The Latest from Iran (18 October): Today's Bombings

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NEW Video: Blame on Sunni Group Jundallah, US For Bombing
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NEW Iran: The Great Supreme Leader Health Mystery
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The Latest from Iran (17 October): Back to Semi-Normal

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2000 GMT: The official death toll from today's bombing is now 42.

1950 GMT: Coincidence or Sabotage? A passenger train travelling from Tehran to Kerman derailed today, and a tea factory in Golestan burned to the ground.

1925 GMT: Mehr News is reporting that the explosion near the Oil Ministry in Tehran was from a faulty air tank.

Islamic Republic News Agency, repeating the air tank story, is reporting one person killed and 17 injured.

1910 GMT: Switching the Foreign "Enemy" from the US to Pakistan. This morning, when the Revolutionary Guard was claiming Washington was behind the bombings, we wrote, "Watch carefully to see if the Ahmadinejad Government maintains this line, which could derail 'engagement'."

There's a big clue tonight that Ahmadinejad has chosen engagement over the blame-US line. Fars News reports that the Iranian Cabinet has demanded that Pakistan bring forward those who carried out the bombings, a positioning reinforced by the summoning of the Pakistani Ambassador to the Foreign Ministry. There is no mention of the US anywhere in the Fars story.

1900 GMT: There are reports of an explosion near the Oil Ministry in Tehran.

1830 GMT: The Death Toll Rises.... The afternoon number of 31 dead from this morning's bombing will rise, though it is uncertain how much. Fars News reports that 35 victims have already been identified.

1625 GMT: National Unity Plan. It's alive, and it apparently has been submitted to the Supreme Leader (who is apparently also alive) for consideration. We've posted a separate entry on the newsflash.

1535 GMT: Iran's Nuclear Programme: This is Not Good. If the following report from Press TV is accurate, Iran's nuclear negotiators --- on the eve of the Vienna technical talks --- just laughed in the face of the "West": "A team of Iranian experts heads for the Austrian capital to discuss the terms of a deal to buy highly-enriched uranium without exchanging any of Tehran's low-enriched uranium."

The deal discussed quietly since June between Iran and other countries, including the US, is precisely for Tehran to transfer 80 percent of its low-enriched uranium to third countries for enrichment. Simply adding highly-enriched supplies to Iran's existing low-enriched stock has no appeal for Washington, which sees third-party enrichment as a way to ensure that Tehran stays below the 20 percent enrichment maximum for "civilian" uses of uranium.


1530 GMT: Another Suspended Sentence. A day after the five-year suspended sentence for Saeed Hajjarian, the same judgement has been handed down on Shahab Tabatabai, Head of Campaign 88 for young supporters of Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mohammad Khatami.

1430 GMT: Now Back to Politics. Mir Hossein Mousavi, writing on his website Kalameh (English summary on Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty) after a meeting with relatives of detained former Deputy Foreign Minister Mohsen Aminzadeh, says he will persist in efforts for reform in spite of the Government's attempts to suppress post-election protests:

Our people are not rioters. Reform will continue as long as people's demands are not met. Keeping these people in jail is meaningless. They should be released as soon as possible.

1340 GMT: On the international front, Fars News reports that Iran's delegation to the technical talks in Vienna tomorrow will include Ali Asghar Soltanieh, the Iranian ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Hamid Reza Asghari, deputy head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organisation, and Mehdi Khaniki, another IAEO chief executive. However, Ali Akhbar Salehi, the head of the IAEO is not going.

1330 GMT: Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani has also taken the line that Washington carries responsibility for today's bombings, "We consider this recent terrorist act to be the result of the U.S. actions and this is a sign of their enmity."

To repeat: US and Iranian officials are due to meet tomorrow in the next step of engagement, technical talks on Iran's uranium enrichment programme.

1240 GMT: The Islamic Republic News Agency is featuring a message from President Ahmadinejad, offering his condolences to the families of those killed this morning and expressing confidence that there would be a swift response to the "criminal action".

1230 GMT: EA's Mr Smith checks in with detail on Jundallah and the bombing: "We would normally dismiss the Iranian allegations of foreign interference as the usual anti-West yarn from Tehran, but the claims against [Jundallah leader Abdolmalek] Rigi warrant extra attention. He is an extremely shadowy figure who appears to be well-protected, to the extent that his own brother has been caught and sentenced to death [Hamid Rigi was reprieved at the last minute although 13 other Jundullah members were executed] by the Iranian authorities but he himself is still at large.

"He has appeared several times on Voice of America Persian, under the label "Leader of the 'Popular Resistance Movement of Iran', which is something VOA made up --- it's not quite the Persian translation of Jundullah. Exactly how the VOA got hold of him for a live interview, via satellite phone, is quite unexplained, as is the prominence and deference accorded to him. This interview caused a serious backlash in the Iranian blogosphere and seriously discredited VOA Persian."

1215 GMT: Press TV's reporting is not only emphasising Jundallah's responsibility for the bombings but playing up a US connection. In a video we've posted in a separate entry, Press TV claims --- from an interview with the captured brother of Junduallah's leader, Abdolmalek Rigi --- that the group "has been in constant contact with the US Embassy in Islamabad [Pakistan] and this has been certified by different groups and sources [of Press TV]".

1200 GMT: The latest from Iranian state media puts the death toll from this morning's larger bombing at 29, including six senior Revolutionary Guard commanders, with 28 injured. The Sunni rebel group Jundallah is reported to have claimed responsibility for the attack. The Revolutionary Guard continue to allege that the US is involved, while state television has also blamed Britain.

0945 GMT: We've moved our initial morning analysis, considering the politics of the Supreme Leader's health, the release on bail of journalist Maziar Bahari, the suspended sentence for Saeed Hajjarian, and more arrests, to a separate analysis.

0920 GMT: Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting has identified the site of the larger of the two bombings as the gates of a conference hall, where the Revolutionary Guard meeting with tribal elders was to take place, in the city of Sarbaz in Sistan-Baluchestan.

0845 GMT: Press TV adds an interesting detail on the bombing, pointing to coordinated attacks: "At around the same time, another group of IRGC commanders were caught in an explosion as their convoy came under attack at a road junction" in the town of Pishin in Sistan-Baluchestan.

0840 GMT: No new details on the suicide boming, but Revolutionary Guard officials have issued a communique saying "foreign elements" linked to the US were responsible.

Watch carefully to see if the Ahmadinejad Government maintains this line, which could derail "engagement". US and Iranian delegations are due to meet tomorrow in the "5+1" technical talks on Iran's uranium enrichment.

0725 GMT: Iranian state media is reporting that "several" senior commanders have been killed by a suicide bombing in Zahedan, the capital of Sistan-Baluchestan Province in southeastern Iran, which left 60 dead and injured.

Those killed include General Noor Ali Shooshtari, the deputy commander of the IRGC ground forces, and Rajab Ali Mohammadzadeh, the IRGC's commander in Sistan-Baluchestan.

The IRGC commanders had gathered to meet tribal elders, purportedly for Shia-Sunni reconciliation. (English summary avaiable via Associated Press)

The Latest from Iran (16 October): Rumours and Drama, Khamenei and Karroubi

NEW A Brilliant Neo-Con Idea: Crippling Iran to Save It
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The Latest from Iran (15 October): Restricting the Movement

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1945 GMT: The English-language website of Mowj-e-Sabz has a short summary of the Mousavi-Khatami meeting (1500 GMT).

1830 GMT: After a four-day absence, fueling speculation of a connection to the ill health of the Supreme Leader (0645 GMT), the newspaper Kayhan has reappeared today.

1515 GMT: The Battle Goes On. Yesterday Karroubi made clear his intention to stand firm against Government threats of arrests. So today the Government reiterated the warnings. The deputy head of Iran's judiciary, Ebrahim Raeesi, has repeated to the Islamic Republic News Agency that the consideration of charges is "very serious".

1500 GMT: Mousavi and Khatami Meet. Parleman News summarises a discussion between Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mohammad Khatami, who asserted that the Iranian nation will not be diverted from its course by "force and pressure". The post-election movement had awakened Iran to the blessings of Islamic Revolution, especially its path toward justice, freedom, independence, and honour, and it would not deviate from its attachment to those ideals."

1345 GMT: Nice response to today's Friday Prayers on Twitter: "Hey Jannati, thanks for the free publicity! You told WAY more ppl about 13 Aban [4 November demonstrations] than the Greens could!"

1255 GMT: HomyLafayette has posted a summary of Ayatollah Jannati's Friday Prayers (see 1015 GMT):

"Jannati warned Greens against trying to exploit anniversary of the US Embassy takeover, 4 November [13 Aban]. He said that their schemes...will be neutralized. Some people who are tools of others want to show their American and Israeli natures on 4 November. If judiciary and security apparatus treat protesters with leniency, they are traitors to Islam and the Revolution."

1235 GMT: In the Midst of Uncertainty, Comedy. Fars News' fumbling attempt to turn the Khamenei health rumours into high evidence of the foreign-directed velvet revolution is book-ended by Michael Ledeen's latest entry onto the stage.

Ledeen's feigned modesty, "I have been given more credit than is absolutely necessary," is belied by his failure to acknowledge the true source of the rumour --- the Peiknet report of doctors at Khamenei's house --- and his surprise at the supposed outcome of his words, "It follows that I effectively shut down the Tehran Bazaar!"

What is most entertaining, however, if contributing nothing at all to knowledge are more Ledeen claims into the air --- "Not only was the Bazaar closed, but there seems to be a run on staples, as people stock up against the possibility of unsettled times" --- and this far-fetched explanation (from "Iranian friends") of the most prominent denial of the rumours so far: "The people at Tabnak believed I had it right, and they put it up in order to say “hey look at this! The Americans know our most secret secrets.”

1055 GMT: Khamenei's Health Rumours? Blame the Velvet Revolution. OK, we've got a long, convoluted denial of the health scare story, courtesy of Fars News. According to their "analyst", this is all part of the post-election scheme, similar to undermine the regime (the Government's bogeyman, financier George Soros, even makes an appearance). And the author is pointed in drawing a comparison with the rumours in 2007 of Khamenei's demise.

1015 GMT: Friday Prayer Update. Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, using the analogy of Imam Sadegh, the 6th Imam, has declared that the issues of security in the Islamic Republic are due to "a lack of respect".

0900 GMT: Bad news for John Hannah, the former advisor to Dick Cheney who is trying to "help" Iran's people by crippling the economy (0845 GMT). China just made it clearer than clear that sanctions are not on the agenda. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, at a Thursday press conference his guest, Iran's First Vice President Mohammad Reza Rahimi, declared, "The Sino-Iranian relationship has witnessed rapid development, as the two countries' leaders have had frequent exchanges, and cooperation in trade and energy has widened and deepened."

0845 GMT: We've posted two special analyses this morning: our newest correspondent, Mohammad Khiabani, introduces readers to the issues in the Iranian economy, while Maryam from Keeping the Change takes on the former Bush Administration official who is advocating harsh economic sanctions "on behalf of Iran's people".

0645 GMT: At one point yesterday, caught up in the rumours of the Supreme Leader's illness or death, I was inappropriately reminded of a classic sketch from the US show Saturday Night Live, in which newscaster Chevy Chase would sombrely inform the audience, "Spain's Generalissimo Francisco Franco is still dead." (Trust me, I'm looking for the video clip.)

Well, Franco is still dead and Ayatollah Khamenei is still not dead, as far as we know. There are indications that something is amiss in Iran: the "hard-line" daily Kayhan has not published since Monday, the English-language Tehran Times has been silent since Tuesday. The Supreme Leader's official sites, leader.ir and khamenei.ir, have not denied the rumours. Leader.ir has been quiet for a week and khamenei.ir refers the reader to the one Iranian newspaper responding to the rumours: Tabnak denounces the US activist Michael Ledeen (who, just as a reminder, was not the original source for the current round of Khamenei rumours; that honour goes to Peiknet, a website associated with "left" Iranian exiles).

The one counter-indication is a note on the Facebook site run by Khamenei supporters, which claims the Supreme Leader was present Wednesday at the rites for Imam Sadegh. If that was true, however, one would expect to have seen the news elsewhere in the Iranian press. So here's our own position: we're on watch, but making no conclusions. If there is no official denial by the end of today, then we will begin thinking that there may be substance to the original Peiknet report.This is not that Khamenei has died, but that he is too ill to be in public.

Part of our caution on the Supreme Leader story is because it is obscuring political developments which are both 100% confirmed and 100% significant. The headline event yesterday was Mehdi Karroubi's defiant response to the Government threats to arrest him. He not only refused to withdraw his allegations of the system's abuses; he promised a doubling and re-doubling of evidence if he was charged.

The initial read is easy: Karroubi will not lie down. Just as in August, when he was threatened with court action, just as in September, when he was told by Ali Larijani to be quiet, the cleric has responded by making himself visible and heard. And this is being achieved despite the Government's 24/7 surveillance on Karroubi and his house.

The more difficult read is whether this marks another surge in the opposition movement. That, as we noted earlier this week, cannot rest on Karroubi alone. Hashemi Rafsanjani appears to be in a phase of fighting for his personal position, but Mir Hossein Mousavi joined Karroubi's most recent push, the meeting of last Saturday. Will he make an appearance this weekend, despite his own difficulties in moving (and even talking) under the regime's gaze? And what does the Green Wave take from yesterday's remarks of the man who some are calling "Obi-Wan Karroubi" (Yes, really.)?

The demonstrations of 13 Aban (4 November) are 19 days away.

A Brilliant Neo-Con Idea: Crippling Iran to Save It

The Latest from Iran (16 October): Rumours and Drama, Khamenei and Karroubi

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Yesterday I noticed an opinion piece in the Los Angeles Times by John Hannah, a former assistant to Vice President Dick Cheney. Hannah --- notable in the Bush years for being Cheney's fixer, running over other Government agencies to ensure the Vice President's will was done on issues from "enhanced interrogation" to rendition to Iraq --- is now declaring his concern for the Iranian people, who will accept "additional hardships" to remove their regime. Fortunately, whereas his boss Cheney pressed in 2007 for the "additional hardship" of bombing Iran, Hannah is now merely talking about a range of damaging economic sanctions.

Once my temperature cooled, I could not bring myself to acknowledging Hannah's piece by responding to it. Fortunately, Maryam from Keeping the Change can, in this effective decimation of the rhetoric and reality of Hannah's proposal. Hannah's original words follow her comment:

John Hannah Want to "Cripple Iran to Save It"

We have to admit: John Hannah's op-ed in the Los Angeles Times (below) takes a clever approach to the old-line heard from most U.S. neo-conservatives on the need to confront Iran with "harsh sanctions" and/or "military action". Citing to an anonymous group of Iranian activists with which he purportedly met while in Europe, Hannah argues in his article that the Iranian Opposition movement wants, but cannot openly call for, "crippling sanctions" against Iran. A provocative point --- should we believe him?

For several reasons, all signs point to no.

Leaving aside the fact that he was formerly a close advisor to Dick Cheney, one of the most vocal proponents of military action against Iran, Hannah is currently affiliated with the right-wing Washington Institute for Near-East Policy, a think tank founded by members of the American-Israel Political Action Committee (AIPAC) in the mid-1980s. AIPAC is a powerful pro-Israel lobby and one of the most influential lobbying groups in the United States. Appreciating that AIPAC's partisan reputation limited its abilities to push the U.S. government on certain policy and legislative proposals, its founders established the Institute in the hopes of having a credible, "objective" vehicle through which to push AIPAC's agenda. In the nearly 25 years since its creation, the Institute has, by and large, taken policy positions that support a more right-wing approach to the Middle East, which are generally in-line with AIPAC's political goals and have included advocating military confrontation with and other harsh measures against Iran.

Now, Hannah's op-ed seems cleverly designed to make challenging his position difficult. According to Hannah, while members of the Opposition Movement, such as former Presidential candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi, have publicly opposed sanctions they have little choice but to take this position. While it is surprisingly hard to confront such a claim, no matter how contradictory it may seem, a quick canvassing of comments made by high-profile members of the "Movement in Exile" suggests the deception of Hannah's argument. To whit, his claims are directly at odds with public statements made by prominent Opposition figures currently based outside Iran, such as the human rights activist Shirin Ebadi and the U.S.-based dissident cleric Mohsen Kadivar, both of whom have opposed wide-raging economic sanctions of the sort suggested by Hannah. Now maybe Hannah could convince us that even these individuals are too fearful of government reprisals to speak out in favor of sanctions -- but, then, one wonders, why this fear has not stopped them from coming out in support of the Opposition Movement over the last four months. Moreover, Hannah's selective quotation of Iran analyst and Obama advisor Karim Sajjadpour also appears to be misleading. His attempt to equate Sajjadpour's purported suggestion that "punitive measures" imposed by the United States may be to the liking of Opposition leader, with Hannah's call for "crippling sanctions" is a tenuous argument at best.

We do not doubt that Hannah did in fact speak to Iranian activists while in Europe. But, based upon the statements he attributes to these individuals, he most likely met with members of the exiled Iranian dissident group Mojahedin-e-Khalq, an organization which is in no way affiliated with the Green Movement. For the last thirty years, the Mojahedin has been the most organized Iranian exile group, actively working to bring down the regime. With an army base in Iraq, along the Iran-Iraq border, and a political headquarters in Paris, the group's primary support comes from members of the Iranian diaspora (particularly in Europe), rather than from amongst people inside Iran. During the Bush Presidency, the Mojahedin was widely known to have allied itself closely with the Administration's neo-conservative hawks and to have consistently pushed for military attack against Iran. Since the organization's activities inside the United States were significantly curtailed after September 11th (the group was officially designated by the State Department as a terrorist organization in 1997, in response to pressure from Iran and in the hopes of achieving a detente with the Reformist Government of then-President Mohammad Khatami), any meeting with high-profile group members would likely have required Hannah to travel to Europe.

In short, John Hannah's claims that Opposition figures support sanctions against Iran is nothing but smoke and mirrors. Those who want to "Cripple Iran to Save It" remain the same individuals who pushed to attack Iran during the Bush years, namely, a coterie of neo-conservative hardliners and exiled Iranian political groups out of touch with the realities of the country.

"Cripple Iran to Save It" by John Hannah

"If current negotiations falter, international efforts to curtail Iran's nuclear program may escalate to the imposition of "crippling sanctions" or even the use of military force. A crucial question that policymakers must consider is whether such punitive measures would help or hinder the popular uprising against the Iranian regime that emerged after the country's fraudulent June 12 presidential elections.

The so-called green movement -- the color has been adopted by the opposition -- poses the most serious challenge to the survivability of the Islamic Republic in its 30-year history. Few analysts doubt that if it succeeded in toppling Iran's hard-line regime, the crisis over the Iranian nuclear program would become far more susceptible to diplomatic resolution.

Before June 12, conventional wisdom suggested that both harsh sanctions and military action would likely strengthen the Islamic Republic by triggering a "rally around the regime" effect. Iran's rulers, so the argument went, would exploit outside pressure to stoke Persian nationalism, deflecting popular anger away from the regime's own cruelty onto the perceived foreign threat -- in effect, short-circuiting the country's incipient democratic revolution.

But the conventional wisdom has taken something of a beating post-June 12. Before the elections, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad sought to blame all of Iran's travails -- a deteriorating economy, international isolation, the mounting threat of war -- on the United States and Israel. But the Iranian people were buying none of it. On the contrary, by the millions they have gone to considerable lengths over the last four months to make one thing clear: When affixing responsibility for the misery, shame and danger being visited on their once-great nation, they focus overwhelmingly on the ruling regime itself -- on its economic incompetence, its tyrannical nature, its international belligerence.

There's good reason to doubt they would react differently now were the United States and its partners to impose painful sanctions. If anything, the bloody crackdown the Iranian people have endured since the election has only fueled their hatred of the current ruling clique and their determination to be rid of it as soon as possible. Popular loathing of the regime has reached such levels that almost any negative development is likely to be seized on as ammunition to attack its gross misrule. Almost any outside action that further squeezes Iran's tyrants and calls into question their legitimacy in the eyes of the world will be welcomed, even at the risk of imposing additional hardships on the Iranian people. The last thing on their minds is defending an indefensible regime in the face of tough international sanctions.

That was certainly the message I heard at a recent gathering of Iranian activists in Europe, including figures closely linked to the green movement's leadership. Sanctions must be imposed, and in strong doses, the group urged. A weak dose, or gradual approach, only allows the regime to adjust, they said. To be effective, sanctions must act like a shock, not a vaccine.

Similarly, prominent Iran expert Karim Sadjadpour told a Washington conference last month: "Whereas in the past [the leaders of Iran's opposition] were ... unequivocally opposed to any type of punitive measures by the United States ... that's not the case anymore."

While it remains too risky for the opposition's leadership to call publicly for sanctions, Sadjadpour claimed that privately they are eager to discuss what measures would be most effective and to synchronize their activities with U.S. actions against the regime.

What about military action? This is a much harder call. Iran experts are split. The majority still maintain that Iranians would quickly unite to confront any foreign attacker. While opposition representatives I heard in Europe think that's unlikely, they are deeply worried that if the regime is not crippled in any military attack, it will move ruthlessly to crush their movement for good.

But a few Iranians -- especially in private -- see other possibilities. They suggest that a bombing campaign that spared civilians while destroying Iran's nuclear installations as well as targets associated with the regime's most repressive elements -- the Revolutionary Guard and Basij militia -- might well accelerate the theocracy's final unraveling at the hands of an already boiling population.

Accurately assessing how these different scenarios will play out is crucial for U.S. interests. The stakes could not be higher, and the answers are far from certain. But it does seem likely that the international community's room for maneuvering may be far more extensive than many believed before this summer's uprising. Just how extensive should be the subject of urgent review by the United States and its allies as they seek to ensure that the Islamic Republic's unprecedented domestic vulnerability is fully exploited to stop its dangerous march toward nuclear weapons.

Iran: A Beginner's Guide to the Economy, Past and Present

The Latest from Iran (16 October): Rumours and Drama, Khamenei and Karroubi
Latest Iran Video: Selling Ahmadinejad’s Economic Plan (13 October)

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EA's newest correspondent, Mohammad Khiabani, introduces us to the economics preceding and accompanying the post-election situation:

The subsidy system that exists in Iran --- one that benefits both individuals and industry by lowering costs of basic daily goods but is highly inefficient and unfair in the distribution of those benefits ---- was never meant to be permanent. It was an expansion of a earlier set of food and energy subsidies that began under the Pahlavi dynasty, as part of the old regime's economic and social policy.

During the 1980s war with Iraq and the US embargo, when Mir Housain Mousavi was Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic (and not too ideologically different from the Revolutionary Guard in his political positions), the subsidy system expanded into a general distribution network that kept consumption in Iran at decent levels. This involved government-run food centers throughout the country, price controls, nationalization of foreign trade, multiple currency exchange rates, and a rationed goods program. Just as in the Battle of London during WWII, when the average Londoner's nutrition levels went up even while the city was being bombed by the Luftwaffe, the effect of this network in Iran was to equalize the consumption of goods. This helped raise the lower classes' living standards even while Iran's wealth declined from the Pahlavi days of its oil-fueled economic "miracle".

However, since the late 1980s, the Iranian regime has slowly dismantled this system. First it opened up to foreign trade, then it aligned its currency rates, then it allowed foreign investment in small parcels, and it finally attempted to tackle the biggest problem of readjusting the prices of basic goods so that they adjust according to market fluctuations. This is a noble goal, because the richest Iranians get the most benefit from the subsidies of food, energy, and gasoline, simply because they consume more of everything. The Islamic Republic has also, in conjunction with slow economic liberalization, expanded the social safety net for its population over the last 20 years, with a combination of decentralized primary health centers in rural and urban areas, large social insurance funds that operate under the category of "non-governmental" organizations, and initiatives to give everyone at least some form of pension and health insurance.

This long process, seen up close, looks like chaos. But if you step back, it has an odd logic to it, and it has contributed to comparatively good standards of living in Iran versus other middle-income countries, as measured by life expectancy, literacy (including amongst females in a region where rates are historically low), and low infant mortality. If you read Thursday's Wall Street Journal article on China's unraveled health care system, which used to be one of the best in the Third World, Iran does not look that bad.

What does this mean? Yes, social policy in Iran is imbued with politics, just as in any large state (look no further than the daily grind on Capitol Hill in Washington). Factions exist, with constituencies, and they jockey for power and recognition of successful policies.

It is all too forgotten now that privatization, subsidy reform, foreign investment, and welfare expansion were all part of the Khatami administration's economic plans between 1997 and 2005. And in a very Clintonesque move, Ahmadinejad has borrowed some of the best ideas of his predecessor and claimed them as his own. It seems now that the current (and very tendentious) alignment of factions in the Majles has fostered the political will to actually pass a restructuring of subsidies, while those conditions did not exist in the second Khatami term.

Daily politics in Iran has lineages deeply embedded in its past. Even the Revolutionary Guard's intervention in the economy stems from the after-effects of the 1980s war, when President Rafsanjani utilized Guard manpower and engineering expertise for the reconstruction of the country. This also had the added benefit of keeping hundreds of thousands of Iranian veterans employed, with a few of them getting quite rich in the process.

It is difficult to predict how well the government will pull off a restructuring of the subsidy system. While a much smaller implementation of gasoline rationing two years ago resulted in a few instances of gas stations being attacked, today the measure is seen as a success and discussed as a microcosm for the reforms. Plans to utilize the social security system of Iran to distribute cash and aid to the lower 50% of Iranians to offset incoming higher prices may actually expand and strengthen the social safety net. This may also inadvertently decrease the power of religious foundations such as the Imam Khomeini Relief Committee, widely criticized as a non-transparent charity organization, but currently very influential in poor Iranians' lives.

Any look through the microscope at Iranian politics must not be blinkered. Instead, it should be accompanied with a longer-term perspective on Iran's economy and society, one that allows us to talk about Iran with the same kind of language and terminology we use to talk about Turkey, Mexico, China, and any large middle-income country.

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1930 GMT: The reformist Assembly of Combatant Clergymen, paralleling the statements of Mohammad Khatami, have written an open letter to the head of Iran's judiciary, Sadegh Larijani, warning about the consequences of the current lawlessness and stressing that the judiciary should be held accountable for crimes, violation of law, and injustices. Among these violations are detentions in solitary confinement and uncertainties about charges:

Our fear and concern is because of the reduction or even destruction of the peoples trust and faith in the judiciary system. How can it be that, with a simple gesture, a newspaper is closed down and thus the artery of information of a party or group is blocked instantly; however, hundreds of newspapers and [Government] media with different kinds of accusations and convictions in their evidence become richer in their unbounded cheek and still the judiciary system is unable to dispense justice and only casts some general conclusions about the reproach of lies?

1910 GMT: A Very Gentle Day. Gentle by post-election standards, with the big domestic news Parliament's approval of Government cuts in food and gasoline/petrol subsidies. Reuters is only now catching up with Saturday's Karroubi-Mousavi meeting, loosely translating Mousavi as claiming, "It seems some people are trying to take us back to the Inquisition era."

1340 GMT: Posturing. After the flurry of political movement over the weekend, relatively quiet today. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is making an appearance in Shiraz, hoping that he doesn't face too many demonstrators. Mohammad Khatami is celebrating his 66th birthday with friends.

Meanwhile, the Iranian Government continues the ritual tough-talk two-step with its US partner, covering up the private movement towards accommodation. Responding to Hillary Clinton's finger-shaking that "the world will not wait indefinitely" for Iranian movement on the nuclear issue, the spokesman for Iran's Foreign Ministry blustered on Monday, "So far, western powers have achieved nothing by using the language of threats and sanctions against Iran. The West, itself, knows that this language is useless. We have always announced that we advocate negotiations."

0905 GMT: We've posted a special analysis of the politics surrounding the four death sentences handed out by the regime in recent days. And we've updated our feature on "Who Controls Iran?".

0900 GMT: A new poster (left) for the 4 November demonstrations is circulating. It repeats the slogans of previous flyers and adds, "United, we will be on the streets.
Join our million-strong green crowd on 13 Aban [4 November] in support of freedom in Iran. Stay in your car in silence in the areas where people are sitting in."

0720 GMT: Iranian state media is trying to keep President Ahmadinejad firmly in the international arena rather than within internal difficulties. The President's latest statement was the reassurance that Iran, not "the West", was setting the agenda for the next round of talks on Tehran's nuclear programme:

We have already agreed to discuss Iran's latest package of proposals. I don't think there will be any problems in the next round of talks but if someone wants to cause problems, they will fail. And if they succeed to do so, they will harm themselves.

Meanwhile the Iranian military is putting out its own tough reassurances, with a Brigadier General asserting, “Updating the defense systems is moving on an excellent progressive trend at present and (Iran’s systems) can compete with hi-tech systems of the world. Now we are in our best conditions of defensive preparedness."

0600 GMT:  Are we seeing an opposition revival? Consider that in the last 48 hours:

*Mohammad Khatami has made a high-profile appearance in Yazd Province and issued one of the strongest criticisms of the Government to date: “Be sure that people will never back down."

*Mehdi Karroubi, in a letter sent in his son's name, used the call for fairness from Iranian state broadcasting to attack the Iran judiciary's handling of his claims of detainee abuses;

*Karroubi has also re-established his web presence with the re-launch of Tagheer;

*Mir Hossein Mousavi, after seeing senior clerics on Thursday about his "social network", had a lengthy meeting on Saturday with Karroubi. In the summary of the meeting, both in Farsi and in English, their emphasis is on a renewal of pressure against the Government over electoral fraud, "legal" injustices, and abuses.

Add to this the re-appearance of Mousavi chief advisor Alireza Beheshti after the attempt to silence him through detention. Yesterday he issued a sharp response to Ahmad Khamati's Friday Prayer, deriding the cleric's claims of a US-sponsored "velvet revolution" (given that the Iranian Government had just sat across from US delegates at the Geneva talks) and calling for "rights" and "respect" for all Iranians.