The Latest from Iran (16 October): Rumours and Drama, Khamenei and Karroubi

NEW A Brilliant Neo-Con Idea: Crippling Iran to Save It
NEW Iran: A Beginner’s Guide to the Economy, Past and Present
Iran: Karroubi Responds to Government Threats “Bring. It. On.”
Iran: The Latest on Mehdi Karroubi
The Latest from Iran (15 October): Restricting the Movement

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

1945 GMT: The English-language website of Mowj-e-Sabz has a short summary of the Mousavi-Khatami meeting (1500 GMT).

1830 GMT: After a four-day absence, fueling speculation of a connection to the ill health of the Supreme Leader (0645 GMT), the newspaper Kayhan has reappeared today.

1515 GMT: The Battle Goes On. Yesterday Karroubi made clear his intention to stand firm against Government threats of arrests. So today the Government reiterated the warnings. The deputy head of Iran's judiciary, Ebrahim Raeesi, has repeated to the Islamic Republic News Agency that the consideration of charges is "very serious".

1500 GMT: Mousavi and Khatami Meet. Parleman News summarises a discussion between Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mohammad Khatami, who asserted that the Iranian nation will not be diverted from its course by "force and pressure". The post-election movement had awakened Iran to the blessings of Islamic Revolution, especially its path toward justice, freedom, independence, and honour, and it would not deviate from its attachment to those ideals."

1345 GMT: Nice response to today's Friday Prayers on Twitter: "Hey Jannati, thanks for the free publicity! You told WAY more ppl about 13 Aban [4 November demonstrations] than the Greens could!"

1255 GMT: HomyLafayette has posted a summary of Ayatollah Jannati's Friday Prayers (see 1015 GMT):

"Jannati warned Greens against trying to exploit anniversary of the US Embassy takeover, 4 November [13 Aban]. He said that their schemes...will be neutralized. Some people who are tools of others want to show their American and Israeli natures on 4 November. If judiciary and security apparatus treat protesters with leniency, they are traitors to Islam and the Revolution."

1235 GMT: In the Midst of Uncertainty, Comedy. Fars News' fumbling attempt to turn the Khamenei health rumours into high evidence of the foreign-directed velvet revolution is book-ended by Michael Ledeen's latest entry onto the stage.

Ledeen's feigned modesty, "I have been given more credit than is absolutely necessary," is belied by his failure to acknowledge the true source of the rumour --- the Peiknet report of doctors at Khamenei's house --- and his surprise at the supposed outcome of his words, "It follows that I effectively shut down the Tehran Bazaar!"

What is most entertaining, however, if contributing nothing at all to knowledge are more Ledeen claims into the air --- "Not only was the Bazaar closed, but there seems to be a run on staples, as people stock up against the possibility of unsettled times" --- and this far-fetched explanation (from "Iranian friends") of the most prominent denial of the rumours so far: "The people at Tabnak believed I had it right, and they put it up in order to say “hey look at this! The Americans know our most secret secrets.”

1055 GMT: Khamenei's Health Rumours? Blame the Velvet Revolution. OK, we've got a long, convoluted denial of the health scare story, courtesy of Fars News. According to their "analyst", this is all part of the post-election scheme, similar to undermine the regime (the Government's bogeyman, financier George Soros, even makes an appearance). And the author is pointed in drawing a comparison with the rumours in 2007 of Khamenei's demise.

1015 GMT: Friday Prayer Update. Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, using the analogy of Imam Sadegh, the 6th Imam, has declared that the issues of security in the Islamic Republic are due to "a lack of respect".

0900 GMT: Bad news for John Hannah, the former advisor to Dick Cheney who is trying to "help" Iran's people by crippling the economy (0845 GMT). China just made it clearer than clear that sanctions are not on the agenda. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, at a Thursday press conference his guest, Iran's First Vice President Mohammad Reza Rahimi, declared, "The Sino-Iranian relationship has witnessed rapid development, as the two countries' leaders have had frequent exchanges, and cooperation in trade and energy has widened and deepened."

0845 GMT: We've posted two special analyses this morning: our newest correspondent, Mohammad Khiabani, introduces readers to the issues in the Iranian economy, while Maryam from Keeping the Change takes on the former Bush Administration official who is advocating harsh economic sanctions "on behalf of Iran's people".

0645 GMT: At one point yesterday, caught up in the rumours of the Supreme Leader's illness or death, I was inappropriately reminded of a classic sketch from the US show Saturday Night Live, in which newscaster Chevy Chase would sombrely inform the audience, "Spain's Generalissimo Francisco Franco is still dead." (Trust me, I'm looking for the video clip.)

Well, Franco is still dead and Ayatollah Khamenei is still not dead, as far as we know. There are indications that something is amiss in Iran: the "hard-line" daily Kayhan has not published since Monday, the English-language Tehran Times has been silent since Tuesday. The Supreme Leader's official sites, leader.ir and khamenei.ir, have not denied the rumours. Leader.ir has been quiet for a week and khamenei.ir refers the reader to the one Iranian newspaper responding to the rumours: Tabnak denounces the US activist Michael Ledeen (who, just as a reminder, was not the original source for the current round of Khamenei rumours; that honour goes to Peiknet, a website associated with "left" Iranian exiles).

The one counter-indication is a note on the Facebook site run by Khamenei supporters, which claims the Supreme Leader was present Wednesday at the rites for Imam Sadegh. If that was true, however, one would expect to have seen the news elsewhere in the Iranian press. So here's our own position: we're on watch, but making no conclusions. If there is no official denial by the end of today, then we will begin thinking that there may be substance to the original Peiknet report.This is not that Khamenei has died, but that he is too ill to be in public.

Part of our caution on the Supreme Leader story is because it is obscuring political developments which are both 100% confirmed and 100% significant. The headline event yesterday was Mehdi Karroubi's defiant response to the Government threats to arrest him. He not only refused to withdraw his allegations of the system's abuses; he promised a doubling and re-doubling of evidence if he was charged.

The initial read is easy: Karroubi will not lie down. Just as in August, when he was threatened with court action, just as in September, when he was told by Ali Larijani to be quiet, the cleric has responded by making himself visible and heard. And this is being achieved despite the Government's 24/7 surveillance on Karroubi and his house.

The more difficult read is whether this marks another surge in the opposition movement. That, as we noted earlier this week, cannot rest on Karroubi alone. Hashemi Rafsanjani appears to be in a phase of fighting for his personal position, but Mir Hossein Mousavi joined Karroubi's most recent push, the meeting of last Saturday. Will he make an appearance this weekend, despite his own difficulties in moving (and even talking) under the regime's gaze? And what does the Green Wave take from yesterday's remarks of the man who some are calling "Obi-Wan Karroubi" (Yes, really.)?

The demonstrations of 13 Aban (4 November) are 19 days away.

A Brilliant Neo-Con Idea: Crippling Iran to Save It

The Latest from Iran (16 October): Rumours and Drama, Khamenei and Karroubi

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

Yesterday I noticed an opinion piece in the Los Angeles Times by John Hannah, a former assistant to Vice President Dick Cheney. Hannah --- notable in the Bush years for being Cheney's fixer, running over other Government agencies to ensure the Vice President's will was done on issues from "enhanced interrogation" to rendition to Iraq --- is now declaring his concern for the Iranian people, who will accept "additional hardships" to remove their regime. Fortunately, whereas his boss Cheney pressed in 2007 for the "additional hardship" of bombing Iran, Hannah is now merely talking about a range of damaging economic sanctions.

Once my temperature cooled, I could not bring myself to acknowledging Hannah's piece by responding to it. Fortunately, Maryam from Keeping the Change can, in this effective decimation of the rhetoric and reality of Hannah's proposal. Hannah's original words follow her comment:

John Hannah Want to "Cripple Iran to Save It"

We have to admit: John Hannah's op-ed in the Los Angeles Times (below) takes a clever approach to the old-line heard from most U.S. neo-conservatives on the need to confront Iran with "harsh sanctions" and/or "military action". Citing to an anonymous group of Iranian activists with which he purportedly met while in Europe, Hannah argues in his article that the Iranian Opposition movement wants, but cannot openly call for, "crippling sanctions" against Iran. A provocative point --- should we believe him?

For several reasons, all signs point to no.

Leaving aside the fact that he was formerly a close advisor to Dick Cheney, one of the most vocal proponents of military action against Iran, Hannah is currently affiliated with the right-wing Washington Institute for Near-East Policy, a think tank founded by members of the American-Israel Political Action Committee (AIPAC) in the mid-1980s. AIPAC is a powerful pro-Israel lobby and one of the most influential lobbying groups in the United States. Appreciating that AIPAC's partisan reputation limited its abilities to push the U.S. government on certain policy and legislative proposals, its founders established the Institute in the hopes of having a credible, "objective" vehicle through which to push AIPAC's agenda. In the nearly 25 years since its creation, the Institute has, by and large, taken policy positions that support a more right-wing approach to the Middle East, which are generally in-line with AIPAC's political goals and have included advocating military confrontation with and other harsh measures against Iran.

Now, Hannah's op-ed seems cleverly designed to make challenging his position difficult. According to Hannah, while members of the Opposition Movement, such as former Presidential candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi, have publicly opposed sanctions they have little choice but to take this position. While it is surprisingly hard to confront such a claim, no matter how contradictory it may seem, a quick canvassing of comments made by high-profile members of the "Movement in Exile" suggests the deception of Hannah's argument. To whit, his claims are directly at odds with public statements made by prominent Opposition figures currently based outside Iran, such as the human rights activist Shirin Ebadi and the U.S.-based dissident cleric Mohsen Kadivar, both of whom have opposed wide-raging economic sanctions of the sort suggested by Hannah. Now maybe Hannah could convince us that even these individuals are too fearful of government reprisals to speak out in favor of sanctions -- but, then, one wonders, why this fear has not stopped them from coming out in support of the Opposition Movement over the last four months. Moreover, Hannah's selective quotation of Iran analyst and Obama advisor Karim Sajjadpour also appears to be misleading. His attempt to equate Sajjadpour's purported suggestion that "punitive measures" imposed by the United States may be to the liking of Opposition leader, with Hannah's call for "crippling sanctions" is a tenuous argument at best.

We do not doubt that Hannah did in fact speak to Iranian activists while in Europe. But, based upon the statements he attributes to these individuals, he most likely met with members of the exiled Iranian dissident group Mojahedin-e-Khalq, an organization which is in no way affiliated with the Green Movement. For the last thirty years, the Mojahedin has been the most organized Iranian exile group, actively working to bring down the regime. With an army base in Iraq, along the Iran-Iraq border, and a political headquarters in Paris, the group's primary support comes from members of the Iranian diaspora (particularly in Europe), rather than from amongst people inside Iran. During the Bush Presidency, the Mojahedin was widely known to have allied itself closely with the Administration's neo-conservative hawks and to have consistently pushed for military attack against Iran. Since the organization's activities inside the United States were significantly curtailed after September 11th (the group was officially designated by the State Department as a terrorist organization in 1997, in response to pressure from Iran and in the hopes of achieving a detente with the Reformist Government of then-President Mohammad Khatami), any meeting with high-profile group members would likely have required Hannah to travel to Europe.

In short, John Hannah's claims that Opposition figures support sanctions against Iran is nothing but smoke and mirrors. Those who want to "Cripple Iran to Save It" remain the same individuals who pushed to attack Iran during the Bush years, namely, a coterie of neo-conservative hardliners and exiled Iranian political groups out of touch with the realities of the country.

"Cripple Iran to Save It" by John Hannah

"If current negotiations falter, international efforts to curtail Iran's nuclear program may escalate to the imposition of "crippling sanctions" or even the use of military force. A crucial question that policymakers must consider is whether such punitive measures would help or hinder the popular uprising against the Iranian regime that emerged after the country's fraudulent June 12 presidential elections.

The so-called green movement -- the color has been adopted by the opposition -- poses the most serious challenge to the survivability of the Islamic Republic in its 30-year history. Few analysts doubt that if it succeeded in toppling Iran's hard-line regime, the crisis over the Iranian nuclear program would become far more susceptible to diplomatic resolution.

Before June 12, conventional wisdom suggested that both harsh sanctions and military action would likely strengthen the Islamic Republic by triggering a "rally around the regime" effect. Iran's rulers, so the argument went, would exploit outside pressure to stoke Persian nationalism, deflecting popular anger away from the regime's own cruelty onto the perceived foreign threat -- in effect, short-circuiting the country's incipient democratic revolution.

But the conventional wisdom has taken something of a beating post-June 12. Before the elections, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad sought to blame all of Iran's travails -- a deteriorating economy, international isolation, the mounting threat of war -- on the United States and Israel. But the Iranian people were buying none of it. On the contrary, by the millions they have gone to considerable lengths over the last four months to make one thing clear: When affixing responsibility for the misery, shame and danger being visited on their once-great nation, they focus overwhelmingly on the ruling regime itself -- on its economic incompetence, its tyrannical nature, its international belligerence.

There's good reason to doubt they would react differently now were the United States and its partners to impose painful sanctions. If anything, the bloody crackdown the Iranian people have endured since the election has only fueled their hatred of the current ruling clique and their determination to be rid of it as soon as possible. Popular loathing of the regime has reached such levels that almost any negative development is likely to be seized on as ammunition to attack its gross misrule. Almost any outside action that further squeezes Iran's tyrants and calls into question their legitimacy in the eyes of the world will be welcomed, even at the risk of imposing additional hardships on the Iranian people. The last thing on their minds is defending an indefensible regime in the face of tough international sanctions.

That was certainly the message I heard at a recent gathering of Iranian activists in Europe, including figures closely linked to the green movement's leadership. Sanctions must be imposed, and in strong doses, the group urged. A weak dose, or gradual approach, only allows the regime to adjust, they said. To be effective, sanctions must act like a shock, not a vaccine.

Similarly, prominent Iran expert Karim Sadjadpour told a Washington conference last month: "Whereas in the past [the leaders of Iran's opposition] were ... unequivocally opposed to any type of punitive measures by the United States ... that's not the case anymore."

While it remains too risky for the opposition's leadership to call publicly for sanctions, Sadjadpour claimed that privately they are eager to discuss what measures would be most effective and to synchronize their activities with U.S. actions against the regime.

What about military action? This is a much harder call. Iran experts are split. The majority still maintain that Iranians would quickly unite to confront any foreign attacker. While opposition representatives I heard in Europe think that's unlikely, they are deeply worried that if the regime is not crippled in any military attack, it will move ruthlessly to crush their movement for good.

But a few Iranians -- especially in private -- see other possibilities. They suggest that a bombing campaign that spared civilians while destroying Iran's nuclear installations as well as targets associated with the regime's most repressive elements -- the Revolutionary Guard and Basij militia -- might well accelerate the theocracy's final unraveling at the hands of an already boiling population.

Accurately assessing how these different scenarios will play out is crucial for U.S. interests. The stakes could not be higher, and the answers are far from certain. But it does seem likely that the international community's room for maneuvering may be far more extensive than many believed before this summer's uprising. Just how extensive should be the subject of urgent review by the United States and its allies as they seek to ensure that the Islamic Republic's unprecedented domestic vulnerability is fully exploited to stop its dangerous march toward nuclear weapons.

Iran: A Beginner's Guide to the Economy, Past and Present

The Latest from Iran (16 October): Rumours and Drama, Khamenei and Karroubi
Latest Iran Video: Selling Ahmadinejad’s Economic Plan (13 October)

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

EA's newest correspondent, Mohammad Khiabani, introduces us to the economics preceding and accompanying the post-election situation:

The subsidy system that exists in Iran --- one that benefits both individuals and industry by lowering costs of basic daily goods but is highly inefficient and unfair in the distribution of those benefits ---- was never meant to be permanent. It was an expansion of a earlier set of food and energy subsidies that began under the Pahlavi dynasty, as part of the old regime's economic and social policy.

During the 1980s war with Iraq and the US embargo, when Mir Housain Mousavi was Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic (and not too ideologically different from the Revolutionary Guard in his political positions), the subsidy system expanded into a general distribution network that kept consumption in Iran at decent levels. This involved government-run food centers throughout the country, price controls, nationalization of foreign trade, multiple currency exchange rates, and a rationed goods program. Just as in the Battle of London during WWII, when the average Londoner's nutrition levels went up even while the city was being bombed by the Luftwaffe, the effect of this network in Iran was to equalize the consumption of goods. This helped raise the lower classes' living standards even while Iran's wealth declined from the Pahlavi days of its oil-fueled economic "miracle".

However, since the late 1980s, the Iranian regime has slowly dismantled this system. First it opened up to foreign trade, then it aligned its currency rates, then it allowed foreign investment in small parcels, and it finally attempted to tackle the biggest problem of readjusting the prices of basic goods so that they adjust according to market fluctuations. This is a noble goal, because the richest Iranians get the most benefit from the subsidies of food, energy, and gasoline, simply because they consume more of everything. The Islamic Republic has also, in conjunction with slow economic liberalization, expanded the social safety net for its population over the last 20 years, with a combination of decentralized primary health centers in rural and urban areas, large social insurance funds that operate under the category of "non-governmental" organizations, and initiatives to give everyone at least some form of pension and health insurance.

This long process, seen up close, looks like chaos. But if you step back, it has an odd logic to it, and it has contributed to comparatively good standards of living in Iran versus other middle-income countries, as measured by life expectancy, literacy (including amongst females in a region where rates are historically low), and low infant mortality. If you read Thursday's Wall Street Journal article on China's unraveled health care system, which used to be one of the best in the Third World, Iran does not look that bad.

What does this mean? Yes, social policy in Iran is imbued with politics, just as in any large state (look no further than the daily grind on Capitol Hill in Washington). Factions exist, with constituencies, and they jockey for power and recognition of successful policies.

It is all too forgotten now that privatization, subsidy reform, foreign investment, and welfare expansion were all part of the Khatami administration's economic plans between 1997 and 2005. And in a very Clintonesque move, Ahmadinejad has borrowed some of the best ideas of his predecessor and claimed them as his own. It seems now that the current (and very tendentious) alignment of factions in the Majles has fostered the political will to actually pass a restructuring of subsidies, while those conditions did not exist in the second Khatami term.

Daily politics in Iran has lineages deeply embedded in its past. Even the Revolutionary Guard's intervention in the economy stems from the after-effects of the 1980s war, when President Rafsanjani utilized Guard manpower and engineering expertise for the reconstruction of the country. This also had the added benefit of keeping hundreds of thousands of Iranian veterans employed, with a few of them getting quite rich in the process.

It is difficult to predict how well the government will pull off a restructuring of the subsidy system. While a much smaller implementation of gasoline rationing two years ago resulted in a few instances of gas stations being attacked, today the measure is seen as a success and discussed as a microcosm for the reforms. Plans to utilize the social security system of Iran to distribute cash and aid to the lower 50% of Iranians to offset incoming higher prices may actually expand and strengthen the social safety net. This may also inadvertently decrease the power of religious foundations such as the Imam Khomeini Relief Committee, widely criticized as a non-transparent charity organization, but currently very influential in poor Iranians' lives.

Any look through the microscope at Iranian politics must not be blinkered. Instead, it should be accompanied with a longer-term perspective on Iran's economy and society, one that allows us to talk about Iran with the same kind of language and terminology we use to talk about Turkey, Mexico, China, and any large middle-income country.

The Latest from Iran (15 October): Restricting the Movement

NEW Iran: Karroubi Responds to Government Threats "Bring. It. On."
Iran-US-Russia Deal on Enrichment, The Sequel
Latest Iran Video: Selling Ahmadinejad’s Economic Plan (13 October)
Iran: The Latest on Mehdi Karroubi
The Latest from Iran (14 October): Watching Karroubi, Rafsanjani, and the Supreme Leader’s Health

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis



2010 GMT: Our Daily Contribution to the Khamenei Death Rumour Mill. The Supreme Leader's Facebook site has the following message from Wednesday, "Today Noon; Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Supreme Leader of Iran attended a rite in respect of Imam Sadeq(A.S)".

If true, this would disprove Tuesday's Peiknet story, the original source of the current health rumors, that the Supreme Leader had been confined to his house by doctors.

1620 GMT: A Dutch Member of Parliament, Harry van Bommel, has urged Foreign Minister Maxime Verhagen to take further action against the imminent execution of Iranians sentenced in post-election cases:

Protest at the European level is not enough. The Netherlands should also use its own channels. There is an escalation of political oppression in Iran and we should react to that by using heavier diplomatic means....To prevent the eradication of any kind of opposition in Iran, the Netherlands must act now.

Human rights is one of Verhagen's policy priorities, and he can be contacted in English or Dutch via Twitter.

1545 GMT: Mehdi Karroubi has responded --- big-time --- to Government attempts to arrest him over his allegations of abuses of detainees. We've got the details in a separate entry.

1405 GMT: Fereshteh Ghazi has posted an interview with  the lawyer of Arash Pour-Rahmani, who was sentenced to death for subversive activity last week. Her headline is a blunt description: "Close to Death but Clueless".

1400 GMT: Iranian authorities continue to prevent filmmaker Jafar Panahi, who was briefly detained on 30 July, from leaving the country.

1110 GMT: President Ahmadinejad has used the setpiece of a meeting with an Egyptian writer and scholar to declare that further US sanctions on Iran are unlikely: “In a status where countries are seeking free trade, talk of embargoes is meaningless. At any rate, they have already imposed sanctions against our country, but achieved nothing. The world is a big place and all states are not controlled by a certain bullying regime."

Of course, this could be read as defiance but another reading is that Ahmadinejad is signalling that productive engagement is alive and well.

0900 GMT: Yesterday we noticed the latest message from Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, delivered after his class at Qom's seminary, challenging the Revolutionary Guard. An EA correspondent adds details of the statement:

As Ayatollah Khomeini has said, the Army, Revolutionary Forces, and Basij militia must not interfere with the political affairs as it would be very dangerous for the country. These forces should use their power against the enemy not the people and friends.

Statements that protecting the Islamic republic is obligatory only apply if the Islamic system is loyal to its values and slogans.

The values and the slogans of the Islamic Republic are "Independence, Freedom, and the Islamic Republic". Independence means not to be obedient to a superpower. Freedom is having the freedom of speech and the belief that the opponents will not be put behind bars. Republic means a system based on people's votes and finally Islamic means that the system should be based upon the Islamic values.

0815 GMT: Amidst the rumours about the Supreme Leader's health, there will be some terrible "analysis" today, but the blogger Allahpundit takes an early lead in the competition. It's not so much that he/she declares "Irresponsible Rumor of the Day" and then treats it as true for his/her thought. It's more that the speculation is awful:

Before the summer uprising, the odds-on choice to succeed [the Supreme Leader] was Rafsanjani....One possibility is [now] the Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, Ahmadinejad’s own personal “spiritual advisor”....Another possibility is that the [Revolutionary] Guard will simply finish the process started this summer and stage a full-blown military coup, installing Ahmadinejad or Jafari as dictator and taking things from there....The third possibility is the likeliest — namely, finding a puppet from among the clerical ranks who can be sold to the west as a 'pragmatist' or 'reformist' while letting the Guard control things behind the scenes.

0625 GMT: Amidst continuing chatter --- all unconfirmed --- about the declining state of the Supreme Leader's health, including claims that the Tehran Bazaar is talking about Ayatollah Khamenei's passing, this line stands out: "Obviously, every rumor about Khamenei’s death to date has been false."

0615 GMT: Meanwhile, in the "West", there has been a notable switch from the nuclear issue to "human rights" to challenge the Obama Administration's engagement with the Ahmadinejad Government. This morning's Washington Post editorial endorses the latest speech by Iranian lawyer and Nobel Prize laureate Shirin Ebadi: "Mr. Obama has extended the hand of friendship to a man who has blood on his hands. He can at least avoid shaking the hand of friendship with him." Tehran Bureau, increasingly prominent as a site for the views of the Iranian diaspora, features Setareh Sabety's comment, "I do not want my President, who made me cry with his words of justice and freedom, who made me think that the impossible was possible, to shake the hands of the murderer of my children."

0600 GMT: More "Information"? Could be coincidence but Javan Online, the newspaper associated with the Revolutionary Guard, has followed its story on Hashemi Rafsanjani with a purported statement from Ayatollah Mahdavi Kani on the post-election protests. Mahdavi-Kani was named as co-author with Rafsanjani of the draft National Unity Plan, published by Fars News in late September, the incident that prompted Rafsanjani's denunciation on Tuesday of "false news".

Meanwhile, Javan's lead story is another purported analysis of US-supported regime change.

0500 GMT: A rather strange day on Wednesday.

We watched for signs of political movement from Mehdi Karroubi and Hashemi Rafsanjani; what we saw was the extent of the Government's attempts to break their challenge.

The headline story of the Government's threats to prosecute Karroubi and Mir Hossein Mousavi was supplemented by accounts of the restrictions on the movements of both men. With constant surveillance and pressure by Government forces, they are confined to houses for long periods and, in the case of Mousavi, reportedly corresponding by written messages inside the home.

As for Rafsanjani, who is free to move and who holds key positions inside the establishment, he faces the Government distortion of his words and views. It also should not be forgotten that the regime maintains the threat of prosecution of his family members if the former President should move too far out of line.

A reader writes passionately, "Rafsanjani has no power any more and he lost it all trying to resolve his personal agenda." That's a fair challenge, especially given Rafsanjani's cautious and perhaps over-complex approach to politics, but I think it minimises the extent of the Government's fightback against a dangerous foe, especially after his mid-July Friday Prayers.

I also think that, as the Government is doing, one has to keep all the leaders in the picture. Individually, Karroubi, Mousavi, and Rafsanjani (as well as others like former President Khatami and senior clerics) can only have limited effect in the campaign for "reform" of the Ahmadinejad Government and Iranian system. It is only when there is both the movement of Rafsanjani inside the establishment and the challenge brought by Karroubi-Mousavi from outside --- again, a convergence we saw in mid-July --- that President Ahmadinejad and his allies are on the defensive.

Logically, then, the Government's approach is divide and rule. If Rafsanjani can be threatened and distorted into a strategy of gradual --- very gradual --- steps and Mousavi can be bottled up, then Karroubi's persistent statements are mere annoyances.

So is that it, then? Not quite. The paradox is that the umbrella political term in Iran right now is "National Unity Plan". Indeed, the Javan "information" that Rafsanjani supported Ahmadinejad's 2nd-term Government was put out in the context of a political meeting on that Plan.

We still don't know the details of the current draft Plan, from amongst the confusing reports of recent weeks, but any "National Unity Plan" which does not take some account of the opposition of past months will be seen as far from unifying.

And, yes, even that could be successful --- can Mousavi, Karroubi, Khatami, and the dissident clerics summon up the strength for another confrontation? --- were it not for another looming presence. The Green movement has been quieted and limited by time and Government restrictions, but it has not been vanquished. And 4 November, the day of the next major demonstration, is now less than three weeks away.

The Government restrictions have lengthened the political game --- we now see patterns in months, rather than weeks or days --- but it has not won it. No amount of surveillance, disinformation, or threat of prosecution can cover up that reality.

Iran: Karroubi Responds to Government Threats "Bring. It. On."

Iran: The Latest on Mehdi Karroubi
The Latest from Iran (15 October): Restricting the Movement
The Latest from Iran (13 October): Government Threatens Karroubi

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

Enduring America, 14 October: "We’re wondering, 'Does Karroubi back down?', and we’re thinking, 'No.' His response to the Government’s ham-fisted warning, which following similar threats over the last two months — may not come today, but I would look for a clear signal from the cleric by the weekend."

We were wrong. Karroubi did not wait until Saturday or even the Iranian weekend on Friday. He has welcomed the promise of Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejeie, Iran's General Prosecutor, to “take [Mir Hossein] Mousavi and Karroubi to court when the time is right”, with the unsubtle hint that he can now bring out some very heavy evidence (English summary via Facebook page linked to Mousavi):

I very much welcome this event so that if during... these years due to some considerations I have not raised some issues, I could do so in detail.

Unfortunately in these years the authorities who, according to Imam Khomeini should be the servants of the nation, have not paid any attention to this advice. Instead of being responsible and taking fair positions, they have confirmed the positions of extremist media to hide their unjust behaviour and also insult and falsely accuse others who do not have any media [to defend themselves].

This time not only I am not concerned about the “trial” but also I very much welcome it so that by this means I can emphasise my concerns that arise from national and religious beliefs of the Iranians and Imam Khomeini’s ideas, and clearly reveal those who are oppose to these concerns.