Iran and Russia: The State of the "Alliance" (Sanaei)

From Tabnak via Iran Review, which translated the interview:

TABNAK: Given the double standard applied by Russia to its diplomatic relations with various countries, especially its duplicity in relations with Iran and the United States, and also due to noncompliance of Russia with its commitments toward Iran, experts have both warned Moscow and called on the Iranian government to revise diplomatic relations with Russia.

This issue has been discussed with Dr. Mehdi Sanaei, professor of University of Tehran and member of Majlis National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, in the following interview.

Q: Recent measures taken by our northern neighbor have opened a new chapter in Iran-Russia relations. What is your opinion about present conditions?

A: Russia’s cooperation with Iran under present critical circumstances will not only serve as an important determinant of bilateral relations, but also influence future international equations.

Independent countries are growing in power and new players have entered international political scene. Therefore, the existing structure of the United Nations Security Council and international relations, which has led to dominance of a hegemonic system on the world, cannot provide solutions to all problems as that structure was suitable for conditions of past decades and is no good for a modern world. For example, crises in Palestine, Iraq, and Afghanistan cannot be solved within that framework. Many countries have owned up to this weakness and even the US President has stated that the United States will not tackle all international problems single-handedly as it is not able to solve all of them alone.

Therefore, five permanent members of the Security Council are not able to solve international issues on their own and they should not only respect the will of other countries, but also take advantage of their potentials in international relations. The recent Tehran meeting, which introduced Turkey and Brazil as new variables to Iran’s nuclear case, meant to tell the world that there are many independent players which are willing to do their part in international relations and the way should be paved for them. Russia is now at a crossroads. There are two eagles in the national symbol of Russia which connote that Russia simultaneously looks to the east and the west.

Russia owes its power to its position between east and west. Therefore, anytime looking to the west has dominated the Russian policy the country has forfeited part of its international political clout. Cooperation between Russia and Iran is a very determining factor for both countries’ policies and the Islamic Republic expects Russia to cooperate with it in international scene. On the other hand, those relations are also of high importance to Russia. There are two possible scenarios to be followed here. Firstly, the rift between independent countries and big powers will not widen anymore, but the big powers will accept to make structural changes to international system and avail themselves of potentialities of independent states in solving international problems. In this state, Russia’s friendly relations with Iran and the Muslim world will increase its weight in international power game. The second possibility is that the aforesaid rift will further widen in which case geo-strategic position and identity of Russia will not allow the country to become too inclined toward the west.

All in all, it is very important for Russia to act in a balanced way in its foreign relations and policy. Just in the same way that cooperation between Iran and Russia has promoted both countries’ positions in international scene, it can continue on the same track without being affected by various external factors. It is true that Russia’s relations with the European Union and the United States have changed and those countries are trying to attract Russia as a strategic partner to put pressure on Iran. Of course, pressures exerted on Russia by the Zionist and other internal lobbies should not be ignored. None of those factors, however, obviate the need for Russia to have friendly relations with Iran as it is to its own interest to have independent states on its side.

Q: Unfortunately, Iran has indicated its dependence on Russia and supported that country’s international positions and performance in an exaggerated way during recent years as a counterweight to the west. Don’t you think that such behavior has spoiled Russians prompting them to ignore their commitments toward Iran including commissioning of Bushehr nuclear power plant or delivery of S-300 missile system? They have also completely ignored Iran’s part in the legal regime of the Caspian Sea.

A: Like other countries, there is no doubt that Russia gives the highest priority to its own national interests. The Russians also want to have maximum level of relations with other states. This is also true about us. Two points should be born in mind here. Firstly, a win-win game should be defined in international relations by strengthening foreign policy leverages. Many Russia experts have noted that in its relations with Russia, Iran should take advantage of various leverages as well as regional and international issues. Part of the problem is rooted in our foreign policy apparatus. We should not make other countries think that we desperately need to work with them. Having more leverage to use under such circumstances will be of great help in this regard. Russia is a big country in the region and cooperation between Tehran and Moscow has been not only to the avail of both countries, but also beneficial to the settlement of international disputes.

Q: To what extent interactions with Russia have been a function of Iran’s maximum interests, not out of coercion?

A: Relations with Russia have been influenced by our foreign policy goals. Some anti-west politicians encourage Russian ties while others, opposed them as they damaged Iran’s relations with the west. Different viewpoints govern the two countries’ attitudes. The Russian foreign policy seeks to promote international standing of that country, which is also an objective for Iran’s foreign policy. However, Russian foreign policy is also pragmatic and interest-based and this has been frequently announced by the Russian foreign policymakers.

Perhaps, some ambiguity surrounding Iran’s relations with Russia stems from different perceptions which shape each side of this relationship. Here, some politicians still think that Russia is a superpower and see Moscow in the context of the Cold War. This is not true. Although Russia is still of great weight in international developments, its capacities are very limited. There has been another group which encourages relations with the west because it considers Russia a country riddled with domestic problems. This is also an erroneous analysis because Russia has banked on energy policy and taken various measures to improve its international standing during the past decade. Part of this ambiguity is, perhaps, the result of different perceptions in two countries. While relations with Russia have been considered strategic in Iran during the past decade, no Russian analyst has ever considered their country’s relations with Iran strategic.

Q: The History of Iran abounds with bitter memories of Russia including imposition of Turkmenchai and Golestan treaties on Iran which led to separation of peripheral lands. There is also bitter memory of Russia’s invasion of Iran during World War II. Don’t you think that existing conditions have once more elicited past memories. How Russia will suffer after losing a strategic ally?

A: Given the importance of bilateral relations and Iranian’s mentality of past relations with Russia and in view of future international political equations, Russia is expected to speed up implementation of projects it has undertaken in Iran in order to build confidence. Relations between two countries are of critical importance and it is needed for the sake of confidence building that Russia complete Bushehr nuclear power plant as soon as possible and have no doubt about delivery of S-300 missile defense system since the related contract has been already signed. In nuclear case, it should not leave Iran and independent countries alone and while maintaining relations with both sides, it should use its influence for peaceful settlement of this issue.

Q: Since Russia and the west have reached an agreement on economic issues, do you think that such a will exists in Russia?

A: I hope so. Not only due to importance of bilateral relations, but careful study of forthcoming international developments also dictates that Russia will need to have Iran on its side.

Gaza Latest: Israel Warns Iranian & Lebanese Flotillas; UN Calls for Lifting of Blockade

On Monday, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said the Cabinet decision to ease the land blockade, allowing more products into the Gaza Strip, would weaken Hamas's hand while forging a ecurity consensus against the "satellites" of Iran and Lebanon, Hamas and Hezbollah. He said:

This is the best decision for Israel because it pulls Hamas’s main propaganda claim out from under it, and allows us and our friends in the world to unite around our real security needs.

The ayatollahs’ regime in Iran stands behind the Iranian boats. Hezbullah stands behind the Lebanese flotilla, even though they are trying to hide it. One must understand that these are attempts by Iran and Hezbullah to break the naval and security blockade of Hamas – and that is why yesterday’s cabinet decision was so important.

Gaza Special: Meeting the “Terrorist” Ladies of Lebanon’s Mariam Flotilla (Narwani)

A day later, Iran's state television reported that the ship Infants of Gaza would sail Sunday for Gaza, carrying 1,100 tons of relief supplies and 10 pro-Palestinian activists. Egyptian transportation official Mohammad Abdelwahab said Cairo would not prevent the Iranian ship from passing through the Suez Canal.

Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi responded with two important points. He said that Israel must not allow Gaza to become an Iranian port and added: "For those who are truly concerned about the [humanitarian] situation in Gaza and wants to bring medical supplies, they are welcome to dock in Ashdod. We will examine [the cargo] and let it in if needed."

Commenting on the Navy probe on the attack on the Freedom Flotilla, Ashkenazi said that "Following initial investigations, the fighters acted superbly under the circumstances."

In Lebanon,  the Naji al-Ali has received Lebanon's green light to depart for Cyprus. The second ship, Mariam, is still awaiting permission.

Noting Israeli Defence Minister Ehud Barak's  assertion on Monday that Lebanon would be responsible for any "violent and dangerous confrontation", Lebanese Foreign Minister Ali Asham responded on Tuesday that "Israel will be held fully responsible for any attack on Lebanon".

Barak also urged UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to shelve plans for a UN-backed independent investigation. He said:

As long as new flotillas are in the preparation, it's probably better to leave it [a UN investigation] on the shelf for a certain time.

We are moving ahead with our independent investigation, which we believe is clearly independent, reliable, credible and should be allowed to work.

As for the blockade, Christopher Gunness, spokesman of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, said to Reuters that only a complete lifting of restrictions will satisfy the agency:

The Israeli strategy is to make the international community talk about a bag of cement here, a project there. We need full unfettered access through all the crossings.

The list of restricted goods is a moving target. We are never told this is banned and that is banned. Israel's blockade became a blockade against the UN.

The Quartet (the United States, European Union, Russia and the United Nations) continued to emphasise not only the "remaining unsustainable situation" in Gaza but also Israel's "legitimate security concerns".

On Tuesday, the Turkish Foreign Ministry joined the international community with a released statement saying that Israel's decision to ease the blockade on Gaza a "positive" but "insufficient" step.

Turkey Analysis: Which Way is Ankara Heading? (Yenidunya)

There seems to be a lot of fuss right now about whether Turkey is "turning its face towards the East".

The query, often simplistic, arises from a number of development. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu is pursuing a "Zero Problem with Neighbours" policy based on dialogue, various economic agreements, and the lifting of visa requirement. The policy includes a close relationship with both Syria and Iran.

This policy has been part of the uranium swap deal with Iran, dismissed by the West; the friction with Israel, from the "low chair" crisis up tothe  nine deaths on board the Mavi Marmara in the Freedom Flotilla; warming relations with Russia, crowned with a nuclear settlement; and the veto of sanctions against Iran in the UN Security Council.



Israeli officials reiterated, following the most recent crisis in high waters, that they view the region separated into two opposite camps. There are "moderates" such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Palestine (West Bank), Jordan, and Israel, There are "extremists" such as Iran, Lebanon, Syria, and (Palestine) Gaza. Israel asks: which will Turkey choose?

That blunt enquiry has been accompanied by some incredibly naive arguments, lacking an apparent notion of the basic principles of international relations. Nuh Yilmaz wrote in Foreign Policy magazine:

"All options are on the table” is the best phrase to describe how Turkey feels about Israel’s attack on humanitarian aid flotilla carrying more than 600 activists from 32 countries... Israel will, most likely, no longer be seen as a friendly state nor an ally, but will be treated as a rogue state by Turkey.

When I say Turkey will imply that “all options are on the table,” I do not mean that Turkey will wage a war against Israel. However, more dangerously, Israel will be seen as a state against which one should protect itself and should consider any possible action because of its unlawful and rogue character.

Others placed Ankara's "adventurism" at the centre of Turkish-American relations. Steven A. Cook of Foreign Policy argued that Turkey had not only shifted its axis but had dared to a challenge the US:

It is hard to admit, but after six decades of strategic cooperation, Turkey and the United States are becoming strategic competitors -- especially in the Middle East. This is the logical result of profound shifts in Turkish foreign and domestic politics and changes in the international system.

Some tried to find a formula for Turkey's "shift". On Thursday, Turkish daily Hurriyet asked whether there would be a "Middle East Union" under Turkey's leadership in the future. This would build on a joint declaration signed among Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria, seeking to lift visas and increase the level of cooperation in the fields of energy, health, agriculture, trade and customs.

Let me be blunt with you and with those who are wringing their hands. There has been no change in Turkey's axis.

Ankara's ultimate destination is still full membership in the European Union. Turkey's efforts and regional diplomatic initiatives are a part of its economic development and a part of its struggle to turn into a "strategic" mid-power which can help (re)shape the region.

The tension between a mid-power in Ankara and an American strategic partner --- a Middle East "spearhead" --- in Israel is the outcome of a power struggle between two allies at a time when the latter is under pressures and the benefits of "direct friendly support" of Washington are being seriously being questioned, inside and outside the US. The perception arises that Turkey is trying to fill the space Israel has left/will be forced to leave.

In the context of Turkey's economic boom and diplomatic manoeuvres to increase its credibility in the region, the  complicating factor is that its part to the European Union is currently blocked. Out of 34 chapters to be confirmed to accept Turkey as a part of the Union, only 12 chapters have been addressed so far. Of the other 22, 17 are being blocked by other countries --- eight alone by Cyprus.

The lesson to take from this dead end is crystal-clear: without political concessions on Cyprus and the Aegean Sea, there will be no European Union in the future for Turkey. So Ankara is not only  trying to gain time by looking to its back garden but also trying to knock on Europe's door with an increased credibility.

At the end of the day, Ankara's manoeuvres are not a new invention but the reflection of an active political agenda. As the president of the Washington-based American-Turkish Council, retired Ambassador James Holmes, said, "Turkey is expanding its interests, rather than isolating itself."

The current international alignments are suitable to Turkey's interests, since Washington needs Ankara more than other countries. That is not because of the political swamp in Afghanistan and Pakistan but also because of the ongoing diplomatic track with Iran and Syria, in the aftermath of Bush the Junior's imperial policies and Israel's perceived aggression in the region. Indeed, engagement and diplomacy is preferable to Washington rather than confrontations that could dynamite Obama's  "change", slapping aside unclenched fists and preventing a settlement between Israel and Ramallah.

There are limits to this political agenda. Although Ankara is ready with an economic surplus to deliver to its neighbours, it has not solved its own problems.

The weakest chain of the "Zero Problem" policy rattled in Turkey's relations with Armenia. Ankara couldn't break through long-standing fearsin the face of threats over energy supplies from the "little brother" Azerbaijan.

And, within Turkey, thousands of Kurdish children are in prisons and more officials of the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) are arrested. Indeed, the war with the Kurdish separatist group PKK is accelerating day-by-day since the Erdogan Government see the Kurdish political movement as a "rival".

And, of course, there are always the Armenian "genocide" issue and the Cyprus problem...

Another limit is Israel . West Jerusalem still means more than a regional power to Washington, remaining and a "friend" and a nuclear "democratic" power. Indeed, Washington sorted out the most recent Flotilla problem and gave a green light to Tel Aviv for an internal inquiry into the violence on the Mavi Marmara. Israel is not discredited in the eyes of Washington just because of a few days, not when military/intelligence relations are indispensable for both sides.

Still, if Ankara can show progress in its Kurdish and Cyprus issues in the near future along with continuing diplomacy advances in the region and a move back from blunter discourse towards Israel, it can continue increasing both its credibility to use as leverage against the EU and to promote its strategic importance to Washington.

The Latest from Iran (9 June): Paying Attention

2030 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Human Rights Activists News Agency reports that the head of Mir Hossein Mousavi's campaign in Babolsar has been arrested.

2000 GMT: A Friendly Notice. To all journalists riding the two-dimensional bandwagon on Twitter & Iran, treating cliches like "Twitter Revolution" as if they were the core of meaningful analysis, I'm not going to respond for the moment --- this is a made-up dramatic revelation, which recurs every few months and does not get to the heart of what social media has meant in the post-election crisis. Best to let it serve as tomorrow's chip paper.

But if you keep it up, I may change my mind....

1900 GMT: Mahmoud Snaps Back. President Ahmadinejad, who has had post-election encounters with dust (read his "victory speech") and insects (see video), worked both into his response to the UN sanctions resolution: "These (U.N.) resolutions have no value...They are like a used handkerchief that should be thrown in the dust bin. Sanctions are falling on us from the left and the right. For us they are the same as pesky flies....We have patience and we will endure throughout all of this."

NEW Latest Iran Video: Obama Statement on Sanctions...and Rights (9 June)
NEW Iran Analysis: What’s Most Important Today? (Hint: Not Sanctions)
NEW Iran Analysis: 4 June “The Day the Regime Will Regret” (Verde)
Iran Election Anniversary Special: The Power of the “Gradual”
Iran Special Report:The Attack on Civil Society (Arseh Sevom)
The Latest from Iran (8 June): Tremors and Falsehoods

1855 GMT: Back to 22 Khordaad. BBC Persian reports on the increased security presence on the streets of Tehran on the eve of 12 June,the anniversary of the election.


1725 GMT: President Obama has just made a statement about Iran in the aftermath of the UN vote on sanctions. We've posted the video.

Here's the quick read: Obama proclaimed that the sanctions were the "most comprehensive" Iran has faced, said that the UN resolution sent an "unmistakeable message", and spent most of the rest of the time justifying the position on sanctions in connection with his policy of "engagement": "We recognize Iran's rights, but with those rights come responsibilities. Time and again the Iranian Government has failed to meet those responsibilities."

Then, in one of the eight minutes of the statement, having declared,"These sanctions are not directed at the Iranian people," Obama switched from nukes to rights. He noted this Saturday's anniversary of the election, "an event that should have been remembered for how the Iranian people participated with remarkable enthusiasm but will instead be remembered for how the Iranian Government brutally suppressed dissent and murdered the innocent, including a young woman [Neda Agha Soltan] left to die in the street".

It was a bit awkward for the President to link back to uranium and sanctions, and he did not help by throwing in the spectre of Tehran's War of Terror --- "Actions do have consequences. And today the Iranian Government will face some of those consequences. Because whether it is threatening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation regime or the rights of its own citizens or the stability of its own neighbors by supporting terrorism, the Iranian Government continues to demonstrate that its unjust actions are a threat to justice everywhere".

However, at least for one moment, "Iran" was seen in more than the one-dimensional image of a nuclear weapon.

1720 GMT: Rafsanjani Watch. Former President Hashemi Rafsanjani's office has released a letter which, in the eyes of Deutsche Welle, criticises the Supreme Leader's silence over President Ahmadinejad and implicitly acknowledges fraud in the 2009 election.

1620 GMT: Sanctions. The UN Security Council has voted 12-2, with 1 abstention, for new sanctions against Iran over its nuclear programme.

The relatively limited measures include restrictions on transactions with Iranian banks, asset freezes on Iranian individuals and companies, and an expanded arms embargo on items such as attack helicopters and missiles.

Turkey and Brazil, who recently signed an agreement with Iran on procedure for talks over uranium enrichment, were the two countries who voted against the resolution. Lebanon abstained.

1605 GMT: Karroubi Watch. Al Arabiya has just published an interview from May with Mehdi Karroubi. Topics covered include the rise of the Green Movement, party politics, accusations of prison abuse and torture, Government mismanagement, and Ahmadinejad's foreign policy. Karroubi also offered this in anticipation of 22 Khordaad (12 June), the anniversary of the election:

We promise and give assurances that no incident will occur. I am certain that if a march is held, paramilitary forces will attempt to turn it violent, but our people are wise, and politically mature enough that even if certain individuals come chanting radical slogans, the people have the ability to control the scenario and confront them. However, if authorisation is not granted for demonstrations, we will then decide what to do; but it is currently not possible to say much.

1545 GMT: On the International Front (Mahmoud Stays Home). On Monday, Iranian state media were trumpeting that their internationally-esteemed President would be showing his strength, in the face of Western pressure, by going to the Shanghai Expo in China.

Today, Agence France Presse says that Ahmadinejad plans to stay away from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting to snub Russia and China for supporting the US-backed sanctions resolution in the United Nations.

1120 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Amnesty International has launched a new campaign, "One Year On: Stop Unfair Trials". Cases include journalists Abolfazl Abedini Nasr, Hengameh Shahidi, Emaduddin Baghi, Shiva Nazar Ahari and Ahmad Zeidabadi, student activists Majid Tavakoli and Mohammad Amin Valian, and Zia Nabavi of the Council to Defend the Right to Education.

1015 GMT: The Nuclear Discussions. A piece of news that slipped under the media radar....

The International Atomic Energy Agency has announced that it has received replies from France, Russia, and the US to the Iran-Brazil-Turkey declaration on procedure for uranium enrichment talks.

No details were given beyond the note, "Attached to each of the letters was an identical paper entitled ‘Concerns about the Joint Declaration Conveyed by Iran to the IAEA’."

That, however, indicates co-ordination between the three governments. And the timing of the IAEA's statement, together with the lack of substance, indicates that it is happy to let the news be overtaken by today's sanctions vote in the UN.

0955 GMT: Reflecting on The Year. Journalist Masih Alinejad has offered her recollections and analysis in an extended video interview with Voice of America Persian.

0935 GMT: A Signal for the Week? Hamshahri features the colourful cover identifying the bad guys in "Sedition '88".

0930 GMT: Intimidation of Kurdistan Businesses? Human Rights Activists News Agency reports that, following a general strike on 9 May to protest executions, members of bazaars across Kurdistan have been summoned and threatened by government authorities and the businesses of others have been sealed.

0800 GMT: What is the Green Movement? An interesting interview with Fatemeh Sadeghi, a former professor at Tehran University, who argues that the Green Movement is not the opposition of the "secular" against the "religious".

0750 GMT: The Post-Election Abuses. Abdul Ruholamini has resurfaced to declare that those responsible for the abuse and killing of detainees in Kahrizak Prison must "pay for their deeds".

Ruholamini, the campaign manager for Presidential candidate Mohsen Rezaei, is the father of Mohsen Ruholamini, who died in Kahrizak last summer. The case was instrumental in bringing the abuses to light and pressing the Supreme Leader to close Kahrizak. Ruholamini had gone farther in public statements at the start of 2010, declaring that high-ranking officials must take responsibility for the crimes, but had been silent in recent months.

Ruholamini may have been prompted to his statement by the news that the trial of 12 people over the Kahrizak case has finished behind closed doors.

0745 GMT: The Events of 4 June. Another perspective, complementing that of EA's Mr Verde, on last Friday's developments at the ceremony for Ayatollah Khomeini comes from Hamid Farokhnia in Tehran Bureau.

Tehran Bureau also features a review by Muhammad Sahimi, "The Green Movement at One Year".

0740 GMT: Parliament v. President (and Supreme Leader). It seems that Ayatollah Khamenei's intervention --- calling for Parliament-Ahmadinejad co-operation and threatening the Majlis with new "oversight" --- may not have been an overwhelming success.

Key MP Ahmad Tavakoli, an ally of Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, has commented in Khabar Online that the Constitution is written for people to cooperate, not to fight. So far, so good for the Supreme Leader.

But then Tavakoli re-asserts, "The Government has no right not to implement the laws from the Majlis."

0715 GMT: On a day when "Iran news", for most non-Iranian media, may be dominated by the passage of the US-led sanctions resolution in the UN Security Council, we set out priorities with two analyses: Scott Lucas declares, "What's Important Today? (Hint: Not Sanctions), and Mr Verde looks at "4 June: A Day the Regime Will Regret".

One US outlet shares our attention to the internal: Newsweek notes last Friday's events, with the shout-down of Seyed Hassan Khomeini, under the (over-blown) headline, "Iran's Hushed-Up Civil War":

For his part, Supreme Leader Khamenei did little damage control, even though he has worked hard to present a united front for Iran’s leadership, knowing that discord suggests vulnerability. He took the stage after Khomeini and asked the crowd to act in a more appropriate manner. But that was it. No defense of Khomeini and no rebuke to the crowd. With the anniversary of the contested election just days away now, Khamenei has been trying to manage a delicate balancing act between quieting and frightening the opposition—and sending mixed messages in the process.

In another warm-up for 12 June, the anniversary of the election, Zahra Rahnavard gives an interview to the Italian paper La Republicca. Beyond general criticism of the Government and the declaration, "I hope to shed the last drop of my blood in the cause of freedom and democracy," she focuses on key issues:

The demands of the women in Iran are twofold: 1) National demands such as freedom, democracy, the rule of the law, freedom of political prisoners, right to individual freedoms; 2) Elimination of discrimination and strengthening of cultural rights, women's rights and equal rights under the law.

....Democracy is not possible without women and without paying attention to the demands of women.

Iran Analysis: What's Most Important Today? (Hint: Not Sanctions)

We begin today with a special analysis from Mr Verde of last Friday's events, which become more rather than less significant with the passage of time: "4 June: The Day the Regime Will Regret".

Keep that, and the internal developments in Iran, in mind today as the international politicians and press run amok with the story of Iran's nuclear programme and the world's sanctions. After months of spin and manoeuvre, the UN Security Council will convene this morning in New York to adopt a US-led resolution for stricter financial measures. The Americans are now confident they will get passage, with Russia and China giving assent --- Washington is putting out the line that it will be a 12-3 vote with no vetoes.

Iran Analysis: 4 June “The Day the Regime Will Regret” (Verde)

The economic reality is that, to get Moscow and Beijing on board, the sanctions package has been diluted so much that the measures are marginal. (As EA has noted regularly, the behind-the-scenes effort to get foreign companies to disinvest from Iran is far more significant.) Politically, however, this will be the platform for tough-guy --- and tough-woman --- posturing with claims, "We have been vindicated."



The US and its allies will intone that this shows the world now realises the seriousness of Iran's threat. Russia and China will say very little, and what they say will be very guarded: we have supported the sanctions but the primary path to resolution should be diplomatic discussions. Turkey, which will probably vote No, will use that move to bolster its emerging claim as a defender of negotiation rather than punishment and, thus, as a country able to work both with the big boys like Washington and the smaller nations seeking recognition and respect.

And Iran's leaders will use the UN measure to their own advantage. Three days before the anniversary of the 2009 election, they will tell their people that this proves the hostility of foreign powers --- the same foreign powers who tried to undermine Iranian democracy by supporting the opposition movement and "regime change". They will insist that the vote in New York reminds those in Tehran, Shiraz, Tabriz, and Ahwaz that they cannot let up in their defense of "Iran" (i.e., the Supreme Leader, the President, and the Government).

In other words, they will use the nuclear-sanctions fuss as their saving distraction. It will be upheld over the arrests, sentences, and executions that continue and, in recent days, escalate. It will be given priority over the political disputes --- on the economy, on President Ahmadinejad's battle with Parliament over legislation, on the treatment of Ayatollah Khomeini's grandson --- within the ruling establishment. It will be the shiny object held high so Iran's people can look away.

So, as the ink is spilt and trees die today for the rhetoric over the UN sanctions decision, the important spin-off will not be on any claimed effect on Iran's centrifuges and uranium. It will be this: will the political theatre 6121 miles away take over the stage in Tehran? Or will it be set aside --- not by Iran's leaders but by others --- for other, more significant shows?