The Latest from Iran (24 July): Reviewing the Situation

2210 GMT: The Re-Appearing Fatwa? But for eyebrow-raising, this wins the prize....

Rah-e-Sabz claims that the Supreme Leader's "I am the Rule of the Prophet" fatwa, which appeared on Tuesday but then receded from Iranian state media, is now back --- unfortunately, the website doesn't link to the supposed location.

NEW Iran Analysis: Rafsanjani Bowing Out? (Abedin)
UPDATED Iran Media Follow-Up: War, War, War. Blah, Blah, Blah. No Facts. More War. Blah.
Iran Interview: Detained US Hiker’s Mother “I Wish I Could Hear Her Voice”
Iran Analysis: The Supreme Leader & the Disappearing Fatwa (Verde)
The Latest from Iran (23 July): Receding Authority

2200 GMT: Bazaar Developments. We close this evening with some eyebrow-raising news.

It looks like there has been an attempted reconcilation between the President and officials of the conservative Motalefeh Party, who have been a traditional power behind the Bazaar. On Thursday Ahmadinejad met Habibollah Asgharowladi, Asadollah Badamchian, and Mohammad Nabi Habibi.

Friction between the President and Motalefeh had been stoked by the dispute over control of Islamic Azad University, with members of the party criticised by Ahmadinejad supporters for their defence of Parliament's position.

Meanwhile, Rah-e-Sabz posts photos of a large fire in Kerman Bazaar. The cause is unclear.

2145 GMT: Today's All-is-Well Alert. Ali Vakili, the managing director of Pars Oil and Gas Company, says that investment in Iran's South Pars gas field has increased by 120 percent in the current Iranian year. Vakili said the rise was the result of the issuance of 3 billion Euros in foreign currency bonds and $3.014 billion in national participation bonds.

There was no reported comment from Vakili on how bonds could assure completion of projects when foreign companies were withdrawing from South Pars.

1830 GMT: The Interrupted Memorial. Footage of the memorial for poet Ahmad Shamlou, disrupted by security forces (see 1640 GMT), has been posted.

1810 GMT: Labour Front. Operators at the Kermanshah Telecommunication Company staged a protest in front of the Kermanshah Governor’s mansion on Thursday.

1750 GMT: Picture of Day. One of a set of photographs of former Deputy Speaker of Parliament Mohsen Armin after his release from detention on $200,000 bail:



1745 GMT: Video of Day. Footage has been posted of poet Shams Langroudi reciting his work at the memorial for Amir Javadifar, killed in post-election conflict last year.

1730 GMT: A Demotion for the Supreme Leader? Reporting on a meeting of the Supreme Leader with his office staff, Rah-e-Sabz refers to "Mr Khamenei".

1653 GMT: Refugees in Germany. The first of 50 post-election Iranian refugees have arrived in Germany after they were granted asylum. The refugees, most of whom are reported to be dissident journalists, had been in Turkey.

1645 GMT: Karroubi Goes After the Guardians. Mehdi Karroubi, in a letter to Guardian Council member Ayatollah Mohammad Momen, has criticised the  Council for "institutionalizing fraud" and offering a "double-standard interpretation" of the constitution.

Karrubi alleged that the Council has become an "instrument for securing and maintaining power for a particular political faction".

1640 GMT: Blocking the Poet's Memorial. Parleman News reports that security forces have forced the cancellation of a memorial at the grave of Ahmad Shamlou, one of Iran's great contemporary poets, on the 10th anniversary of his death.

1405 GMT: Talking Tough. For Revolutionary Guard Commander Mohammad Ali Jafari, all this Government in-fighting is irrelevant: leaders of the "uproar" will be dealt with in a timely fashion.

1400 GMT: More Larijani v. Ahmadinejad. The Speaker of Parliament is in fighting mood: he has accused the Government of violating the Constitution over subsidy cuts.

1330 GMT: Parliament v. President (and It's in State Media). Press TV and the Islamic Republic News Agency breaks their usual silence on the Parliament's growing conflict with Mahoud Ahmadinejad, highlighting the issue of $2 billion for the Tehran Metro.

Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani is quoted, "Executive bodies are obliged to enforce this law after its communication. They cannot refrain from enforcing it. According to the Constitution, the president must communicate any law within a specific period of time. If a legislation is not communicated in due time the Majlis speaker will communicate it."

The Government has refused to sanction the $2 billion, possibly because of a political battle with Tehran Mayor Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf. (Former Vice President Massoumeh Ebtekar has just made this point in Rah-e-Sabz.)

1245 GMT: Academic Corner. Peyke Iran claims 13 professors at Al-Zahra University have been dismissed and students have advised to study China and Russia.

1240 GMT: Offside. The sports daily Goal has been banned for three months.

1200 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Mohsen Armin has been freed on bail of about $200,000.

An appellate court has upheld the 9 1/2-year sentence imposed on human rights activist Bahareh. Hedayat. The 7-year term of Milad Asadi has also been upheld.

1105 GMT: Parliament v. President. Another MP, Mus al-Reza Servati, has declared that the Ahmadinejad budget lacks ministerial signatures and is therefore illegal.

1045 GMT: Culture Corner. The Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance has reiterated that censorship of books and films is necessary.

1005 GMT: We have posted a separate analysis, "Rafsanjani Bowing Out?"

1000 GMT: Economy Watch. Peyke Iran claims that up to 85% of workers now have temporary employment contracts.

0925 GMT: The Universities Conflict. Raha Tahimi, writing for the Institute of War and Peace Reporting, posts a useful overview of the dispute over control of Islamic Azad University and the "temporary ceasefire" between former President Hashemi Rafsanjani and President Ahmadinejad.

0915 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. On Wednesday Mehdi Karroubi visited Narges Mohammadi, the women's rights activist who was recently released from detention.

Mohammadi continues to suffer from poor health and the lack of treatment provided when she was in prison.

0735 GMT: Cyber-Watch. Ali Aghazadeh of Parliament's National Security Commission has reportedly declared that "countless new sites need more control" by the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps.

0730 GMT: Conspiracy Theory. It wasn't all cheer and sending a man into space in the President's speech on Friday (see 0649 GMT).

Ahmadinejad "revealed plans by the United States and Israel", announcing, "They [Washington] have decided to attack two of the regional Arab states, which are our allies, with the help of the Zionist regime to create fear of decision-making in Iran."

The President teased the audience by not revealing which two Arab states are under the gun. Instead, he turned to another concern, chastising Russian President Dmitry Medvedev over remarks on Tehran's nuclear programme. Ahmadinejad regretted that Medvedev had "become the mouthpiece for the plot by the enemies of Iran."

The President did say that he maintained hope for relations with Moscow.

0700 GMT: Road to Nowhere. Iranian Students News Agency claims that the Ministry of Transport owes billions of dollars to construction companies, with 500 road and rail projects unfinished. Parliament has asked the Minister of Transport not to accept plans for construction proposed after the President's recent tour of the provinces.

0655 GMT: The Supreme Leader's Back-Room Politics. Amidst the intrigues this week over Ayatollah Khamenei's "I am the Rule of the Prophet Fatwa", Rah-e-Sabz offers an analysis of the Supreme Leader's advisors, including chief of staff Asghar Hejazi, the mysterious "Mr Vahid", and Khamenei's son Mojtaba.

0649 GMT: Mahmoud Looks to the Stars. Speaking at the National Festival of Iranian Youth on Friday, President  Ahmadinejad said Iran plans to launch its first manned shuttle into space by 2019.

Ahmadinejad added that the project was scheduled for 2035 but that the launch date was reviewed in a Cabinet meeting this week. He did not offer the reason for the sudden 16-year advance in his Ministers' calculations.

0645 GMT: Energy Posture. Iranian 1st Vice President  Mohammad Reza Rahimi has said that Iran is considering the removal of the dollar and the euro from its oil trade transactions: "In our oil transactions, we will use any currency that is to our benefit.”

Reports indicate that Iran and China may start using the yuan, the Chinese currency, to settle their oil transactions. An Iranian official has also suggested the dirham, the currency of the United Arab Emirates, for business.

Following the latest UN and US  sanctions, Iran has been experiencing difficulties in carrying out its international trade deals in dollars and euros.

The Latest from Iran (23 July): Receding Authority

1130 GMT: New Media Nonsense. A quick note to The International Herald Tribune: if  you are going to shell out money for a guest columnist to discuss the political effects of new media in the Middle East and Iran, you might to go to someone who is actually involved with those new media. Otherwise you get declarations like this:

We must face the fact that all the new media and hundreds of thousands of young bloggers from Morocco to Iran have not triggered a single significant or lasting change in Arab or Iranian political culture. Not a single one. Zero.

(I should add that I am a great admirer of Rami Khouri, who wrote the column. To my knowledge, however, his primary connection with the subject on which he is pronouncing is as an observer of "Millions of young people communicate with each other digitally, express their views and identities, and sometimes mobilize for causes as disparate as promoting a new movie, arranging a dance party, sharing photos or bemoaning a tired old dictator".)

NEW Iran Interview: Detained US Hiker’s Mother “I Wish I Could Hear Her Voice”
Iran Analysis: The Supreme Leader & the Disappearing Fatwa (Verde)
The Latest from Iran (22 July): Confusing Regime

1030 GMT: Talking Tough. Minister of Commerce Mehdi Ghazanfari has warned against any plan for the inspection of the country's cargo ships: "Iran reserves the right to respond to inspections as any such attempts will be a move beyond the sanctions resolution."

0855 GMT: Today's All-is-Well Alert. Press TV, drawing from Mehr News, reports:

Iran ranks sixth among the world's countries based on inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) performance, the latest report released by a UN agency shows.

New data released by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) show that Iran attracted more than $3 billion of direct investment from abroad in 2009, which is twice the amount of the previous year. This is despite the fact that global FDI inflows dropped during 2009 as compared to the previous year.

The UNCTAD ranking is for the year 2009, the most recent year available, and examines the economies of 141 economies.

The link to the "Country Fact Sheet" for the report is currently broken. Other reports have indicated that foreign direct investment into Iran has plummeted in recent months.

0605 GMT: Declaration of the Day. Meeting the son of the late Grand Ayatollah Fadlallah on Thursday, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad pronounced, "All the injustices and brutalities in the world today will soon be eradicated with the awakening of all nations."

No comment.

0530 GMT: Three days after it started, the affair of the Supreme Leader's "disappearing" fatwa is still inconclusive. There has no been explanation for why his declaration --- "I am the Rule of the Prophet" --- suddenly showed up and was then withdrawn from most of the official Iranian media.

Mr Verde has done an excellent job at rounding up the political and religious possibilities, none of which are promising for Ayatollah Khamenei's authority. I will go a step further: amidst all the challenges within the Iranian system, the confusion points to two aspects:

1. The Supreme Leader wanted to bring senior clerics, many of whom have been disquieted by the growing conflict amongst "the establishment", in line by asserting his leadership. The fatwa was the wrong move, however: far from reassuring the clerics of Khamenei's authority, it soon provoked more concern. So it had to be pulled back.

And/or...

2. There is a rift even within Khamenei's inner circle. One group pushed this initiative --- likely with Khamenei's assent, but possibly going farther than the Supreme Leader might have expected --- another pushed back.

Speculative, I know. So maybe it's best to start by saying that the outcome of this week is not clarity but confusion. And, as Mr Verde has driven home, it is not strength but weakness.

Meanwhile....

The Universities Fight

In another pointer to the challenges for and possibly to the Supreme Leader, conservative politician Morteza Nabavi has said that Khamenei has left the resolution of the conflict over Islamic Azad University to the judiciary.

Political Prisoner Watch

Zahra Rahnavard, activist and wife of Mir Hossein Mousavi, http://www.rahesabz.net/story/20011/ of labour activist Mansur Osanloo, who has been detained for three years.

The "Discussions with the US" Diversion

The curious episode of Iran's claims that it has been approached by Washington for talks --- revelation or propaganda? --- trundles on. Reformist MP Mostafa Kavakebian has said there should be no preconditions on discussions.

Trouble with the Water

The Governor of Tehran Province, Morteza Tamaddon, has insisted that the Minister of Health is responsible for the problems with the capital's polluted water supply.

The Latest from Iran (22 July): Confusing Regime

2125 GMT: Today's All-is-Well Alert. Iran's police chief Esmail Ahmadi-Moghaddam has declared that there is no smuggling of gas and oil across Iran's borders.

Then again, maybe all is not well: despite there being no smuggling, Ahmadi-Moghaddam has said the budget for border defence is inadequate.

2115 GMT: Religious Difficulties. Mohammad Nasser Saghaie Biriya, the President's religious advisor has resigned, allegedly because of divisions over the enforcement of hijab.

Saghaie Biriya is a disciple of Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, who has been seen as Ahmadinejad's religious mentor.

NEW Iran Analysis: The Supreme Leader & the Disappearing Fatwa (Verde)
Iran Media Follow-Up: War, War, War. Blah, Blah, Blah. No Facts. More War. Blah.
Iran Special: Khamenei’s “I Am the Rule of the Prophet” Fatwa — Strength or Weakness? (Verd
The Latest from Iran (21 July): Khamenei Rattled?

2100 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Detained student activist Arsalan Abadi has been sentenced to six years in prison by an appellate court. Abadi, arrested during the Ashura protests on 27 December, had originally been given a nine-year term.

2055 GMT: Regime v. Rafsanjani. Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami has tried to put former President Hashemi Rafsanjani in his place, saying that his position is still the same as it was on 19 June last year, when the Supreme Leader tried to close off debate over the result of the Presidential election. Khatami said Rafsanjani's s future depends on Ayatollah Khamenei's decisions and the elections for the head of Expediency Council, the position Rafsanjani currently holds.

1945 GMT: Prohibiting Remembrance. Back from a break to catch up with this news from Wednesday....

The National Front of Iran has announced that security forces pressured the organisation into cancelling its public events. The head of the National Front was that any gathering in 7th Tir Square and boarding the bus to travel to Baboyeh Cemetery is prohibited.

On 21 July 1953, demonstrators protested the dismissal of the nationalist Prime Minister, Mohammad Mosaddegh, and were killed inby security forces of the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. The victims were laid to rest in Baboyeh.

1310 GMT: Scattering the Students. Rah-e-Sabz reports that Tehran University's dormitories will be evacuated this summer, with students distributed across the city.

1245 GMT: Economy Watch. Reformist MP Mohammad Reza Khabbaz has declared that excessive imports will break the back of domestic production.

1000 GMT: (Refuting the) Rumour of the Day. MP Qodratollah Alikhani identifying the mis-information put out by Javan, the newspaper linked to the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, dismisses its latest tale that Green leaders met in a hotel sauna.

0954 GMT: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Film Expert. The Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance has announced that a High Council for Cinema, led by the President, has been established.

An EA correspondent ponders, "What would be the titles of the films considered by this Council?"

0945 GMT: Education Corner. The licence of the Islamic Association at the University of Kashan has been revoked by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education.

Meanwhile, the Ministry of Education is reportedly sending religious missonaries to 3000 girls' schools in Tehran.
0855 GMT: Sanctions. MP Mohsen Nariman has challenged the Government's official line: "Claiming that sanctions have no effects is political propaganda."

0810 GMT: Staying on Point. Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani is continuing to ensure that his credentials on foreign policy are not in question, saying on Wednesday that the Iran-Brazil-Turkey declaration on a uranium swap is the only solution to the nuclear issue and adding that sanctions are sure to result in failure.
0805 GMT: Getting the Right Clerics in Place. According to Rooz Online, Seyed Reza Taghavi, the head of policy for Friday Prayers, has said 60 Friday Prayer clerics will be "retired" this summer.

0705 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Journalist Azam Visemeh after her release from detention yesterday:



0700 GMT: In the Bazaar. Nejat Bahrami, writing for insideIRAN, analyses, "Bazaari Criticism of Ahmadinejad Bursts into the Open":

Another factor that can bring the bazaar and the opposition closer to each other is the role of the government. Mistakes made by the government and their impact should never be underestimated. Continuation of failed economic policies by the Ahmadinejad administration and further pressure on Iran by the international community can further intensify the economic crisis in Iran and alienate some parts of this important, influential group of merchants.

0655 GMT: Sanctions Watch. Two overviews of interest this morning....

Shayan Ghajar writes in insideIRAN, "Sanctions Open Iran to Russian, Chinese Firms", while Ardalan Sayami's analysis in Rooz Online is that "Sanctions Turn the Government to the Private Sector".

0635 GMT: A Clue on the Fatwa? Personally, I believe that the first audience for the Supreme Leader's supposed fatwa on Tuesday was the senior clerics of Qom, some of whom have been unsettled throughout the post-election crisis and many of whom were roused to anger by the June attacks on Seyed Hassan Khomeini and on the houses of Grand Ayatollah Sane'i and the late Grand Ayatollah Montazeri. (Using this line of reasoning, a possible reason for the "disappearance" of the fatwa is that it was not received well by those clerics.)

Support for this interpretation comes in Rah-e-Sabz, which posts a provocative account of Ayatollah Khamenei's recent journey to Qom and his meetings with the clerics.

0605 GMT: Perhaps the most spirited response to our coverage since Tuesday of the Supreme Leader's alleged fatwa --- "I am the Rule of the Prophet" --- has come from a reader who say, "Nothing new, he has simply reiterated the meaning of the velayat-e-faqih [clerical supremacy] as originally articulated by the late Ayatullah Ruhollah Khomeini....It is not always good to murky the water as you like doing here."

With respect, I beg to differ. While the content of Ayatollah Khameini's declaration has its precendents, it has not taken on the form of a fatwa, at least not under this Supreme Leader. And, as always, the distinction lays in timing, context, and developments: Why now? To what end? And what has happened to the fatwa, which has "disappeared" from many Iranian state outlets?

Mr Verde takes another look in an analysis.

Meanwhile....

Mousavi's Latest

Almost lost in the confusion over the Supreme Leader's statement --- did he or didn't he? --- was Mir Hossein Mousavi's intervention in a meeting with professors.

Mousavi, unwittingly intersecting with the presentation of and uncertainty over Khamenei's words, condemned “fabrication” and “distortion” of truth by the Government and stressed that “systematic lies” are the signs of the “decline” of a system. He said the media of the Green Movement should make every effort to “unravel” these lies and counter the “ominous phenomenon": “We must provide our people with a truthful analysis of every situation that the government represents through lies; even though our possibilities are not as much as the authoritarian government.”

Mousavi also spoke about the recent bombings in southeastern Iran, declaring that the problems of the ethnic groups in the border regions must be a priority and maintaining that terrorism can only be confronted through “development coupled with justice".

Power Crisis

Tabnak reports that electricity prices for farmers will increase 10-fold.

The Latest from Iran (21 July): Khamenei Rattled?

2120 GMT: Back to our lead story today....

Edward Yeranian of Voice of America has picked up on the Khamenei "I am the Rule of the Prophet" fatwa, "Iran's Supreme Leader Says He Represents Prophet Muhammad on Earth".

We are still trying to get to the bottom of whether the fatwa was genuine but has been pulled back from prominence, whether it was released prematurely, or whether it is the outcome of a far-from-ordinary rift within the establishment (to the point of being "disinformation").

We will have a fresh analysis in the morning. Snapshot? Whether the fatwa is genuine or now suspect, the episode does not bode well for Ayatollah Khamenei.

NEW Iran Media Follow-Up: War, War, War. Blah, Blah, Blah. No Facts. More War. Blah.
NEW Iran Special: Khamenei’s “I Am the Rule of the Prophet” Fatwa — Strength or Weakness? (Verde)
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Iran Follow-Up: Dealing with the Media’s “War, War, War” Drumbeat
Iran Document: Isa Saharkhiz in Court “Should the Supreme Leader Be Dismissed?” (18 July)
The Latest from Iran (20 July): Khamenei “I am the Rule of the Prophet”

2100 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Dr. Akbar Karami, a noted religious scholar, has been released on bail.

Student activist Majid Tavakoli, detained since 7 December, has had his first prison visit in more than three months. Ali Tavakoli, Majid's brother, said that he was allowed to see his brother for 10 minutes from behind a booth.

Ali Tavakoli said Majid's physical appearance was better than before and that he was in excellent spirits.

Majid Tavakoli is serving an 8 1/2-year sentence.

1500 GMT: Economy Watch. Reformist MP Mostafa Kavakebian has warned about rising prices before Ramadan in August and said the Bazaar must control those prices without reliance on more imports.

Kavakebian also said that the sale of 18% of the auto company Saipa --- officially going to employees, unofficially rumoured to a firm associated with the Revolutionary Guard --- will suffer the same fate as the privatisation of Iran Telecom.

1440 GMT: The Revolutionary Guards Document. Arshama3's Blog has re-posted and offered a quick assessment of the leaked document setting out Islamic Revolution Guards Corps procedures for monitoring the Iranian opposition.

1435 GMT: The Clerical Front. Four senior clerics, asked about "teacher-centred lectures", have responded by rejecting the concept and declaring that the seminary must remain independent.

1430 GMT: Electricity Squeeze. Hamshahri alleges that Iran is exporting cheap power to the Herat area in western Afghanistan while the domestic industry and facilities are damaged. The newspaper claims Afghans have made a profit of $2 million while Iran has lost that amount.

1415 GMT: Economic Non-Data. Bank Markazi, Iran's central bank, has again declined to publish the country's rate of growth.

1410 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Journalist Azam Vismeh has been released from detention.

1355 GMT: Corruption Watch. Rah-e-Sabz writes that more associates of the Fatemi Street insurance fraud have been summoned to court.

1345 GMT: After the Bombings. MP Zohreh Elahyian, a member of the National Security Council, has said that more control of foreign residents is planned. She blamed problems in border regions on Mossad and CIA "with their dollars".

Elahyian said, "We have full control in the Sistan and Baluchistan region, but this incident proves the long-term planning of the enemy."

1314 GMT: The Oil Squeeze. Trade and shipping source say the owner of a gasoline tanker, believed to be the Libyan-flagged Lia, has refused to allow the vessel to sail to Iran from Turkey.

1310 GMT: Parliament v. President. Is it reconcilation time? There has been a meeting of Government and Majlis representatives after the 20-day vacation of Parliament, and the Government is reportedly sending the legal decisions on its budget and legislation to the Majlis next week.

1305 GMT: Another Bust-Up in the Establishment. Aftab News publishes what appears to be a dramatic story of more tensions between the Government and "hardliners". The President's chief of staff Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai reportedly claims that Ahmadinejad said Rahim-Mashi would be targeted as a "kafaar" (infidel) within a year. In particular, there would be problems with Hossein Shariatmadari, the managing editor of Kayhan. Rahim-Mashai is quoted, "To Shariatmadari, I'm no Muslim but a spy, monafegh (heretic), and member of the violet coup."

1250 GMT: The Mystery of the Fatwa. We find ourselves caught up in an increasingly murky story over the appearance of the Supreme Leader's fatwa on Tuesday. It is not appearing on Ayatollah Khamenei's "official" sites. It is still up on Iranian Labor News Agency but not on Iran Students News Agency.

An EA correspondent, noting a similar case recently over another purported Khamenei fatwaagainst Motorola's mobile phones and other products because of the company's business with Israel, writes, "Something is fishy about these supposed fatwas....I am not really sure who is running these fatwas and why."

Meanwhile, sociologist Majid Mohammadi assesses the present fatwa and declares that it is a "gravestone on the rule of justice".

1240 GMT: The Guardians. Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati has been re-elected as head of the Guardian Council.

1105 GMT: Today's "Western Approach" Story. Now it's the British who are supposedly begging for talks. From Mehr News: "Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami has twice rebuffed the British ambassador’s request for a meeting. On June 27, the British ambassador to Iran sent a letter to Khatami asking if a meeting could be scheduled, but Khatami did not reply to the letter. Later, the British Embassy sent a letter to him via the Iranian Foreign Ministry, and the cleric responded this time but said he did not want to meet the British ambassador."

Mehr does not offer the possible topics for this meeting, and it is unclear why the British would seek out Khatami, who has no official position in Iran's political hierarchy.

1048 GMT: At the Movies. From CNN:

A government-linked film studio in Iran plans to make a movie about the Iranian nuclear scientist who Iranian officials say was kidnapped by U.S. agents, state media reported Tuesday.

According to Iran's semi-official Fars news agency, Sima Film production company has hired a group of film school graduates to write a script about Shahram Amiri. The head of the production company didn't say when the film would be ready.

1045 GMT: Travel Dip. Kalemeh reports that tourism to Iran has dropped 60%.

1030 GMT: Talking Tough. The Supreme Leader has repeated that the intelligence services of the US, Britain, and Israel are to blame for last week's suicide bombings in southeastern Iran: "One of the main goals of the enemies behind the terrorist attack in Iran's southeastern city of Zahedan was to create division and religious discord."

Ali Larijani, at the World Conference of Speakers of Parliament in Geneva, declared that the US lacks the courage to strike Tehran: "Iran is ready for any possible incidents and is well aware of the ongoing developments in the region. If the US makes such a mistake, it will pay dearly."

1000 GMT: Mousavi Latest. Mir Hossein Mousavi, meeting professors in the Islamic Association of Teachers, has spoken about the Green media and the need to counter the propaganda of Iranian state outlets.

0955 GMT: The Khamenei Fatwa. An English translation of the Rah-e-Sabz article on the Supreme Leader's declaration has been posted: "For the first time, and openly, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, in response to a religious letter, has placed himself officially on the saintly level of ‘all-qualified priest’, ‘deputy Imam at the time of the absence [of the 12th Imam]’, ‘the ruling branch of the Imams’, and ‘true all-time deputy to the Prophet’. He pointed out there shall be an absolute obedience to his governmental orders to reveal ‘full commitment to the Supreme Leader’."

0945 GMT: Sanctions Watch. Thomas Erdbrink and Colum Lynch write in The Washington Post, "New Sanctions Crimp Iran's Shipping Business as Insurers Withhold Coverage".

Beyond noting the recent announcement by Lloyd's of London that it is halting coverage of gasoline imports to Iran, Erdbrink and Lynch quote Mohammad Ronaghi, the deputy manager of Iran's Sea Pars, "Iranian-flagged ships are facing problems all over the world as they currently have no insurance coverage because of the new sanctions. Basically, most ports will refuse them entry if they are not covered for possible damages."

The journalists also note the specific difficulties of Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines while carrying this reassurance from its managing director, Mohammad Hussein Dajmar, "These sanctions have not affected us much. The world has many ports. We will sail to those nations that want to do business with us."

0900 GMT: The Push Against Ahmadinejad. The battle within the Iranian establishment is now getting some attention: Robert Tait of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty has posted a lengthy overview, "Iranian Conservatives Unite In Bid To Undermine Ahmadinejad".

(A bit of illuminating background to the story. I spoke for about 30 minutes with Tait as he was researching the article. We initially discussed EA's "exclusive" on the discussions between Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, leading MP Ahmad Tavakoli, and Secretary of Expediency Council Mohsen Rezaei over a move against the President.

Tait does not refer directly to the Larijani-Tavakoli-Rezaei talks --- it is difficult to do so without named sources --- but writes instead, with a link back to our article:

One report has even suggested that conservatives have met to plot a way of impeaching Ahmadinejad and remove him from office, although seasoned observers caution that such an outcome is unthinkable without Khamenei's approval -- which is thought unlikely.

As an unseasoned observer, I also told Tait that the discussions, even amongst high-ranking conservatives, had to win over the Supreme Leader: that is a key reason why Larijani and Co. were hoping to bring in senior clerics and Hashemi Rafsanjani.)

0700 GMT: We've posted a quick follow-up note on the US-based media's insistence on hyping the possibility/probability of Israeli military action against Iran as fact rather than speculation.

0555 GMT: Let's start the morning with a bit of perspective.

Tuesday's big story was not the supposed US approach to Tehran for discussions --- which was at most a request by Senator John Kerry to come to Iran and which may or may not have been true and may or may not have been whipped up by Iranian state media.

Tuesday's big story was not a possible Israeli military strike against Iran, which for now exists more on the keyboards of feverish "analysts" who --- from hysteria, speculation, ingenuity, or simple desire for such a strike --- than in any plans in West Jerusalem and Washington.

Tuesday's big story was not Iran's five-point plan for Afghanistan, unfurled at the Kabul Summit by Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki as an attempted sign of Tehran's influence in Central Asia and a counter to Western attention to sanctions and Iran's nuclear programme.

Tuesday's big story was the surprise and then confusion over the Supreme Leader's grab for authority through his fatwa linking his rule to that of the Imams and even Prophet Mohammad. What is the significance? Mr Verde assesses in a special analysis for EA.

Iran Special: Khamenei's "I Am the Rule of the Prophet" Fatwa --- Strength or Weakness? (Verde)

Mr Verde writes for EA:

First, a summary of what Ayatollah Ali Khamenei claimed in his fatwa on Tuesday:

*Khamenei is claiming that he is a cleric of the highest rank who possesses all the required credentials to hold the position of “velayat-e-faqih” (Supreme Leader).

LATEST Iran Analysis: The Supreme Leader & the Disappearing Fatwa (Verde)
Iran Analysis: Voices Raised — Removing the Supreme Leader (Verde)

Many Shia clerics and scholars, including the late Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, believed in 1989 that Khamenei did not have the required religious credentials to permit him to hold the position of Supreme Leader. Other regime officials have said that Khamenei has the credentials, but such claims were made in political speeches. This time the claim is made in the name of a religious edict and by Khamenei himself.

*Khamenei is claiming that his rule is a direct succession to that of the Prophet and the Shia Imams.

During recent months, as he has been trying to cope with the fallout of the crisis within the Islamic Republic, Khamenei has repeatedly compared himself to the first Shia Imam and his opponents to the Imam’s enemies. Now he is claiming that he is not only the successor of the Imams, but of the Prophet too.

*Khamenei is claiming that he is the ruler of the Muslim of the world.

In the regime's past, political declarations claimed that the Supreme Leader is the leader of all of the world’s Muslims. This time Khamenei is claiming it himself.

The issue? Around 90% of the world’s Muslims are Sunnis. Sunni Islam does not recognize Shia Grand Ayatollahs and the Islamic Republic’s principle of religious jurisprudence. This declaration will not go down well with the Sunnis, especially as it comes from Khamenei himself.

*Khamenei is claiming that obeying his orders is compulsory.

Since very early days of the Islamic Republic, the assumption has been that the order to the Supreme Leader must be obeyed. More than three decades after the establishment of the Islamic Republic, Khamenei has seen the need to remind everyone of that fact.

(Note: some religious scholars believe that, due to his limited religious credentials, Khamenei does not have the authority to issue fatwas. We will ignore these concerns for now.)

The obvious significance of this fatwa is that Khamenei is saying that his orders must be carried out without failure. This fatwa will make it easier for Khamenei to insist that his wishes are carried out by all factions of the Islamic Republic, for example, in complicated situations like the recent Islamic Azad University crisis. It will be easier to fire officials to be sacked or disqualify candidates from elections. All that will be required is reference to this fatwa.

The not-so-obvious significances?

According to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic the Supreme Leader is the highest authority in the country. During the time of Ayatollah Khomeini and since Khamenei came to power, it has always been assumed that the Supreme Leader’s orders must be carried out.

A dramatic demonstration of this was during the reformist-dominated Sixth Majlis (2000-2004). The Parliament was debating a new law that would have revoked the draconian press controls which had been passed by the Fifth Majlis. Khamenei wrote to the Parliament asking for the liberalized press law to be halted, and Mehdi Karroubi, who was then the Speaker, stopped the passage. He cited the order from Khamenei and said it must be obeyed.

Since last year, Khamenei has been forced to intervene in his capacity as Supreme Leader in many instances. The latest episode came only yesterday with the revelation that two Siatan and Baluchistan MPs, who resigned in protest of the government’s inability to provide effective security for the province, withdrew their resignation on Khamenei’s orders.

Another example: after the vote of confidence over Ahmadinejad’s cabinet last summer, then Deputy Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Reza Bahonar revealed the Khamenei had ordered MPs to vote Yes, saying that otherwise many ministers would not have obtained the required support. In that instance, even after Khamenei’s intervention, three proposed ministers did not get the vote of confidence.

And another example: the Majlis investigation into allegations of corruption against First Vice President Mohammad Reza Rahimi were blocked by an order from Khamenei.

Since last year, Khamenei has been forced to act more as a senior administrator of the Islamic Republic than as a Supreme Leader who is supposed to preside over state affairs. His need yesterday to remind everyone that orders must be obeyed points to an uncertainty he might have about the effectiveness of that administration.

This could mean that Khamenei’s authority is not as solid as it was in the past. For example, last summer President Ahmadinejad refused to follow Khamenei’s order and remove his ally Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai from the post of First Vice President until the order was made public by the Supreme Leader’s office. From the other side of the political spectrum, despite Khamenei’s insistence that the 2009 presidential elections were fair and the elections issue is over, the reformists are refusing to back down and have at times not only disobeyed the Supreme Leader but mocked him too. Then there is the Parliament vote to block the Supreme Council for Cultural Revolution decision on Islamic Azad University, asserting the President's control. That vote was in direct contravention of Khamenei’s (and, before him, Khomeini’s) statements that the Majlis should not interfere in the decisions taken by the SCCR.

Over the past year Khamenei has struggled to assert his political authority within the regime. He is being defied by senior figures like Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi, and Mohammad Khatami. He has been criticised by politicians like Hashemi Rafsanjani and by clerics like Ayatollah Dastgheib. He has found it hard to force them into obeying him.

The same can be said about the general public. During street demonstrations, there have chats of “Death to Dictator” and “Death to Khamenei”. The Supreme Leader has not been able to persuade all of his people to accept his decisions. He has instead been forced into using brute force and detention against his opponents. The regime’s security forces, with naked and gruesome violence, cleared the streets of demonstrators last year, and the intelligence forces have jailed many members of the opposition.

The resulting problem is that Khamenei has not been able to demonstrate that he has any real authority in Iran beyond the use of force by his security personnel. Any seemingly minor incident thus has the potential to become a spiralling crisis. Furthermore, many opposition figures who are in jail are now taking any possible opportunity to challenge his authority (Examples include recent statements by Isa Saharkhiz and Ahmad Ghabel). The regime’s authority is no longer that of its positive qualities, but that of its muscle, and that muscle may be starting to get tired.

On the conservative side there problems too. The conservative-dominated Majlis voted in the case of Islamic Azad University and the SCCR case in contravention of Khamenei’s views. That forced the Supreme Leader to give out two separate orders to Azad University and SCCR and to set up a panel to look into the case.Even the estalbishment of the panel suggests that Khamenei’s opinion is not strong enough for regime insiders to accept his decisions. Leading MP Ali Motahari has said that although he follows the Supreme Leader, he will voice his disquiet about issues too, and another conservative, Morteza Nabavi, has said that many of his colleagues are giving up.

Add to this the failure of the Ahmadinejad Government to cope with many of the problems in the country and, in some cases, its "success" in making matters worse. On 19 June 2009, Khamenei said clearly that he considers Ahmadinejad closer to him than even his decades-old friend Rafsanjani. The starting point of  the incompetence of the Ahmadinejad administration is the demonstration that the Supreme Leader is not able to choose the right people for the right job.

On the religious front, the clerics in Qom have refused to publicly back Khamenei’s post-election decisions. This has led to the Supreme Leader calling them imperceptive confidants and criticising them regularly. In contrast, after the 4 June humiliation of Seyed Hassan Khomeini, the clerics were effusive with their support for Hassan's grandfather, the late Ayatollah Khomeini, and praised his personal and religious qualities.

In recent months some criticism of Khamenei has been taken to a new level. Last year most of the criticism was directed at specific actions or decisions, but now some of the criticism has become personal to the point of demanding Khamenei’s removal from the post of Supreme Leader --- examples include statements by  (example: statements by Abdolkarim Soroush, Mohsen Kadivar, Saharkhiz, and Ghabel.) This criticism is coming not from an foreign-based opposition that has no allegiance to the Islamic Republic but from former regime insiders with substantial revolutionary credentials.

And the fatwa may not check the criticism. Many high-ranking Shia clerics will probably be upset because Khamenei is saying that, during the age of absence (of the 12th Shia Imam Mahdi), he is the rightful successor of that Imam. Doing so, he is usurping the claim of legitimacy of the Grand Ayatollahs,  that they are here to guide the faithful while the 12th Imam is hidden. And many Shia scholars do not accept the rule of the Jurisprudent (velayat-e faqih) during the age of absence. They assert that any claim of rule by an Islamic state during the period that the 12th Imam is hidden is a false pretence, since a true Islamic state can only be set up by him. Others who try to take this role are impostors.

Last year, the main talk was ofthe  illegitimacy of the Ahamdinejad as president. Now the issue seems to be shifting to the unsuitability of Khamenei for the post of Supreme Leader. This new fatwa may be an attempt at countering the challenges against the Supreme Leader himself. But one is left wondering if it will not backfire as did Khamenei’s message of condolence for Grand Ayatollah Montazeri’s death last year or his fatwa trying to ban Chahrshanbeh Suri (Fire Fiestival) in March.

But note the difference: if this declaraton backfires, the consequences will be far more dramatic.