could not --- streets were filled not just with pro-Government supporters but with those who wanted to make Qods Day a renewed marker of their anger and their hopes. That footage was already being complemented and even surpassed by the videos that made it out of the regime's grasp. And the stories also came through: via phone calls, via the e-mails that could not be blocked, via blogs, via the curiosity-now-fixture called Twitter.
By 1000 GMT, no one noticed the Friday Prayers being led by Ahmad Khatami. The Ahmadinejad speech was down the list. The demonstrations had become Qods Day.
And that victory was obtained despite, not because of, some conditions that had been thought essential. Mir Hossein Mousavi played at best a marginal and belated role, whether this was because his genuine participation in the rallies had been limited and then twisted by the Government or because he was simply unable to make his presence felt. And former President Rafsanjani --- the chants rang out, "Hashemi, where are you?" --- was nowhere. The opposition's Web outlets were filtered, taken down, curbed.
And still the marchers turned out.
2. ...SETS A NEW TEST FOR ITS LEADERSHIP
This, however, is not a final victory. It's not even a triumph in the sense of making the Government alter its path. That awaits the political manoeuvres and power plays that will once more come to the fore.
Mehdi Karroubi passed his personal test yesterday. Three months, he was "just" a well-liked cleric and politician who --- by regime manipulation or by the limits of his political range --- had received less than two percent of the Presidential vote. Now he is the symbolic figure for many in the Green Wave. He has carried the fight in his letters, statements, and his encounters with Government officials. And today, by virtue of a well-organised office and communciations network, a focus on the injustices and abuses of the regime, and a personal charisma and persistence, he is at the head of the opposition as the next challenges are faced.
Mohammad Khatami is now in an important supporting role. His place yesterday was limited but quite visible, when the news and eventually pictures of his encounter with security forces, forcing him to withdraw from the rally, emerged. Now he returns to discussions with the reformist clerics and political parties who seek to link up with other factions to press their case against the President and, to an extent, the Supreme Leader.
And Mir Hossein Mousavi? The episode of the pictures --- "Was he at the rallies? And, if so, with whom?" --- has deeper roots in both the initial hope for his leadership of the Green movement and the later doubts as his public visibility was replaced by a series of statements. On reflection, I think this is more because of Government success than Mousavi's failure: this is one case where the threats and the sabotage of communications has drawn the net tighter and tighter around a leader. However, the return to basics brings this recognition: on 30 July, Mousavi was turned away from the "40th Day" memorial when Karroubi pressed on, and yesterday, when Karroubi (and Khatami) were able to show persistence and defiance, Mousavi could not.
Yet, as I write, I recognise that this attention to "leaders" might be contributing to the regime effort to limit the movement and its achievements. For, while the MKK trio are significant, opposition to the Government and the system has come in the last month from a wider range of political and clerical voices. In particular, the message out of Qom is that a majority of the Grand Ayatollahs and Ayatollahs want significant change to preserve the Islamic Republic. The paradox is that, as their role has been increasingly constricted by a move by President and his allies away from "Islamic" and "Republic" to "secular" and "authoritarian", space for their views is being opened up by the complementary presence of public opposition. That is why the Government has swung at them with a heavy hand by jailing their relatives, a step which I suspect may produce more problems than solutions for the regime.
3. AHMADINEJAD STUMBLES
We have underestimated the President throughout this crisis and we may do so again, but yesterday --- at least inside Iran --- was a powerful slap in the face to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
It was a slap felt in an episode just after the President's attempt to seize and define the political agenda with his introduction of Friday Prayers. As he spoke to IRIB Channel 2, the chant rose up behind him, "Ahmadi, Ahmadi, Resign, Resign!" All the weeks of promoting himself, standing up to the Supreme Leader, challenging Hashemi Rafsanjani, and smiting his reformist opponents, and a few voices (may they be protected) had whipped off the Emperor's clothes.
There is a powerful paradox here: Ahmadinejad's speech in itself was a politically shrewd one. He avoided any recognition of internal difficulties by playing the Israel/Palestine card (and throwing in Native Americans as well). For those at home, it represented, "I'm in charge here leading Iran, and Iran leads the world." For those abroad, it was, "C'mon. Take me on. Recognise me."
And the second part of that effort worked. Outlet after outlet in the "West" fell for the "Ahmadi Denies Holocaust" line. This was supplemented by the President's interview with NBC television (added to the Iranian declaration that 137 foreign media representatives had been granted permits to cover Qods Day), which has now become, "Ahmadi Won't Give Up His Nukes". It is a repeat of the political cycle of the last four days, only this time it is more for the President's preservation than Iran's grand geopolitical contests.
Where Ahmadinejad failed was at home. He failed not because of the speech but because it followed a stark, heavy-handed effort to wipe out dissent. And all it took was the first signs of the dissent to realise that his contest is not over. Legitimacy may await him in New York this week, but it is not guaranteed at home.
4. THE WANDERINGS OF THE SUPREME LEADER
This is a lesson of absence. I'm not sure that our updates yesterday ever mentioned Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
If this was just a case of Qods Day, would not be that significant. After all, it is Hashemi Rafsanjani who has had the lead role on this occasion over the last 25 years; there is no requirement for the Supreme Leader to come to the fore for the political symbolism of supporting Palestine.
This Qods Day, however, is in a wider political arena, one which the Supreme Leader jumped into hours after the Presidential polls closed. With that decision, he put his own authority on the line, and much of the story of the last three months has been whether he ensured or damaged that authority. So absence yesterday comes not in the midst of certitude of his Supreme Leadership but in the question of whether Khamenei is now scrambling for position vs. his own President.
Nice mirror image: if Mir Hossein Mousavi has to re-establish his political relevance in forthcoming days, so does the cleric who denied him the Presidency in that very political move on the night of 12 June.
5. AND NEXT? THE LONG(ER) MARCH
My colleague Mr Smith projected yesterday that the outcome of the Qods Day protests and manoeuvres would be a continued stalemate, both between forces within the system and between the regime and opposition.
I can see the merit of the assessment but I beg to differ re "stalemate" (Mr Smith uses the word again today, but I think his surprise at the large turnout may have bring a shift in his analysis). Stalemate indicates no movement, and yesterday was a rejection of deadlock, both in the slogans and the politics.
This does not mean, to repeat, "revolution" (even if that was the goal of the protesters, which it most certainly is not). Rather, it is a quest to find spaces and to open up new ones for negotiation. In practical terms, that is likely to return us immediately to the dance over arrests and detentions. But, in addition to the less visible and flammable but equally important dimensions of the economy and governance --- take note that foreign policy and the nuclear programme are not on that list --- those issues carry the wider question of Ahmadinejad's authority.
If this was a President and his allies inclined to compromise, I could see the way out. Stop mentioning the internal enemies, not only in yesterday's speech but in statements to come. Gradually release the detainees and stop the show trials. Do not crush but isolate Karroubi, Khatami, Mousavi, and the dissident clerics, hoping that with time fatigue and resignation will ensure no more large demonstrations.
This is probably the resolution sought by the Supreme Leader, notably in the meetings held by Ali Larijani with Mehdi Karroubi and with senior clerics. Already, however, the question has arisen whether there is any flexibility in the system: the smack-down of Karroubi's claims on detainee abuse by the Judiciary committee indicate either that bureaucracy is not prone to any meaningful talks or that the Presidency, rather than the Supreme Leader, has the upper hand in the system.
For this is not a President inclined to compromise. So he, and probably the Revolutionary Guard behind him, are likely to wield the heavy hand. There would seem to be limits to how far they can go --- dare they risk the arrest of the opposition leadership? --- but I am not sure, in a game of Political Chicken, whether they will let up on the accelerator and avoid a possibly catastrophic showdown with the opposition.
More importantly, and this is where the long(er) march comes, I am not sure whether Ahmadinejad yet realises that he may be aiding the opposition in the Iranian version of "What Does Not Kill You, Makes You Stronger". This President and his allies may have thought they would land a knock-out blow with their swinging of the last week, but when the bell finally rang last night, the opposition was still standing.
Welcome to a contest which just went beyond 15 rounds.
The Latest from Iran: Challenge Renewed (19 September)
The Latest from Iran (18 September): Qods Day
Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis
1. THE VICTORY OF THE GREEN WAVE...Let's start with the basic but important observation. After all the attempts of the regime has tried to crush dissent in the last three-plus months --- the speeches, the threats, the shutdown of communications, the arrests, the raids, the trials --- the protestors came out yesterday. They came out not in scattered groups of hundreds across the capital, not in the "few thousand" of initial estimates on Friday, not in the "several thousand" of our judgement after President Ahmadinejad's speech, not in the "10,000" to which we cautiously moved, but in "tens of thousands".
How many? That is now a statistical game with no resolution. What matters is that, for all the regime's attempts to force a recognition of its legitimacy, it has still not succeeded. By 1000 GMT, even as Ahmad Khatami was delivering the Friday Prayers, the President had been eclipsed by the story of "No Gaza, No Lebanon, My Life for Iran". Despite the regime's portrayal of "Israel/Palestine" as the meaning of the day (a plot which many in the "traditional" media shamefully, if unwittingly, abetted --- see below), despite all the smokescreens and the restrictions, the images and videos came out. Al Jazeera's footage told the story that its reporter could not --- streets were filled not just with pro-Government supporters but with those who wanted to make Qods Day a renewed marker of their anger and their hopes. That footage was already being complemented and even surpassed by the videos that made it out of the regime's grasp. And the stories also came through: via phone calls, via the e-mails that could not be blocked, via blogs, via the curiosity-now-fixture called Twitter.
By 1000 GMT, no one noticed the Friday Prayers being led by Ahmad Khatami. The Ahmadinejad speech was down the list. The demonstrations had become Qods Day.
And that victory was obtained despite, not because of, some conditions that had been thought essential. Mir Hossein Mousavi played at best a marginal and belated role, whether this was because his genuine participation in the rallies had been limited and then twisted by the Government or because he was simply unable to make his presence felt. And former President Rafsanjani --- the chants rang out, "Hashemi, where are you?" --- was nowhere. The opposition's Web outlets were filtered, taken down, curbed.
And still the marchers turned out.
2. ...SETS A NEW TEST FOR ITS LEADERSHIP
This, however, is not a final victory. It's not even a triumph in the sense of making the Government alter its path. That awaits the political manoeuvres and power plays that will once more come to the fore.
Mehdi Karroubi passed his personal test yesterday. Three months, he was "just" a well-liked cleric and politician who --- by regime manipulation or by the limits of his political range --- had received less than two percent of the Presidential vote. Now he is the symbolic figure for many in the Green Wave. He has carried the fight in his letters, statements, and his encounters with Government officials. And today, by virtue of a well-organised office and communciations network, a focus on the injustices and abuses of the regime, and a personal charisma and persistence, he is at the head of the opposition as the next challenges are faced.
Mohammad Khatami is now in an important supporting role. His place yesterday was limited but quite visible, when the news and eventually pictures of his encounter with security forces, forcing him to withdraw from the rally, emerged. Now he returns to discussions with the reformist clerics and political parties who seek to link up with other factions to press their case against the President and, to an extent, the Supreme Leader.
And Mir Hossein Mousavi? The episode of the pictures --- "Was he at the rallies? And, if so, with whom?" --- has deeper roots in both the initial hope for his leadership of the Green movement and the later doubts as his public visibility was replaced by a series of statements. On reflection, I think this is more because of Government success than Mousavi's failure: this is one case where the threats and the sabotage of communications has drawn the net tighter and tighter around a leader. However, the return to basics brings this recognition: on 30 July, Mousavi was turned away from the "40th Day" memorial when Karroubi pressed on, and yesterday, when Karroubi (and Khatami) were able to show persistence and defiance, Mousavi could not.
Yet, as I write, I recognise that this attention to "leaders" might be contributing to the regime effort to limit the movement and its achievements. For, while the MKK trio are significant, opposition to the Government and the system has come in the last month from a wider range of political and clerical voices. In particular, the message out of Qom is that a majority of the Grand Ayatollahs and Ayatollahs want significant change to preserve the Islamic Republic. The paradox is that, as their role has been increasingly constricted by a move by President and his allies away from "Islamic" and "Republic" to "secular" and "authoritarian", space for their views is being opened up by the complementary presence of public opposition. That is why the Government has swung at them with a heavy hand by jailing their relatives, a step which I suspect may produce more problems than solutions for the regime.
3. AHMADINEJAD STUMBLES
We have underestimated the President throughout this crisis and we may do so again, but yesterday --- at least inside Iran --- was a powerful slap in the face to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
It was a slap felt in an episode just after the President's attempt to seize and define the political agenda with his introduction of Friday Prayers. As he spoke to IRIB Channel 2, the chant rose up behind him, "Ahmadi, Ahmadi, Resign, Resign!" All the weeks of promoting himself, standing up to the Supreme Leader, challenging Hashemi Rafsanjani, and smiting his reformist opponents, and a few voices (may they be protected) had whipped off the Emperor's clothes.
There is a powerful paradox here: Ahmadinejad's speech in itself was a politically shrewd one. He avoided any recognition of internal difficulties by playing the Israel/Palestine card (and throwing in Native Americans as well). For those at home, it represented, "I'm in charge here leading Iran, and Iran leads the world." For those abroad, it was, "C'mon. Take me on. Recognise me."
And the second part of that effort worked. Outlet after outlet in the "West" fell for the "Ahmadi Denies Holocaust" line. This was supplemented by the President's interview with NBC television (added to the Iranian declaration that 137 foreign media representatives had been granted permits to cover Qods Day), which has now become, "Ahmadi Won't Give Up His Nukes". It is a repeat of the political cycle of the last four days, only this time it is more for the President's preservation than Iran's grand geopolitical contests.
Where Ahmadinejad failed was at home. He failed not because of the speech but because it followed a stark, heavy-handed effort to wipe out dissent. And all it took was the first signs of the dissent to realise that his contest is not over. Legitimacy may await him in New York this week, but it is not guaranteed at home.
4. THE WANDERINGS OF THE SUPREME LEADER
This is a lesson of absence. I'm not sure that our updates yesterday ever mentioned Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
If this was just a case of Qods Day, would not be that significant. After all, it is Hashemi Rafsanjani who has had the lead role on this occasion over the last 25 years; there is no requirement for the Supreme Leader to come to the fore for the political symbolism of supporting Palestine.
This Qods Day, however, is in a wider political arena, one which the Supreme Leader jumped into hours after the Presidential polls closed. With that decision, he put his own authority on the line, and much of the story of the last three months has been whether he ensured or damaged that authority. So absence yesterday comes not in the midst of certitude of his Supreme Leadership but in the question of whether Khamenei is now scrambling for position vs. his own President.
Nice mirror image: if Mir Hossein Mousavi has to re-establish his political relevance in forthcoming days, so does the cleric who denied him the Presidency in that very political move on the night of 12 June.
5. AND NEXT? THE LONG(ER) MARCH
My colleague Mr Smith projected yesterday that the outcome of the Qods Day protests and manoeuvres would be a continued stalemate, both between forces within the system and between the regime and opposition.
I can see the merit of the assessment but I beg to differ re "stalemate" (Mr Smith uses the word again today, but I think his surprise at the large turnout may have bring a shift in his analysis). Stalemate indicates no movement, and yesterday was a rejection of deadlock, both in the slogans and the politics.
This does not mean, to repeat, "revolution" (even if that was the goal of the protesters, which it most certainly is not). Rather, it is a quest to find spaces and to open up new ones for negotiation. In practical terms, that is likely to return us immediately to the dance over arrests and detentions. But, in addition to the less visible and flammable but equally important dimensions of the economy and governance --- take note that foreign policy and the nuclear programme are not on that list --- those issues carry the wider question of Ahmadinejad's authority.
If this was a President and his allies inclined to compromise, I could see the way out. Stop mentioning the internal enemies, not only in yesterday's speech but in statements to come. Gradually release the detainees and stop the show trials. Do not crush but isolate Karroubi, Khatami, Mousavi, and the dissident clerics, hoping that with time fatigue and resignation will ensure no more large demonstrations.
This is probably the resolution sought by the Supreme Leader, notably in the meetings held by Ali Larijani with Mehdi Karroubi and with senior clerics. Already, however, the question has arisen whether there is any flexibility in the system: the smack-down of Karroubi's claims on detainee abuse by the Judiciary committee indicate either that bureaucracy is not prone to any meaningful talks or that the Presidency, rather than the Supreme Leader, has the upper hand in the system.
For this is not a President inclined to compromise. So he, and probably the Revolutionary Guard behind him, are likely to wield the heavy hand. There would seem to be limits to how far they can go --- dare they risk the arrest of the opposition leadership? --- but I am not sure, in a game of Political Chicken, whether they will let up on the accelerator and avoid a possibly catastrophic showdown with the opposition.
More importantly, and this is where the long(er) march comes, I am not sure whether Ahmadinejad yet realises that he may be aiding the opposition in the Iranian version of "What Does Not Kill You, Makes You Stronger". This President and his allies may have thought they would land a knock-out blow with their swinging of the last week, but when the bell finally rang last night, the opposition was still standing.
Welcome to a contest which just went beyond 15 rounds.
2055 GMT: Reports that writer and blogger Ali Pirhousienlou and hsi wife Fatemeh Sotoudeh have been arrested.
Meir Javedanfar offers this useful overview, 
UPDATE 13 September 2130 GMT: The Supreme Leader's represenative to the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps 