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Entries in Hashemi Rafsanjani (16)

Wednesday
Oct142009

The Latest from Iran (14 October): Watching Karroubi, Rafsanjani, and the Supreme Leader's Health

NEW Iran-US-Russia Deal on Enrichment, The Sequel
Latest Iran Video: Selling Ahmadinejad's Economic Plan (13 October)
Iran: Tehran’s Growing Confidence Against the Israeli Threat

Iran: Rafsanjani Statement on “False News” (13 October)
Latest Iran Video: The Shiraz Protest Against Ahmadinejad (12 October)
Video: Protest at Tehran Azad University (13 October)
The Latest from Iran (13 October): Government Threatens Karroubi

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IRAN 3 NOV DEMOS 32025 GMT: Grand Ayatollah Montazeri has issued a thinly-veiled challenge to the Revolutionary Guard through another statement. Focusing on the abuses of the armed forces, he declares, "Some think that because they have guns they should exercise the power of their guns and use it everywhere. In any society that wants to be obedient, its armed forces should not be cruel but rather be compassionate and merciful."

2000 GMT: Remember how we started this morning with a letter from Hashemi Rafsanjani, criticising and warning about "false news" to discredit him? Well, consider this from Javan Online, a publication closely linked with the Revolutionary Guard, as reported by Tabnak:
"Since the inauguration of the 10th administration, I believe in its legitimacy. Presently Mr. [Mahmoud] Ahmadinejad attends the Expediency Council meetings as president, with invitations signed by myself," Rafsanjani said in a meeting with Iranian political figures in favor of the national unity plan.

It's not surprising that Javan would put this story, whether or not it is accurate. What is surprising is that, in light of Rafsanjani's warning that the only reliable news about him would come either from his website or the offices of the Expediency Council, an important website like Tehran Bureau would reprint Javan's claim without reflection.

1850 GMT: Amidst a quiet domestic news day, we've picked up on the international story missed by most of the media, "Iran-US-Russia Deal on Enrichment, The Sequel".

1500 GMT: The Facebook page associated with Mir Hossein Mousavi has responded to the Government threats to take Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi to court with the reminder, "In case of the arrest of any of the Green movement’s leaders, we will take to the streets from 'Revolution' to 'Freedom' Square. The network [will use] media mobilization (SMS, email, flyer, wall notices, posters, Internet) for raising widespread awareness until the emergence of the Green army . (English summary via Iran News Digest)

1250 GMT: Amidst a lull in political developments, and as part of our increasing attention to the economic context, we've posted a two-part video from Press TV examining (and ultimately selling) President Ahmadinejad's economic proposals.

0805 GMT: We've posted what I think may be one of the most revealing analyses from within Iran, written by Dr Mahmoud Reza Golshanpazhooh, on the country's international position, "Tehran’s Growing Confidence Against the Israeli Threat".

0655 GMT: According to Peykeiran, a fifth death sentence over post-election conflict and "subversion" has been handed out to a "Davoud Mir Ardebili". The report claims that Ardebili is not a monarchist, the allegation made against three other condemned men, but merely called a radio station to report union protests.

0650 GMT: Today's Puffing of the Chest. Brigadier General Hussein Salami, the deputy commander of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps says,"Unlike the wrong conception of the enemies, Iran is strong and invincible."

No further comment or meat-related jokes necessary.

0640 GMT: Watching the Economy. Press TV's website has a must-read story betraying nervousness over both Iran's economic situation and the politics around the headline measure, Ahmadinjead's proposed subsidy reform.

The story begins with apparent good news, with a fall in the annual inflation rate from 20.2 percent to 18.5 percent. However, the headline also notes, "Jobless Rate Soars", rising to 11.3 percent from 10.2 percent over the summer.

And here's the stinger of the piece: "Economists fear that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's subsidy reform plan, which aims to gradually cut energy and food subsidies, will hike up inflation. The Iranian parliament has approved the outline of the bill, but lawmakers are still at odds over the details of the plan."

Our initial reading of the push for subsidy cuts, with the impulse being the worsening budget situation of the Iran Government, was too narrow. There are good structural reasons to reform the system, though I am uncertain how much these factor into Ahmadinejad's calculations. Far more significant --- and provocative --- is the President's political scheme, taking some of the money saved from the cuts and distributing it to Iran's poorest people.

0620 GMT: Our starting point today will be a close eye on the next steps of two key figures, Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mehdi Karroubi.

Rafsanjani surfaced yesterday to publish a letter via Iranian Labor News Agency, denying "false news" of a letter that he and Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Mahdavi-Kani supposedly sent to Mir Hossein Mousavi on 28 September. We think this is a reference to the claimed "National Unity Plan", "revealed" by Fars News that day. At this point, however, Rafsanjani's step is a defensive move, fending off pressure from the Government and media who oppose him, rather than a major political step. We have an analysis and English translation of the letter in a separate entry.

The situation around Mehdi Karroubi is more dramatic. The Government threat to prosecute him, issued yesterday by two high-level officials, is a clear response --- showing nervousness as well as supposed strength --- to the resurgence of Karroubi's public statements, especially his Saturday meeting with Mir Hossein Mousavi.

So, to be blunt, we're wondering, "Does Karroubi back down?", and we're thinking, "No." His response to the Government's ham-fisted warning, which following similar threats over the last two months --- may not come today, but I would look for a clear signal from the cleric by the weekend.

Meanwhile, a brief article in Peiknet has stoked the fire of rumours about the poor state of the Supreme Leader's health. The website claims that three doctors were summoned urgently to Ayatollah Khamenei's house and, after examining him, insisted that he cancel all public and Government meetings and stay at home, with only his family seeing him. To our knowledge, no other source has corroborated the Peiknet assertion.

Rumors that the Supreme Leader has cancer, specifically prostate cancer, have persisted for years --- our readers have discussed these in comments. For now, we'll keep watch, especially to see if Khamenei stays out of public view.
Monday
Oct122009

Iran: So Who Controls the Islamic Republic?

The Latest from Iran (11 October): “Media Operations”

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UPDATE 12 October 0845 GMT: EA's Mr Smith offers his reading of the Foreign Affairs analysis:

"I do not see what this adds to what we knew already. Besides making the silly mistake of identifying Mesbah Yazdi with Mohammad Yazdi, and stating that the former was head of Iran's judiciary (in reality his real influence and authority are, until proven otherwise, rather limited to "spiritual guidance" of Ahmadinejad), the rest are allegations that have been fed to him after having floated on the Web for months. The Taeb-Jalili-Khamenei trio was floated by Roger Cohen [of The New York Times] in one of his dispatches from Tehran.

The only tidbit that would be interesting, if verified, is the purge of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps and the removal of pro-Mousavi Guardsmen before the elections. That would make sense, and it would be interesting to have real statistics on that.
--
Earlier this week Foreign Affairs published an article by Jerry Guo on "the rise of a new power elite" of "the Revolutionary Guard and its allies" in Iran. The article raised points which have been discussed by Enduring America readers for several weeks, considering politics, the military situation, and the battle for control of key sections of Iran's economy. In addition to Guo's attention to the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps, notice his inclusion of Saeed Jalili, the secretary of Iran's National Security Council, and the Supreme Leader's son, Mojtaba Khamenei, amongst the "coalition of power".

Letter from Tehran: Iran's New Hard-Liners

The headquarters of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) are in a European-style palace, replete with Greek columns and a grand staircase, in the eastern suburbs of Tehran. From here, the IRGC orchestrated the crackdown that followed Iran's disputed presidential vote in June, beating protestors on the street and torturing those behind bars. More ominously, the IGRC and other extreme hard-liners have sidelined fellow conservatives in the Iranian government, carving out their own power base in a regime that is becoming increasingly insular, reactionary, and violent.

So far, much of the analysis of the emerging Iranian power struggle has focused on the clash between the country's conservatives and reformers, pitting President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his patron, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, against Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, two thwarted presidential candidates, and Mohammad Khatami, a former president. (Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a former president and seasoned kingmaker has eased toward the reformists in the election's aftermath.)

The real struggle, however, is the conflict among the hard-liners themselves, many of whom operate behind the headlines in unseen corners of the state machinery. Although Iran's opposition movement has witnessed an unprecedented surge in public support, the election and its aftermath mark a radicalization of the system not seen since the early days of the Islamic revolution.

In the reformist era of Khatami, and to some extent during Ahmadinejad's first term, the country's conservative theocrats and technocrats -- such as Ali Larijani, the speaker of the parliament, and Gholam-Hussein Mohseni-Ejei, the ousted intelligence minister who criticized the state's use of forced confessions -- held much of the power over the executive and legislative branches. Although they were entrenched status quo forces, these pragmatists believed in the dual nature of the Islamic Republic's statehood -- a country with religious and political legitimacy.

But now such figures are losing their influence to a new breed of second-generation revolutionaries from Iran's security apparatus known as "the New Right." They are joined in the emerging power structure by ultraconservative clerics and organizations such as the Alliance of Builders of Islamic Iran. These neo-fundamentalists call for the "re-Islamization" of the theocracy, but their true agenda is to block further reform to the political system in terms of reconciling with both domestic opponents and the West.

This coalition includes Hassan Taeb, the commander of the Basij, the paramilitary branch of the IRGC; Saeed Jalili, the secretary of Iran's National Security Council and the country's chief nuclear negotiator; and Mojtaba Khamenei, the supreme leader's second son, a man so feared that his name is not often uttered in public.

Hard-line figures such as the younger Khamenei and the IRGC leadership are granted religious legitimacy through the support of the most radical mullahs in the theocratic establishment: Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, the head of the Guardian Council, the committee that certified the election tallies, and Ayatollah Mohammad Mesbah Yazdi, a former head of the judiciary and Ahmadinejad's spiritual adviser. Yazdi is affiliated with an underground messianic sect called the Hojjatieh Society, which hopes to quicken the coming of the apocalypse. Democratic reforms, the Majlis (parliament), and elections are mere annoyances under this radical Islamic worldview.

It is not surprising, then, that Yazdi issued a fatwa shortly before June 12 that gave authorities tacit approval to fudge the vote. Indeed, the clerics seem to have gotten the intended result: after the election, a number of employees at Iran's Interior Ministry released an open letter stating that "the election supervisors, who had become happy and energetic for having obtained the religious fatwa to use any trick for changing the votes, began immediately to develop plans for it."

Yazdi's influence on Ahmadinejad became pronounced in the early days of the president's first term, when Ahmadinejad declared that the return of the apocalyptic 12th imam would come within two years. Now, his second term will likely be marked by even more radical behavior: in a meeting with Yazdi in June to discuss his domestic agenda, Ahmadinejad promised to Islamize the country's educational and cultural systems, declaring that Iranians had not yet witnessed "true Islam." Then, in August, amid calls to purge reformist professors, a presidential panel began investigating university humanities curricula deemed to be "un-Islamic." Several progressive students told me that they have been barred from returning to campus this semester, including a top law student at Tehran University. "I was going to continue the protests with my law degree in a more effective manner," he said. "But now I am just a simple pedestrian."

But ideology remains secondary in the struggle to maintain and consolidate control within the fractured regime. It is becoming increasingly clear that Ahmadinejad and his associated faction of neo-fundamentalists no longer aim to take on the mantle of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's revolutionary ideals. As Khamenei's representative to the IRGC put it, "Some people are sticking to Imam Khomeini's ideas ... [but] the situation has changed." Accordingly, religion and revolutionary ideology have become convenient means to an end, but not the end themselves. Purges of un-Islamic faculty and students are meant to target the organizers of mass protests; the arrests and subsequent trials of political opponents, meanwhile, act to shield the financial interests of the IRGC and its hard-line partners.

Read rest of article...
Sunday
Oct112009

Iran: English Text of Mousavi-Karroubi Meeting (10 October)

Iran: So Who Controls the Islamic Republic?
The Latest from Iran (11 October): “Media Operations”

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Translated on the Facebook page associated with Mir Hossein Mousavi:

Yesterday (Oct 10, 2009) Mir Hossein Mousavi visited Mehdi Karroubi in his home to talk about the post-election events. In this meeting both presidential candidates by pointing out the efforts of the IRIB (the state-run TV and radio channels) to diminish the reform movement, emphasised on their legal rights and demanded to appear on TV/radio to defend themselves and reply to the false accusations made against them on the “national” stage.

At the beginning of this meeting Mehdi Karroubi said that the recent presidential election was a great opportunity, and the establishment could have used this opportunity to strengthen its position in the international community. Noting that the behaviour of the government after the election was far from the status and ideas of the system that was founded by Imam Khomeini, Karroubi strongly criticised the illegal arrests of Alireza Beheshti, Morteza Alviri and Ebrahim Amini (senior advisors to Mousavi and Karroubi) as well as the other political prisoners who have sacrificed a lot for the revolution and the country.

Karroubi, the Secretary General of the Etemade Melli party, called the treatment of the students and revolutionary figures by the government as “odd and strange” and by reminding the events that happened during Shah’s time when the military forces attacked the university, called these kinds of behaviours obscene and that after all these years there was no one who could defend such acts and that he considered these as signs for all the officials to be careful with their actions so that so that future generations would have a good memory of them.

Mehdi Karroubi pointed out the recent letter by the Tehran Governor’s office that prohibits the members of Tehran’s City Council from comforting and meeting with the family members of the victims of the recent events, calling this behaviour “very uncivilised”. Karroubi also  pointed out the recent remarks made by Mohseni-Ejei (the new Prosecutor General) in which he had said that the country was in a combat situation, Karroubi stated that these words were to create fear from the revolutionary courts (show trials) and asked why these kinds of statements are made: why one should pretend that the country is in the military mode and everyone should keep quiet and be silent? Noting that some of the military leaders such as the General Commander of the Revolutionary Guards are accusing the reformists of providing topics for the foreign media, Karroubi asked them who is truly providing topics for the foreign media. “Is it us or you? Do we make harsh statement or you? Who is behaving roughly, you or us?”

Karroubi also pointed out the Qods Day rallies. He stated that the position regarding Israel has not changed and that the Qods Day is a day to support the people of Palestine and condemn the violation of their rights by Israel, but he added:
We should be thankful to the many people who attended these rallies. Most of those who participated in these rallies in response to our invitation were chanting slogans about Iran and their country and were concerned about their fate. We cannot ask people to be ignorant about their country, and although the main propose for this day was Palestinian people, I ask the authorities to explain what has happened in the country that suddenly on Qods Day people are split in two groups and some express their concerns in the slogans they were chanting.

At the end of his remarks, Karroubi stressed that some are talking about the presidential elections as if nothing has happened and are telling people that there has been no fraud in the election. He asked, "Why are the Government telling people these lies as if people don’t know what has happened to them? If that is true then what are all these protests?"

Karroubi added that the authorities are claiming that Ahmadinejad had 300,000 votes in 10,000 ballot boxes, while Karroubi did not even have a single vote in those boxes....

This is despite the fact that some of the observers at the polling stations say that in a ballot box I had 100 votes but they counted only one for me. At least say something that people won’t laugh at you over it. If you are telling the truth then in response to tens of hours of denying the fraud on the “national” media and putting pressure on the innocent detainees to obtain false confessions from them, give us some airtime too so that we also present our evidence and reasons.

Mehdi Karroubi believes that the public opinion and their trust is the greatest resource of the system. Karroubi said:

The greatest resource of Imam [Khomeini] was the public trust and had said so himself several times. Therefore the trust in the system should not be destroyed and no one should move in that direction. Some of these gentlemen knowingly or unknowingly are moving in that direction and are constantly preparing material for the foreigners. Let’s make a right move to come out of this situation. Let’s announce the real statistics. IRIB, which has become a biased and destructive media with every day destroying its credibility more, should follow the right course and should try to win the trust of the people again.

Mir Hossein Mousavi, pointing out the events after the election, strongly criticised the behaviour of the government. He said that it is a bitter irony that the revolutionary figures who were active from the very beginning of the revolution are today in prisons: “I don’t know why these events are happening and why they are doing this to the religious and revolutionary figures.”

Mousavi believes that these actions are causing wounds to the people’s souls and spirits that will not be easily treatable in future. He pointed out the show trials for the reformists, staged with a lot of propaganda, and asked: “What did you gain from this show? Are you seeking to hold inquisition courts? Do you understand the downfalls of such actions in the society?”

Mousavi referred to the great number of revolutionary figures who have been pushed aside and said:
In the past four years, many wrong actions have taken place that have made the revolutionary figures either go to the sidelines or lose their enthusiasm for working. Have a look and see how many ministers, members of the Parliament, and revolutionary figures were eliminated. The sidelines of our revolution have now become greater and more important than its core. How many Presidents we have, how many ministers we have [who have been marginalised]. We have members of the Parliament, managers, leading intellectuals who have all been pushed to the sidelines. Why are all these talents eliminated?

Pointing out his warnings over the past year, Mousvi expressed sorrow over the abuse of the county’s financial resources by some of the power centers, such asthe questionable transfer of telecommunications to the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps and the methods of financing the $8 billion cost.

Mousavi then referred to the accusations [by the Government] of "velvet revolution" and said: “Unfortunately these days from every podium, there is a remark being made to destroy the revolutionary figures. The holy podium of the Friday Prayer is now specific to a party and the hardliners are using any means to eliminate everyone who has a different opinion from them.”

Mousavi, pointing out the history of Russia and the Communist period, said that in an era some people took power that tried to eliminate those who were active in that revolution by removing the images of them from books and pictures and by forging the history to deceive their people and the people of the world, but [eventually] their government was overthrown and historians wrote the real history. He emphasised:
The few should not think that the events of the beginning of the Revolution and the years after that are gone from people’s minds. Recently, one of the gentlemen who had a position in my cabinet and then resigned over some differences has made comments that make you wonder. It is three or four months that he is spreading lies at IRIB and his media against me, Mr. Karroubi, and people who have supported us and tried to destroy our characters. Don’t we have the right to defend ourselves on “national” TV too?

Recalling the meeting with Ayatollah Hashemi-Shahroudi (the former Head of the Judiciary), Mousavi said:
Mr. Shahroudi called me and asked if I could go to his office. I went there. Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani (the Head of the Assembly of Experts and the Expediency Council) was there too, but I was not originally informed about his presence. We talked about the events that happened after the election and then Mr. Shahroudi asked me what I would do. I said that we were clear and that they should give us time so that we could also defend ourselves in live broadcast from the national media in that environment of destruction. Prior to that Mr. Larijani had also asked me if I would go to the television and I said yes. In the meeting with Mr. Shahroudi, he suggested a legal gathering and I accepted. Right then he called the High Commission of National Security, they spoke and they agreed too. Then they told us to write a request. We prepared a request [for a gathering] signed by me and sent it. A few days later we received a note from the High Commission of National Security that they had rejected our request according to some article and it was also signed by some managers.

Mir Hossein Mousavi, criticising the extent of lying among some officials, added:
They are constantly giving false information to the public and think that people will believe them. How many times have the number of people killed after the election changed? Then they claim that the fraud in election is a lie. There are people who are determined to pretend that there was no fraud in the election. This was repeatedly propagated from the television.

Well, if you are certain of your action, why are you worried of our presence on television or why are you preventing the presence of our experts there? If you are truthful, then establish a roundtable with the presence from our experts so that both sides could put their views.

Mousavi, pointing out the restricted vironment that has been created, said: “Today the environment is in such a way that no one can criticise the administration. Anyone who says something [against the administration], even if he is one of their own people, is linked to the enemy, is said to be against Imam [Khomeini], and will have false accusations made up against him.”

Mousavi reiterated: “I asked them why you, who voided 700 ballot boxes during the sixth parliamentary election so that you could get one specific figure elected to the parliament, don’t open a hundred ballot boxes in a live television broadcast so that people can see how many ballot papers without a serial number are in there?”

At the end Mousavi expressed hope that the devotees of the system think and resolve the problems that have been created. In his opinion it is impossible to ignore the public’s awareness and to ask the students to be quiet, as they are sons and daughters of this people and demand an answer.
Thursday
Oct082009

The Latest from Iran (8 October): Will There Be a Fight?

NEW Green Tweets: Mapping Iran's Movement via Twitter
NEW Iran: A Telephone Poll on Politics You Can Absolutely Trust (Trust Us)
UPDATED Iran: Rafsanjani Makes A Public Move with “Friendship Principles”
UPDATED Iran: How a Non-Story about a Non-Jew Became Media Non-Sense
The Latest from Iran (7 October): Drama in Parliament?

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MORTAZAVI1900 GMT: It appears that the State Department's withdrawal of funding from four Iran-centred human rights organisations including the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, which we noted yesterday, may get some media attention. Alex Massie of the British magazine The Spectator has written about the "shabby, and actually terrible" Government treatment of the groups, raising the concern of Andrew Sullivan of The Atlantic magazine.

1845 GMT: A University student newspaper has been closed by Government order after it implicitly accepted that the Holocaust had occurred.

1545 GMT: We're here, but it is a really slow news day, compounded by breakdowns in communication. Twitter seems to be out of action. Press TV's website is still leading with yesterday's story of the Supreme Leader's speech, and CNN has nothing beyond the disappearance of the Iranian nuclear scientist Shahram Amiri (see 1025 GMT).

1050 GMT: Fereshteh Ghazi ("Iranbaan") has posted another set of updates on the conditions of detainees.

1025 GMT: Kidnappings and Talks. Both in Iranian and non-Iranian media, headlines are devoted to Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki's allegation, "We have found documents that prove US interference in the disappearance of the Iranian pilgrim Shahram Amiri in Saudi Arabia."

The claim elevates an already murky story into the current power politics around Iran's nuclear program. Amiri is one of four Iranians who have "disappeared", whether through defection or kidnapping, since 2007. All four have been connected with Iran's military or nuclear programme. (Note that Press TV coyly refers to Amiri, beyond the "pilgrim" status, as "a researcher".) There have been allegations that the disappearances may be connected with an Israeli covert effort to cripple Iran's nuclear efforts.

Mottaki's statement, however, is connected more with an attempt to get leverage in the post-Geneva negotiations. The article uses comments by University of Tehran academic Seyed Mohammad Marandi to put further pressure on the US, "As long as the United States continues to behave in an unacceptable manner, I think it will be very difficult for Iranians to be convinced that true negotiations can lead to a fruitful conclusion." Marandi also applies that pressure to Iran's regional manoeuvres: "What is even more disturbing is the fact that the Saudi regime has effectively discredited itself and...will be seen by those who know what has gone on in the region as being confined to American demands and effectively abiding by American wishes."

0955 GMT: A Bit of Fun. Thanks to Persian Umpire, we have posted the ultimate telephone poll of Iranians on politics and President Ahmadinejad.

0915 GMT: The Death Sentence is Noticed. Reuters, citing the Green movement website Mowj-e-Sabz, has written about the death penalty imposed on Mohammad Reza Ali Zamani (see 0620 GMT).

0910 GMT: Parleman News offers an overview of yesterday's events in the Iranian Parliament. The focus is on Ali Larijani's success (and thus President Ahmadinejad's defeat) in winning re-election as head of the Principlist majority party, but there is also a bit of light-hearted banter between journalists and MPs over the question, "Where is my vote?"

0635 GMT: Following up our story of the morning (0600 GMT): Ayande News has an interview with Saeed Mortazavi (pictured), most of which is on the events surrounding Kahrizak Prison. Mortazavi minimises his role in the detentions and abuses, claiming that deaths occurred because of "prior injuries" rather than incidents at Kahrizak.

0620 GMT: Beyond the politics, a curious silence this morning on our last report of yesterday, the first death sentence passed on a post-election demonstrator, Mohammad Reza Ali Zamani. Possibly because the news has not been reported inside Iran, I cannot find a sign that the opposition has picked up on the development. If the death penalty is carried out, it could offer the symbolism of a martyr --- as with Neda Agha Soltan or Soltan Arabi --- for high-profile protest.

0600 GMT: The open challenge in Parliament to President Ahmadinejad, or at least to some high-profile officials, did not materialise yesterday, despite the existence of a report into post-election abuses which could be the foundation for that confrontation.

The document remained classified, and no one --- not even the reformist press --- broke out to make claims beyond the identification of two likely culprits, Iran Deputy Prosecutor General Saeed Mortazavi and Tehran police chief Ahmad Reza Radan.

That does not mean that the challenge has evaporated. To the contrary, there are enough signals from conservative/principlist members of Parliament to indicate anger with a Government which both oversaw and covered up the abuses. The symbolic catalyst for this is "Kahrizak", the prison where detainees were beaten, on occasion to death. One of those detainees was Mohsen Rohulamini, the son of a prominent academic and adviser to conservative Presidential candidate Mohsen Rezaei, and it is his case that appears to have propelled the movement that someone has to answer for "crimes".

The question, as we noted yesterday, is how far that anger has translated into talks "across parties" not only to press the President on the report but to turn this into a wider attack on his authority.

We know that Hashemi Rafsanjani met principlist clerics on Tuesday. What we don't know is how much contact he has had with conservative/principlist politicians and officials within the Government. And we do not know what role the "Green movement", or rather its leaders, have in any discussions. It could be that the relative silence of Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi in recent days is because they are now in talks which need time to produce action, or it could be that they are on the outside but waiting to see what occurs.

Throughout the crisis, EA readers have reminded me that Iranian politics is rarely measured in days or even weeks but in far longer periods. That timeframe seems to fit here.
Wednesday
Oct072009

The Latest from Iran (7 October): Drama in Parliament?

UPDATED Iran: Rafsanjani Makes A Public Move with "Friendship Principles"
UPDATED Iran: How a Non-Story about a Non-Jew Became Media Non-Sense
Video: 4 Clips from Tehran Azad University Protests (6 October)
The Latest from Iran (6 October): Loud Noises, Quiet Manoeuvres

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MAJLIS2130 GMT: A very depressing end to the day. The Committee on Human Rights Reporters has announced that Mohammad Reza Ali Zamani, a member of the The Association of Monarchists, is
to be executed by hanging for taking part in the demonstrations following the June elections. Zamani, who had no access to independent legal representation, was transferred on Monday from Section 29 of Evin Prison to Branch 15 of the Revolutionary Courts and his sentence was handed down by Judge Salavati.

To our knowledge, this is the first death sentence for a partipicant in post-election protest.

(http://chrr.us/spip.php?article6138)

1800 GMT: Disturbing article in Payvand that 10 of the 21 members of the "press court jury" have been replaced in elections. Out go Fatemeh Karoubi, wife of Etemade Melli party head Mehdi Karoubi, Masih Mohajeri, editor-in-chief of Jomhouri Eslami newspaper, and cleric Mohsen Doagu, all of whom have been critical of the Ahmadinejad administration. The news accompanies the closure of three more newspapers since Sunday.

1715 GMT: Report that 12 members of the Iran Teachers Union who were arrested on Tuesday (the day after World Teachers Day) have been released from detention.

1530 GMT: Let's Keep It Global, OK? Sure looks like Mahmoud Ahmadinejad wants to talk about matters other than domestic trifles. He appeared on Iran state television after a Cabinet meeting to confirm Tehran's willingness to consider "third-party enrichment" of its uranium, adding:
I think these negotiations were a step forward and I hope we proceed with the same trend so we will have constructive cooperation to resolve all outstanding global issues....In these negotiations we witnessed better behaviour than in the past from some countries and we noticed that the logic of respect and justice is being established gradually. These talks are good basis for continuation of the negotiations.

1319 GMT: Prompted by readers, we're investigating the story that the Obama Administration has cut funding to four Iran-centred human rights organisations. The only article so far, in Boston.com, considers the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center. The three other groups are not identified.

1315 GMT: Fereshteh Ghazi ("Iranbaan") has updated on the condition of a number of detainees, including the two of 18 students who were not released after University protests last week.

1105 GMT: And Now A Distraction. Press TV summarises the Supreme Leader's public address in the northern city of Chalous:
The enemy started to throw mud and spread rumors in order to undermine and downplay this big political victory....The enemy caused unrest in a part of the country. We see that it is worried about the 85 percent participation of the Iranian nation in the presidential election....Iran's foes are angry with progress and development of the nation.

And so on and so on....

0915 GMT: OK, So We Did Talk. Aladdin Boroujerdi, the Head of Parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, has messed up the Government's "Maybe We Did, Maybe We Didn't" strategy by confirming that Iranian and American delegates did have bilateral discussions at the Geneva meeting on Iran's nuclear programme. Saeed Jalili, the lead Iranian negotiator, had denied that any 1-on-1 conversation took place.

0820 GMT: One source for the claim that Saeed Mortazavi is on the firing line for the Parliamentary report on post-election abuses (see 0740 GMT) is member of Parliament Ali Reza Zakani, who claims that documents will soon be produced for judicial authorities establishing Mortazavi's guilt.

0810 GMT: Ayatollah Dastgheib has written another letter criticising the handling of the post-election crisis, alleging that "military men" are the cause of "vices" in Iran.

0755 GMT: Is This A Confession of Fraud or An Attack on Larijani? In an interview, conservative member of Parliament Javad Karimi Ghadousi claims that Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani wants a National Unity Government so that he can replace Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as President. Ghadousi criticises Larijani for investigations of post election events, such as the raids on Tehran University dormitories and the abuses at Kahrizak Prison, "in defiance" of the Supreme Leader's statement that these were "side issues".

This, however, is the headline assertion: Larijani called Mir Hossein Mousavi on the night of the Presidential election to congratulate him on victory, and Deputy Speaker Mohammad Reza Bahonar wrote a letter to Ayatollah Khamenei that the regime has to accept and prepare for Mousavi as President.

0745 GMT: Back in Action (with a Great Headline). It looks like Mehdi Karroubi's Web presence has returned, with the repackaging of Tagheer on a different URL. It criticises proposed First Vice President Rahimi (see yesterday and 0530 GMT) with one of the best lines in the post-election crisis: "Fake Correspondence of Fake Minister in Fraudulent Government".

0740 GMT: News is coming out of the Iranian Parliament that while parts of the report on post-election abuses are classified, it does criticise --- as rumoured --- former Tehran Prosecutor General (now Iran Deputy Prosecutor General) Saeed Mortazavi and Tehran police chief Ahmad Reza Radan.

0550 GMT: Nothing to See Here. Not a word on Press TV's website about the internal political dynamics. Instead it goes for Iran in the World, with "the [Supreme] Leader...has said Iran's military advances are no a threat to any nation but instead are helping them progress 'without dependence' on the US."

Nothing in Fars News' headlines either; however, the Islamic Republic News Agency does feature a critique of "the archaeology of Hashemi Rafsanjani's National Unity Plan". The analyst, Mohammad Sajjad Nosrati, begins with an invocation of "the discourse of [French philosopher/sociologist] Michel Foucault" (somehow I can't see the same approach being applied to Barack Obama's health care plan in the US) before asserting that the Plan was put forth a few months before the Presidential election.

0530 GMT: After days of fencing and manoeuvring for position, we may see some interesting developments inside and around the Majlis today, as a Parliamentary committee is scheduled to present its report on post-election abuses.

Tensions between the President and conservative/principlist groups have been re-emerging, with hints that condemnation of episodes such as the crimes in Kahrizak Prison may have to name some names, pressing the Ahmadinejad Government to take the reprimand and offer up a scapegoat. That has been accompanied by a renewal of discontent over the President's choice of allies and cronies, with whispers becoming public grumbles about selections such as the First Vice President Mohammad Reza Rahimi. And one should not overlook that the headline, "Supreme Leader Reshuffles Top Positions" at the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps and Basiji headquarters, sits on top of a continuing battle between the President and others to control the Ministry of Intelligence.

Still, the key word in the opening sentence above is "may". The Parliamentary report has already been delayed, and conservative/principlist critics may decide once again to put aside their differences with Ahmadinejad. For what we have yet to see in this crisis is a conservative/principlist decision to set aside their basic opposition to "reformists", allying with them at least temporarily to force changes from Ahmadinejad and the security forces.

And that in turn takes us to the heart of the confusion and tension over the "National Unity Plans", whether that is one Plan, two rival Plans, or even more. With a lot of attention on Hashemi Rafsanjani, the question has not been answered: is there any plan which has finally brought agreement between conservative/principlist groups and reformists to work together in a committee to bring signficant changes?